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The dissertation explores international aid given by western donor agencies to 
P alestin ian  NGOs earmarked as civil society promotion. It aims to study the discourse of civ il 
society a t work, and the impact of d ie use of the concept of civil society both by donor agencies 
and recipient Palestinian organizations.
The research is based on a variety o f interviews with about 40 donor agencies 
(governmental, multilateral or non-govemmental) and as many Palestinian NGOs. It explores 
the conditions under which NGOs have been seen as decisive actors for the support and the 
fostering o f a stronger civil society. It analyses the (funding) mechanisms that bring donors 
and NGOs to work together, their interplay, and the ideational impact that the production of 
knowledge around ‘civil society’ has on both actors.
The first part o f the dissertation consists in a theoretical discussion as to why should 
international actors support civil society abroad, and explores the potential tension between 
external aid and civil society as one of the domestic venues for the definition o f autonomy. It 
explores various explanations o f the alleged difficulties of Arab societies to develop their own 
civil society. It will contrast three ideal-typical conceptions of civil society in the Arab worlds 
-  those of Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim, Burhan Ghalioum and Azmi Bishara.
The second part is a study o f the historical evolutions of the categories ‘donors* and 
‘NGOs*. Some emerging trends in providing funds to NGOs abroad and to civil society 
support will be matched with a study of assodational life in Palestine since the beginning of 
the 20th century.
The third part analyses the products of ‘civil society at work* in the past ten years. Since 
there has been historically a rich civil society in Palestine, it is interesting to explore the 
transformations caused by the massive influx of aid for civil society promotion. The two 
contrasting cases consist of service-oriented NGOs (active in the field o f health — older 
NGOs) and o f value-oriented NGOs (active in the field of human rights and democracy — 
younger NGOs). We will look at the evolution of the interplay between international donors 
and these two sets of NGOs, which are increasingly dependent on agenda and funds coming 
from abroad.
The final chapter argues that the discourse o f ‘civil society’, as promoted by 
international donors, as articulated and re-appropriated by local NGOs, has a triple 
exclusionary pow er. First, in political terms because of the various interpretations o f  civil society 
in terms of political engagement; second, in sociological terms, because of the formation of a 
privileged middle-class; and third, in philosophical terms because o f the re-enforcement o f 
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Chapter I: One Civil Society, Two  Palestines
'L iberal politics is based on cultural consensus and aims a t human progress.
It is the product o f rational discourse as well as its precondition.
It must dominate the unredeemed world 
-  if  not by reason then, alas, by force -  in  order to survive. '
(Asad 2003a: 61)
1.1. Cultures and Civil Society
Langhor, in her recent article reflecting upon problematic Arab liberalizations and massive 
donors’ efforts to ‘democratize* Arab regimes, daims that there has been “too much civil 
society, [but] too little politics** in the promotion by external actors o f  democratic 
oppositional forces (Langhor 2004). Another approach has been to refute the argument 
according to which the “development of civil society” in the Arab Middle East has been 
“retarded]” by “deeply imbued cultural values and social structures” (Carapico 1998b: 1), and 
to stress instead that civil society in the Arab world can assume “different forms under 
different circumstances’* and that civil society is fluidly expanding where space for civic 
activism is granted in a context of largely authoritarian regimes and when resources are made 
available {ibid.: 12-17). Surely, the model of civil society studied in Yemen by Carapico is very 
different from a European em bod im ent of civil society, but nevertheless, varying forms of 
social activism can contribute to the “emergence of a modem individual” taking over the 
status of the “subject, though not yet endowed with full citizenship”1 (Hussein 1993: 14). 
Some now argue that the plurality of discussions about “public Islam” can serve to define a 
“common good” that can “also encourage the gradual emergence o f ever more abstract 
patterns of membership and citizenship [ ...]” (Salvatore 6c Eickelman 2004: xvi).
This dissertation aims precisely at exploring issues related to civil society in the Arab Middle 
East and in particular western promotion of civil society in the Palestinian context through 
NGO support Has there been also too much civil society and too little politics in the case of
1 The full quote reads: “Nous pensons que cette mutation révèle l'émergence, dans la plupart des sociétés du 
tiers monde, d'une nouvelle figure sociale — celle d’un individu moderne, qui a pris le relais historique du 
membre anonyme de la tribu ou du sujet asservi, mais qui n'a pas encore acquis le statut du citoyen’' (Hussein 
1993 : H).
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western support to civil society organizations there? H ow does Palestinian civil society differ, 
according to donors and local NGO activists, from the ‘western" or European model? What is 
constitutive of Palestinian civil society? What are the impacts of such an intensive promotion? 
Another preliminary puzzle, and unavoidable theoretical framework, is given by the alleged 
problematic relationship between Arab/Muslim2 polities and democracy/democratization. A  
vast amount of literature has been produced in the last twenty years or so (starting with the  
Islamic revolution in Iran) about the alleged incompatibility of the two conceived worlds o f  
autocratic Arab-Muslim regimes and democratic principles. This is often referred to the 
question o f ‘political Islam* ,3 as a catchphrase to express the tension between the m ain 
sources o f  authority (religious or political?) to rule M iddle Eastern polities. Eventually, th is 
translated into some reified reductions such as those o f  Huntington (1993 &  1996) whereby 
the ‘west"4 is portrayed as an homogenous democratic bloc pitted against, among others, an  
illiberal Islamic enemy resisting democracy. One o f the consequences of such views is that 
there is a lack  of democracy within the Arab-Muslim wodd(s) that many western donors try to 
compensate through, e g ,  civil society promotion in  the Arab Middle East (AME). Such view  
— also paralleled in the discourse o f  development, whereby one end (the ‘under-developed’ o r 
‘developing countries’) is receiving aid from ‘developed’, or ‘advanced* capitalist states — 
contributes to the problematic making of blocks opposed, when not in terms of values, 
through the presence (or not) o f certain institutional arrangements and prevailing norms. In 
our case, civil society is promoted by western actors in Arab Middle Eastern societies 
considered in need of i t
Without a thorough investigation o f  both concepts (origins and meaning of civil society in its 
European historical context, as well as the disputed existence of an Arab civil society), no 
satisfying and receivable conclusions can be attained about the potential success of civil 
society promotion by international donors in the Arab Middle East There m ust be first an 
investigation about the assumptions, preferences and shortcomings o f the concept of civil 
society on both sides (assuming that one accepts the temporary opposition western vs. Arab), 
and deconstruct the way by which (political) Islam and (western) civil society are represented, 
at worst, as enemies by certain, and at best as rather exclusive characteristics. To do so,
2 Chapter 3 will be devoted to this topic. For reasons outlined later, we will limit our research to the Arab Middle 
East, in short, AME.
3 In such phrase, the problem is simply Islam. No reference is made to the Arab world anymore. This is a first 
hint at the tendency of generalization of the literature dealing with the question of democratization in the region. 
More on that aspect in Chapter 3.
4 For a critique of the concept ‘western’, with a good historical depth, see Bessis 2001.
Despite the potentially negative charges o f  the words of ‘west’ or ‘western’, I will use them in a limited way 
referring to the geographic regions inducting western Europe and North America.
H1HW...
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attention w ill be dedicated to epistemological, political, and (to a lesser extent) psychological 
dimensions o f the study o f the existence of an Arab Middle Eastern civil society.
Analogous problém atiques have been raised for other regions of the world: Afdcanists debate 
the question o f the exportability o f the State (Bayart 1989; Badie 1992). Three decades ago, 
Latin America specialists also discussed the idea that the cultural substratum common to the 
Ibehc peninsula and to Latin America was a reason for the resistance to democratization 
(Wiarda 1974). Eastern Europeanists have in recent years questioned the view o f a ‘western 
model’ that would ‘export’ civil society to post-communists states (Hann &  Dunn 1996, 
Hemraent 1998, Chiodi 2005). In a similar vein, some have argue that there is an 
incompatibility between liberal democracy and ‘Asian values’5, notably in Confucian cultures, 
that allegedly tend “to focus on discipline over rights, on loyalty rather than on entitlement” 
and that would be hostile to western individualism (Sen 1999: 231 ff; Hank 2003: 11).
These examples are all elements o f the same problematic view according to which different 
religious beliefs, mentalities, or cultures are at the origin of the difficult or failed access to 
democracy o f certain countries. Explanations of the kind are based on the assumptions that 
cultures, as a commonly dted  explaining macro-variable, are closed entities with clear borders 
as well as with constant and immutable features. N olens volens, authors relaying such 
explanations confine culture to a mechanistic role whereby cultures, like frozen entities, are 
meant to interact like billiard balls, that clash, push each other, but never mingle or evolve 
and are given as such in an immutable manner. In other words, values behind cultures, 
mentalities or religious principles are portrayed as fixed, homogenous and unbridgeable. On 
the contrary, democracy is seen in the discourse o f most western actors as a universal feature 
that should ‘penetrate * these non-porous entities or that should be exported there.
But the very notion of ‘exporting’ democracy also implies a corollary view that it has a 
specific origin — in that case, democracy would be defined as ‘western* or European. On one 
hand democracy is seen as a western product that can be exported everywhere, on the other, 
as a form of cultural particularism. But by doing so, one runs the risk of misinterpreting this 
geographical origin as an abstract cultural feature: such argument, eventually, reinforces the 
views that cultures are closed entities. Thus, one faces the classical aporia or deadlock of 
cultures, trapped between the two extremes of universalism and relativism/particularism. 
There are usually three m ain  types o f solutions put forward about the question of the 
‘exportability’ o f democracy and related concepts such as civil society or about the existence 
of local forms o f democracy/civil society.
5 Pye (1985) is one key exponent of such thesis. The two other authors mentioned here (Sen 1999 & Hank 2003) 
are arguing against such views.
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T h e first approach is based on the dichotomy universalism/relativism. Though most o f th e  
authors would distinguish the two approaches, I believe that they participate both to a b iased  
view on values positing actually and implicitly different blocks. Universalist literature in  a  
large measure tries to persuade that there exist universal values which Rawls defends, fo r  
example, in Political L iberalism  and The L ew o f  P eoples under the concept o f  ‘overlapping 
consensus* (Rawls 1996 Sc 1998). Rawls* views stem from his conception of justice as fairness 
and of political liberalism that should serve as a m in im a l social contract.6 His ideas have had a  
significant influence on many other authors (one thinks here about the issue o f human rights) 
promoting political liberalism, as a form a distributive justice that needs to be shared w ith  
other ‘non-decent’, ‘non-liberal* societies. But these reflections have the starting point o f  
existing differences that one needs to bridge under the heading o f universalism (political 
liberalism being one of such source o f universalism). In this line, Rawls* approach is blind to  
other political models since he puts forward one that all should follow, rejecting potential 
counter-models. Another critique to this universalist credo is that it is not as universalist as i t  
claims, but is the result instead o f a contingent historical process (Baccelli 1999): political 
liberalism, as one important matrix of liberal democracy, is not just made of abstract 
principles, but also bom o f a precise historical context that owes to the geographic and socio­
economic cradle in which it grew. Even more problematic is the fact that such concepts grew  
from theorization made in  a specific historical and geographical zone (interlacing them even 
more so to a limited region).
A subset o f  this type o f  response is to stress not the universalistic features, but the 
particularities that are inherent to societies. It is best exemplified in the now successful and 
widespread views on multiculturalism. This holds that there are many different and discrete 
cultures that do in fact ex ist These cultures should now be acknowledged as such, or, to use 
Taylor*s phrase, be recognized (Taylor 1992). His argument stems from the moral obligation 
not to do harm  to the other, since “misrecognition shows not just a lack, o f due respect It can 
inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is 
not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need** (Taylor 1992: 26). The problem 
with recognition of multiculturalism is twofold. On the one hand, the dialogical project o f  
recognition is still based on a situation of asymmetry o f one (Taylor’s) identity over that o f  
the ‘others’7 and implies a form o f  hierarchy. On the other hand, it encloses the other’s 
identity or culture in new limits: its members are therefore trapped in a given identity, without 
knowing w ho decides for whom w hat are the boundaries. So, as in universalistic approaches,
6 On the bases for the ‘overlapping consensus’, see (Rawls 1996: lOff and in part. 15)
7 For a discussion o f Taylor’s “recognition o f difference as a moral imperative”, see Harik 2003,
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one faces logics of groups’ homogeneity, and multiculturalism can serve as disguise for 
reifying and ‘museumising’ the others through the discourses of cultures (Werbner 1997). 
Even more dangerous is the fact that multiculturalism can serve to hide racist sentiments 
hidden behind some m in im al tolerations® of a demeaning other (Hank 2003; Abrahamian 
2003: 541). Thus, multiculturalism that tends to express its acceptance o f diversity in terms of 
toleration,9 or that compares by underlining the lacks o f the ‘others’, can become another 
form of universalism with different guise.10
The second type of explanation puts the stress on the domination of a ruling  ‘north’ over an 
under-developed and formerly colonized south. The first sub-category of such view is that of 
dependency theory, best embodied in the works of Wallerstein (1979). In this account, 
discussions about cultural differences become the pretext to hide deeper structural imbalances 
in terms of power and resources between a ruling centre and the (semi-)peripheries.
Culture is much more important in the post-colon ial approach (second sub-type of the 
domination approach), where the study of symbolic domination of Europe or the ‘west’ over 
post-colonial worlds through intellectual means is central. In this reading, Chakrabarty’s effort 
Provincialising E urope (2000) is programmatic for the unpacking of the power of knowledge 
and in particular of social sciences. Knowledge, through categories such as democracy, civil 
society and secularism, just to name some of the contentious concepts one w ill face in this 
research, contributes to the further reproduction o f the former colonial hegemony o f Europe. 
But, even if  democracy can be conceived as ‘exportable’, the result is not far from that 
described by Chakrabarty, whereby “the European colonizer of the nineteenth century both 
preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied [them] 
its practice”(Chakrabarty 2000: 4).
A post-modem response to this view of cultures against one another has been to put the 
stress on the fact that no pure essentialist identities exist, but only hybrid forms. This is a way 
to fight the widespread homogenising, tendency of modernist theories, but also to tackle 
much of the ethnocentrism implied in the vast majority o f social sciences.11 But the problem
* On the shortcomings of anti-racist discourses, see Lentin 2004 
5 For a critical genealogy of tolerance and toleration, see Asad 2003a.
10 Another critique of multiculturalism is raised by Amselle who notes that a consequence of multiculturalist 
discourses convey the idea that human groups are the care-takers of traditions, or o f a cultural acquis, at the 
expenses of a interactive and dialogical relationship between various cultures. See (Amselle 2001: 230).
With an eye on Arab societies, the subject o f this thesis, see also (Ghalioun 2000: 25). Speaking about the 
question of secularism in the Arab societies, he writes, in full line with our criticism of relativism: “H faut éviter 
surtout l’approche culturaliste simpliste prédominant dans les études orientales. Cette approche présuppose à 
tort que la laïcité est une valeur culturelle propre à certaines cultures, que les cultures n’évoluent pratiquement 
pas et que les organisations sociales des différentes communautés sont déterminées en grande partie par ces 
cultures toujours identiques à elle-mêmes.” See Chapter 3.
n For the problematic pitting o f hybridity versus essentialism, see (Werbner 1997:16-19).
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with hybridity — as with multiculturalism -  is that “cultural difference has also become th e  
basis for an exaggeration of difference and, with it, the incommensurability of cultures”  
(Werbner 1997: 17). Thus, discourses of hybridity do not counter the fact that there a r e  
differen ces between cultures. Moreover, even if  entities, or identities are indeed hybrid, th e y  
were probably not so before, implying some transformation of a pure origin. Similarly th e  
vocabulary o f ‘cross-fertilization’ falls into the same trap: despite the understandable aim to  
stress diversities and to forgo essentialisms, it nevertheless assumes that before the cross­
fertilization, or hybridization, there were some ‘pure’ entities. Therefore one is facing a sim ilar 
problem — though differendy formulated, since at least it tackled the problematic issue o f  
ethnocentrism in social science — of the universalist vs. particularist approach.
A  final problem with approaches stressing the domination relationship between ‘north* a n d  
‘south* is that they un-intendedly formalize the existence of two groups portrayed a s  
homogenous o f a dominant ‘west* or ‘north* (wherever these might end) over a poor a n d  
resource-free ‘south* (wherever this might start), this time not in terms of cultural boundaries, 
but in terms of capacity of domination. Put differendy, such views assume a sort o f  
intentionality of domination in each level of the ‘west’ or of the ‘north’: international 
organizations, governments, policy-makers, intellectuals, workers, NGOs, etc. But unless on e 
adopts far-fetching conspiration theories, it is difficult to accept such reductionist 
explanations, with a new form of Leviathan called ‘Domination*, with different arms, eyes an d  
brain participating to the same exploitative end. This is nothing but a form o f homogenising 
explanation. Despite some positive deconstructive arguments about ethnnocentrism, post­
colonial studies still need to come up with more convincing holistic arguments. Its strength 
probably remains on the individual level, namely by stressing on how single individuals 
serve(d) to perpetuate European domination12 - some examples will be put forward in later 
parts of this research (Sections 6.1.2 & 6.1.3).
A  th ird  an d  final way to cope with the aforementioned problem of spotting an exact origin 
to concepts, identities and cultures, is to stress the sim ilitude, and commonalities within various 
cultures. In that line of thinking, “world cultures” are not discrete entities, but may rather “be 
ranged on a continuum with no disruptive hiatus separating them” (Ha rile 2003: 11). 
Therefore, what matters more is not the ascription of concepts to a given cultures, but to 
stress the similitude, or commonalities within the various approaches to these concepts. Thus,
12 As Chakrabarty puts i t  “first, the recognition that Europe’s acquisition of the adjective ‘modem’ for itself is 
an integral part o f the story o f European imperialism within global history: and second, the understanding that 
this equating o f a certain version o f Europe with ‘modernity’ is not the work of Europeans alone; third-world 
nationalisms, as modernizing ideologies p a r excellence, have been equal partners in the process” (Chakrabarty 
2000: 43).
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local differences are acknowledged, but what is more important is the process o f continuous 
interactions between universalising references and particularist elements and bases that links 
these potential differences. Similitude, as the touchstone of the argument, can be defined as 
“a condition which is encountered in a pluralist world, and the awareness o f which prepares 
self-centered and self-important cultures to develop a sense of global community in the midst 
of great diversities. It stems from the fact that difference is real, but not a necessary source 
for estrangement.”13 14
An applied approach o f such view is that of the French anthropologist Amselle in his 
treatment of the topic of *branchem ent (in English ‘connection’, or logging in ’) that is a 
process in which various elements come together to produce a continuously redefined and 
evolving entity.
«  E n recourant à la métaphore électrique ou informatique du branchement, c’est-à-dire à celle 
d ’une dérivation de signifiés particularistes par rapport à un réseau de signifiants planétaires, on 
parvient à se démarquer de l ’approche qui consiste à vo ir dans notre monde globalisé le produit 
d ’un  m élange de cultures vues elle-mêmes comme des univers étanches, et à mettre au  centre de la 
reflection l’idée de triangulation, c ’est-à-dire de recours a un élément tiers pour fonder sa propre 
identité. » u
As Amselle puts it:
«  En d’autres termes, il s’agirait d ’inverser le raisonnement habituel qui consiste à opposer 
radicalem ent universalisme et relativisme afin de montrer que runiversalisme, loin de contraner la 
m anifestation des différences, est le moyen privilégié de leur expression »  (Amselle 2001: 49).15
In this view, individuals or larger social groupings can connect with or ‘click* on different
répertoires according to the needs and situations of the actors. This is a move above the
traditional identity process formation described by the Norwegian anthropologist Barth
where there are actually two elements or counter-forces playing in the definition or negotiation
over an identity mostly defined on its boundaries (Barth 1969). However, one faces in Barth’s
seminal definition the same dichotomy of Sve’ vs. the ‘other’, which is again problematic.
The advantage of Amselle’s model is that the references and répertoires can be changed
according to the situation o f some actors, and it introduces more flexibility about the changes
and evolution o f cultures, and allows taking previous historical encounters with some forms
15 This definition is from Iliya Harik. Personal communication with the author about the Paradoxes o f Cuiiural 
Diversity (Harik 2003). I am grateful and indebted to him for sharing his views.
14 “Through the electric or computer-based metaphor of connection (tapping, or log in), that is a metaphor of a 
derivation/tapping of particularist meanings vis-à-vis a network of worldwide meanings, one can detach 
her/himself from the view that sees in our globalized world the product of a miring or blending o f cultures, the 
latter being conceived as impervious universes. Instead, what is at the centre of the thought process here is the 
idea o f a triangulation, namely the use of a third element to ground her/his own identity” (translation mine).
‘Tut differently, it would inverse the usual line of thinking which radically opposes universalisai and relativism 
in order to demonstrate that universalisai, far form thwarting differences, is the privileged means through which 
they are expressed” (translation mine).
21
of universalising cultures16 into consideration. It also allows one to avoid concepts and id e a s  
o f clearly delineated cultures which would be closed on themselves or self-containing, and th e  
image o f hybridization, or of ‘cross-fertilization’ since the latter two concepts sh are , 
unwillingly, their explanatory power to radiologist discourses of the 19* century based on th e  
spurious view that there were once pure entities (Amselle 2001: Chap. 1).
I have chosen to stick to the third type of epistemological enquiry for different reasons. F irs t 
o f all, the concept of civil society Ís too strongly enmeshed and embedded in European 
history to be simply considered as universalist (Chapter 2). But it is also a form of reduction 
to hold the view that it is a western concept, or a European concept. Maybe the phrases an d  
some constitutive parts around civil society might well be indebted to its birthplace an d  
therefore ‘European’, but it will be here argued that much of the substance o f  civil society is  
common to various cultures, o f which the Arab Middle Eastern ones (Chapter 3). Therefore, 
there is a continuum  of civil society — framed diversely, there is a sim ilitude within different 
conceptions of civil society — with some minor cultural declinations, but without strong 
“disruptive hiatus”, despite many claims against such a view. This form o f comparison is  
(contrary to the previous critique to multiculturalism) is not stressing the ‘lacks’ of the 
cother(s)’, but stresses positive and similar elements.
In this line what matters is to study the context o f interactions between international 
promoters o f civil society and local agents of implementation and to stress that there is a  
strong common basis (or similitude) between the two types o f actors in  the promotion of c iv il 
society. W hat might turn out to be problematic is not the fact that civil society is alien to a  
given culture (in this case Arab-Muslim), but instead that the visions about civil society o f  
some actors is at the same time too limited and therefore limiting and that it is this problem 
that contributes to the simplified conclusion that civil society is lacking in  Arab-Muslim 
polities (Chapters 5 & 6). However such conclusion is somehow rendered difficult since many 
actors (international and local) expliddy make frequent references to cu ltura l differences 
between their views on civil sodety. Thus, similitude must be searched on a deeper level and 
against the odds of the more accessible and easier discourses pointing out to cultural sources 
in order to explain variance (as m uch of the social sdence literature does, and in turn 
influences practitioners) (Chapter 6).
The advantage o f such approach is, I believe, twofold. First, it allows for a re-questioning o f 
the content o f dvil sodety both here* and 'there’ through the lenses o f <brancbement\ namely 
the connection of a particular historical context under which civil sodety promotion takes
16 Amselle, in his study of Africano-centrism, highlights such roles taken earlier by Islamisarion and Arabization 
(around the 10th century CE) and later by European colonization, as universalizing forces.
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place in Palestine with a set of external donors. It will thus be argued that discourses of civil 
society serve not only the flourishing o f an effective civil society, but also domestic actors in a 
political struggle against the local authority (Chapters 6 & 7). The branchemcnt\ or connection, 
to a universalist element (civil society) is therefore more than a two-pronged dialogue, since 
the local context in which aid takes place is highly influential in its chances to succeed or to 
fail. Second, such an approach allows taking the role o f discourse analysis and the production 
of social sciences into critical consideration: social science production about Arab-Muslim or 
European civil society also contribute to the problematic views that there are deep and 
unbridgeable cultural differences. So the problem is not ‘only’ in terms of empirical evidences 
of the existence of an Arab-Muslim civil society but also about the ways social research deals 
with such debated issues.
It is the task of this dissertation to try to disentangle some o f these points.
* * * * * *
Why so much focus on these broader theoretical issues o f cultures while the topic is about 
donors, civil society and Palestinian NGOs? Two reasons.
The first is that the problem o f the rise of political Islam and return to much more 
conservative ideologies in the Middle East has been sometimes explained in  terms of the 
longing by local populations for endogenous political responses to replace the fatiguing ‘western’ 
nationalist and socialist doctrines o f  the first seven decades of the 20th century17 (Ayubi 1991; 
Tripp 1996; Halliday 2003; Houston 2004). In this light, reference to Islam as a locally tailored 
response would be adapted to the broad layers o f society deprived o f political opportunities 
in what are mostly autocratic regimes in the region (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Burgat 2002: 
106-110; Levine & Salvatore 2005). Even if political Islam is very often banned from public 
discourses, or controlled by ruling regimes, it can always remain successful and adapt on 
lower levels where regimes cannot really interfere, namely the level of individual faith, and 
through the networks of mosques and religious associations. To paraphrase Carapico, civil 
society is there where autocratic regimes leave space for civic activism (Carapico 1998b: 15- 
18), and religious worship venues w ill almost inevitably be used as a platform for such forms 
of activism.
In this context, aid can be a double-edged sword: for international actors, civil society 
promotion is seen as a solution to the lack of democratic life (lack generally portrayed in 
terms of cultural features o f the Arab Middle-East), but for local recipients who are longing
17 Needless to say, the worldwide resurgence of religious conservative discourses also help in this over­
determination of the ‘religious’ as an element of response for political problems. See (Berger 2000), or (Casanova 
1994). For a critique of this view, see (Burgat 2002:107).
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for a decoupling and for a dissociation of western influence and ideologies, aid can be seen a s  
both an imposition and an attempt to put aside endogenous and domestic resources f o r  
activism. In that sense, aid can reinforce the (perceived or not) contraposition o f  a  
universalising concept (such a civil society promoted by donors) against local particularisms. 
It therefore makes sense to look at civil society promotion through the prism of cultures ( a t  
least in a first phase), since donors expect to promote a different content to civil so c ie ty  
because o f the perceived cultural differences, while local recipients tend to formulate th e  
m essage o f  civil society through different cultural expedients (be they places for civic activ ism  
or different wording or symbols).
There is in both cases a sort o f over-determination by loca l factors and features (in one c a se  
negative, and in the other positive), which potentially renders civil society promotion m o re  
difficult in this region o f the world. Instead, donors and external actors ought to pay m uch  
more care to understand whether the local settings are different, and if  so, i f  they are because 
o f cultural traits, or because o f other reasons (be they conjunctural or structural). T h is  
dissertation w ill discuss at length some of these ‘cultural’ differences, through theoretical 
chapters, but also through a careful analysis of practices and discourses both by donors an d  
local NGOs. It will be argued that cultural differences tend to be exaggerated and that th ey  
tend to lim it the capacity o f civil society promotion in the region.
The way civil society promotion is understood, ‘re-packaged’ by donor organizations and re ­
interpreted differendy by local actors can produce elements of conflict with endogenous 
motivations for collective action. Civil society, embedded within a larger concept o f  
democracy, becomes thus an important locus towards autonomy and has to be also studied 
through these lenses o f autonomy/heteronomy (Chapter 2). It is argued that civil society 
promotion can be a source of tension, because the flourishing of civil society (as well as to  
reach a satisfying degree o f  democracy) is intrinsically a dom estic feature but at the same time, 
dv il society promotion has taken in the last decade or so an increasingly international 
dimension (Whitehead 2004). In other words, there is a potential tension between civil society 
that normally works within a domestic setting, and its promotion by external actors. Are these 
dimensions compatible with one another? Civil society can be perceived domestically as a 
means to reach a condition of autonomy,18 but civil society promotion by external actors can 
lead to the definition o f nomas that are different or alien to the domestic norms and,
18 Understood for now (more in Chapter 2), in a political sense, as the capacity of a given group to struggle in 
order to define its own laws. Heteronomy is the contrary situation, whereby others’ laws are imposed onto a 
given group.
therefore, contribute to a situation o f heteronomy for the domestic society which benefits 
from this aid.
Hence the constant focus throughout this work on international actors in their interactions 
with local NGOs, and the constant eye on civil society promotion as a critical factor that 
might interfere within the domestic arena of Palestinian politics. Needless to say, because of 
the large amounts of aid money dedicated to the Palestinian Territories, o f the p ro m in ent role 
of external actors in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the significant 
number and involvement of international donors, the question of autonomy towards the 
definition o f a common political project is even more important here.
The second reason for the insistence on culture stems from more general questions that 
arose in the literature over the last decade and a half. Civil society promotion and the ‘aid 
industry’ (Van Rooy 1998) have come under close scrutiny in recent years, unfortunately not 
always for the best Despite millions o f dollars poured into civil society promotion and NGO 
support in particular, little success has been noted in the difficult ‘transirions’, in particular in 
post-communist southeastern European states (Chiodi 2005; Mendelson 2002; Hemment 
1998). This region is another example of the problematic international aid towards civil 
society promotion.19 Some scholars have also there tried to explain the failure o f southeastern 
European states to democratize in terms of the region’s ‘backwardness*, o f its ‘primordialist* 
values or of a *Balkanist’ substratum that privileges a stronger role of families over individual 
secular emancipation (Chiodi 2005: 35). In this line of presentation as well, culture comes at 
the rescue to explain this resistance to a ‘western model’, but with the problematic view that it 
is seen as a reified explaining factor. Again, this ‘western model’ of civil society is presented as 
the panacea to a ll ills, but is never really questioned. A similar problématique was also spotted in 
a Muslim post-Soviet region, that o f Central Asia, where Roy highlighted the danger of 
“artificially importing values and institutions from a western model that might be both less 
universal and less democratic than it claims” (Roy O. 2002b: 126).
But actually in  most of these cases, scholarly research tends to overlook ‘here’20 the potentially 
negative (or problematic) role played by international donors, to privilege modes of 
explanations based on some lack, fallacies or shortcoming ‘there’. Instead, there has been an 
over-celebration in the last decade o f the benefits of constructivism and therefore a tendency
191 am grateful to Luisa Chiodi, a colleague at the IUE and member of the collttivo me for making me aware of 
the strikingly parallel problems o f ‘transnational dvil sodety promotion’ in Albania with those o f Palestine.
201 will use throughout the dissertation this pair here’ vs. ‘there’, as shorthand for western or northern donors’ 
sphere as opposed to the regions where aid is disbursed. I am aware of the risk of inducting this research in 
*here’, but this is a way to stress the limit of objectivity vis-à-vis the topic, since I am anyway an outsider to 
Palestinian dvil sodety.
25
to magnify only positive elements. Unfortunately, such literature often suffers from a lack  o f  
internal knowledge of the societies under which international aid operates.21 Hence the h e r e  
repeated and advocated necessity to operate a critical study of both recipient NGOs (C hap ter 
4) and donors (Chapter 5), as well as a double critical study of civil society in general and o f  
civil society in the local context o f Palestine and of the feeding loop of production of so c ia l 
science about the matter.
This work intends not to be another deconstructing piece of social sciences, though lo n g  
parts o f this work will be about critically studying the condition of emergence o f civil so c iety , 
its links with democratization, international relations (IR) and development studies literature, 
because o f the influence such approaches have on international aid for Palestinian N G O s 
(Chapter 2). This dissertation also intends to shed a positive light on the way the A iab-M uslim  
civil society can be approached. In particular, insistence will be given to Arab and lo c a l 
(Palestinian) interpretations and conceptions o f civil society. A local civil society actually  
exists but not always according to the ways and criteria through which it has b een  
conceptualized in its European cradle. Therefore one needs to take this local comprehension 
of the topic on board to offer a better chance to international civil society promotion to  
succeed (Chapters 3 & 7).
Based on empirical evidence o f the existence o f local forms of civil society and on th e  
discussion of some Arab intellectuals* views and definitions of civil society, this study a lso  
hopes to contribute to general and theoretical debates about civil society. The title ‘the pow er 
to promote and to exclude* should be understood not just as a discretionary application on th e  
ground o f  civil society promotion, but also as a hint to the possible shortcomings of th e  
discourse o f civil society. On a theoretical level, it  will be argued that one has to consider the 
genealogy o f the concept to understand what it stands for, but also what such theories bide. 
On a discursive level, special attention will be dedicated to the evolution o f a peculiar 
understanding of civil society by some local actors and how a limited vision o f  civil society is 
also transmitted by international donors into the Palestinian setting (Chapter 6). Eventually, i t  
is not that civil society is intrinsically ‘western’ or ‘European*, but rather different visions and 
interpretations of civil society are at the origin of the optical illusion that there is a lack of civil 
society in  the Arab-Muslim region. Funding technicalities (type of aid, type o f contracting), 
institutional practices, and different views on civil society generate tendencies towards 
institutional and discursive isomorphism, at the expense o f  the expansion of the substance o f 
civil society. Hence, its exclusionary power must be seen on different levels (Chapter 7).
21 For one example of positive views about ‘prindpled norms’, see Risse & aL 1999.
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1.2. Two Palestines
The long history of Palestinian NGOs offers an interesting case study for this research, 
because civil society activism started in the Territories22 well before the massive international 
funding which gradually emerged from the second half o f 1980s. Many argue that civil society 
activism has been vital to the creation of proto-national institutions and that for decades of 
occupations, associational life was a first step towards self-determination (Hilal 1998b; 
Robinson 1997; Abdel Shafi 2004). Most notably many small popular committees started 
from the 1970s onwards as local autonomous forms o f socio-political organizations (away 
from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) bureaucratic structures) which later 
evolved into larger entities. Many consider them as a laboratory for democratic life since they 
were a means for forbidden political parties to organize their social movements, and where 
thus contributing to some form o f autonomy.23 Even if  this model stemmed in particular 
from secular leftist parties, it was later emulated by mainstream nationalist groups (in 
particular Fa tab), and even by Islamic and Islamist24 groupings. Conscious references to the 
history of the three m ain political ‘ fam ilies* within the Territories (secular left, mainstream 
nationalist and Islamist groups) should serve to understand the intricacies of socio-political 
life as the backdrop against which civil society promotion takes place.
In other words: what impact does external aid towards civil society have on already existing, 
well established and firm ly  rooted d v ir  society organizations? How does it differentiate 
between the various views of civil society embodied by these various forms o f socio-political 
actors? Put in nutshell, what does the (rather loose) affiliation of local organizations to Fatah, 
Hamas and the secular left mean in terms of interpretation o f civil society? Do 
institutionalized NGOs have similar views on civil society than charitable associations? Is the 
latter type of organizations also considered part o f civil society by international donors?
But before embarking on some responses to these questions, one needs to understand the 
social fabrics of Palestinian politics that frame civil society work in the Territories. To do so, 
one needs to conduct a prior study of the socio-political environment framing Palestinian
22 The thesis covers only the Occupied Territories, as opposed to Mandatory Palestine or 1948 Palestine (of the 
Partition plan). Palestine means here the W est Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.
23 Nationalist political parties were forbidden under Ottoman, British and Israeli rule or occupation. More on the 
history of civil society in Palestine in Chapter 4.
2i More on the different approaches to the two labels in Chapter 3. For now, ‘Islamic* will be understood as a 
qualification for structures referring generally to the ethos of Islam, but which refrain to actively impose its views. 
Tslamist*, on the contrary, refers to open and publicly acknowledged struggle to spread the ethos o f Islam as the 
main source of social norms upon its constituencies.
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associational life in a historical perspective,25 but also question social science production a n d  
the historiography on the matter.
For this reason, it will be here spoken about two Palestines. This expression  has a d o u b le  
purpose: in the one hand it aims at stressing the selective production o f socio-political 
science literature about Palestine (dealing in particular with ‘high1 features o f  the conflict w ith  
Israel), and in the other hand, it highlights some other authors* tendency to simplify and ap p ly  
monolithic descriptions to social phenomena in the Territories. In both cases, the phrase ‘tw o  
Palesrines* should be understood as a ca ll to take  the diversity o f Palestine in to  
consideration  but w ithout p it t in g  blocks in  too sim p listic  terms. W ithout this approach 
and an understanding of the two Palestines, any civil society promotion is doomed to failure 
since it relies either on a study of Palestinian political elites only (without further 
considerations for their links w ith the social bases) or on an ecological fallacy, according to  
which studies of a minor part o f  the Territories, e.g. o f an urban minority around the cen tral 
zones o f Ramallah and Jerusalem, is mistakenly extended to the whole of Palestine (without 
taking the variations of its regions or social strata into consideration).
This image aims at stressing the lack of differentiation of P alestin ian society within a large 
share o f the social science dealing with Palestine, which then might have a serious influence 
on how donors act in the Territories. The image of the two Palestines also a im s at reframing 
the rather distorted account that the second Intifada took over the last years. Let us now see  
more concretely what are some o f the shortcomings of social science production.
M isleading simplifications about two Palestines
First of all, there is a tendency o f lot o f the literature dealing with Palestine to read local 
socio-political features uniquely through the lenses of the conflict with IsraeL This runs a  
twofold danger. It can not only reduce internal social dynamics and political development to a  
mere backstage happening of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with litde importance, but also 
deterministically subordinate local developments to more macro-level negotiation issues. A  
frequent example of such dangers is embodied in the debate as whether the second Intifada 
was waged and led directly by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) or whether it was a 
truly popular uprising. The widely spread line that Yassar Arafat (Chairman o f  the PLO and 
President o f the PNA) and the PNA organized and staged the uprising against Israel to  
destroy all peace hopes does no justice to the fact that there is a strong in ternal dimension o f  
the Palestinian population’s uprising against corrupt segments of its leadership.
25 This goes along Talal Asad’s plea, according to which an anthropology o f Islam cannot be done without a 
prior study o f the socio-political environment in which it evolves and by understanding its relation to power 
(1986:11 & 14). The parallel to Islam comes from the fact that much of the fault-line in civil society promotion 
comes from cultural differences, which are, in this precise case, seen as having religious origins.
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A related danger by this over-determination of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to simply put 
history aside o f the nature o f colonial occupation by the former on the latter. In other words, 
by applying methods and reading o f ‘post-conflict’ analysis (such as confidence-building 
measures), one risks forgetting the substance of the conflict in order to privilege means and 
channels to solve i t  A possible consequence is to forget to take the historical depth and 
composition o f the Palestinian population in its diversity (refugees, displaced persons, and 
residents) into consideration (Nabulsi 2004).
A second danger of social science literature is that, because o f the symbolical importance that 
the Palestinian question has for much of western academia, it is partly determined by the very 
hegemonic nature of western academic world This translates into the framing of the 
Talestinian Question* not in terms of priorities defined by local social scientists, but by 
western academia, with all the problems that the intricacy between power and knowledge 
poses. In a paper debating on the “Problem s o f S ocial Research in P alestin e right after the signing 
of the Oslo Agreements, a Palestinian sociologist was stressing the structural bias in favor of 
western academia:
“Thus division of labour emerges in which visiting scholars, relatively well funded, and with 
access to  publishing outlets abroad, often dictate the terms in which terms Palestinian discourse 
is packaged and presented to the external world, while Palestinian ‘consultants’ and informants 
act as the proletarian com ponent in  this scholarly multinationalism” (Taman 1994: 80)
In other words, the ‘packaging* of Palestine studies (or of only parts of Palestine) might have
unintended effects upon the ways international donors and researchers (just to name two
categories o f non-Palestinians dealing on a frequent basis with questions o f ‘development’
and aid in the region) conceive their object of study. Two examples can illustrate this point: a
Palestinian sociologist recently wrote a scathing book review against a nevertheless quite
interesting and well informed account of the shortcomings of institution building in Palestine
(Brown N. 2003) for its failure to relate its studies to the stepping up military operations of
Israel during the four years of the second Intifada (Hilal 2004). Less passionate but as
problematic is the documented case o f the very powerful influence o f international donors
over the setting of research agenda through the dozen of research centres in the Territories,
creating a situation of “heteronomy” for social scientists (Romani 2003).
Thirdly, the last danger of an unfair or incorrect representation of Palestine stems from media
representation. International media have the tendency to concentrate most of their energy to
central zones at the expense of forgotten and more remote zones covered ooly in certain
cases o f very violent confrontations (such as the demolition campaigns in Rafah in summer
2004, or the destruction o f Jenin Refugee Camp in 2002). Thus, most western reader or TV
viewer will by now be familiar with pictures of Ramallah or Jerusalem, but much less with
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Nablus, Qalqiliya or Khan Younis, which axe less covered by media reports. Again, th is  i s  
probably due to the more general tendency to focus on the political elite and on issues r e la te d  
to the peace process. A  contrario, this partial view might create an artificial divide between t w o  
zones separated by a chasm o f ‘civility’: the first is that covered by media, where a cohort o f  
local ‘experts’, cosmopolitan and well off spokespersons concentrate around the m o r e  
accessible Ramallah and Jerusalem; the second where one faces other types o f individuals n o t  
keen on subtle analyses but stressing discourses of resistance and putting forward p o o re r  
towns such as the violence-ridden and inaccessible Rafah, Nablus and Jenin. Eventually t h e  
risk is to too simply oppose more peaceful zones (from which come elaborate in te llectua l 
discourses) to zones where conflicts reach daily peaks but whose image is amalgamated w ith , 
armed actions framed within simple religious discourses or symbols o f resistance. This le av e s  
little space for thorough reflections on deprived and marginalized populations and tends t o  
automatically equate social mobilization with less refined intellectual discourses and u p o n  
which more ‘traditional’ forms o f  solidarity allegedly prevail.2* Moreover since resistance 
movements are stronger in these zones and that a majority of them mix nationalist a n d  
religious motivations, there is a reinforced image that the two Palestines are moved b y  
different sodo-cultural forces, where religion plays a decisive role mostly in  the later setting. 
W e are back to the over-determination by religion as cultural traits.
B lurred two Palestines
But the content of the two Palestines (and its representation in social sciences) should b e  
more refined than that As a matter o f fact, it is no easy task to delineate the borders between 
the two Palestines. Earlier in the century one could have drawn quite easily a border between 
an urban, educated and bourgeois Palestine as opposed to a rural, poor and conservative 
Palestine. The problem is that after decades of occupation, and shocks o f wars and uprisings, 
cleavages are not so clear anymore and they partially overlap in certain regions or periods, b u t  
not in others. For example, a new nationalist middle-class gradually emerged to replace 
traditional families (Sahliyeh 1988), but some of them made their way back to power through 
an alliance with the ruling PNA; the first Intifada contributed to the “homogeneizing [of] the 
social base o f the Palestinian communities” (Tamari 1990: 6), but there was a subsequent re- 
tribalization in certain zones of the Territories (Usher 1997); there was an intertwining o f  
rural with urban ethos, through urbanization of large villages (such as Ramallah and al-Bireh) 
but also a spread of urban values to the hinterland (Tamari 1995: 287 & 299; Legrain 1999a: 
103). A latter new line o f division is the opposition between PLO returnees and inside local 26
26 For examples of media analysis in the Palestinian case, see Caxey 2001 and Tuastad 2003, and in general in 
Asad 2003b, and Geisser 2003.
30
population, but that has to be used very carefully since the category ‘returnees’ is different 
from that o f the ‘deportees’ and the former are far from being an homogenous social group 
(Challand 2002). Another difficult division is whether ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ should be considered 
as a dichotomy or as a continuum. A study on the feiia b  (peasant) and townsman noted “that 
’rural’ and ‘urban’ are another pair o f such megaconcepts badly in need, and nowhere more 
than in Middle Eastern Studies, o f some kind of disaggregation” (Baer 1982: 101). The issue, 
which actually depends on the assumptions made on the nature and functions of the two 
types o f place, cannot be decided without paying attention to the historical moments and 
places where students of the urban and rural develop their thinking {prieLi 105). The same can 
be said, mutans mutandis, about the dichotomies suggested so far. The emergence o f Islamism 
is not ‘simply’ the result o f a resurgence of ‘traditionalism’: rather, “ religious 
fundamentalism” in the Palestinian case, “is essentially an urban phenomenon”, and more 
precisely in small cities, according to Taman,27 where leftist secular factions did not succeed in 
managing to transform and change totally Palestinian society (Taman 1995: 300). So one has 
to study the historical evolutions o f ideologies within the local context to understand why 
civil society promotion has a differentiated impact according to the zones and strata of 
P alestin ian society.
The difficulty for the reader with the image of two Palestines is precisely to come up with a 
clear picture o f what is what and where. Gaza City is a case in point where there are huge 
economic discrepancies between refugee camps and urban zones in terms of socio-economic 
revenues. A close look at the 1996 elections shows that popular votes did not express clear 
political or socio-economic cleavages, but rather a form o f ethno-local solidarity dating back 
to the creation o f small administrative districts {ndhiyya) during the Ottoman period (Legrain 
1999a: 100-106; Legrain 1999b: 84). There is a less tangible division represented by 
generations’ difference:2® The fact that half of the Palestinian population is under the age of 
18 is also an important feature for Palestinian politics.29 Polls and student council elections 
tend to show that the decrease of support for Islamist organizations was less pronounced in 
younger strata of the population (Hilal 1998b: 145n.l3). This trend might be reinforced by 
the fact that this younger generation has not known the predominantly secular political 
rhetoric, which during the second Intifada, lost even more ground to the performative
27 Small cities that Tamazi (rather problematically in my mind) opposes to larger cities o f the coastal area whose 
control was lost during the 1948 war. For a critique of this view, see (Legrain 1999a: 103).
28 Though this reading grid is favoured by some (like the internationally read Khalil Shikaki). For a discussion see 
Shikakj 2002 and an opposite view in Taman 2002, and Legrain 2003a.
29 PCBS’ figures indicate that by mid-2003, 0-14 year old population represents 46% of the overall population 
(taken in PASSIA 2004: 274).
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language of resistance and nationalism, but drawing mostly its strength, from Islam ic  
vocabulary (Hamzah & Larzillière 2005).
The tw o Palestinss o ftin s research
So w hat makes the distinction between two Palestine still a necessity if  none o f the suggested 
characteristics gives enough grounding or has enough explanation strength to a d iv ision  
between two Palestines? In the precise case of civil society promotion, it can be sustained th a t  
one o f  the most active sector o f civil society, namely NGOs, has managed to have a stro n g  
power base and substantial influence in certain areas only. This will be the d iv ision lin e  fo r  
the advocated distinction between two Palestines within this research.
\
Put simply, there is a  first P alestine in which mainstream discourses about civil society  j 
promotion (such as those advocated by a majority of international donors) reasonably m anage J 
to make their way and influence the work o f a  certain type of NGOs, namely those la te r  
described (Chapter 5) as professional developmentalist NGOs. On the contrary, the s e c o n d  
P alestin e  is that where civil society promotion is less successful For example, western aid ’s 
discourse fails to substantially penetrate broad layers o f the charitable NGO sector; th e  
impact o f aid in this sector is very small in terms o f re-interpretation o f international 
discourses by local charitable organizations, but it has to be stressed that funding to this type 
o f organizations is also scarce. Finally, there is a whole sector of NGOs, those close to  
Islamist circles, which are totally impermeable to such civil society promotion efforts an d  
discourses, because no funding is given by western donors, because the discourse of c iv il 
society promotion has no hold on the targeted population, or simply because such N GO  
leaders consciously refuse to make reference to the discourse of civil society.
To the^ contrary," there is an inverted relation between the three types of organizations and  
their local constituencies, namely the Palestinian demos. For the sake o f the clarity o f  
argumentation (which will be circumstantiated and refined in the subsequent chapters), one 
could sustain that there is a p o litica l paradox in  the success of civil society promotion by  ̂
western donors: if  success of civil society promotion is measured in terms of institutional 
strength o f  the NGOs (understood as its developed capacity to deliver a service or to
■' •' i
7 promote a cause from  above), then NGOs that receive most of the international aid earmarked 
for civil society promotion tend to have actually less impact and influence upon their 
beneficiaries in terms of political mobilization (which would then be the counter-measure o f  
the success o f NGOs, in terms of its capacities to organize social mobilization through a 
bottom-up mobilization force). On the contrary, NGOs with greater popular support (from ' 
beton) are the less successful in terms of financial support from western aid  So on one hand, i
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there is a first Palestine that is massively targeted by international aid, where some NGOs i 
manage to deliver professional services but whose distance to its social base become loser ̂  
from the early 1990s onwards (Abdel Shafi 2004: 11). On the other, there would be a second j 
Palestine characterized by a more symbiotic relationship between NGOs and their local ) 
constituencies, but where western aid either does not really interact with or simply does not i 
consider for funding.
The beginning process of such a chiasmus was already described in 1995 tinder the phrase 
suggested by Rema Hammami, namely that within the left factions* NGOs there was a 
‘professionalization* coupled with a ‘depoliticization’ increasing with the signing of Oslo 
(Hammami 1995). In her words, there was a “transformation of the mass movements into an 
NGO co m m u n ity , of mass-based, voluntarist organizations into more elite, professional and 
politically autonomous institutions” (ibid.: 56) which has many reasons (on which Chapters 4 
and 6 w ill try to disentangle the most important issues). Though it has to be said that the 
process described here is true for some NGOs only (in particular those around the decision 
centres of Gaza, Ramallah and Jerusalem), there are some nuances to bring to the discourse 
of H am m am i. However, a decade later, many other factors and elements converge to give 
credit that the discourse of civil society (introduced by the left, or within the ‘first Palestine) 
“amounts to a discourse of defeat” (ibid.: 52).
Few months after the outbreak o f the second Intifada, wide criticism mounted against these 
NGOs (of the ‘first Palestine’). Some spoke of an exaggerated ‘NGO-ization’ o f  Palestinian 
social life (regretting thereby the insistence on formal structures rather than the quality of the 
relationship with the population in  needs of basic help) (Kuttab 2001). Others contrasted the 
dynamic role o f civil society during the first Intifadat but its absence and its incapacity “of 
organizing at the mass lever* (Hammami & Tamari 2001: 6 & 18). Some lamented that many 
NGOs (read o f the first Palestine) had become only a “globalized elite** far from the masses 
(Hanafi & Tabar 2002 and 2003). The women NGO sector, which was very strong and very 
close to the grass roots level until the early 1990s became professionalized, lost most of its 
constituency and ran many programmes that are very often divorced from real needs (Jamal 
M. 2005). Finally, others denounced the futility of “privilege seeking** of various NGOs 
(along the PNA leadership and prominent academic figures) without noticing the growing 
“confidence gap between the leadership and the masses from the start** [of the Oslo Process] 
(Heacock 2004: 16 & 15).
The other face o f the coin is the second Palestine, characterized by a much more 
homogenous and close relationship (even symbiotic in some cases) between large segments of
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the Palestinian population and civil society associations. This is probably for two reaso n s. 
First, there has always been a form of self-management (Heacock 2004: 25) and engrained  
ethnolocalism within Palestinian society which led it to prefer a family solidarity n e tw o rk  
when in  need of help (Legrain 1999a; Malki 1994). This translates into a high rating by th e  
local population of the services and support offered by charitable organizations, and in  
particular Islamic ones, well above UNRWA and other NGOs’ services that score a bit b e tte r  
than the “inefficient and corrupt’* PNA.30 Second, in this context o f resilient primordial t ie s  
of the hamula (large family clans), and in some zones o f  tribal affiliation, charitable N G O s 
manage to offer a locally-tailored response covering real needs of the population, as opposed  
to grand schemes offered by large NGOs following the trends o f die international a id  
industry. Even with scarce resources, these organizations whose work was in  jeopardy aro un d  
2000 for the lack of financial support (Jamal A. 2000), managed to remain close to th e ir  
constituencies of the second Palestine, whereas an “NGO elite” o f the first Palestine w a s  
often playing an “ambiguous dual role” hesitating between a role in political or civil so c iety  
(Abdel Shafi 2004: 8).
One o f the problems is that civil society promotion does not really try to penetrate the sec to r 
of charitable organizations (and o f Islamic ones), either because the latter is resistant to  
western aid sometimes perceived as a form of intrusion, but also because many  o f the w estern  
discourses on this second Palestine (in short portrayed as the ‘traditional’ Palestine) do n o t 
see in it the prerequisite for success o f civil society promotion. Why? For the simplistic reason 
that it is precisely ‘traditional’ or too communal in its w ay of organizing itself, and therefore 
not ripe yet for ‘modem’ forms o f civil society support (namely institutional capacity build ing 
and the like). This goes hand in hand with some o f the views held by development actors 
(touched upon in the following chapter) which apply eurocentric methods without reflecting 
on the differences or commonalities that social movements have in the region. Thus, 
international aid considers that kinship-based associations and “strong ties to family [...]  have 
often been received as an impediment to democratic forms of participation, and hence 
democratic development”. But the reality is different and there are no evidences that such  
communal ties affect civic engagement in a negative manner (Jamal A . 2004: 3&21). 
Therefore the very exclusion of this second Palestine from western aid, it w ill be argued, is  
defeating the purpose o f civil society, in its continuing struggle to improve democratic 
standards o f the polity.
30 Heacock (2004:26) quotes results of the Participatory Poverty Assessment done in 2002 by the Palestinian 
Ministry o f Planning and International Coordination (MOPIQ.
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This translates, in  terms of the two Palestines, in the differentiated capacity at the end of the 
Oslo years to respond to local needs in times of the emergency provoked at the outbreak of 
the second Intifada. The argument of the two Palestines could not be sustained without 
considering the circumstances and the very nature of the so-called peace process, and its end, 
through the military escalation from the Israeli side leading to the wide-scale popular uprising. 
This time was a period of intense criticism against larger and more successful NGOs for their 
failure to relate to the real needs o f the population rather than responding to the shifting 
priorities of international donors. The first Palestine, in this reading is also made of, ¿rosso 
modo, the PNA leadership whose very survival was linked, up to the outbreak o f the second 
Intifada, to the success and continuation of the peace process. On the other side, the second 
Palestine was made of the large sectors that did not harvest any benefits from the peace 
dividends (through PNA patronage or through the booming of the aid industry o f which the 
leftist factions were the most beneficiary).
Therefore a quick glance at the political economy of the Oslo years point to an increasing 
inequality between a “VIP class”, made of a “co-opted Palestinian leadership” and a 
“neutralized” Palestinian society that "is resentful [and which] cannot satisfy their daily needs 
without the services of this elite group” (Bishara 1998: 221). In simple terms, it suffices to 
point to the fact that if  some (very few) benefited tremendously from the Oslo years, 
Palestinian per capita GNP fell every year from 1993 to 1997 (Lasensky 2004: 223), and that 
by 2002, “the average per capita real income was 30% below what it was in 1994” (Le More 
2004), instead o f providing the usually excepted economic trickle-down effect in other *post- 
conflict* or reconstruction cases. Rather, tax money handed back to the PNA (Kanaan 2002) 
and the far from transparent system of economic monopolies31 on the import o f cigarettes, 
gas, fuel, and constructing materials contributed to the flourishing of a thin layer of 
increasingly rich and powerful Palestinians (most notably in security services), but probably 
unaware that they were pawns in the hands of economic interests guided by Israel, thus 
“reinvesting a local, colonial genealogy of development as control” over the Palestinian 
masses (Lagerquist 2003).
If the latter were more or less “neutralized” during the Oslo years, thus proving the success 
of co-optation put in place by the Israelis (Bishara 1998), it was done at the price o f a growing 
alienation between the majority o f the population and its ruling elites in the Territories. 
Things literally went out of the control of this elite with the second Intifaday when the 
“disgruntled masses [...] gave support to the initiatives of militants from every side who went
31 On these monopolies, see (Roy S. 2001a: 37lff), (Asseburg 2002), and (Khan& aL 2004: Chapt 5).
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into the battle” of the second intifada, leaving space for the PNA leadership only to fo llo w  (a n d  
not organise) the uprising that started in September 2000. This is the same moment w h e n  
“civil society in the making was not as vibrant as one had expected a few years before, a t  t h e  
end o f the 1987 Intifadd* (Heacock 2004:23 & 17, his emphasis).
Part o f this dissertation will explore not only broader theoretical approaches to civil society  in  
the Arab-Muslim world, but also this very specific question o f Palestinian politics, as to k n o w  
whether international aid to civil society promotion might have plaid a role in  this g ro w in g  
alienation between the majority o f the population and its leadership. Put differently, one h a s  
to explore the possibility that civil society promotion reinforced the divide between the tw o  
Palestines instead of providing means to suture the differences between the two areas in  a  b id  
to create a more democratic society at large.
To conclude this part, but also to move forward with the presentation of what a research o f  
the differentiated impact that civil society promotion can have within the two Palestines, i t  
will be assume for the sake o f the argument, that there are geographical limits to the tw o  
Palestines. Despite the inherent difficulties in pinning them down, the two Palestines w ill b e  
taken as ideal-typical constructs or heuristic tools, to stress and explain the huge gap b e tw een  
the ‘two Palestines’ and to understand what can be some of the impact o f civil so c ie ty  
promotion in the territories.
On the first hand, there is a reality of profound socio-economic (some would argue p o litica l 
as well) differences between the two Palestines. The simple way to frame it is to oppose a r ic h  
central and urban zones around Jerusalem, Ramallah (and at least until the beginning o f th i«  
Intifada) Bethlehem (potentially until the outbreak of the second Intifada) and Gaza C ity a s  
well, to rural and poorer zones inducting Hebron, Nablus and the northern govem orates 
(Tulkarem, Jenin, Salfit, Qalqiliya, and Jericho) o f the W est Bank with the southern half o f th e  
Gaza Strip. It is partly a deavage between refugee camp population and urban populations, 
and partly a deavage of access to an internationalized labour marked around Jerusalem a n d  
agricultural workers or day-labour into Israel through Erez border crossing in the Gaza S trip , 
or over the Green Line in the case o f the West Bank.
So the image o f the two Palestines would like to take various dynamics into account, such as 
the quickly evolving social and political characteristics o f the Territories. The support of th e  
peace process, for example, reached a very high proportion quickly after the signing of th e  
Declaration o f Principles (DoP). But inversely with the outbreak of the second Intifada, there 
was a quick radicalization in the streets of Palestine in support of armed struggle again. Four 
years o f exhausting and extensive military campaign from the Israeli side, and the passing
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away of Arafat meant a quick ‘de-radicalization* of Palestinian public opinion. But the rift 
remains between two Palestines. And to summarize it w ith a political stand off during the 
informal Fatah primaries to name a presidential candidate for the 2005 elections, one could 
say there is on the one hand the first Palestine symbolized by M ahm o ud  Abbas (Abu Mazen) 
and on the other the second Palestine of Marwan Barghouthi. The former (deputy chairman 
of the PLO) is not keen to stress the rhetoric of resistance, is well-off, and has been a direct 
beneficiary o f the Oslo years thanks to his close ties to the PLO/PNA apparatus nexus. The 
latter (Secretary general of Fatah in the West Bank) is from a poorer background, represents 
politically different socio-political strata of Palestine32 and does not hesitate to use a totally 
different rhetoric (that of armed resistance if  necessary).
Hopefully this distinction will help the reader to assess the differentiated impact of dril 
sodety promotion upon the two types of Palestine. One core argument o f this dissertation, 
beyond the exclusionary power o f d r i l  sodety, is that international aid to the Territories 
would hare a greater chance of succeeding33 if  d r il sodety promotion were aiming at the 
whole of the two Palestines and if  variances between the two parts were to be taken into 
account34 Therefore constant reference will be dedicated to the rarious dvil sodety voices of 
the two Palestines and an effort w ill be made to try to assess whether international donors 
applied preferential treatments according to the zone implied.
1.3. Overview of the Thesis
This work is based on a discussion o f some theoretical works as well as on a sample of 
interriews (international donors and local NGOs). It consists in three other sections. Part one 
is the theoretical discussion (Chapters 2 & 3). Part two is the entry into the fieldwork results, 
through the study of the historical evolution o f local NGOs and international donors 
(Chapters 4 & 5). Finally, Part three consists of two large empirical chapters leading to the 
condusions (Chapters 6 & 7).
Chapter 2 w ill deal with a brief genealogy of the concept o f  ‘dvil sodety* and analyze the ways 
in which the concept has been taken over, modified and re-cast in three types o f theoretical
52 For a succinct description, see J ad (2004). In her words, “Marwan Barghouti presents himself, not only as the 
representative o f the poor and marginalized refugees, but also of the historically neglected peasants from whose 
ranks he comes. His flamboyant discourse o f challenge, resistance, sacrifice and negotiation resembles that of 
Hamas, but with secular connotations. This discourse finds a ready audience among poor youth, in particular 
those in Fateh who have often been treated as mere fuel for the manoeuvres of the political leadership”.
33 Assuming for a second that international aid to dvil sodety organisations really intends to promote a more 
partidpatoiy form of sodo-polirical life and a more democratic polity in the Territories.
34 A large survey about democracy expectation in Palestine in the beginning of the Oslo years confirms that 
support for the mainstream party and Islamists is stronger in the lowest education and income groups (Hanf & 
Sabella 1996: 23 & 72). Civil sodety promotion should therefore take such structural differences (explaining 
difference income and education levels) into consideration, in a bid to have effective aid to take place.
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literature (international relations for its focus on international actors’ intentions behind c iv i l  
society promotion, democracy and democratization studies for the expected p o s it iv e  
outcomes o f dvil society, and for the study o f civil society as a source of autonomy for t h e  
population, and development studies for the study o f  concrete application o f civil so c ie ty  
promotion through NGOs.)
Chapter 3 is a discussion about the existence or not o f an Arab Middle Eastern (AME) c iv i l  
society. It sheds light on some o f the (neo-)Orientalist assumptions that favor the view o f  a n  
incompatibility o f AME politics with the ‘emergence o f a vibrant civil society’ (to use  a  
common eulogic phrase about the subject), and suggests alternative trails o f interpretation f o r  
a more accurate account of the conditions for the existence of an AME d v il sodety. I n  
particular, it will be argued that to understand the difficulties for AME d v il soaeties t o  
develop and grow, one needs to unpack the concept of dvil sodety from its m a n y  
assumptions implied and to adopt first a differentiation view on dvil sodety in gen era l 
(horizontal axis o f differentiation), before embarking on the study of the local (AME) con tex t 
in which d v il sodety is evolving (vertical axis o f  differentiation). A second part o f this chap ter 
will propose three alternative views o f Arab intellectuals on dvil sodety in the region.
Chapter 4 provides a short historical account o f the emergence of NGOs in the Palestinian 
territories. It focuses on the evolution o f the legal framework and the change o f powers in th e  
region. Against the background o f  the long battle w ith the emerging PNA to ensure a  
minimal freedom of association, the chapter w ill focus on the formal and informal constraints 
encountered by NGOs in their daily work. This chapter is also the occasion to make a sh o rt 
portray o f  the different types o f NGOs active in the territories and the evolution of the N G O  
sectors in the two Palestines.
Chapter 5 w ill do the same but on the level of international donors. As for Palestinian NGOs, 
it is argued that one needs to adopt a diachronic study of the evolution of types o f  
international donors, of their work and study some o f the technical mechanisms through 
which aid is distributed to local NGOs. Once this will be done, we will move to the particular 
scene o f international donors active in Palestine and study the evolution of its composition, 
origin and types. Finally the chapter will offer a typology of western donors’ approach an d  
definition o f civil sodety, based on the interviews performed for this research. This typology 
will make the link with the axes of differentiation suggested in Chapter 3 to critically assess 
what type o f d v il sodety promotion is favored by which type of actors.
Chapter 6 reconstructs the ‘dvil sodety at work’ in the world of local NGOs. A first part w ill 
look at the various discourses1 produced by local NGOs (and most of the time commissioned
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by international donors) on civil society and try to make sense out of them. The two 
following parts will be dedicated to the thorough study of two sectors of local NGOs: one is 
the service-providing health NGOs and the second that of caused-oriented advocacy NGOs. 
We w ill try to assess the different ways discourses about civil society will influence the work 
of these two sectors, and how they are gradually intertwined and embedded within other local 
political narratives.
Chapter 7 will add further distinctions about the exclusionary power of civil society. It will 
focus on the political, sociological and ideological elements of such exclusionary power, and 
suggest alternative conclusions.
1.4. Sample, Methodology, and Data Collection
As always in social sciences, the danger — sometimes referred to as ‘operationalism’ -  is to 
search where there is light, or where the currents are taking researchers according to the ebbs 
and flows of academia. NGOs are the most visible phenomenon of contemporary civil 
society, but it is probably only the tip of the iceberg. But since these associations are the type 
that is mostly funded by external donors, NGOs will be the focus o f this research on civil 
society promotion. To complete the pictures, interviews were also done with donor 
organizations to have a better understanding of how they perceive and define civil society 
promotion in general and in the Palestinian context in particular.
Fieldwork took place in three phases.35 The first phase was an aborted attempt to enter the 
Territories: arriving in the region in late March 2002 ,1 faced the beginning of the systematic 
military re-occupation of most of the West Bank (under the Israeli codename of ^Defensive 
Shield’). Due to the shock this operation provoked throughout the region, the circumstances 
made it virtually impossible to do any interviews, let alone collect material because each single 
town (except Jericho, and for a short period Hebron) was declared closed military zone and 
almost impossible to reach. Nevertheless, this short period allowed me to get more 
acquainted with the world o f emergency operations through some contacts with international 
organizations.
The second and third fieldworks were less problematic and took place between the months of 
January to March 2003, and January to March 2004. My selection for the Palestinian
3S On top of the fieldwork periods, I lived for nine months in Palestine, working for one o f these large 
Palestinian NGOs. I thus gained precious insights into their ways of functioning, and how Palestinians perceived 
external support for civil society.
From January to September 2001,1 worked under the umbrella of the Swiss NGO Mededns du Monde, for one of 
the largest Palestinian health NGOs (Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, UPMRQ. I lived in 
Ramallah throughout the period, and worked between Ramallah and Jerusalem for the External Relation 
Department of UPMRC, dealing thus on a daily basis with international donors, proposal writing, and reporting 
activities.
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interviews was simple: having established a first list o f all NGOs active in advocacy a n d  
primary health care,36 and of the most important and visible donors to these sectors, I d e c id e d  
to try to interview all o f  them, though remaining open to the snowball effect whereby o n e  
person interviewed would suggest that I meet another organization not yet on the l i s t .  
Rapidly, it was clear I could not do it for two reasons. First, new names of NGOs and d o n o r s  
that I was not aware of in the first place appeared and cumulated on m y list while d o in g ; 
interviews. Secondly, the difficulties in reaching places of interview increased month b y  
month. Nablus and the whole northern half of the W est Bank were accessible only w i t h  
difficulty from 2003 onwards, and I was denied entry into the Gaza Strip (which I p a r t l y  
covered in 2003) during my last fieldwork in 2004.
However, because of the amazing readiness of most Palestinians to speak to researchers ( e v e n  
more so when the research covers h ea l perception o f international aid) and o f in ternationa l 
donors, and the small distances between the strategic decision centres, I was able to h a v e  
quickly a large number of interviews. When I reached about 40 interviews with donors a n d  
the same amount with local organizations, it became clear that covering the whole o f t h e  
territories was not a necessity. Therefore, the coverage of the Palestinian NGOs re f le c ts  
about half o f the Territories, with the southern ha lf o f the West Bank covered ( f ro m  
Hebron/Khalil up to Ramallah) and the northern half o f  the Gaza Strip (from North Gaza t o  
Gaza City).
For a full list of interviews (both Palestinian and international ones) ordered by types/sectors 
of interventions), see Appendix L
Concerning the internal validity of the sample, it can be said that the interview sam p le  
represents about half o f the Occupied Territories and offers a rather homogenous p ro file . 
First, the balance of NGOs interviewed in the West Bank (WB — 69% of the sample) and th e  
Gaza Strip (GS — 31% of the sample) is exactly similar to the balance between the to ta l  
number o f NGOs (69% of all NGOs in the WB, against 31% in the Gaza Strip),37 though, 
offering a slight over-proportion for the West Bank when compared to the total population 
(63% in the WB, for 37% in the GS for a total population o f 3,63 million38).
36 More will be said about the selection criteria to delineate what is an ‘advocacy* and ‘primary health care’ 
organization (Chapter 6, in particular, Sections 6.2 and 6.3).
37 Figures on total numbers of Palestinian NGOs taken out of my own database. The percentage per 
govemorate (or district) in the Table 1 is based on the total o f NGOs in either the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. 
‘Mv* NGOs per district means the number of NGOs interviewed in that govemorate for the research. 
Percentage on total sample.
38 Population as at mid-2003. Figures from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Taken in (PASSIA 2004: 
274)
Second, there is a good coverage of the peripheral zones (north of Gaza, and Hebron district 
-  one could include in the peripheral zones of Beit Lahem since the second Intifada  has meant 
a daily closure and real difficulty in reaching the city o f David, both for Palestinians and 
internationals). Third, if there is an over-representation o f the interviews from the central 
zones around Jerusalem and Ramallah (23 out o f 52 for Palestinian NGOs and the vast 
majority of international donors), this reflects the trend o f both donors and local NGOs to be 
active in these precise zones. Finally, a comparison of my NGO sample with my database on 
Palestinian NGOs proves that in terms of numbers, the proportion of interviewed NGOs is 
not very far from that of the distribution of all NGOs in the Territories (see following tables 
& maps).
Thus, it can be concluded that, in all probability, there is no systemic bias in the sampling 
with regard to donors’ preference to funding made available to Palestinian NGOs.
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Table 1 : Maps and tables about the sample o f local NGOs (existing and interviewed")
Govem orates of 
the W est 
Bank (W B )
Total local N G O s Num ber of Interview ed 
Local N G O s
Nbrper
district
%  of all 
N G O s (W B )
“M y- N G O s 
per district
%  o f  m y  
sa m p le  p e r  
d istrict
JEN IN 38 6 % 0 0 %
TU B A S 1 0 % 0 0 %
TULKA R M 22 4 % 0 0 %
Q ALQ ILIYA 8 1% 0 0 %
N A B LU S 55 9 % 1 3 %
S A LFfT 7 1% 0 0 %
JE R IC H O 31 5 % 0 0 %
RAM ALLAH 132 22 % 14 3 9 %
JE R U S A LE M 148 24% 9 2 5 %
B E TH E L E M 89 15% 4 1 1 %
KHALIL (Hebron) 81 13% 8 2 2 %
Total W B 612 100% 36 1 0 0 %
Govem orates of 
the G aza 
Strip (G S )
Total local N G O s
Number of Interview ed 
Local N G O s
Nbrper
district
%  of all 
N G O s (G S )
“My" N G O s 
per district
%  o f m y  
sa m p le  per 
d istrict
Jabaliya/North 25 9 % 2 1 3 %
Gaza City 161 59% 14 8 8 %
Deir al-Balah 30 11% 0 0 %
Khan Younts 33 12% 0
I
0 %  !
Rafah 23 8% 0 0 %  !
Total G S 272 100% 16 100%  !
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As for international donors, they were selected on the same basis as Palestinian donors, that is 
by establishing a list of the largest donors present in the territories (thanks to existing lists of 
international NGOs (AIDA lists)39 and o f governmental agencies active in the Territories.40 
Complementary information was gained thanks to the interviews with Palestinian NGOs. An 
effort was made to have a good distribution of donors by their type (multilateral and bilateral 
for governmental donors, and for non-governmental entities, a balance between larger and 
smaller ones). However, many donors do not have an office in the Territories and work from 
their home country (what I called the ‘invisible* donors). I had the chance to interview one 
such invisible donor and the result from the interview led me to conclude that there are no 
significant differences between visible and invisible donors. Therefore I stopped conducting 
interviews after about 40 o f them, since most of the donors and of the topics were covered.41 
Though it w ill be mostly spoken o f ‘international donors* in  the following text, it should be 
read actually as ‘western donors*, that is, funding bodies (either NGOs, INGOs,42 IOs — 
international organizations such as UNDP, or governmental development agencies) that 
provide financial help to local NGOs through open and visible channels (as opposed to more 
secrete militant funding). They can be labelled ‘western* since most of them operate or are 
either based or guided from headquarters in Europe or in North America. Though some UN 
are formally multilateral,\ they can be considered part of this western group since their mode of 
governance and institutional practices are modeled on some o f the larger western 
development agencies (see chapter 2 &  5). But in no case should *westem* be understood as 
Christian, since a large Muslim charity (Islamic Relief) — just to name one — based in the UK, 
is also part o f this sample and operates through the same modalities as its Christian sister 
associations (like for example, getting funding from the ELJ). The difference with, say a 
Kuweit-based Islamic charity, or w ith funding provided to Islamist NGOs, is the fact that 
‘western’ organizations operate very transparently and according to open planning and report
39 The Association o f International Development Agencies (AIDA) gathers about 50 non-govemmental donors 
meeting monthly in Jerusalem. I attended many of their meetings during the period I worked in Ramallah in 
2001 before starting this research. More on AIDA in Chapter 5 and in particular in Section 5.4.4.
40 A list o f them can be found in PASSIA 2004.
41 Let us finally note that some additional but informal interviews were done with a few extra international actors 
(such as the ICR.C or OCHA) but the results o f these interviews have not been taken into consideration in the 
corpus of studied donors. The same holds for some local organisations interviewed in order to complete the 
range of views and gather additional information. They are marked with an asterisk in the list of interviewed 
organisations in Appendix I.
42 According to UN standards, a NGO becomes ‘international NGO (INGOs)’ if  it is operative in three 
countries or more. See (Chiodi 2005: 8 fh 26).
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methods, whereas the latter types o f organizations would not systematically and openly rep o rt 
about funds made available to local NGOs.43 4
The questionnaire used is a semi-structured topic-guide with semi-open questions. There w a s  
a high insistence on NGO actors* subjective perception about the way funds are given to  
NGOs and about their definition o f dv il society, democracy and their involvement in  th e  
process o f  setting priorities. For the second fieldwork, I added a diagram on which N G O  
actors were asked to determine whether their distance between their organization and fo u r 
different actors (PNA/PLO, political parties, donors and local population) had increased o r  
decreased over the years. This self-anchoring mechanism that attempts to stress subjective 
perceptions was inspired by the development literature dealing with assessment methods fo r
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A  large quantity of documents produced on and by NGOs on dvil society in  Palestine w a s  
also collected for this research. Because of the language difficulties during the in terview s 
(some o f them were done in  Arabic, some in French and the vast majority in  English) and fo r  
printed material (again with a large proportion of English material but also some A rab ic  
presentation material was gathered), it was impossible to apply a discourse analysis m eth od  
supported by existing software materials. Rather some elements of text analysis a r e  
parsimoniously used to complete, along with excerpts of my interviews, theoretical 
discussions and to add substance to other empirical evidence.
A  large amount of the research time was spent on gathering my own information o n  
Palestinian NGOs and donors in the Territories. There is no one official or recognized source 
from which to determine the identity and number of Palestinian NGOs. The same is true fo r  
donors. M any estimations are made in the literature (and they will be reported here), but th e  
only official figures about Palestinian NGOs will not be revealed by the PNA, and in  
particular by the Commission (former Ministry) for NGO affairs, despite attempts made to  
get exact figures.
The list I have come up with is the merger o f different sources. The main ones are th e  
various directories prepared by the UN Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories 
(UNSCO) (UNSCO 1998, 1999a & 2003), completed by the lists made available by th e  
various sections of the Union o f Charitable Societies (Jerusalem, Hebron and Palestinian
43 This is, obviously, a bit of a simplification since some o f the Gulf-Based Islamic NGOs actually raise funding 
with the same technologies as their western sister organisations: mass or personalized emails, online sites, TV 
campaigns in  some cases (see Ghandour 2002). Again the visibility on the ground is very different no large 
stickers, posters or fancy brochures about the activities of most of these donors. See also Benthall & Bellion- 
Jourdan 2003.
44 See Roche 1999, in particular 141 ff.
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General Union of Charitable Societies). Another list of 157 institutions based in Refugee 
Camps of the Territories provided another source to check which information were still 
missing from the other lists (Said & Abdul-Majeed 2000). Finally, some complementary 
information has been gathered either from personal double checks, or from PASSLA’s 
diaries.45 Unfortunately the database of the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute 
(MAS) including about 900 NGOs (MAS 2001a&b) was not available for consultation, but 
access was granted to a list of health, human rights, democracy and advocacy organizations by 
one o f the staff. Obviously, the interviews done provided much more insights into the 
organizations* structure, way of working and understanding o f what is understood by ‘civil 
society*.
45 PASSIA is the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. It publishes each year a 
diary, with extensive lists of hundreds of Palestinian institutions, from Parliament members, to lists of NGOs, 
hospitals and schools.
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Ch apter  II: Debating  (International) Civil  
So ciety
‘ It is one thing to want c iv il society; 
It is another to understand what it is *  
(Kumar 2001:168)
Exploring the origins and the evolution of the concept ‘civil society* is an essential first step 
to understand some of the assumptions that underpin, define and also motivate actors to 
invoke the (in appearance) widely accepted positive role of civil society. To do so, one has to 
approach the concept in a pluri-disdplinary manner to grasp what is at stake in  different 
paradigms and disciplines. One needs to be wary o f the normative expectations linked to the 
development o f a concept that has its roots in modem western liberal history. Therefore it is 
important to go back to the roots o f the concept of civil society before discussing some of its 
problems when fa c in g  its application in contemporary settings.
A second reason for this multiple historical and theoretical review is the increasingly 
transnational context in which civil society is invoked. Civil society is not only an object of 
scientific enquiry, but also the motivation of a large ‘aid industry* (Van Rooy 1998). Therefore 
one needs to put the concept under scrutiny not just for its historical evolution but also in 
terms o f consequences these studies can have on the more concrete application of civil 
society promotion around the globe.
In order not to forget what is at stake at the end-side o f civil society promotion (the 
interaction o f donors with NGOs, and the interaction of their various interpretations of the 
concept), I w ill highlight some o f the specific debates that arose in the last decade in the 




2.1. The Origins of Civil Society
The notion o f ‘civil society" (that appeared in its modem form in the 17th century46), w a s  
widely disputed and used in the 18th and 19th centuries, but almost disappeared for m ost o f  
the short 20th century. It re-emerged in the 1970s, and invaded as a topos the field o f p o litica l 
discourse and of political theory from the 1980s onwards, in particular because o f the co llap se  
o f the Soviet Empire and of the political changes in  the Iberic peninsula and in L a t in  
America.47
The idea o f ‘civil society’ first appeared as a concept opposed to ‘natural society’ in the ‘so c ia l 
contract’ debates, and is best exemplified in texts o f thinkers such as Hobbes, L o ck e , 
Rousseau, Smith or Ferguson, and was, at first, synonymous with the State. The emergence o f  
this vocabulary around the 17* century occurs “in a context where there was an urgency o f  
finding ways o f granting legitimacy and meaning to the new order that emerged in the w a k e  
o f the Westphalian peace treaty and the provisional end of a century and a half o f bloody c iv i l  
wars in Europe” (Hallberg & Wittrock 2005). Civil society in the 17th and 18* centuries m e a n t 
socially and politically organized forms of life and government, and implied the notion o f  
civility, and civilization (as opposed to the helium omnium contra omnes depicted by Hobbes). F o r  
most o f  the thinkers of that time, it  implied a positive development, a notion o f necessary  
p r o ce s s  in  reaching the phase o f civil society. Only Rousseau, in  his D iscoure su r l'origine e t  l e s  
fondem ents de l'inégalité pa rm i les hommes (Rousseau 1996[1755]) doubted and questioned th is  
optimistic view of a transformation from société naturelle to société civile.
19* century thinkers introduced an element that now looks decisive to us, namely th e  
distinction between dvil society and the state (Bobbio 1995). This has to do w ith the g rad u a l 
emergence o f the modem state and the development o f an increasing sphere o f cap ita list 
activities48 (Gallardo 1998: 85). The concept takes a significant and substantial turn w ith  
Hegel whose innovative conception posits for the first time ‘civil society’ as an e lem en t 
between the state and the patriarchal sphere of the family. Civil society no longer coincides 
with the state, or at least with all aspects of the state. In fact, civil society is for Hegel o n ly  
one part o f the state. By recovering the analysis o f the first political economists (Smith a n d  
Ricardo), Hegel shows that the contractualist society described by natural law thinkers is ju s t
46 For a discussion about the origins of the concept in Aristotle as hoinoniapolitikt, its translation and use in the 
Medieval period, and its gradual appearance in Renaissance as sodetas dvi&s, see Hallberg & Wittrock 2005.
47 It must be stressed that expectations about dvil soderies were very different in the Soviet sphere of influence 
than in Latin America.
45 This argument is also captured in Benjamin Constant’s 1819 text on the comparison between Ancient and 
Modem times. See (Constant 1988:309-328).
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one sphere of the political life: that o f the needs and the contractual relationship o f the do ut 
des (Hegel 1930 [1821]: §182-256).
Elaborating on the private-public articulation, Tocqueville introduces a three-way distinction, 
with political society complementing the state and civil society. The distinction between civil 
and political societies distinguishes him from HegeL According to the author of De la 
démocratie en A mérique, what distinguishes civil from political society is that the former deals 
(on a quite low-level) with private interests, economic activities,49 but also moral and 
intellectual activities, whereas the latter (on a higher level) is a sort o f aggregate o f civil 
associations for a larger common cause. The distinction is somehow an artificial one, since 
the author notes that they benefit from one another (Tocqueville 1981 v. 2 :1 4 7 ).50 
As important for the development o f the concept in  the 19th century is Marx’s usage o f the 
term which derives from HegeL Marx sees in civil society a diversion from the real question 
of that o f economic class distinction. For him, civil society is part o f the base, and is dissolved 
into the economic factors, expressed in the superstructure of ideology and judicial power. 
This view is partially challenged by Grams ci in the sense that civil society now is an important 
element of the superstructure, which becomes subordinating (Bobbio 1988: 87) and which is 
necessary to impose and gain hegemony within a  society. Civil society, as the sphere of 
voluntary acceptance, is here opposed to political society (the sphere of coercion), and to the 
oppressive state (Edwards B. & aL 2001: 2).S1
After Gramsd, the concept of civil society gradually disappears, even though some authors 
explore the idea o f state-sodety relations, but using a different vocabulary, such as the 
Habermasian "public sphere’ (Habermas 1990). In the 1970s and subsequent years, the notion 
of ‘dv il society* reappears as a main tool to conceptualize the state-sodety relations. A  recent 
conceptualization of this opposition state-dvil sodety has been to define dv il sodety as the 
sphere where questions (inputs) are addressed to the political system which in turns has the 
duty to respond (outputs) (see Bobbio 1985: 26).
Its massive return to the front of the stage is strongly indebted to European history and more 
precisely to Polish history, with the well-described proto-example of Soiidam osc. The Polish 
trade union represented, in its efforts to resist the state’s authoritarianism, an ‘incarnated’ 
form o f dvil sodety. The concept was made again fashionable by the new Left, in its search
49 The notion of do ut des also appears în Tocqueville (1981 v. 2:147): “Des hommes ont par hasard un intérêt 
commun dans une certaine affaire. Il s’agit d’une entreprise commerciale à diriger, d’une opération industrielle à 
conclure : ils se rencontrent et s’unissent; ils se familiarisent peu à peu de cette manière avec l’assodation. »
50 ‘Tes associations civiles facilitent donc les associations politiques; mais d’autre part, l ’association politique 
développe et perfectionne singulièrement I’assodation civile.” See (Tocqueville 1981 v. 2:147).
51 See also Levine & Salvatore 2005.
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of theoretical background to attack Stalinist and bureaucratic degenerescence of the Sov iet 
bloc in the East and to undermine state coercion in the West. In another anti-statist 
understanding52, the use of civil society can justify new social movements which em erged 
after the troubled last years of the 1960s. In that sense, Gramsci’s view of civil society proved 
to be a valuable ally, because o f the notion o f voluntary and cultural hegemony bestowed 
upon civil society. It finally gained ground because of the so-called * third wave o f  
democratization’ and the alleged role played by non-state actors, in the series o f post-soviet 
and national liberation (see infra).
On the epistemological level, the ‘return’ of civil society can be explained by the focus put o n  
the importance of the state — B ringing the S tate Back In (Evans & aL 1985) being th e  
paradigmatic example o f that Following that reinsertion, state-society became again a  
dominant topic in social sciences from the late 1980s onwards. Migdal’s Strong societies and w eak  
states (Migdal 1988) offers a concrete example o f how civil society becomes endowed w ith a  
normative status with a rather clear function. The concomitant emergence o f neo-liberalism 
through, most notably in our case, the Washington consensus (Fine & al. 2001) easily  
accommodated the thématique w ith its main preoccupation that state functions as gardien d e  
nuit thereby leaving sufficient space for rational actors and society to interact according to th e  
rules o f a globalized m arket
Beyond this brief genealogy, at least four p rob lem atic  aspects with the general concept o f  
civil society need to be discussed for the argument o f this dissertation. These are th e  
assumption o f progress that discourses o f civil society entail, the questionable autonomy o r  
independence vis-à-vis the state, the potential dichotomy political vs. civil society, as well a s  
the cultural embedded-ness of the concept in  European history (but this last point will b e  
discussed later in this chapter).
F irstly , the very idea that civil society is linked to the notion of progress stems from its f irs t 
historical use, namely in  the Scottish Enlightenment where civil was synonymous w ith  
‘civilized’ and in the contractualistic thinkers who interpreted it as a way ou t o f disorganized 
life in common. Hegel is the first to analytically question this argument because civil society is  
only one o f the moments to reach a  full-fledged State. But from Tocqueville onwards, c iv il 
society is attributed a positive role, because it is so constitutive of the American democracy. 
This can be seen as the turning moment where the couple civil society-democracy has 
eclipsed the previous pair civil society-state of nature. Except from Marxist perspectives (for 
which civil society is hurgeriich), one can trace benevolent, i f  not outright positive connotations
52 It is not just anti-statist. Civil society, in  the eye of the new left, can be a tool for attacking economic and neo- 
coxporadst institutions. See (Edwaxds B. & al. 2001: 3).
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to the concept of civil society particularly because of this precise shift of the role o f civil 
society with Tocqueville. In other words, “the concept was first proposed to explore the 
possibility and limits of collective self-determination on the eve o f the ‘democratic 
revolutions’” (Terrier & Wagner 2005a).
Another element that contributed to the positive connotation o f civil society is its intricacy 
with the emergence o f the modem polity. A sociologist o f the state has described the 
conceptual couple state and society as a protracted effort to characterize the advance of 
modernization (Poggi 2001). But this is far from problematic since ‘modernity* is never 
universally identifiable, or definitive. On top of being a process, there are also multiple roads 
to modernities (Eisenstadt 2003). But this is not always acknowledged and the passed journey 
made on the path(s) of modernity should not become a norm that others have to follow in 
the same manner. This tension between the contingency and the necessity of civil society as a 
metonymy o f modernity, is captured by Terrier and Wagner for whom “ much o f social and 
political theory has assumed that there is a single model o f ‘modem society*, to which all 
societies will gradually converge because of the higher rationality o f its institutional 
arrangements” (Terrier & Wagner 2005a). Nevertheless, this view of a single model explains 
the success of civil society since it is part o f the success towards the attainment o f modernity. 
One just needs to look at the current debates and grand statements where notions of 
‘civilization*, ‘modernization* (of ‘traditional* societies) have been re-instrumentalized towards 
shaping foreign policies nowadays. In these circumstances, one can only be puzzled by the 
strong parallel with the 18th century’s use of civil society in opposition to the state o f nature 
and current talks of civilization and democratization. The parallel between the attainment of 
political modernity (through the contract of civil society and the idea of civility in  the context 
of Scottish Enlightenment) and the panacea o f civil society and democracy promotion 
nowadays, merits to be underlined and explored. If there is a valid parallel (‘us* = ‘civilized’, 
versus ‘others* = in the state o f nature as in  the case of the 17-18th century, or 
straightforwardly ‘barbarian* to denote inferiority (Pagden 1982: 15); and ‘us* = ‘western’ 
world with a ‘vibrant* civil society versus ‘others*= undemocratic countries without societal 
mechanisms to lead towards democratization, as often portrayed in the literature), then civil 
society functions as a boundary, as an identity marker, as much as modernity seems to 
describe the level of advancement of legal-rationalization o f the western liberal state. All this 
questioning is to stress some of the contentious elements deeply embedded within the origins 
of civil society. Civil society becomes thus a problematic concept to use, since it refers to a 
certain history and ‘exporting* it could lead to a problematic form of euro-centrism. Further
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consideration will try to assess whether it is part o f a given history, or also o f a certain cu ltu re  
(Chapter 3).
Second, it is debatable for many to say that civil society is independent from the state (or f o r  
the sake o f discussion from the sphere of family — in the so-called “dual autonomy*’ 
(Schmitter 1997). Drawing clear cuts between the three levels (state, civil society a n d  
(reproduction sphere) is all too artificial and simplistic. One just needs to take p o litica l 
parties as example of institutions that could have been put in both categories, either state o r  
civil society (see for example Bobbio 1985: 26). A  simplistic three-way division also tends t o  
reify civil society as an instrument with the function to counter-balance state’s privileged. 
Most o f the authors agree that civil society remains a problematic concept, because it is n o t a  
set of given institutions, but is “rather a process whereby the inhabitants o f the sp h ere  
constantly monitor both the state and the monopoly o f power in civil sodety”  (Chandhoke, 
2001: 22). It takes various forms and contents according to the historical phase, to the so c ie ta l 
features, and to state development. A  recent study of civil society organizations (CSOs) in t h e  
Middle East goes along that same line. Middle Eastern NGOs in particular are subject t o  
intense pressures for the domestic regime and NGO networking are granted a space on t h e  
basis that they would not properly threaten the state. This form of ‘pact5 prevents the o u tr igh t 
emergence o f counter-power centres and NGOs power struggle is eventually quite similar t o  
the lines o f state power (Ben N efissa 2002: 24-25). One just needs to take the cases of Jo rd a n  
where most o f the NGOs have a  dose link to the monarch’s family (Brand 2001), or in E g y p t 
where the state strictly limits CSO s’ room of manoeuvring (Ben Nefissa 2002: 24), to see th a t  
autonomy from the state is from being a given.
T h ird ly, debates are still taking place among scholars to deade whether political soriety i s  
similar to civil society, or to w hat extent it needs to be differentiated. One o f the fe rven t 
advocates o f separation between the two argues that one can not assume one single d is tin c t 
logic o f its own for dv il society, but rather, one should draw a line between political and c iv i l  
society (Chandhoke 2001: 5). Another scholar drawing from dvil sodety activism in n o n -  
westem states makes the same argum ent Chatterjee notices that the “die domain of d v i l  
social institutions”, as concdved by authors such as Cohen and Arato (1992), “is s t i l l  
restricted to a fairly small section of ‘dozens’”, but the problem is that this hiatus i s  
“extremely significant because it is the mark of non-Wes tern modernity as an a lw ays 
incomplete project o f ‘modernization’ and o f the role o f an enlightened elite engaged in  a  
pedagogical mission in relation to the rest of sodety” (Chatterjee 2001: 172). She condudes 
by advocating the drawing of a distinction between political and dvil sodety, w ith the po litica l
52
society being somewhere between state and civil society (ibid.: 173). What makes this 
distinction necessary is the “historical study of modernity in non-Westem societies”. For 
Chatterjee, the “most significant site o f transformations in the colonial period is that o f civil 
society; the most significant transformations occurring in the post-colonial period are in 
political society. The question that frames the debate over social transformation in the 
colonial period is that o f modernity. In political society o f the post-colonial period, the 
framing question is that o f democracy. In the context of the latest phase o f the globalization 
of capital, we may well be witnessing an emerging opposition between modernity and 
democracy, i.e. between dvil society and political society.” (ibid.: 178)
With regard to this research, it will be interesting to keep an eye on these problematic aspects 
o f dv il sodety. Which is the degree o f independence of NGOs vis-à-vis the sphere of state? 
Should one not distinguish between political and dvil sodety? How much o f the notion of 
‘progress’ is still perceivable in the current usage o f dvil society in the Palestinian case?
Let us now turn to how dv il sodety has been envisaged mostly in the last decade as a 
contribution to democratization and how it can be seen as a source of autonomy for 
organized collectivities towards democracy.
2.2. Civil Society and Democratization Literature
Studies of regime changes (both towards democratic regimes, e.g. O’Donnell, Schmitter & 
Whitehead 1986, and breakdown o f democratic regimes, Linz & Stepan 197853) started in the 
1970s, with attention from the 1990s onwards being paid to the issue of democratization 
(Pridham 2000: 1). Thè focus o f attention switched from a debate about the constitutive 
elements of d em ocra t to a study o f democratization with all the necessary pre-conditions, 
influences, sequence, and outcomes o f a process generally going from one end (non- 
democratic) o f an imagined continuum to the other (democratic). In other words, a new 
theoretical ground emerged that attempted to set patterns o f democratization.
It is because o f the dominant neo-liberal paradigm of the 1980s, that dv il sodety appealed so 
much in  1990s. Civil sodety is based on a pluralist definition and understanding o f sodety 
where individual action (providing that ‘dual autonomy* is granted) is constitutive o f a space 
for control o f  the state. Therefore it entails anti-statist assumptions that were later made 
popular by Putnam (1993), whose work on social capital was widely used by large 
developmental organizations and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the IMF. In exchange for financial support, ‘developing’ countries engage in  the liable
53 These two authors actually made the distinction between poBtical and civil society. Their approach is to say that 
political society includes parties and other actors directly interested by power or who are openly striving for i t  
Civil society ís more about influencing, and not seizing power.
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m u a
path o f  conditionality which “has increasingly been tied to issues of governance and 
democratization, and support for those organs of ‘civil society’ that are most amenable to 
market-friendly policies - a far cry from the earlier presumption that authoritarian regimes are 
more suitable because o f their greater powers to resistance to populist agitation against the 
impact o f  adjustment” (Fine &  al. 2001:11).
Good government and governance became an inevitable leitmotiv in the early years of the 
1990s, because they involve civil society, informal economy, and an intermediary sphere o f  
action.54 A ll these make of civil society an important entry point for the “promotion o f  
accountability, legitimacy, transparency and participation as it is these factors which empower 
civil society and reduce the power o f the state. [ ...]” (Williams & Young, 1994: 87f).
The problem is that in this context ‘civil society’ too often implies a rather narrow definition. 
It is not just a sphere o f deliberation and of negotiation; it becomes a true agent o f changes, 
in an anthropomorphic way, which indudes in its definition the intervention o f a newcomer 
on the scene o f democracy, namely the NGOs and related advocacy groups. By the early  
1990s, the NGOs were on everybody’s lips and had become a widely spread object o f  
academic study. They also offered a channel for activists to reach top-decision levels, in  
governments or in international institutions such as the World Bank. According to a recent 
study on policy-makers, this would explain why the W orld Bank, for example, talked so m uch 
about NGO and civil sotiety, and why social capital and governance became so common in  
the literature produced by the World Bank in the so-called Post-Washington consensus 
(Guilhot 2001:230).
A recent trend of the literature dealing with democratization has enthusiastically pushed c iv il 
society even more to the centre o f  the stage. This has to do with the massive treatment of the 
topic o f  globalization in  the social science literature, and the emergence o f the idea o f  a  
potentially cosmopolitan society and democracy. W ith the confirmed trend of the 
professionalization and internationalization of NGOs, advocacy issues covering and dealing 
with the whole of the planet are now a prime concern. Academically, this phenomenon has 
translated into a new wave o f  study with the impact o f principled beliefs carried by an  
international or transnational form o f civil society and in particular by NGOs. In this 
perspective, NGOs are too often represented unproblematically “as the heroes and vanguard 
of an emerging global civil society, challenging the instinctive authoritarianism of states and
54 Good governance replaced the discourse of good govemmentality from the 1980s. The latter requires a 
greater involvement of the state, whereas the former involves also non-state actors, in accordance with the 
dominant neo-liberal paradigm. For an example of govemmentality and its implications, see (Ferguson 1990:
64ff). He qualifies the principle of govemmentality by the fact that the “main features o f economy and society 
must be within the control o f a neutral, unitary, and effective national government [ . . . ]” {ibid.: 72).
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the power of international capital” (Josselin & Wallace 2001: 1). One should insist that even i f  
NGOs are mentioned literally everywhere, that does not mean that this form o f institution 
(NGO) is the unique form or norm of civil society.55
Another type o f too benevolent assumption around civil society and democratization is 
expressed through the resilience of the economic development argument, first presented by 
Lipset in 1959. The level of economic development was then the best predicator for the 
chances of democracy to flourish (Lipset 1959). It was too simplistic to be true and the 
argument was later proved false or unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the idea that there must be an 
economic pre-requisite for the flourishing of civil society is well presented in the literature. 
Gellner’s Conditions o f  Liberty. Ciml Society and Its R ival is evaluating the chances to civil society 
to grow in terms o f diffusion or concentration of economy and coercion (Gellner 1994: 
205ff). The later part on development studies also highlights some of the allegedly positive 
role o f civil society (and in particular o f NGOs) in terms o f economic benefits (privatization) 
that then translate into political development
Many points o f the assumptions o f civil society as a contributor to democratization need to 
be questioned. First, one should question the automatically democratic, representative and 
accountable character of NGOs (to name a ‘usual suspect1. As Halliday puts it, “they are self- 
righteous at best, elitist at worst”. Despite their noble claims, NGOs can easily be re-baptized 
either BINGOs (business-influenced NGOs), RINGOs (reactionary NGOs or royal 
NGOs56), GINGOs (government-influenced NGOs), MANGOs (male-controlled NGOs) or 
even TINGOs (tribal NGOs). Are NGOs really part of this allegedly autonomous sphere of 
civil society (Halliday 2001: 22-23)? As for an assessment o f their impact, some authors take a 
very cynical stance calling the result o f transnationalism ‘wishful thinking* (Guilhot 2001). 
Others take a more pragmatic critical line in the case of external civil society assistance in 
Russia, stating “neither assistance nor transnational networks alone make a state democratic” 
(Mendelson 2002: 233).
The main aspect underlined here is that NGOs have been often described in a benevolent 
manner, probably because of the teleological assumptions entailed in some of the 
democratization studies. But does civil society exist because of the existence o f a modem 
liberal state, or, in a chicken-egg manner, does the modem state exist because o f the existence 
o f a civil society? This is the paradox formulated by Michael Walzer: “a democratic civil
55 Chapter 6 will tackle this issue more in detail. If we concentrate our attention on NGOs, it does not mean that 
we consider it to be civil society as a whole.
M As in the case of Jordan. See Brand 2001. On the variety of NGOs, see also Carapico 2000.
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mu
society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a 
strong and responsive state” (quoted in  Edward B. & aL 2001:13).
A study of western history tends to show that some forms o f civil society existed well before 
the founding of a modem dem ocratic state with the establishment of guilds, corporations and  
the like (see Black 1984: 239), and that the civil society we tend to refer to is the product o f  
institutional democratic arrangements.57 Therefore the whole functionalist expectations 
bestowed on civil society are flawed from the beginning. This type of democracy-centric 
expectations about civil society can be found in the m any articles in  the beginning of th e  
1990s trying to decide for once whether there is a civil society, say, in  a Muslim society. O f  
course, authors could not find the ‘same’ civil society as in  the ‘west*. The fact is that there is  
a civil society in many o f the Middle Eastern states but western categories limit the ir 
perceptions (Chapter 3, in  p art Section 3.2).
The second main problem with civil society in the democratization literature is die disputable 
question o f its independence, both vis-à-vis the state and of the sphere o f  
production/reproduction. It is a  mistake to believe in a quasi-formal separation between th e  
three distinctive spheres (Chandhoke 2002: 35). First, it  probably does not make much sense 
to speak o f civil society, or (for our research) of NGO actors as a cohesive group (e .g ., 
Edwards M. & Hulme 1997). Critical views on civil society develop the argument that th is 
kind o f error leads to pinpointing different forces and mechanisms to explain the internal 
work o f civil society. Rather, in this line of criticism, “civil society is not only constituted b y  
the state and the market but [is] also permeated by the same logic that underpins these tw o  
spheres” (Chandhoke 2002: 49). This is very close to a Hegelian perception o f civil society 
which is part o f the same A ufhebung process leading from abstract rights to ethics (v ia 
morality), and from family to the state (Hegel 1930[1821]). A recent empirical study on donor 
NGOs also points out the fact that the logics behind the competition amongst international 
NGOs is precisely based on process of accumulation of resources and that the 
internationalization of these NGOs is greatly shaped and structured by the states in which 
each NGO is based (Siméant 2002: 27ff).
A  final, but small, analytical problem arises from the fact that advocacy NGOs — when not a ll 
NGOs — are too often equated w ith civil society (Carothers 1999: 342). This is true not on ly 
for the academic production (as in  the case o f transnational studies), but also for some NGO 
actors in  democratizing countries, proving thus the im pact and influence of dominant
57 At least, there is a contradiction in the usual Tocqueville type of argument brought forward about the need for 
a rich and diversified civil society. Tocqueville himself seems to indicate that democracy is indeed required 
before having this famous “art d ’assocatiorF, “science mere de ra ri de Fassoàatiori’ (see in particular, Tocqueville 1981 
v .2 :138 & 141).
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interpretations o f democratization and civil society upon domestic actors.58 Therefore one 
should adopt a vocabulary about NGOs that does not bring together under the same label the 
two things of civil society and of one o f its proxy, namely NGOs,
2.3. Civil Society and International Relations (IR) Literature:
The External Dimension
The emergence o f a ‘global civil society* is occupying much of the academic debate on civil 
society. But actually, not much exploration has been done about the relationship between civil 
society and the international system. Whitehead recendy noticed the apparent contradiction 
between democracy and civil society, understood mosdy as domestic processes, and the 
increased promotion of democracy within the international arena (Whitehead 2004: 115), But 
much can be said about the notion o f civil society promotion and the intentions and projects 
in international actors.
When looking at the longstanding and more recent debates raging in the academic discipline 
of international relations, one cannot but consider the predominant role ascribed to state, 
power, systems and structures. Much less importance is given to society in these debates, and 
to civil society, except until recendy.
Needless to say, there are various ways to conceive and operationalize each of these concepts. 
At first sight, IR literature seems to live on clear-cut cleavages: realism vs. idealism, (neo- 
)realism vs. (neo-)institutionalism, constructivism vs. essenfialism. But looking into the details 
of these approaches (or schools o f thought) and their application in the case of 
democratization, the cleavages vanish into profoundly different W eltanschauungen, leading 
scholars to emphasize one set of actors or values at the expense of others. Relevant materials 
within various schools o f thought w ill be used to understand some potential implication of 
civil society in  the IR literature, and how the four main schools o f thoughts formulate 
hypotheses about the reasons and intentions behind the interactions between international 
donors and recipients NGOs, in particular about the expected outcomes of external civil 
society promotion.
a) Neo-Realism
A blunt statement from neo-realists would be that democracy promotion is not their main 
concern. Realpolitik  deals with sovereign states, no matter what the type of regime in  charge of 
the state. This echoes Zakaria’s famous article on the R ise o f  Illiberal Democracy where it is
58 E. .̂, in Palestine, an umbrella organization, the Palestinian Network o f NGOs (PINGO), in its press releases, 
often writes statements such as ‘'We, Palestinian civil society.. Not only are they only NGOs, and not the 
whole o f Palestine civil society, but also, they represent only a ¿action o f NGOs active in Palestine. See Section
7.2.3.
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stated that instead of “mak[ing] the world safe for democracy” (as W oodrow Wilson s ta ted  
it), the “task is to make democracy safe for the world” (Zakaria 1997: 43). This view is n o t  
infrequent in the neo-realist approach, and some others even argue that there is a case fo r  a  
link between democracy building and the outbreak o f wars (Mansfield & Snyder 1995). A l l  
these views go against the democratic peace argument, and the promotion o f dem ocracy 
around the globe.
However, hypotheses w ith regard to the state, civil society, and democratization can be m a d e  
within a neo-realist framework. From the 1950s onwards and for most of the Cold War, t h e  
state was to be protected by all means and it was not “fashionable then to speak of ch a llen ge  
to the state” (Edwards B. & aL 2001: 7) and to call for a strong civil society or for the re sp e c t 
of ethnic minorities when installing a democratic regime. Even nowadays, for conv inced  
realists, civil society and NGOs can be seen either as “front-organizations thinly d isgu is in g  
the interests o f particular states, or as potential revolutionaries, seeking to undermine n a tio n a l 
solidarity and the stability of the state system” (Josselin & Wallace 2001: 1).59 
On the 'positive’ expectations o f  the neo-realist school vis-à-vis democratization, one c a n n o t 
discard the arguments for democratic peace: it is in the interest of democratic regimes to h a v e  
democratic neighbors60 to neutralize the predatory environment This has become esp ec ia lly  
true with the end of Cold W ar, when western liberal democracy seems to have set t h e  
standard. W ith regard to civil society, the neo-realist approach tends to negate both t h e  
impact o f  transnational actors (the international system is like a billiard game, with c lo sed  
entities) and the effectiveness o f international norms. To justify not entering this field, rea lis ts  
like to adopt a cultural relativism to justify non-interference in a region o f the world judged a s  
culturally heterogeneous (Donnelly 1998: 3If). With regard to the introduction’s efforts o f  
'thinking transculturality*, it is striking to see how the discourses of differences o f cultures c a n  
serve a realist approach of IR, but without further elaborating much on w hat is meant b y  
culture (except that it matters).
Some very rare exceptions believe that human rights and probably also democracy should b e  
given a space in neo-realist theory, and invoke the positive intrusion of “morality” into th e
59 Note that this is one of the rare occasions where civil society and NGOs (be they northern or southern 
NGOs) are not entrusted with any positive role or functions. This argument (of associations as a threat) is a 
typical Tocqueville argument: he points out the general (but erroneous) belief that too many civil associations a r e  
considered dangerous for the stability o f the state. On the contrary, Tocqueville believes that freedom of 
assodaton can reinforce the State (see Tocqueville 1981 v.2: 150).
60 One should however be aware of the rapidity with which certain countries declare themselves democratic (o r 
to claim that other ones are), and look beyond the mere electoral process to qualify a state truly democratic. It 
might be convenient to rlaim that a state is democratic for the reason that its leader has been ‘fairly’ elected an d  
thus engaging in the path of triumph o f moral politics. But the mere procedural fafade might hide an 
authoritarian regime that serves the interest of greater power(s). For a discussion of the notion o f ‘control’ by 
external actors, see (Whitehead 1996: 8f).
international system (Donnelly 2000: 200). To do this, Donnelly analytically advocates the 
acceptance o f an internationalist model (in-between the statist and cosmopolitan models), 
where states and societies, supplemented by NGOs and individuals, can promote democracy 
and respect for human rights (1998: 28f).
Some neo-realist hypotheses with regard to democratization and civil society could be the 
following ones.61 Structures serving state power should be favored (like administrative 
apparatus). In a domestic interpretation of the neo-realists, democracy and civil society 
promotion should limit the number o f counter-power locus, to minimize the risk o f having 
protest against war. A final one is that civil society assistance should concentrate on already 
existing strong actors. Conflict over the control of civil society organizations w ill develop 
between state and ‘independent’ counter-power elements, of which NGOs are good 
examples.
b) World-system theory and dependency theory
A world-system theory gradually disappeared from the front stage in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
There are still some interpretations o f the international system that are based on this core­
periphery dominated relation, but this is now approached from a slightly different angle. 
Recent studies highlight the “historical tendency towards concentration and centralization of 
power in ever-larger geographical units” (Gowan 2002: 14362). What is thus now new in this 
approach is that it studies not only the mechanisms and logic o f economic concentration, but 
it also studies the role of cultural hegemonic domination. This last approach derives from the 
work done over the last two decades, by the so-called post-colonial scholars.63 
Many authors in  this sub-school o f  thought express concerns about the distorting effects of 
development and highlight the ambiguities lying in the external push for political 
liberalization. They criticize the general assumption that economic liberalization will 
automatically lead to political liberalization, and hence democratization. World-system 
scholars would define these political processes as economically motivated to promote the 
expansion o f capitalism, with international finance institutions (World Bank, IMF) being 
eventually controlled by Washington. Post-colonialists would argue that behind development
611 intentionally formulated my hypotheses in prescriptive terms to highlight the normative assumptions 
underlying them.
62 The author is here referring to (Arrighi & Silver 1999).
63 The latter developed mostly as a pure cultural critique of western domination, following the model set by 
Edward Said in Orientalism (1978). Even if  it is difficult to speak of school o f thought o f IR in the case o f post- 
colonialism, I believe that some contentious issues relate quite well in this framework o f civil society (and 
democracy) promotion, in particular with regard to civil society and die impact of NGOs on the political process 
in developing countries. Some would oppose the positioning o f post-colonial within a wodd-system approach, 
since the former does not insist too heavily on economic and structural domination but highlights the cultural 
shortcomings between first world countries and developing states. Nevertheless, similarities in the conclusions 
between the two approaches led me to include them under the same heading.
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lies a form o f cultural and political imperialism by the first world. Therefore, both lines 
ultimately adopt a highly critical study o f the condition under which democratization takes 
place because the latter does not alter the structures of domination.
Hypotheses formulated here partly overlap with some constructivist studies that are more 
closely based on a poststructuralist theory, in the sense that they are concerned with the  
mechanisms interlinking power and the production of knowledge. As one o f the m ore 
classical world-system authors formulates it, behind democracy is a dominant discourse that 
promotes, under universalistic guise, a globalizing westernising (”occidentalisant*) force, which 
hides nothing but a capitalist logic (Amin 1999: 201 f). In the light o f  the discussion o n  
cultures (Section 1.1.), such a statement Ís rather problematic, since it implies between th e  
lines some artificial boundaries between a democratic west and a non-democratic periphery 
countries.
Hypotheses along this line of thinking would contend that by serving western interests, 
democracy promotion is more likely to have distorting effects on the domestic process by co ­
opting certain groups.64 The result is the creation of a specialized elite, which ran m ake 
alliances with local compradors. Democracy promotion, i f  practiced by core capitalist countries, 
aims at developing a strongly dependent economy in the (semi-)periphery. Opponents to th is  
approach, in turn, would work on the conscientization (awareness-raising) o f the lo ca l 
population towards the importance o f their independence (support o f trade unions). C iv il 
society has thus an important role in this context according to the Gramscian perspective 
which sees civil society as an important locus to conquer and reach political hegemony. 
Finally, one can expect that democracy promotion should have differentiated outcomes, 
according to whether efforts are concentrated on the periphery or the semi-periphery 
countries. In a semi-periphery, the logic would probably to lobby for the creation of a n  
internal elite that relays the interests o f the core countries.
c) Neo-liberal institutionalism
While neo-realists believe that states should protect themselves from one another, n eo ­
liberals, in their turn, think that states should provide the least interventionist framework, 
possible framework to protect individuals from one another. States are still important, b u t  
they must be complemented by the intervention of “transnational and sub-national actors”  
(Shaw 1994: 61 & 81). What matters is  the dispersion o f  power (through pluralism): on th e  
domestic level a variety of institutions should be active outside the state’s sphere (e.g.y po litica l
64 See for ex. (Chatterjee 2001: 172), who insists that political society is the sphere were such changes take place, 
and not in the tivil society sphere. Cf supra.
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patties and NGOs); on the international level “democracies would also be more inclined to 
international co-operation, as this represented an extension of internal bargaining 
procedures” (Gillepsie & Youngs 2002: 9). Thus, neo-liberals believe that both institutions 
and economic interdependence matter a great deaL
With regard to democratization, two points are worth making. First, the presence of 
international institutions can serve to promote democratic values, and indirectly constrain 
behaviours towards democracy. As Baldwin puts it, neo-liberals “insist more on the mitigating 
role of institutions over anarchy's constraints” (Baldwin 1993: 8). Second, market and 
economic cooperation can create common interests for large segments o f the international 
system, thus enhancing common measures towards democratic practices, and ultimately 
democratic peace. Kant, in his Zum eivigen Frieden (1795), is the first to explore the condition 
for a democratic peace, based on the conditions that “ the civil constitution of every state shall 
be republican” (1st definitive article, Kant 1991 [1795]: 99). This ascribes Kant to a liberal 
cosmopolitan school of thought, where democratic rationality goes along with shared 
international interests (Doyle 1997: 310).
It is important to stress the fact that neo-liberalism draws on methodological individualism. 
Thus, collective action is considered as the aggregation of individual actions (Corcuff 1995: 
14f), and structures matter less than in  a neo-realist paradigm (Halliday 2002:251). As a result 
of the view on individual actions, support for forms of pluralism and, hence, for civil society 
is a logical by-product of neo-liberal thinking, which ultimately adheres to the rational choice 
perspective, where actors constantly weigh costs and benefits. North’s argument o f path 
dependency can also be placed in this sub-section (North 1990). One of the roles o f 
institutions is to provide the frame for actions as well as the rules of the game, giving a sense 
of historical continuity (Tomquist 1999: 93-97). Thus a variety of institutions should be 
promoted, but mostly out o f the sphere of the state, because of the dominant view of 
governance (ib id : 131).
Neo-institutional hypotheses would expect that democracy and civil society promotion 
should favour forms enhancing pluralism within the state, but independent of the latter (as in 
the case of a commonly accepted definition of civil society). Democratization cannot be 
successful “through governmental agreements alone, but requires popular participation” 
(Junemann 2002: 87). Hence the insistence on bottom up approaches. Finally, the accent 





In what has been described as the founding article of the constructivist school, Wendt (1987) 
suggested taking an analytica l rather than a substantive stance to criticize what he saw as the 
leading but conflicting paradigms o f  IR, namely neo-realism and the world-system theory 
(Wendt 1987: 355). He labels “stmcturaftonism’’65 the efforts to give ontological status to 
both individuals and structures (ib id .: 335), in contrast to the state-centred realist approach 
and the danger of world-system theory reifying structures. Structurationism was later 
relabelled as ‘constructivism’ to highlight the fact “that the human world is not simply given 
and/or natural but that, on the contrary, the human world is one of artifice; that is 
‘constructed* through the actions o f  the actors themselves. [ ...]  The human world is the result 
o f the ‘praxis”’ (Fierke & Joergensen 2001:17).
One o f the many possible constructivist approaches would be to concentrate on the effects o f  
non-material and ideational factors upon the international system. Two approaches illustrate 
which elements can lead us to formulate hypotheses with regard to democratization. The first 
deals with transnationalism and the impact of international norms such as human rights and  
the defence o f the environment Authors like Keck Sc Sikkink (1998) and Risse Sc aL (1999) 
have investigated how transnational actors, such as advocacy NGOs, created space fo r 
political action in the domestic arena.66 Away from state structures, scholars adopting th is 
view are m ore interested in  what influences the interests o f actors and to what extent th e ir 
identity influences their decisions (Risse Sc aL 1999:8-9). The emergence of advocacy issues 
reflects the transformation o f new social movements, with a professionalization o f northern 
NGOs and their increasing influence upon policy makers (Guilhot 2001). It also reflects th e  
increasing northern concerns about issues such as human rights, environmental protection 
and gender equality (Pouligny 2001).
Another line privileged by constructivism is to look at the logic of appropriateness as this is  
done by Olsen, and the role and im pact of persuasion and rhetoric into political decisions (e.g . 
March & Olsen 1998: Checkel 2001). A final and recent study, in the line o f Katzenstein, 
deals with normative consistency and how institutional arrangements in Europe and the U SA  
(e.g.y the autonomy of central bank and civilian-military relations) are taken for granted an d  
adapted w ith a marriage o f local interests by democratizing countries (Epstein 2002a&b).
65 Drawing on the sociological findings o f Giddens and Bourdieu, the author argues “the structural properties o f  
social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute these system" (Wendt 
1987: 361).
66 Carothers rightly points out that advocacy NGOs have a "limited range of socio-political interests roughly 
conforming to the American liberal agenda” (Carothers 1999: 337).
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Constructivist hypotheses with regard to democratization w ill focus more precisely on 
domestic processes and actors, and on the impact of norms, ideas and language (as opposed 
to the analysis o f the structures, or o f the role of inter-dependence). A final difference 
between constructivism and neo-liberalism is that advocacy issues might lead to m ore state 
interventions, which is problematic for neo-liberals, apparently not so for constructivists. 
Hypotheses, in the line of constructivism thought, would expect that democracy promotion 
should give priority to NGO actors, preferably those acting in the advocacy field. Democracy 
promotion should enhance the understanding of local specificities (e.g. minorities) to improve 
the possibility o f  an adoption of international principles. Moreover, it should promote norms 
and practices that can relate to the local setting if  the overall desire is to see these norms 
being locally accepted.67
The following table sums up the m ain  arguments and points about the importance (or not) of 
democracy promotion (DP), in which it is assumed that civil society and in particular NGOs, 
have a role to play. Fieldwork elements discussed later w ill shed light on these various 
competing expectations and explanations.
67 See for example (Mendelson 2002: 241).
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Table 2: Possible outcomes o f civil society promotion according to four IR schools







DP should aim at 
developing (preferably 
strong) states with 
strong capabilities to 





nothing but a sub­
form of western 
structural domination 
that does not try to 
alter the unequal 
distribution o f 
resources.
Interdependence of a 
variety o f  actors is the key. 
Economic liberalization 
will lead to some form of 
political liberalization. The 
less intrusive the state, the 
better.
Concentration on the 
effects o f  non-material 
and ideational factors 












the local population 
towards their needed 
independence should 
be supported (e.g. 
trade unions)
DP should favour the 
creation o f institutions, 
which can play an 
important mitigating role in 
the international system; 
DP should favour forms 
enhancing pluralism within 
the state, but independent 
o f the latter.
Path dependency 
explanation
DP should promote the 
creation o f a variety o f 
institutions whose role is 
to adopt norms and 
practices that can relate 
to the local setting if  the 
overall desire is to see 
these norms being locally 
accepted
NGOs? Do not really matter
On a domestic level, 
DP should limit the 
number of counter­
power locus.
Do not really nutter 
(m a Marxist 
perspective. It would 
in a Gramsdan one)
Do cutter
DP should favour 
cosmopolitan elements and 
promote universal values
Do matter
Insistence on bottom up 
approaches
Importance o f advocacy 
issues.
TOP-DOWN Approach BOTTOM — UP Approach
What will be 
the outcome 
o f DPP? 
Some 
hypotheses
If DP creates a 
diversity of 
institutional actors, 
there will be conflict 
over their control 
between state and 
‘independent’ counter- 
power elements (e.g. 
NGOs).
DP thus reshapes the 
lines (or creates new 
lines) of power 
struggling inside the 
political arena.
NGOs will become an 
elite group (a 
transmission belt) to 
the capitalist 
domination, and will 
be driven away from 
their local duties and 
responsibilities.
DP mosdy favour 
sstructures and institutions 
that have the ability to 
conform to western liberal 
models (isomorphic 
condition).
NGOs should play a 
complementary role to the 
State (service-oriented).
NGOs likely to succeed 
and emerge with funding 
in the DP process are 
the ones led by NGO 
actors with connections 
to northern NGOs.
DP diverts NGO action 
from service to 
advocacy-type activities 
The likelihood for 
NGOs actors to receive 
DP funding is increased 
if  they have connections 
to foreign donors
These rough models and the final hypotheses should serve to understand which kinds o f  
strategies/approaches can be chosen by international actors when dealing with southern 
NGOs. Nevertheless, some questions are left out o f this IR overview. Let us see briefly w h a t 
are three o f the shortcomings of the study of civil society promotion with an IR perspective.
F irst of a ll, as pointed by Lukes as early as the 1970s, the whole pluralist paradigm is b ased  
on a simplified (‘mono-dimensional7) approach to power (Lukes 1974). Another problem  
linked to pluralism is to the quantity vs. quality o f civil society organizations (CSOs). In m an y  
places of the world, civil society assistance has paved the way for the creation o f many n ew  
NGOs. But too often (as in the Palestinian case), many NGOs do the same kind of w ork . 
Should it therefore be pluralism in mere numbers (quantity) or in types of NGOs and w o rk  
done (quality)? This is not a rhetorical question, since one of the basic assumptions o f
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pluralism and o f democracy for that matter, is that internal competition has also a positive 
role to play in terms of creativity and o f alternatives suggested in the definition of a common
Second, much o f the IK literature is deeply western-centric and cannot really take regional 
and cultural specificities onboard (or simply does not really care about the topic). How should 
international civil society assistance account for organizations, like Islamic ones, that 
voluntarily refuse to use or even openly oppose concepts that are acknowledged as ‘western’ 
such as democratization, civil society and the like? How to account for organizations resisting 
to isomorphic pressures? Should international civil society assistance promote political parties 
that do not fit western political party models? Even if  IR is about distribution of power in the 
international arena, there are finer and fluid issues that cannot be fully grasped (like the 
definition and perception of ‘civil society’).
2.4. Civil Society and Development Studies
To bridge the external dimension o f  civil society promotion with more substantial and 
domestic issues, a short literature review will be dedicated to the development studies 
literature. Because of the constant movement of back and forth between academic debates 
and empirically informed researches, ‘development studies’ can serve to spot some other 
tensions with application of civil society promotion. It can also hints at some forms of 
warning in the precise interaction between donors and NGOs, since the later has been a 
privileged vehicle o f doing development over the last decades.
Despite the fact that development studies is a pluri-disdplinary endeavour that stand at the 
cross-roads o f political science, history, human geography, sociology and economics 
(Tomquist 1999: 24), it would be excessive and erroneous to speak o f a dear distinction 
between theory and praxis in the case o f  development studies. On the contrary, there is often 
a very tight promiscuity between the two sides, in particular between some of the academic 
production and funding organizations.
The developmentalist approach has produced many reports and guiding frameworks to deal 
with, e.g.y civil society, which could be interpreted as a rather positive feature since it feeds the 
learning circle. Thus, many governmental institutions produce knowledge and reports on civil 
society and developmental projects, and some of the quoted works here are the by-product of 
research project financed by donor organizations. Tomquist’s Politics and Development, and 
Kumar’s PostconfHct E lections, D emocratization & International A ssistance are two examples of 
commissioned work for, respectively, the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA) and USAID. Other governmental institutes such as the Department for International
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Development (DfiD, from the UK), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) regularly publish 
books w ith a much broader readership than their professional targets. Non-govemmental 
centres also have published scores o f books and studies on civil society. Carothers’ Learning j 
Curve (1999) and Funding Virtue (2000) were both published for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Edwards & Hulme’s two books (Edwards M. & Hulme 1996 & 1997)
(Beyond th e M agic Bullet, and NGOs, S tates and Donors: Too Close f o r  Com forti) were the result o f  
conferences organized and convened by Save the Children UK. Other institutions have 
specialized in  this type o f publication. INTRAC, for example, is an Oxford-based “NGO 
supporting other NGOS”,68 which convenes conferences and debates on topics such 
organizational development, strengthening civil society and participatory development. Two 
books (edited by Clayton 1994; 1996) are the product o f INTRAC and they are very often 
quoted in  academic texts (NGOs, C ivil Society and the State, 1996, and G overnance, D emocracy a n d  
C onditionality, 1994). A brief overview o f who participated in some o f their conferences (see 
Clayton 1994:136), gives a sense o f the potentially wide impact of this type o f institutions can  
have upon development professionals. One can wonder whether the title Too C lose f o r  C om fort?  
(Edwards M . & Hulme 1997) could also apply, mutatis mutandis, for academic production an d  
decision-taking circles.
The sense here is that much of this literature conveys the same message: civil society (in  
which NGOs play a leading role) is indeed important, i f  not essential, for the spread o f  
democratization around the globe, in the credo of the last twenty years. Such a homogenous 
discourse posits the possible existence of an epistemic community (Haas 1992) around th e  
topic o f civ il society. Although Haas developed his concept around the issue o f international 
policy coordination, most of the conditions for an epistemic community  are m et in the case 
o f civil society: there is a “shared set o f normative and principled belief [ .. .] , a shared causal 
beliefs [ . . . ] ,  a shared notion of validity [ ...]  and a common policy enterprise” (Haas 1992: 3 ). 
Obviously, it is a difficult and impossible task to argue that all the (no ngo vernm en tal 
professionals have a common agenda vis-à-vis civil society. Differences do exist, but there a re  
nevertheless strong commonalties in  their approach to civil society assistance.
A short overview o f the history o f the developmental paradigm might give some hints at th e  
reason o f  these commonalities. The idea o f international aid and development as a n  
instrument o f  socio-political change dates back to the end of World W ar II. Econom ic 
development was then considered the best w*ay to reconstruct a viable international system —
68 INTRAC stands for the International NGO Training and Research Centre. See their website at 
wwwintrac.org.
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Keynesian politics being also applied in domestic welfarist policies at that time (Senisolla 
1999). Aid is intimately linked to the notion of development» and direct post-World W ar II 
period, with the Marshall Plan as a leading market-driven developmental plan to prevent the 
further spread o f communism (Cooper & Packard 1997: 7-8).69 Most famously, the school of 
thought of modernization was the first articulated paradigm and Upset’s 1959 seminal article 
is an innovative ideological contribution to that way of thinking. Neo-Marxists (and in 
particular dependency theory and a world-system view a la Wallerstein) opposed the “crypto­
imperialist” views o f the modernists (Schuurman 2002: 12). Twenty years later, a similar clash 
took place between neo-liberals calling for a globalized development creating more 
interdependence through institutions, and post-modernists who were prompt to criticize the 
Euro-centric development line o f thinking (Munck & O’Heam 1999). Part of the 
deconstructionist enterprise of post-modernism was precisely about questions such as 
‘development’, anthropology as colonization of the mind, or the “Enlightenment ideal of the 
emancipation o f humanity” (Schuurman 2002: 13). Again development is seen as a form of 
domination (or will thereof of the ‘first’ world over third world countries.70 The current re- 
emergence of modernization tenants (for some ‘neo-moderaization’, see Blaney & Inayatullah 
2002) and the critique against US imperialism bom after 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, are, in a way, nothing but a renewal of the debates of the 1960s and 1970s. The 
various developmentalist schools o f thought reflect nothing but the dominant paradigms that 
clashed in the second half of the last century. It is difficult therefore to envisage a free- 
floating developmental discourse that is independent from wider issues o f power. The case 
study of the World Bank (as a leading financial development agency) and its views on civil 
society is a perfect illustration of th a t
The argument for the potential existence o f an epistemic community is even mote striking in 
the case o f the World Bank with regards to civil society. W hen it was set within the Bretton 
Woods Agreements framework in 1944, the World Bank was meant to be a purely financial 
institution. To ensure the neutrality o f  the Bank, regulating articles made dear that the World 
Bank was “not supposed to implement non-economic measures” (Williams & Young 1994: 
85). The following excerpts (taken from the World Bank’s web pages on civil society whose
69 For a further critique of the colonial context in which development can be understood, see Cooper & Packard 
(1997). For a classical account of how economic development was a pre-requisite for democracy in the context 
of the Cold War, see Lipset 1959. The works o f W.W. Rostow were also very important for the spread of 
modernization theories.
70 The names themselves of ‘first’ and ‘third’ world testify to the Cold War ideological context in which they 
were forged.
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activities axe fully funded by the Bank) demonstrate that it is far away from the ‘non­
economic neutrality’ it is supposed to have:
What is Civil Society?
Civil society consists of the groups and organizations, both formal and informal, which act 
independently of the state and market to promote diverse interests in society. Social capital, the 
informal relations and trust which bring people together to take action, is crucial to the success 
of any non-governmental organization because it provides opportunities for participation and 
gives voice to those who may be locked out of more formal avenues to affect change.HSocial Capital and Civil Society Can Promote Welfare and Economic Development
When die state is weak or not interested, civil society and the social capital it engenders can be a 
crucial provider of informal social insurance and can facilitate economic development
Social Capital and Civil Society Can Strengthen Democracy or Promote Change
A strong civil society has the potential to hold government and the private sector accountable. 
Civil society can be a crucial provider of government legitimacy.
Putnam's seminal work Making Democracy Work (1993) shows that citizens who are active in local 
organizations, even non-political ones, tend to take a greater interest in public affairs. T h is 
interest, coupled with interpersonal social capital between government officials and other 
citizens which is fostered when both belong to the same groups and associations, renders the 
government more accountable.
Civil society gives a voice to the people, elicits participation and can pressure the state.71 
Here, civil society can “promote welfare” or democratization; it “generates social capital”  
which in turn is a “successful” component of “economic development”; it can “pressure th e  
state” and almost “substitute for the state”. The impression is now that, for the W orld B a n k , 
civil society and its compagnon de route - social capital, as defined by Putnam - are true agents o f  
change and are bestowed an important mission.
These concepts are intimately linked to the so-called Washington consensus,72 where the sh if t  
from modernization to neo-liberalism is completed. The state, which was difficult to c ritic ize  
under the paradigm of modernization (because it was seen as an agent o f change and becau se  
the context o f the Cold war did not really permit attacks to the state in general), becomes th e  
main target o f neo-liberal practices and theories. W ith the "End of History1, there seemed to  
be no necessary justification - but to invoke its name - for the definitive success o f the n e o ­
liberal project, which had become l'horizon indépassable, appeared undisputed (Fukuyama 1992). 
In this context, the pluralist dimension of civil society, and its (for some ‘per definition’73)  
opposition to the state, makes o f  the concept a very good entry point to implement n e o ­
liberal (and anti-statist) policies. I f  the Washington consensus was best described as aggressive
71 See http://www.woddbank.org/wbp/scapital/sources/dvUl.htm and 
http://www.woridbank.org/wbp/scapitai/ sources/dvil2.htm.
72 For a brief overview o f the content and context of the Washington consensus, see (Fine 2001: 132), or 
(Dezalay & Garth, 1998).
73 At least this is the result o f a reductionist reading o f the concept that has been repeated over the last decades. 
But the overview of the origins of the concept demonstrated that there is another substance to the concept, 
namely the ways about which a collectivity is organized in the pursuit of a common good.
68
neo-liberal policies, pro-market-driven, and led by narrowly economists and monetarists, the 
so-called post-Washington consensus re-discovered political institutions, and incorporated 
more elaborate elements of civil society, into a “single, coherent and marketable agenda, 
encapsulated in  the notion of ‘good governance’. Always a prescriptive institution, the Bank 
became a normative agency, involved in the promotion of political participation, 
transparency, accountability or the rule o f law. [...] The promotion of economic liberalization 
was successfully converted into a struggle for freedom and rights” (Guilhot, 2001: 232f). A 
long-time observer o f the World Bank’s policies has recently argued that the change from the 
Washington consensus to the Post-Washington consensus has to do with corrections made in 
the approach to development. The World Bank had to take the imperfections o f a purely 
economic approach into consideration and had to develop a “more state-friendly and more 
sodal-friendly” approach. The key idea is a complementary dimension where “social, and 
covert political, engineering is to complement economic engineering, with social capital 
providing a client-friendly rhetoric” (Fine 2001:20).
Social capital has made its way to the fore, as much as civil society did a decade ago. This fact 
expresses both the large success of the neo-liberal programme, but also the shortcomings and 
the imperfections provoked by the latter. Social capital is “important to the efficient 
functioning o f modem economies and is the sine qua non o f stable liberal democracy. [...] 
Building social capital has typically been seen as task for ‘second generation’ economic 
reform” (Fukuyama, 2000: 3). Gradually, development, as promoted by the Washington 
institutions, fares well from the pure economic dimension to get closer to political 
development
Putnam’s M aking Democracy Work (1993) has had a tremendous impact on the debate and was 
‘recycled’, despite its shortcomings, in the developmental literature as an example of how 
important is the concept of social capital and civic participation for stability o f and trust in 
government In the USA, this book and Putnam’s Bowling A .lone (2000) sparkled a wide debate 
on the alleged decrease of the civil and civic life in the United States, the cradle o f the “art of 
association” as described by Tocqueville. <
Putnam adopts a functional view on social capital, which is quite different from that o f the 
concept’s founder, Pierre Bourdieu. In the latter’s understanding, social capital is studied on 
the individual level (micro-level) and is best explained with reference to social constructivism. 
Putnam (making reference to Coleman) deals more with meso-level, and wants to 
demonstrate why Northern Italy has been more successful than the South in its development 
According to him, it is “because it has enjoyed superior levels of social capital. More
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specifically, social capital is identified -with the formation o f associations w ithin civil society, 
in the interstices between government and economy. Such civic, so-called horizontal, 
associations prospered, along with democracy and growth, in the north as opposed to th e  
south. In other words, social capital makes both the government, and hence the economy, 
work better” (Fine 2001: 85).
That is obviously a problematic reading, because it does not look at the original unequal 
distribution of resources, and proves to offer a  very deterministic interpretation. Putnam’s  
trust in social capital could also be dismissed w ith regard to the fascist experience, w h ere  
social capital and civil society failed to denounce the dominance o f the state’s pow er. 
Nevertheless, Putnam’s work makes its way as a p iece  incontoumabk  in the literature quoted a n d  
suggested by the World Bank, which enlarged the content o f its civil society web pages w ith  
some explanations on the importance of social capital in  1998 (see supra). This reading is  
actually concomitant with the methodological individualism adopted in the post-W ashington 
consensus, where society is seen as the aggregation o f behaviour o f individuals, and which is  
linked to rational choice, and maximization theories (Fine 2001: 143). From there, the step to  
governance is easily taken, since the latter, which can be understood as “the conscious 
management o f regime structures w ith a view to enhancing the legitimacy o f the p u b lic  
realm”, through human agency rather than formal state institutions (Hyden &  Bratton 1992 : 
7&5). With the post-Washington consensus, “the scope for intervention and the rationale fo r  
it are both widened and deepened. Policies can be designed to be either market-strengthening, 
or market-correcting. Avenues for investments are unlimited. In addition, they le a v e  
considerable room for discretion and for more extensive intervention on *dvil s o c i e t y for n o n ­
market responses to market imperfections are fair game for improvement” (Fine 2001: 1 5 3 , 
my emphasis).
This over-determination and re-framing o f the discourse o f  civil society in  terms o f econom ic 
imperatives is also highlighted by Beckman (Beckman 1997: 2) who regrets that this very fa c t  
then discredits the whole concept when applied in  a transcultural setting.74 Roy makes a  
similar argument about civil society promotion and development in Central Asia b ecause  
what eventually matters is not the real attainment o f  some forms o f consolidated civil so c ie ty , 
but rather economic objectives, namely structural adjustment programmes (Roy O. 2002a& b). 
In such cases, civil society serves to hide more structural interventions and not the pursuit o f  
democracy.
74 Local actors very quickly perceive the duality o f discourse o f civil society and this can contribute to its 
discrediting.
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The World Bank and international financial institutions have been an easy target for 
academics and have been accused of more than what they have really done (or wanted to do). 
Nevertheless, there is a sense that the view adopted on civil society by the World Bank has 
been largely influential Even southern NGOs are very familiar with the parlance of the 
World Bank, either through the necessity of speaking the same language (to receive funding), 
or because of the training courses given by large developmental organization in proposal 
writing or related topics. As we shall see in the Palestinian case, large and influential 
development institutions, thanks to their donor status, have a variety of means and resources 
to steer the course of the discourses o f civil society. In particular, the differentiated capacity 
that some local actors (in that case Palestinian NGO activists) have to connect to (to use 
Amselle’s idea o f branchement)ls or click upon the widely accessible répertoire o f the World Bank, 
makes the work o f  propagation of such limiting definitions o f civil society much easier (see 
Sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3). The line of reasoning, or World Bank's parlance, is not im posed upon 
local actors, but is simply re-appropriated by different actors in  another institutional setting. 
Funding then functions to grease the machinery. ...
But the way the World Bank uses the concept of civil society is problematic in at least two 
ways: first, it entails serious assumptions that make it norm ative (and somehow instrumental), 
and, secondly, it bears a heavy degree o f ethnocentrism.
The analysis o f the evolution of the concept of civil society and its intricate relation with 
social capital and governance has demonstrated how the evolution is deeply related with the 
dominant paradigms of the 1980s and 1990s. Civil society is therefore a good framework to 
indirectly attack the state without appearing to totally retreat from aid, intervention and 
development efforts. Another assumption is that civil society is entrusted with too much of a 
clear Junction  that of defending civil liberties, and protecting citizens from state's abuses. 
There is a dimension of checks and balances, which would refer to Montesquieu, or to some 
extent to Locke and the early thinkers o f civil society (in its contraposition to the state of 
nature). Putnam’s view is to that extent clear civil society and social capital are key 
prerequisites to democracy. This functionalist reading of the W orld Bank (and others) is not 
the only possible interpretation. Just to cite another interpretation, in a Gramscian view, civil 
society could be seen as an emancipating force in the fight for hegemony, with no dear 
function assigned but to provide a sphere for the struggle over hegemony.
Conceptualized and debated later by (mostly) Western thinkers, the notion of ‘civil society’ is 
now given a life o f its own and is expected to act as a transforming agent in other (political 75
75 See Anns d ie  2001 and Section 1.1.
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and socio-cultural) settings, and in other historical contexts.76 But, as Seligman puts it, can we 
divorce ‘civil society’ from the western history and context (Seligman 1995: 201f)? A Muslim 
Turkish scholar expressed strong views about this question: Civil society is “a Western dream, 
a Western telof*  (Mardin 1995: 278f). The normative dimension is a well-spread one in most 
o f the literature on democratization, as much as it was under the modernization paradigm: 
western liberal entities set the model, and the rest of the world follows.
There still remains to cut into the thorny issue of whether this imposition of models by 
dominant actors is suffering from ethno-centrism or from euro-centrism. The first should be 
understood as a general attitude “characterized by or based on the attitude that one's own 
group is superior”,77 whereas the second is an attitude o f superiority of a precise socio- 
geographical context, namely Europe, which, in  this reading, becomes seen as the main and 
determined cradle for this alleged superiority. The differentiation is crucial within a 
transcultural setting. By sustaining the eurocentric argument, one indirectly sustains that there 
are clear delineated entities and, through extension of the reasoning, civil society is linked to 
European history.78 The ethnocentric view, on the contrary, implies a more general and 
abstract level of approaching concepts with alleged universal characters.
As argued later, civil society is already too m uch engorged and full o f ethnocentric dangers, 
because of its origin, and for its predicate ‘civil’ which seems to hint more at ‘civilized’ than at 
‘civic’. Civil society is a concept that, as we w ill see in the study o f  civil society within the 
Arab-Muslim intellectual debates (Chapter 3), is clearly loaded with ethnocentrism but that 
should not be interpreted as eurocentric.
Another dimension o f normativeness is the problem of what can be termed circular thinking. 
One takes some features o f a phenomenon and then makes o f  them the basis or the 
prerequisites to introduce changes, whereas, the features have, by definition, been resulting 
from a long process. In Eberly’s words, the problem is that civil society “often takes its 
definition from the things - namely, the tasks - one has in  mind seeing performed by civil 
society” (Eberly 2000: 6). We are not far away from the paradox previously enounced by
76 Chiodi, in her research on transnational civil society promotion in Albania applies Chakrabarty’s concept o f  
‘hyperreality’ to describe this phenomenon (Chiodi 2005).
77 Definition taken from the Collegiate Dictionary.
78 Such views can lead to the formulation of research questions of the kind: Have Palestinian NGOs internalized 
the notions and/or contents o f civil society, or have they just instmmentalize them in the process o f asymmetric 
exchanges characterizing development? Incidentally, this was the original research question for this dissertation, 
but since then, clear distance was taken since that type of question implies that Palestinian NGO activists did not 
have or were notfamiHar at a ll with notions o f civil society before their encounter with the topic through their interaction with 
international (read western) donors. I believe this is an incorrect way to ask the question. The analysis of the evolution 
of the entry ‘civil society’ in the Palestinian jargon demonstrates this point (see Section 6.2.3.a-c).
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Walzer: which o f the (democratic) state or o f the civil society comes first? For the W orld 
Bank, there seems to have no doubt about the protogenesis o f civil society.
A  final normative view o f the World Bank is related to the functional approach assigned by 
Putnam’s hypothesis o f  social capital. Civil society is here taken as a set of institutions, rather 
than a process. This interpretation is important because it entrusts NGOs and formal 
organization to ‘speak* and ‘act* on behalf o f the ‘civil society*, in moves and developmental 
projects aiming to correct or influence formal and informal economic practices, in  an attempt 
to replace or rather to amend the state*s activities.
It is the very nature o f development to link the richest (western) countries to the rest o f  the 
‘developing* world. This inevitably leads to a form of clashing views, cultures and political 
references. Because o f the various assumptions and normative expectations that civil society 
entails, the application o f ‘civil society* as suggested by the World Bank leads to some forms 
o f ethnocentrism, nolens volensP  Since the World Bank has assigned to ‘civil society* an 
instrumental function, it must logically have an aim to fulfil. W ith the collapse o f  the 
Communist Empire, leading figures of such institutions make little secret of their belief that 
modem liberal democracy is the unique telos. Part of the difficulty in  deciding whether the 
type of discourse put forward by the World Bank is ethno- or euro-centrism, is the 
overlapping o f two telor. a geographic one — Europe, or the ‘west’, and a economic-political 
one — modem liberalism.
Beyond the particular approach o f the World Bank and its limited view on civil society, 
development studies have nevertheless managed to offer some more positive (because 
constructive) views on the question of civil society. There is a growing concern that the way 
o f  approaching civil society and NGO assistance is not satisfactory.
In particular some authors have critically assessed how grand schemes of ‘development* 
promoted by large financial development institutions contribute to a depoliticization within 
certain domestic contexts (Ferguson 1990). Other researchers have produced alarming 
reports on how the hegemonic discourse on civil society can have negative effects when 
taking a step back from the transnational context is which this discourse is defined. Brand 
(2001) and Chatelard (2004a) in Jordan (both anthropologists stressing how NGOs are rather 
GINGOs, governmental NGOs), Hudock (1999: northern-southern NGOs) are all examples 
o f  this growing literature, that has a rather anthropological grounding. Mendelson (2002) is 
another case in point, but with a wider international politics perspective. Some scholars 
dealing with democratization and transition studies are indeed also critical o f some simple 79
79 It is difficult to  say i f  th is is  done on purpose. In any case, it can be stated that it  fits its purpose to en ter in to  
non-econom ic fields o f  intervention.
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interpretation and straightforward positive views on civil society (Chatterjee 2001, Schmitter 
1997, Kumar 2001, just to name a few).
Throughout the thesis, a distinction has been drawn between northern and southern NGOs. 
It is very important to make an analytical difference between the two, as suggested by 
Hudock (1999). She correcdy points out that “the way most NGOs seek and receive 
resources from their external environments subjects them to ex ternal control and leaves them 
unable to contribute to the process of dvil society development by empowering people to 
voice their own needs and to make claims on government to meet those needs”.80 Justifying 
elements behind this distinction stem from the different level o f institutionalization (more 
advanced for northern NGOs), modes and patterns of funding, a different relationship to 
their respective government (closer for northern NGOs).
The distorted and frequent result o f external NGO assistance is that prominent southern 
organizations are a core group of elite NGOs w ith connections abroad, namely with northern 
NGOs (Hudock 1999: 3, 11). The problem w ith that (encapsulated in  the subtitle o f her 
book), is that only these few elite NGOs promote democracy because of/thanks to their 
proximity to the donors. But as she notes, it w ould take more th a n  that to have a profound 
democratizing impact: “Southern NGOs contribute to civil society only when they build 
organizational capacity at the com m un ity  level, develop replicable service delivery models, 
and contribute to policy debates” {ibid: 16). I f  only a few NGOs manage to exploit political 
opportunities and the framing process, and this at the expense o f less experienced and often 
smaller NGOs, then external assistance will have only partly succeeded. Therefore one needs 
to discover what makes people successful or not, through a study o f personal trajectories.81 
Developmentalist literature can also offer rich inputs and insights into practical experiences. 
For example, it can inform and make donors and practitioners sensitive to the fact that 
development programs differ if  done in low-income countries, or middle-income countries.82 
Programs towards education and health will be differendy oriented according to the category 
of income. Similarly, one can imagine different approaches to civil society on this basis. 
Health, to take one example relevant for this research, will not just concentrate on 
malnutrition or primary health care facilities in  middle-income countries (Ensor & W itter 
2001); rather, one can imagine having health programs serving a complementary role with 
that of the state or, on the contrary, ru n n in g  contrary to state elites’ interests (Stark 1985). In
80 My emphasis (Hudock 1999; 2). Note that the argument is dose to that o f the world-dependency theory, 
although she uses a neo-liberal framework to study organization inter-dependence.
81 In that sense, die notion of individual social capital (as defined by Bourdieu) on a micro-level becomes an 
interesting tool {eg. through prosopography).
82 For a description of these categories, see Appendix IV.
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other words, health can be an entry point into politics, or can also serve to hide political 
factors (Jabbour 2003).
Each case of civil society promotion and development project is actually unique, and that has 
to inspire us not to be influenced by fixed and ready-made concepts. One of the main 
problems of theory and m oderation  is to lose in specificities, timing being one. As 
highlighted previously, there lies in much o f the IR literature the problem of chronofetishist 
and tempocentrist interpretation, where the present is sealed off from a remote and somehow 
‘ideal-typicized’ past (Hobden & Hobson 2002: l l ) . 83 It might be trivial to say that, but two 
points are worthwhile noting here with regards to the question o f  timing.
Much of the literature on civil society promotion is based on the very assumption that money 
spent by international donors will have an effect on political change in the country where the 
money is spent At first glance, the idea is simple: money buys programs that, in turn, should 
have an impact But is it really so? Must money precede, or does it tend to follow founding 
events? This is a thin line especially as it is difficult to really prove that money consolidates 
rather than provokes changes in a given polity. In the case of Palestine, preliminary findings 
suggest that most o f the donors arrived only after the signing o f Oslo.84 The form o f 
conditionality that ensued was that money would be only given to local civil society 
organizations uncritically supportive of the peace process (Hanafi &  Tabar 2002). Therefore it 
is important to study when donors arrived and not just when local NGOs were created.
A related question o f the difficult timing and of the danger o f  adopting a fixed view is 
embodied in the question of conflict/post-conflict aid. Some guidelines exist and recommend 
differentiated approaches. Thus OECD’s Comité d’Aide au Développement recommends, 
right after a conflict is ended, the descending priorities or action (Mooney 1995):
Re-establish economic capacities
State institutions to ensure inner security and then rule o f law 
Reintegration o f displaced/refugee population 
Reinsertion o f former fighters 
Disposal of land mines (where necessary)
As it appears, civil society it not on top o f this list o f priorities, even though humanitarian 
assistance can, in the case of destroyed state infrastructures and capacities, function as
83 This applies m ostly to  the neo-realist thinkers, such  as W altz, for whom  the p ast is repetitive, continuously 
exhibiting a struggle o f  power.
84 M oney was thus spent to consolidate a  very bad and  poor agreem ent that m an y  observers denounced as 
beating its own seeds for future failure. For a d iscussion  on the predictable fa ilu re o f  Oslo, see various 
contributions in  Carey's ed ited volume (2001), and K han  &  aL 2004. On the yea rs  o f  arrival o f  international 
donors, see Section 5.4.1.
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channels for aid assistance. In any case, coordination among donors is called for by all sides 
to enhance the efficiency of the humanitarian assistance (Mooney 1995; Macrae 2002). Most 
o f the literature dealing with external assistance for civil society assumes that financial help 
w ill come either after a conflict, or at least in  a period o f relative calm that is conducive to 
political change.
W hat does the literature say about such a change from a post-conflict to conflict situation, 
whereas one expects to have the change from conflict to post-conflict? What does this 
unexpected sequence mean for civil society that was the main (or one o f the main) target of 
post-conflict foreign aid? What does it mean for advocacy NGOs and other NGOs active in 
democracy promotion? What does it mean for the community of (western) funding 
organizations?
Specialized literature deals with this type o f problem. For example, a recent report on 
humanitarian aid in  conflict times spots the trend of having a bilateralization of funding, 
rather than a multilateral type o f funding (Macrae 2002: 12). W hat are the likely impacts of 
these changes? W hat are the likely impacts on organizational arrangements and 
transformations? Therefore the study suggested in  the light o f Kriesi’s work on the evolution 
of social movements organizations can take another dimension by including this question of 
timing in external assistance (Kriesi 1996:152-184; Section 7.2.3). Can this shift conflict/post- 
conflict become an intervening variable on which NGOs becomes what? Parts o f the 
following chapters w ill show the limits and shortcomings o f adopting too a fixed view.
2.5. Civil Society as a Source of Autonomy
As the anthropologist Harm has suggested, civil society is “riddled with contradictions and 
the current vogue predicated on a fundamental ethnocentridty.” Yet, the concept is so used 
that it would be difficult to get rid o f i t  Hann suggests working to make the “concept more 
supple and serviceable in the context especially of non-Westem cultures” (Hann & Dunn 
1996). Eisenstadt and others (Hoexter & aL 2002) have indeed done this work, by stressing 
that the Hegel’s conceptualizations o f civil society might have been right for some parts of 
Europe but not for others for the reason that the state takes many forms and can have 
therefore different influence on civil society (Eisenstadt 2002: 139). Two alternative roads 
exist: that o f  Eisenstadt to stress the multiple roads to modemity/ies, or the one that stresses 
a political project aim ing at democracy and autonomy that is common across time and space. 
In other words, the emphasis can be put on the sim ilitudes rather than on the dividing lines 
(Section 1.1).
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Here we again touch on the question o f cultural/time relativism. A Turkish scholar pointed 
out that the ‘ ‘Western dream [of civil society]” transforming into reality does not “translate, 
for instance, into Islamic terms”, even if  attempts of modernization took place in the 19th 
century (the so-called Ottoman taw gm al). With a certain elegance, the author points to a 
possible reason for the failure of the process of ‘modernizing’ the Ottoman Empire according 
to western standards (development of a rationality and bureaucratization of the state agency): 
“The Ottoman bureaucrats still had both feet in the Ottoman view of a social collectivity 
made up of subjects ra th er than d ti^ en f (Mardin 1995:278-293, my emphasis).85 
A recent volume on civil society and its use in non-Westem perspectives, deals precisely with 
the question o f ethnocentrism. Goody points out that “the Western orientation embedded in 
the notion o f ‘civil society’ is not of course necessarily an impediment to its use.” He adds: 
“Indeed there is a kind of moral evaluation attached to the very concepts of civility, 
rationality, and enlightenment, qualities that are seen as contributing to the so-called 
European miracle and that are necessarily unique to the W est That approach makes for an 
ethnocentric and suspect social science which does little to clarify the analysis o f the 
undoubted achievements that took place at that time, but which must be seen in the light not 
only of those of ancient Greece, but o f those of earlier Mesopotamia, o f the Arab Middle 
East and of Tang and Sung China” (Goody 2001 :151&153).
The problem o f ethnocentrism is twofold. On one hand, there is a form of ‘active* 
ethnocentrism, where a concept such as civil society is taken out o f its context and exported 
elsewhere, with a whole array o f assumptions and simplifications (as in the case of the W orld 
Bank). On the second hand, the belief that this concept may prove positive, say, for the 
democratization process in a developing country, is also potentially suffering from a ‘passive’ 
form of ethnocentrism. By that, one should understand that writers and possibly World Bank 
program directors could fall into the trap of distorted knowledge on developing regions. A 
good set o f example o f this kind o f mistake is easily noticeable in the Middle Eastern 
situation, where it is often said that countries will never achieve forms of democratization 
because of Islam and its alleged political and holistic overtones. This is of course an 
essentialist discourse with some moral or ethnocentric judgements, that intellectuals like Said 
(1978) have labelled ‘Orientalism*.
A  solution to these shortcomings o f civil society and of its inherent ethnocentrism is to 
search for sim ilitudes within civil society, that is, as much as possible, liberated from the 
restrictions o f a pre-determined historical or geographical limit. In that sense this gives way to
85 Note the parallel to  H ussein  1993.
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a reinterpretation o f civil society as an endeavour to organize collectively forms o f socio­
political mobilization towards autonomy and democracy.
As stressed in the passage about the origins o f ‘civil society’, the notion ‘V as first proposed 
to explore the possibility and limits o f collective self-determination on the eve of the 
‘democratic revolutions’” (Terrier & Wagner 2005a) and its re-appearance in  the 1980s 
coincided with a renewed focus on democracy.
To approach civil society through the lens o f autonomy is a way to link it to the increasingly 
transnational context in which civil society promotion takes place. Notwithstanding the 
tensions arising from an external support for what is mosdy a domestic process, one can 
come up with few basic characteristics o f what civil society should be about. A way to 
incorporate these two dimensions (internal construction and external push for civil society) is 
to tie the concept o f civil society with that o f autonomy.
Rousseau’s Contrat S ocia l lays the cornerstone of the notion political autonomy (Rousseau 
2001 [1758]). By studying the models and modalities o f political society, Geneva’s famous 
thinker actually highlights both the strength o f social contract and the limits o f the ‘volonté 
gén éra le* or the ‘general will’ (best encapsulated in the opening sentence).86 The voluntary 
gathering o f individuals into a social contract is the best way to assure the preservation o f 
(wo)mankind (Rousseau 2001 [1758]: chap. VI). The ultimate test o f  human freedom resides 
in the fact that the group Tétai c iv il1) has the capacity to give and agree on its own laws. This 
capacity is nothing else than the concept o f  autonomy. In this process, the participation o f 
each member of the social contract is the necessary component to this process o f  legislation. 
It is precisely this positive feature that determines, for Rousseau, whether there is a social 
pact, and not, as in  Hobbes’ view, whether a ‘commonwealth’ has been established to escape 
the state o f nature in  which men are at war with each other.
A further elaboration o f the concept of autonomy which can promote crucial understanding 
to the possible link between autonomy and contemporary civil society is provided by 
Castoriadis. In his many writings, at the crossroads o f political theory but also largely 
influenced by psychoanalytical tools, he defines autonomy o f a society as its capacity o f auto­
institution, and not just in terms o f giving its own laws (Castoriadis 1986: 518). The process 
o f auto-institution implies the capacity for societies to open lj “call into question their own 
institution, their representation of the world, their social imaginary significations” (Castoriadis 
1997: 17). Closure and open-ness are key for Castoriadis’s understanding o f autonomy 
(envisaged as a radical project): closure means here the fact that a given society does not have
86 “L ’hommes est n é Bbre, e t partout i l  est dans lesferT  {Rousseau 2001:46).
78
the possibilities to chose the ways and means in which they reflect about themselves. Closure 
implies therefore a form of heteronomy, that is the law o f others imposed on this society. On 
the contrary, openness is important not only in terms o f choosing its institutional setting but 
also on an “informational and cognitive” level (Castoriadis 1986: 513).87 
In our study o f civil society, such elements become important in order to grasp the fact that a 
(civil) society not only must have the possibility to choose and define its own laws, but in 
order to do so, it m ust also be free to imagine these laws according to its chosen cognitive 
and ideational means. In other words, promoting political autonomy can only be done if  this 
is done in agreement with the chosen beliefs and institutions o f a given society.
In the case o f transnational civil society, there is no autonomy if  this translates into the 
imposition o f  norms, values, or institutions that do not fit the ways in which a given civil 
society would like to imagine itself. Language, in particular, is very important in  the 
conception o f Castoriadis to reach autonomy.88 The attention paid therefore to language is 
not just about a question o f ‘translation’, but also of semantic and how certain concepts are 
perceived within and by different social realms.89
Put in a nutshell, civil society promotion should be twice careful. On the one hand, it is an 
invitation for socio-political actors to participate in the definition of a variety of political 
projects that can contribute to a democratic life. On the other hand, civil society promotion 
has to take the differences in which a society chooses to define itself into account, without 
which there can not be full autonomy. The work on sim ilitudes is here again useful: one can 
stress the common interests o f any society to choose and opt for a positive, pluralist and 
democratic political system, but one should not insist too much on imposing fixed 
approaches and definitions and on stressing dimensions of difference that eventually would 
result in some forms o f estrangement by large sections o f this society.
This excursus is to stress that autonomy has a dual nature. There must be an *autonomy jrvm*\si 
order to have the *autonomy to*. It is not thinkable to qualify as autonomous a polity or a social 
group that does not have the two dimensions of autonomy. It is essential for this research to 
assume that civil society (of any polity) to be one of the places of the foundation for 
autonomy, and that it has to a role to play in this process.
87 I am fully aware that Castoriadis believes that such a process of auto-institution is not possible in what he 
terms archaic and traditional societies, precisely because they are, in his view, closed (Castoriadis 1986: 514). 
However, I believe that, along the lines o f Houston 2004, there is too much o f  determinism in defining a society 
‘traditional’ or ‘archaic’, and in particular by defining it so because o f the heteronomy imposed by religion.
88 See, e.g. his Pinsdtution et l ’imagnairet in (Castomdis 1999:171 ff, in particular 174).
89 On the role of language as a source o f estrangement, see (Ghalioun 2000: 26f).
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Such an approach would allow taking the variety of cultural approaches and common re­
definition o f a substantial content to civil society into consideration. One would thus avoid 
putting aside too easily communal, parochial and/or ‘traditional’ forms of organizations as 
‘non-modem’ and therefore not belonging to a too strict definition of civil society. 
Communalism in various cultural contexts can be a means to obtain political legitimacy 
(Hank 2003: 30) and that should be considered even more if  it is a basis for the definition o f 
an autonomous political project90 Similarly, concepts such as individualism, secularism and 
egalitarianism91 have not always been part of western societies and it would be wrong to assume 
that they must pre-exist in order to have a civil society. This argument is consistent w ith the 
view put forward by Hussein (1993), who speaks both of cultural differences and of common 
aspirations in societies o f the ‘south’. This is the matter of concern o f the following chapter.
90 See some examples o f  this argument in Salvatore 8c Eickelmann 2004, and in Hoextei & a l 2002.
911 am indebted to the text o f  (Hank 2003:11) for this selection of 'dominant ideological principles in western 
cultures’.
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Chapter  III: C ivil Society and the Arab  Middle- 
East
Vs there a civil society in Islam? Are Islam and democracy incompatible? [...}  
Such questions usually bring astonishment, or at least skeptiscism. 
Even a cursory look a t the Arab world, however, w ill show how much the Arab people, 
including the majority o f fundamentalists, are interested in dem ocracy 
and the construction o f civil societies in the ir po litica l life ’
(Moussalli 1995:79)
'[. ..] Islam combines the theocentrism o f Christianity with the legalism o f Judaism.
The result is a legal blueprint o f social order; 
which stands above mere power and political authority '
(Gellner 1994:17)
•In sum, neither the concept nor the function o f civil society as a complex o f social institutions 
and groups countervailing the state is  alien to the Muslim countries'
(Kamaii 2003(2001]: 104)
A s stressed in  the previous chapter, civil society can be attributed many different meanings, 
all based on different philosophical and/or theoretical grounds, as well as practical fields {jus 
naturaUs, Hegelian perspective, Gramscian, liberal, functionalist, developmentalist, 
democratization, etc). This polysemy actually is one of the reasons for the difficulties to pin 
down a precise definition and delineate clear limits to the concept Another problem is its 
intrinsic link and co-substance with the gradual emergence of modem democratic polities in 
the largely liberal western world.
These difficulties later remerge when applying the concept in a non-Westem context The 
theoretical debates about Middle Eastern civil society illustrate these aporias. From the 1980s 
onwards a vast amount of literature was produced more specifically about the existence or 
not of an intersection between ‘civil society’ and ‘Arab Middle-Eastern politics’. Is there an 
Arab civil society? Can there be a Muslim civil society?
The purpose of this chapter is not only to critically discuss this literature from a western 
perspective, but also to stress the local Middle Eastern perceptions of the debate and Arab 
Middle Eastern intellectuals’ conception o f civil society. Therefore, the first sub-section of 
this chapter will deal with western knowledge about the oriental/A xsb civil society (and in
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particular a discussion of Orientalist and neo-Orientalist arguments) and the second with 
some Arab Middle Eastern authors (Sa’ad ed-din Ibrahim, Azmi Bishara, Burhan Ghalioun) 
conceptualising civil society and offering cutting points to the limits o f civil society/non-civil 
society.
3.1. Is Civil Society Problematic in the Arab Middle East?
3.1.1. Thinking in simplifying blocks
According to the Freedom House’s surveys, Muslim countries lag way behind the rest o f the 
world in terms o f democratization (Karatnycky 2002). No need to take this quite problematic 
way of ‘measuring* the advancement o f democracy around the globe,92 the fact that 
democracy is not (yet) widespread in the Middle East may lead students of the region to 
conclude that there is a regional problem to explain this ‘backwardness* in terms of 
democracy. It is tempting to conclude, as many have done already, that there is a cu ltural 
origin for this deficit and that Islam is the likeliest troublemaker. Explanations for such 
‘backwardness* are, in this view, of ‘traditional* and cultural origins and have found many 
supporters in the social and political sciences. Huntington is probably one o f the best and 
long-lasting exponents of such ideas outside the field o f Middle-Eastern studies. Already in 
his P olitica l O rder in  Changing Societies (1968), he applied cultural reasons intrinsic to Islam to 
explain corruption; similarly, all societies that do not match his description of modem 
societies w ill be deemed ‘traditional* without further elaboration (Huntington 1968: chap 1). 
Implicit in his model o f the waves o f  democratization (Huntington 1991) is the idea o f  being 
in the righ t wave or trailing behind. His even more problematic Clash o f  C ivilisations (1996) 
solidifies even more the essentialization o f distinct cultural blocks.
Before discussing some o f the actual arguments according to which there can be no real 
Muslim civil society (so called neo-Orientalist arguments), I want to address the revealing 
difficulty about the labelling ‘Arab civil society* or ‘Muslim civil society*. I have also 
personally struggled to adhere to one appellation or the other and finally I have followed 
Sadilri (2004: 3ff) in opting for the ‘Arab M iddle Eastern* (AME) civil society since it partly 
limits the scope o f our discussion.93 W hatever the name used, one should feel uncomfortable 
choosing any of them for it leads in  any even t to implied generalizations. Does the alleged
92 Freedom House’s surveys provide only highly aggregate results and are not transparent enough in terms of 
how the coding is done in  general
93 Though I intend to limit my discussion ‘only’ to the Arab Middle East, I might invoke consciously examples 
of other Muslim polities to address some of the critiques later in this chapter, as much as Orientalist authors 
tend to mix both in time and in geographical scope the origins of their factual and counter-factual examples. 
Therefore some critical literature dealing with Iran (Kamali 1998; 2002), Turkey (Mardin 1995), and Indonesia 
(Hefner 2000) might appear in this chapter, but only on rare occasions.
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problem have to do w ith Islam} Or is it with the Arab culture? Does it have to do with some 
M iddle Eastern features such the wide presence of petroleum and the mixed blessing oil 
provokes?
Islam is not as unitary as some try to persuade their readers. It stretches, as a majoritarian 
religion, in countries from Mauritania to Indonesia, but other millions of Muslims live in 
Europe and North America. Certainly, there must be some differences in the way Islam is 
taught, understood and practiced throughout these various countries. Just by spotting some 
o f  the main internal divisions (Sunni vs. Shi’ite, four main schools of religious legal 
interpretation — Hanbalite, Shafi’ite, Malakite and Wahhabites — plus many subgroups such as 
Druzes, Alawites, Ismailites, Kharijites, Zaydites, etc.94), one will have to come to 
acknowledge that Islam entails many division lines, be they dogmatic or practical in their day- 
to-day practices (providing that religion can be the source of motivation for action, which is 
already a disputable idea). Moreover there is a very important resilience and adaptability o f 
various Islamic movements throughout the region (Ismail 2001).
Arab culture is no homogeneous block either. ‘Arab’ refers, as needs to be stressed, to people 
sharing the same language, namely Arabic and henceforth a common form of cultural beliefs 
that are not only religious. There are millions of non-Muslim Arabs in the Middle East: 
various Arab Christian minorities (Copts in Egypt, Assyrians in  Iraq, Syrian Orthodox, 
Armenian Orthodox, Catholic, Protestants and Evangelical, etc.) and Jews bom in  Arab 
countries but whose Arabic culture (for those, ie . the majority, who made alyah and ‘returned* 
to Israel) was repressed by the dominant Ashkenazi ruling culture (Shohat 2002; Abdo & 
Lentin 2002). Honour killings do exist also in Arab Christian communities and, as such, 
cannot be ascribed to Muslims only (Chatelard 2003), but rather to cultural practices o f  the 
patriarchal Mediterranean world. On top o f the religious differentiation, many sociological 
differences coexist within these Arab worlds: the more urban and merchant societies o f 
Lebanon, or United Arab Emirates have little in common with the increasingly ‘re-tribalized’ 
and rural society o f Yemen. Within Arab majority societies one can also find large groups of 
non-Arab populations, such as the Berbers of the Maghreb (e.g. Kabyles in Algeria) or o f 
Kurdish minorities in Iraq and Syria.
Middle Eastern, finally, is not a simple concept. People disagree whether to include or not in 
this term Afghanistan, or even Iran for certain, in its Eastern borders (recently some have 
argued in favour o f including Central Asia under this label95). Should Mauritania be included
94 For a short overview o f the diversity in terms o f minorities, see (Tapper 1992).
95 For example, Eickelman (1999), in the third version of his standard The M iddle E ast An Anthropological 
Approach, includes some examples from Central Asia.
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on die western end? How to bridge differences between a fiercely secular Turkish state and 
an overtly religious Wahhabite regime in Saudi Arabia? How to take into consideration 
differences between an extremely rich Saudi class and poor rural migrant groups living in  a 
slum of Tehran, with another ISmillion people? How can one assume a common pattern o f 
citizenship in a highly divided country such as Lebanon (in sectarian terms) as opposed to the 
exclusive club of the 10% of the Kuwaiti population having full citizenship rights? Their 
W eltanschauung, access to education and politics, as well as their vision of the state have to 
differ from one case to the other.
In reverse, would it  make sense to speak o f  a Christian civil society? Surely the question would 
provoke some dismissing smiles for it is an unusual label. Invoking a ‘European dv il society’ 
would need some precision so as to make a distinction between western vs. eastern Europe, 
or, say, northern vs southern European d v il sodety, unless one accepts to speak o f  an 
advanced capitalist liberal dv il sodety. One should be therefore very wary to make sweeping 
statements about the existence or not o f such Christian, European, Arab or Muslim d v il 
sodety. It is even more the case when studies enquire into the existence or not o f a ‘C ivil 
Islam*96. W hat would be our reaction to a book entitled Ts there a Civil Christianity?’ N o 
doubt, dismissing smiles would be replaced by grim ones, even i f  it was of certain actuality 
around the 12* to 15* centuries. So how to cope with the study of Arab Middle Eastern 
polities? How have social sciences coped with this question?
3.1.2. A truly necessary comparison and simplification?
The problem with conflating Arab with M uslim  and Muslim with Middle East is that it makes 
of the Middle East the “true locus of Islam” and o f Europe the “true locus o f Christianity”, 
which is twice problematic, as pointed out by Asad in his seminal A nthropology o f  Islam  (Asad 
1986: 3). First, it implies a vision of religion as “the essence o f a history and a civilization” 
and, second, this “particular contrast affects the conceptualisation o f  Islam” (ibid.: 3). N olens 
volens, most o f the literature dealing with topics relating directly o r not to Islam does invoke 
“ essentially distinct” forms of societies, and o f  polities (Zubaida 1993: ix; emphasis mine).
The need for such automatic comparisons and simplifications has in  my view two roots. First, 
there is the influence o f Orientalism as defined by Said (1978), i.e.y a process whereby the 
Orient is constructed, in writings o f western intellectuals, as the m irror of what the Occident 
is not and vice versa. No Orient exists, even geographically, i f  not as a reflection o f the
96 This is the title of a recent book on the implication o f Islamic rhetoric in Indonesian politics (Hefner 2000). 
Despite the fact that the author cannot be attacked for being ’Orientalist’ a la Said (1978), the mere title indicates 
that he implicitly assumes that one has to prove that Islam can be civilized) and that it is not necessarily violent, 
ruthless and un-civilized, which is itself problematic.
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Occident. Many authors, sometimes unwillingly, are falling into the trap of ethnocentrism and 
more particularly o f Eurocentrism, by assuming that what is the case here in Europe either 
ought to be there as well, or lacks as a consequence of supposed Oriental characters, ideas and 
norms.97 Examples of such by generalisations or essentialisations w ill be later given and 
deconstructed, but the main feature of Said’s critique (and o f the corpus out on which he 
organizes his argument) is the centrality of language, writings and discourse in the elaboration 
o f Orientalist approaches. Said, who was professor o f comparative literature, insisted 
probably too much on this aspect of language and did not look enough into empirical 
evidence or historical evolutions to attack western Orientalism (and as such, Said can be 
attacked as being ‘occidentalist’ since he tends to do himself about western writing what he 
denounces about western description of the Orient).98 Orientalism is a critique addressed to 
social sciences, literature, music and visual a r t  The three main themes of Orientalism in social 
sciences are the centrality of language,99 the over-determination o f  Islam as the origin of 
formal causation, and the seemingly unchanging historical conditions in which the Orient 
lives in (Halliday 2003: 202-205). Said makes the distinction between latent and manifest 
Orientalism: the former deals with fantasies and dreams about the Orient whereas the latter 
(sometimes influenced by the former) makes explicit claims to essentialized differences 
between the west and the orient. Such themes will remerge in the 1990s, but with slightly 
revised vocabulary and ideas. It is what Sadowski (1993) labelled neo-Orientalist, whose 
themes we will analyse later.
In a sense, the tendency to make simplifications and generalizations is a general feature o f the 
human mind. As it has been stressed by psychology and anthropology, the mechanism o f 
complexity reduction is a way for individuals to react and cope when confronted to an alien 
environment. According to Gehlen, complexity reduction is one psychological mechanism 
through which human beings can obtain re lief (Entlastung)i from the burden represented by all 
the external impressions and stimulations that they receive when confronted with the external 
world (Gehlen 1988). For Gehlen, cultures are nothing else but a complex set o f devices put 
in place precisely to provide with such E ntlastung possibilities for human beings. Processes o f 
differentiation due to inherent ethnocentrism can therefore also be explained in terms of 
psychological mechanism.
97 For a discussion of Said’s arguments and weakness, as well as other pre-1978 writings on Orientalism, not as a 
discipline, but as an critique, see (Halliday 2003: chapt 7).
98 See in particular (Sadiki 2004:132f). Many other critiques to Said have since 1978 developed. See in particular 
(Ahmad 1992) for a Marxist critique. See also (McLeod 2000:39-50), and in particular 47-49.
99 The ‘Orientalist’ method refers originally to anyone studying Arabic and other oriental (mosdy Semitic) 
languages. There, Greek and Roman philology was the emulator and main model to follow.
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On a different level, the need for implicit or explicit simplifications and comparisons between 
the first world and the Middle East stems from the hegemonic position o f western 
production o f knowledge. Social sciences, as a case in point, are themselves part of the 
project o f western modernity. Sociology and political sciences emerged in the 19th century 
along the creation o f the modem western nation-state and contributed to its cognitive 
representation (Wagner 1994). Therefore, not only do sociology and political science have as 
an object o f study the western state or society, but are inherently part of this project. From 
that reason stems the fundamental question: can a system of knowledge having its roots in 
one specific world be used to decipher another one?100 Similarly, Asad (2003a) wonders 
whether it is realistic for western thinking to decode non-westem thinking since it is not able 
itself to describe the totality o f its world. Stauth, in an unpublished paper, stresses this 
difficulty.
“What is modernity? This is the most central issue of sociology. There exists a disturbing and 
unsatisfying entwinement of modernity and sociology: Sociology then is science of what 
modernity is and how modem society operates. Classical social theory claimed that modernity is 
rationalism and objectivism, and that modem society operates with rationally conceived 
concepts and gradually takes the place of the traditional societies.” (Stauth 2002:19)
There seems to be a potential circular relationship between sociology and modernity, which
leads to the process o f fix ation  o f the other non-modem under the concept of ‘traditional*. As
Balandier observes:
« La typologie par différences — Afin de mieux maîtriser Finterprétation sociologique, de 
nombreux auteurs (en générai nord-américains) ont réduit la diversité des sociétés accédant au 
développement à un seul type, défini en tant que modèle de la « société traditionelle ». Ce 
modèle est construit par différence, par opposition au modèle de la société moderne qui réfère à 
Fensemble des sociétés industrielles à techniques acancées : si bien que la « société 
traditionnelle » finit par apparaître comme la simple figure inversée de la société moderne. » 
(Balandier 1981:115)101
Thus, if  modernity is portrayed as evolving and dynamic, universalis tic, functionally 
differentiated, ‘traditional* societies w ill be static and unchanging, particularistic, and 
segmented.102 This tendency is not proper to modernity or Vestem* thinking but is almost as 
old as writing. In his study of Herodotus, Hartog demonstrates how the so-called father o f 
history represents the other(s) in function o f (or relatively to) the Greeks and the Greek space
100 Watzlawick in his Hoar R ea! is Real underlines the limit of human beings' attempts (while sending cosmic 
satellites to the fin is universae with a drawing of a man and woman on the satellite and a code to explain human 
language) to describe in our own human language the reality o f womankind on earth for non-earthly beings 
outside our solar system to try to create a form o f  communication with other beings (Watzlawick 1992)
101 ‘Typology through differences: In order to master in a better way sociological interpretation, many authors 
(in general North American) have reduced diversity within developing societies into one unique type: this type is 
what is defined as ‘traditional society’. This model is based on differences, in opposition to the model offered by 
modem society which actually refers to the whole o f advanced industrialized societies. Thus, ‘traditional society' 
ends up being simply the mirrored figure o f modem society” (translation mine).
102 The list could be longer. For some dichotomies see Balandier (1981:115). See also Stauth (2002:11), quoting 
Luhmann. Bayart also questions these dichotomies in many places (1989).
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of knowledge (“espace g r e c  du savoir qui, implicitement, loge toujours un observateur (grec) en lui-m êm e”) 
(Hartog 2001: 534). Herodotus’ technique of double mirroring (ib id : 484-498) for example 
calls upon the Scyths’ altérité or otherness (as a nomad population adhering to Kingship rule) 
to stress the Athenian identity (living in  a polis, resisting the Barbarian basileus — King, and 
adhering to isonom ia, another way to say democracy). But the argument ‘we-other’ (so far 
classic in terms of identity formation in anthropology103) suggested by Hartog does not stop 
here. This demarcation o f the other through narration is not just an ethnocentric process (in 
this case bellenocentrism ), such as Thucydides who saw in today’s Barbarians the Greeks o f 
yesterday (Thucydides 1995: I, 6). Rather it highlights the prominent role of the narrator; as 
the only figure who knows, sees, and narrates and the only figure who can order the Greek 
space of knowledge (Hartog 2001: 536f).
The mechanisms o f  differentiation between groups, societies, culture, nations or related 
imagined ‘others’ through narration and social sciences texts are thus intrinsically problematic. 
Generally speaking, any production of knowledge is reductive of reality since it aims to 
provide a cognitive map. There is therefore necessarily a process o f selection and exclusions, 
which takes place in three different levels:
a) The psychological dimension (complex reduction and Hntlastung);
b) The epistemological dimension (inherent blind spots to social sciences as part o f 
the project o f modernity and subsequent limitations to other settings), and
c) The political dimension. It is a political act to select events (for historical 
narratives), categories (such as ethnies), or limits (real borders or putative ones) 
to turn it into a precise map o f reality.
W ith regard to the study of the Arab Middle Eastern society, one should therefore have an 
eye on all three dimensions to come to truly conclusive responses. This has three 
implications:
On the psychological level, one should bear in mind that Muslim societies104 have constituted 
for many centuries the non-Christian frontier from which Europe could potentially draw 
parts of its identities. Rodinson’s study on La fascination de l ’Islam  (1989) highlights that 
European and Muslim worlds have been two ‘univers en lu tté  since 732 and the Battle of 
Poitiers, but with different moments and themes (seen first as a threat then as partner; called 
successively Mohametan, then Turk, then Muslim (now Islamist?), etc.). Thus, the
103 See also the foundational article of Barth who stresses that the “continuity o f ethnic units depends clearly on 
the maintenance of a boundary" (Barth 1969:14-15).
104 I would follow Albert Hourani’s plea to use the plural when speaking of the Arab worlds and societies 
(Hourani 1991), in order not to homogenize, like Ernest Gdlner did in his Muslim Society (Gellner 1981). See also 
Ghalioun 2000, for the necessity to speak of contemporary Arab societies.
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universalis tic and respectful discussions o f the 18th century disappeared in die 19th century and 
were replaced by more contemptuous overtones, after Europe’s industrial take-off (Rodinson 
1989: 85f).10S This negative view o f Islam has translated in  19th and 20th centuries sociological 
labels of "Oriental despotism’, or o f ‘Asian modes o f production’.106
On the epistemological level, as observed by Asad, one should be cautious when using ready­
made concepts entwined with modernity (Asad 2003a). Is the west as ‘modem’ as it claims to 
be? Is secularism really a given in western liberal societies? Has individualism always been part 
of the liberal project or is it a rather recent reality?107 Similar questioning of the concept of 
democracy and democratization was done in the previous chapter. A ll these questions suggest 
that, if  there have been many roads to modernity (and to its study), there are only a few (if 
only one) roads to the study of what is so often deemed ‘traditional’.
One should be aware and try to spot in the social sciences literature revealing elements of 
such exclusionary power. Example o f  this latter are the stark and unproblematized opposition 
of anachronistic use o f religions,108 or the selective attribution o f  causation to disputed 
concepts such as Islam in the following statement “Islam is the cause for the lack of 
democracy in the Middle East” (hypostatization).
3.1.3. First step towards a positive model: unpacking ‘there5, and ‘here5
To react and respond to the “entwinement” (Stauth 2002) o f social sciences with modernity 
and to the dominant position of western production of knowledge, one needs to look at the 
contingent situations in which a society, a culture, a religion or a polity has to evolve. This 
distinction between necessity and contingency is crucial in order to give less passion to the current 
debate about Islam and democracy,109 or about the existence o f an AME civil society. Asad 
also rightly insists that religion cannot be studied without a prior examination of the socio­
political environment in which it evolves and by understanding its relation to power (1986: 11 
& 14).
105 Though Rodinson misses here an important argument highlighted by Keddie (1991) by which she shows that 
the marginal advance of European powers (not only industrial nascent forces but also colonial powers) was 
transformed into a decisive one by thwarting peripheral countries’ efforts to industrialize as well.
106 Undoubtedly, the current *war on terrorism’ draws much of its potentiality and momentum from such 
psychological overtones and plays upon the collective imaginary. See for instance Tuastad 2003 and Sarasin 
2004.
107 On the matter, see Kalupner 2003.
108 Asad speaks of anachronistic use of religions, since they are considered either as faiths, or as socio-historical 
features. But in the latter case (religions in a historical perspective), some refer preferentially to one period or 
another, then leading to some generalisations. See Asad 2004.
1091 include in this approach the couple Islam  and Democracy’ and not just AME civil society because much of 
the literature related to the question of civil society is either explicitly framed in those terms, or they are labelled 
in very close terms (like modernity, secularism, etc.).
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A more compelling approach to the question of an AME civil society (or Islam and 
democracy/democratization) is to spell out assumptions, and go through some preliminary 
deconstruction of core concepts behind the study of the possibility o f an AME civil society 
(or of Islam and democracy). This is what could be called differentiation o f  a  con cep t This work 
must be done on two distinct levels, a horizontal axis and a vertical one. Let us attribute the 
horizontal axis to gen era l characteristics o f civil society, which, as demonstrated in the first 
chapter, has its origins, in western (pre-)liberal polities.110 This axis will also be the focus of 
attention for the deconstruction of concepts related to civil society, such as democracy, 
secularism, individualism and modernity.111 The axis is conceived as a continuum with on the 
left end a consistent differentiation of a concept (symbolized by a ‘+* on the graph) and, on 
the right end, a total lack of differentiation thereof (see following Table 3, w ith a t- r). The 
decisive factor to place one study about e g . civil society is the treatment (or not), or the 
deconstruction (or not) of a series o f various elements that constitute the concept o f civil 
society (such as its definition, discussion o f its origins, assumptions outlined, etc.).
The vertical axis has the same characteristics (continuum, not a scale), but w ill deal w ith 
deconstructing concepts within the setting o f the Arab Middle East, with a central focus on 
Islam, and Arab cultures and their interaction with elements o f the horizontal axis. As 
Ghalioun puts it with regard to the interaction between Islam and laidty, “even in  countries 
belonging to the same culture and going through the same pitfalls o f history as in  the case for 
Muslim countries w ith their common struggle towards religious renovation and against 
European colonialism, the processes o f modernization are not equally the same” (Ghalioun 
2000: 25f. translation mine).112 Thus, one needs to apply a reading according to two axes, a 
horizontal one about, in this case, ‘modernity*, and a vertical one that would spell out the 
differences within the AME.
On the top end (symbolized by a *-* on the graph), one w ill find studies that lack of 
differentiation of concepts related to Islam, the Arab culture etc., and on the lower end 
(symbolized by a *+* on the graph), works that look at historical differentiation and/or 
evolution of concepts, at geographical diversity or that assess intervening variables.
110 Black would sustain that it is also the case in pre-liberal societies. See his views on guilds about civil society 
(Black 1884).
111 Modernity could be another way to label the horizontal. But I refrain from using it as such, because I believe 
it is problematic to see it as a western feature. It is rather part o f the problématiques that one needs to 
deconstruct, and not the concept
112 “Même dans les pays appartenant à la même culture et traversant les mêmes avatars de l’histoire comme les 
pays musulmans avec leur combat commun pour la rénovation religieuse et contre la colonisation européenne, 
les processus de modernisation ne sont pas les mêmes. ”
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Table 3: Modelization for the study o f  the "Arab-Middle-Eastem civil society’
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For example, if  an author takes a definition o f democracy based, say, on the mere existence of 
elections, then there w ill be an obvious lack o f problematization, and w ill end up somewhere 
in the right end o f the horizontal axis. The same w ill happen for someone who assumes, in 
the case o f secularism, that there has always been a clear distinction o f powers between the 
Christian Church and temporal powers. To the opposite end one w ill find studies that 
acknowledge the gradual evolution and emergence o f secularism in western societies. The key 
questions to position a study along one o f the axes would be: does it take the concept X  for 
granted (historically, conceptually, and/or epistemologically)? does it take Y for granted 
(historically, conceptually and/or epistemologically)?
Put in a nutshell, and taking cultural differences for granted for the sake o f the ideal-typicity 
o f the model, the horizontal axis is about the conscious effort o f  differentiation (or lack 
thereof) o f the west, whereas the vertical axis is about the differentiation (or lack thereof) o f 
the Arab Orient and in particular Islam.
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The purpose o f this table and its cutting into four quadrants is not to produce clear-cut lines 
between ‘norms* or Values’ that are either ‘western’ and ‘Arab’ or ‘Islamic’. The anchors o f 
the two axes are discussions of complexities o f debatable concepts. The necessity stems from 
the fact that the lack o f deconstruction and of differentiation of such concepts can be at the 
very origin of simplifying discourses about an alleged lack of civil society, or democracy in  the 
Arab Middle-East In other words, such visualization aims at avoiding the idea that 
democracy, or civil society, can be simply cloned elsewhere without reflecting first on its 
nature and then on the place where it should be ‘exported’.113
The following subsection will be about filling the following four quadrants with some 
examples taken from recent social science dealing with ‘Muslim society’, ‘Islam and politics’, 
‘Islam and modernity*, ‘Islam and secularism’, ‘Muslim liberties’, and so on. I will argue114 that, 
as a rule of thumb, the more accurate works to study the plausibility o f having a AME civil 
society tend  to be located in the third quadrant (Q III), and the less proper work and hence 
misleading works in Q I. Let us now look at practical examples o f the latter case, through the 
recent ‘wave’ o f literature dealing with the paradigm of Islam & Democracy.
3.1.4. Unpacking Neo-Orientalism
Let us identify, first, some of the traits attributed to Islam and Muslim societies under the 
revived form o f hypostatizations and essentializations about Islam and AME societies, that 
have been labelled ‘neo-Orientalism* (Sadowsky 1993). But what is meant exactly by neo- 
Orientalism? What are its themes and how has it departed and evolved from Said’s 
understanding of Orientalism?
Beyond the literary critique o f Said, Turner, in his M arx and the E nd o f  Orientalism  (1978) 
provides other elements for the definition and approach o f Orientalism, which is not ‘just’ a 
matter o f literary and colonial continuity in  western writing. It is also an epistemological battle 
between internalist theories and externalist theories,115 between traditional sociology and 
historicist Marxism (Turner 1978: 5 & 10). The former focus on “values, attitudes, and 
motives as internal features of societies which either inhibit or promote modernisation” and 
is best embodied in Weberian sociological approaches. The latter approach, within Marxist 
tradition, deals with dependency, underdevelopment as part o f more general and external
113 For a discussion on the limits of framing Middle Eastern politics in terms o f democratization, see 
Scblumberger 2000.
114 I already plea guilty with regards potential attacks about systematic bias and endogenous definitions of my 
axes. But I am doing what most of political scientists do when using quantitative methods, reducing multi­
dimensional phenomena into discrete bi-dimensional variables and reducing complex causational factors into a 
‘simple’ regression analysis.
115 That is to decide whether the problems of the AME stem from inside its own field or whether it is due to 
external factors.
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phenomena (ibid.: 10£f). To a certain extent116 both are inadequate for the study o f the M iddle 
East, because they suffer from Orientalist syndrome, which is “based on an epistemology 
which is essentialist, empiricist and histondst. The essential assumption is present in the 
notion that ‘Islam’ is a coherent, homogenous, global entity” (ib id : 7),
What are the differences between Orientalism and neo-Orientalism? Though some themes o f 
Orientalism remain present (such as “pervasiveness of Islam as a total ideology” offering not 
only a religious credo but also political and social responses, Islam seen “as a disease”,117 etc.), 
neo-Orientalism presents in some cases themes that have diametrically changed. Put in a 
nutshell, neo-Orientalism emphasizes m a tte r  o f political Islam (Zubaida 1993: xiii). Let us 
dwell on three themes of Orientalist literatures (the existence o f  an ‘Islamic State’, violent 
threats to international order, and ‘strength of Muslim society’) and see how their treatment 
has evolved in the last decade. This three topics were chosen for the reasons that they are 
pillars o f the (neo-)Orientalist battery but also for the reasons that they have evolved 
differendy: If  there is a pervasiveness o f the argumentation in the case of an ‘Islamic State’, 
there was a slight change about the issue o f violence. Finally, the third theme (strong/weak 
soaeties) has witnessed a radical change in its approach over the last 20 years,
a) ‘Is lam ic  S tate ’
The idea o f an Islamic state occupies many artides and books about the nature o f the 
alternative form o f power suggested by Islamic and Islamist writers. The model that is most 
often invoked is that o f the Islamic State created during the period o f the first four caliphs 
(the so-called righdy-guided caliphs or rashidun) portrayed as the Golden Age o f Islam and 
seen as a model for a contemporary ‘political Islam’. Islamic thinkers themselves very often 
mention this model, but it is also a topic discussed by western intellectuals. Neo-Orientalists 
(such as Crone (1980) and Pipes (1983)) draw lessons from the early centuries o f Islam (and 
from the rashidun) to condude that systems o f power suggested by Islamists nowadays are 
directly inspired by that of the first hundred years of Islam. This view  contends that ulam a 
(derics) have more than religious legal powers but actually go beyond the spiritual into the 
temporal by setting political rules as well for its community. In other words, this model 
stresses the total predominance o f religion over politics, therefore m aking it impossible, in  the 
conclusion o f neo-Orientalists, to have a liberal democracy and a flourishing civil soaety.
A much subtler form o f this type o f argument is that portrayed by Gellner in his M ushm  
Society (1981), whose ideas about the problem between Islam and politics are reformulated in
116 Marxism less, in the view o f the author, at least in his attempt to suggest an alternative to histondst Marxist 
by outlining Althusser’s approach and revised version o f the Asiatic modes of production (Turner 1978: 5).




his theory of civil society presented in his Conditions o f  L iberty (1994). In the first book, G ellner 
exploited his ethnographical work in Morocco to generate a model o f Muslim society — note 
the singular, despite the claim to cover all Muslim societies — that stresses a duality o f 
sociological rules: rural hinterland dominated by a tribal ethos, and performing heterodox 
forms of religious practices (saints and magic) as opposed to urban centres dominated by 
merchants and ulamas (guardians of scripture and pure religious practices). Ibn Khaldun 
(ca.1340-1402), the father of sociology for many (Laroui 1987) is invoked by Gellner precisely 
for having formulated a rather similar opposition topped with his famous cyclical model o f  
dynasties and the role o f religion in system maintenance (Ibn Khaldoun 1997). The problem 
is that 600 years after Ibn Khaldoun’s description, Maghrebin societies have evolved and no 
longer follow the same exact dynamics. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun was writing in a very 
particular moment o f Maghreb’s history, which might have not been generalizable to other 
periods (Zubaida 2003 [1995]: 35). In other words, one should question Gellner’s 
conceptualization o f the ‘traditional’ and the extendibility of his model across time and 
space.118
These Orientalist conceptions of Gellner then find their way in his later work that deals w ith 
civil society, in his Conditions o f Liberty. C ivil Society and Its R ivals (1994), a true reglem ent de com ptes 
with Marxism and Islam. Gellner here boldly concludes that Muslim civil society w ill never be 
able to emerge because of the “unique and exclusive sacralization o f  one faith [i.e. Islam] 
[which] makes pluralism impossible” (Gellner 1994: 195). Pluralism (institutional and 
ideological) (p. 3), modem conception o f freedom (p. 9), and the existence o f a ‘modular 
man*119 (103ff) are, for Gellner, conditions for liberty and for the emergence of a distinctively 
modem civil society. Leaving the validity o f  such theory aside,120 important for us is to stress 
the numerous generalizations — and un-discussed assumptions — with regard to Islam, and the 
predominant role o f  the ummab as an alleged “doctrine which, in  the name of abolishing the 
political and sacralizing and freeing the economic, in fact unified and centralized the political, 
the economic and the ideological” (ibid.: 196). We touch here on a topos o f (neo-)Orientalism,
118 On that aspect, Zubaida (2003 [1995]: 32ff) demonstrates how Gellner’s contraposition of a rural tribal ethos 
vs. an urban civilization (for example see Gellner 1981: 54-56) actually fits his other models of High and Low 
Cultures and function as “mirror-image o f traditional Christendom” (Gellner 1981: 54), and of Durkheimian 
sociology (for the tribe) vs Weberian one (in the case o f urban life) (Zubaida 2003 [1995]: 35).
119 Not only are his arguments fraught ̂ id i generalisations about Islam, but his concepdon of a modular man is 
quite reactionary: undeclared primacy of masculinity, belief in a necessary cultural homogeneity o f modem 
society, nationalism as end history, etc. Apparently decades of critiques to Popper’s open society, disasters 
provoked by shallow nationalisms, and thirty years o f very important feminist studies have not permeated into 
the modem modular Gellner.
120 For a discussion of Gellner’s fraught arguments about Muslim Society, see Zubaida 2003 [1995].
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i.e. the idea that Islam provides a total way o f life, which we w ill briefly discuss later in  the 
concatenation of neo-Orientalist arguments.
Responses to these arguments are two-fold, one dealing with medieval Islam and one with 
contemporary consequences. The first one is  to stress that it was rather ‘the Political* which 
was appropriating ‘the Religious* in the early centuries o f Islam (Ayubi 1991: 3) and not the 
other way around Thus, the Sunni tradition merged spiritual leadership (imamah) and political 
one {mulk or sultan) into the Caliphate but always with religion being subservient to politics 
(ibid.: 16-17 & 202; Charfi 2000). Kamali also looks at historical circumstances under which 
the philosopher al-Ghazali “provided theological legitimization for the Sultan’s legal, worldly 
and religious leadership** (Kamali 1998: 41 f). Demonstrations dealing with Medieval Islam are 
not only negative or contingent ones. Sadiki stresses the originality and advancement o f  al- 
Farabi’s conception o f a virtuous city, a treaty written around 900CE. In a very Aristotelian121 
conception o f the human as %?onpolitikon, al-Farabi (870-ca 950CE), one o f the first and most 
important Arab philosophers, sees in human associations the site o f  marirniring happiness 
and sustains that decay happens when humans leave political society (Sadiki 2004: 212). 
Finally, recent studies o f the Muslim public sphere in early centuries o f Islam demonstrate 
that rather than being mere toys and instruments o f power, ulam a (clerics) and Sufi mystic 
orders, aivqa f (religious endowments) provided a vital shaping of a Muslim open public sphere 
(see Hoexter & aL 2002: in part. 151).122
The second response (in contemporary debates) is to show that political Islam not only is 
constrained to use modem secular means o f communication, but that its very struggle is 
about obtaining the rule over states that are secular and modem in their definitions and ways 
o f working (Tripp 1996: 56). Zubaida, while scrutinizing the Iranian Islamic Republic also 
stresses that despite all its Islamic garb and rhetoric, the state set and ruled by Ayatollah 
Khomeini is nothing but a modem nation-state123 (quoted in Ayubi 1991: 150), and whose 
preoccupation rapidly turned into ‘normal* state, with for example anti-natalist policies being 
rapidly implemented (Ibrahim 1997: 42). Other sociological works go against the ideas o f a 
class of ulama leaving no space for political participation; numerous counter-examples of 
religious clerics involved in civil society activities exist, most notably in  the Tobacco and
121 “Xhe second teacher”, as he is referred to by Arabs (the first being Aristode), Al-Farabi’s influence will be 
long-lasting, both in Muslim philosophy (Ibn Sinna (also known as Avicenne) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes)), but 
also in Medieval Christian theology, through Avicenna, and in particular in  13* c. Latin Aristotelism (Garzanti 
1991: 50f, 68 & 293).
122 For an actualisadon o f such arguments in contemporary Muslim politics, see Salvatore & Eickelman 2004.
123 For a discussion of how Khomeiny’s rhetoric changed from an Islamic universalism into mere nationalism, 
see also (Halliday 2003:62-63).
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Constitutional revolts in Iran (Kamalt 1998), or where ulama are instrumentalized by secular 
regimes in order to give the latter a moral approval (Tripp 1996).
Asad also emphasized that the Islamist idea of an Islamic State, which operates no distinction 
between state and religion, is not a product of the mainstream historical tradition o f Islam. 
Rather, in his view, it  is the product of the totalising ambitions typically of modem  politics and 
o f the m odernising state. In the Islamic history “there was no such thing as a state in the m odem  
sense.79 (Asad 2003b[1997]: 352). This is not to say that the fact that many contemporary 
Islamist movements have endorsed the idea is irrelevant - which is obviously not the case. It 
simply means that the fact that many Islamic militants have accepted this perspective as their 
own, striving for the establishment of an Islamic state, does not make it essential to Islam,
b) Islam  an d  vio lence
There has been a significant change on the link between Islam and violence over the last two 
or three decades towards the representation o f an increasingly violent and threatening Islam. 
The atrocities of the Lebanese wars, joined with the practices of such ruthless regimes as 
those of Saddam Hussein, Hafez el-Asad and others contributed to the spreading o f a vision 
o f violent polities. W ith the Iranian Revolution and Islamic contention to power in Sudan and 
Algeria, it was not only Arab societies but Islamic ideologies that were portrayed as the origin 
o f violence and threat Lack of democracy went hand in hand with the vision of violence or, 
as Pipes likes to say: “Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest democracies 
in the world” (quoted in Sadowski 1993: 14). We face here another example of the classical 
argument of the Muslim exception and unicity.
The trend set by neo-Orientalism and reinforced with the ‘war on terrorism’ is that the 
phenomenon now assumes global proportions. So what was formerly an internal Orientalist 
Muslim problem acquires an international dimension with reiterated concerns about Islam 
presence — and therefore threat — in the first world. Danger is now seen everywhere, but 
without reframing violent acts within the broader context. Thus, violence becomes 
increasingly divorced from its context and explained in terms of cultural traits (Tuastad 2003: 
592). Such a manner o f depicting Islam as inherently violent is very often too simplistic124 
(Esposito & Burgat 2003: Introduction).
One proof o f this allegedly increased threat by Islam lies simply in the titles and labelling of 
scholarly production o f knowledge.125 Most o f the following titles are about either accusing
124 See the systematic association in the last few years of ‘terrorism’ threat with clandestine immigration from 
Muslim countries. Only rarely does an item on European media dealing with immigration not make reference to 
link with organized crime or ‘terrorism’ networks (see, for instance, Geisser 2003).
125 The picture is even bleaker in the media. For an example, see Asad 2003b [1997]: 348. About the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict, see BBC’s ‘Mid-East coverage baffles Britons’ (29/06/2004). Available online.
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‘Islam’ o f negative deeds or spreading accusations linked to Muslim politics: “The Muslims 
are coming! The Muslims are coming!”126, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”127, “Terror, Islam, 
and Democracy”128, “the Crisis of Islam: Holy W ar and Unholy Terror”129, “Onwards M uslim 
Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the W est”130, “Terror and Liberalism”131. 
Other titles are not directly related to violence, but do not suggest a very positive picture: 
“The Malady of Islam”132, “Arabs and Democracy: A Record o f Failure”133, “M uslim 
Countries and the Democracy Gap”134, “W hat Went Wrong? W estern Impact and Middle 
Eastern Response”135 ’’Civil Islam”136, “A Fundamental Fear7’137, Islam and its diseases, etc. 
The list could be much longer.138
A good exemplification o f such demonising tendencies, though not in  titles but in  arguments, 
is the already discussed book of Gellner, C onditions o f  L iberty. B y drawing implicit parallels 
between historical teachings of Marxism, he reinforces his point about the impossibility o f the 
future emergence o f a Muslim civil society. H is reading is a Popperian interpretation, as the 
author openly claims (Gellner 1994: 110). The paradox is that, though Popper was arguing 
against the (open or implied) historidsm o f Plato and Marxism, Gellner’s sociology o f the 
Muslim ummah becomes in its turn deterministic leaving no space for later alternative 
developments. Thus, Gellner’s will to represent Islam as a threat for d ie  modular man and his 
social corollary (civil society) makes it  literally impossible for the Muslim ummah to evolve out 
of its atomized predicament. The parallel between Marxism and Islam is made explicit in  his 
1991 article in which he claims that civil society has been atomized and fragmented in  both 
Marxist and Islamic systems (Gellner 2003 [1991]: 27).
Responses to these arguments are difficult to make in  such a hostile environment, even more 
so after the horrendous attacks o f  September 2001. Asad righdy questions the unequal 
treatment reserved to violent actions perpetrated by Muslim militants: “No liberal in  the W est 
would suggest that the Gush LLmunim in Israel represent the essence o f Judaism, or that the 
assassination of abortion doctors in the U.S. by proTife activitists represents the essence o f
12& PIPES Daniel, 1990, N ational Review, 42 (19/11), p.29. A ll of the following tides are not automatically listed in 
the bibliography, unless cited elsewhere.
™ LEWIS Bernard, 1990. The Atlantic Monthly» 226(3).
128 BOR.OUMAND Ladan & BOROUMAND Roya, 2002, Journal o f Democracy, 13(2), 5-20.
129 LEWIS Bernard, 2003, Modem Library, New York.
130 SPENCER Robert, 2002. Encounter Books, San Francisco.
131 BERMAN Paul, W.W: Norton, New York.
132 MEDDEB Abdelwahab, originally published in French, 2002, Seuil, Paris.
133 TALBI Mohamed, 2000, Journal o f Democracy, 11(3), 58-68.
134 KARATNYCKY Adrian, 2002., Journal o f Democracy, 13(1), 99-112.
135 LEWIS Bernard, 2002, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
136 HEFNER Robert W ., 2000, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
137 SAYYID S. 2003, Zed Books, London & New York.
138 See also Abrahamian’s analysis of US and European media coverage after 9/11. Abiahamian 2003.
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Christianity” (Asad 2003b [1997]: 350). But a H amas militant killing Israelis will be branded by 
most as an ‘Islamist terrorist’, with no discussion o f the motives. ‘Terrorism* has now become 
a quasi-performative piece of language, leaving no space for critical discussions.139 As Burgat, 
in his U islam ism e enfa ce , observed:
«  A l’évidence, le lexique religieux a pu servir id  et là à cautioner la violence, mais il n’en est 
nullement à l’origine. Pas plus que la Bible ne saurait “expliquer” FERA, le Coran ne peut donc 
pas expliquer Ben Laden. L’islamologie est une sdence importante, pourvu que l’on se garde de 
l’utiliser pour comprendre les convulsions trivialement politiques du monde contemporain. » 
(Burgat 2002 xv)140
This is exactly what Halliday is doing in approaching ‘terrorism’ in a historical perspective. He 
systematically looks at political motivations of ‘propaganda of deeds’ (Halliday 2000) at both 
origins, that of state and that from below (or non-state actors). The over-use o f the label 
‘terrorist’ by state powers (which are actually committing most o f what could be labelled 
‘terrorism*) against non-state actors denotes a general (and not just AME problem) features o f 
recent decades: threat to existing political order (ibid.: 71-87).
c) From weak to strong societies
It was frequent in classical Orientalism to argue that Muslim societies were weak and 
quiescent as opposed to ruthless and despotic powers. “Orientalist view o f Asiatic sodety can 
be encapsulated in the notion that the social structure of the Oriental world was characterized 
by the absence of civil society, that is, by the absence o f network o f  institutions mediating 
between the individual and the state” (Salamé 1987: 10). Societal quietism was, in this line, 
explained by the meaning of Islam itself (which in Arabic means, among others, submission) 
and by the despotic type of rulers active in  Muslim history (Sadowski 1993: 16). Turner links 
the concept o f quietism and Oriental despotism to a lieu  commun o f  the representation o f 
Oriental sodeties under the mosaic theory. According to this theory, the diversity o f the 
social, sectarian and geographical fabrics o f the region is embodied in  the picture of a mosaic. 
Thus, one faces a sodety highly fragmented, and with no middle-class (which, in  a Weberian 
sodology is problematic141). Islam provides the main integrative function for this “tattered 
mosaic” and is, in a Durkheimian view, a sort of “social cement” (Turner 1978: 83 &  40- 
47).142 Therefore, Muslim sodety is stagnant and unchanging. This would also explain why,
139 For a discussion see Badiou 2003.
140 “Obviously, religious rhetoric has been used here and there to justify violence, but it is not at the origin o f it. 
In as much as it can be sustained that the Bible will not ‘explain’ IRA, the Qur’an cannot explain Ben Laden. 
Islamology is an important science, lest one uses it to understand the trivially political convulsions of the 
contemporary world” (translation mine).
141 Islam is portrayed by some as a system that is resistant to capitalist development. For a rebuke of such views, 
see Rodinson 1966.
142 For a critique of the metaphor of the mosaic, see Chatelard 2004b.
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according to a view, there have never been any revolutions,143 which, in Lewis* view, is the 
proof that the conception o f ‘revolution’ is alien to Islam and its history (Lewis 1988).
The tou rd e fo r ce  o f neo-Orientalism has been to topple and put on its head the previous pair of 
strong state/weak societies into a new one, that of weak state/strong societies.144 This has to 
do with the accommodation of Middle Eastern theory to the general dissociation from 
modernization theories where states were seen as crucial actors o f  development (see Ayubi 
1995: 13ff) and for economic development With the gradual retreat o f the state in 1970s and 
early 1980s studies, discourses about civil society became en vogue in  the second half o f the 
1980s, as already mentioned (Section 2.1).
But other political changes took place in  the Middle East that were not exactly fitting the
expected *weak civil society’ vs. ‘strong state’ paradigm. Most important was the Iranian
revolution (1979) where ba^aaris [/.?. merchants] and Shi’ite clerics formed a civil society
alliance to topple the Shah’s regime (see Kamali 1998; Mottahedeh 2002 [1985]). But the fact
that religious forces came to power with an openly defiant Islamic rhetoric posed more than
theoretical worries: there was fear that other states would fall to Islamic insurgencies
elsewhere (which was problematic for US interests in the region). The states in the region
turned out not to be as strong as they were portrayed and expected to be. The reason for this
‘sudden’ weakness lies in the drastic decrease of oil price and hence of state revenues
(Sadowski 1993: 16), Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia being obvious examples of internal
Islamist violence. O n the literature level, this re-focus on the state is exemplified in Migdal’s
Strong Societies and W eak States (1988), but actually most of his argument about the Middle East
is problematic,145 Gellner also speaks in these terms referring to the fact that there is, in  the
case o f Muslim society, a weak state and a strong culture146 (Gellner 1981: 55f). Sadowski best
captures the fluctuating mood of social sciences:
This broad intellectual shift, which emphasized the virtues — even the necessity — of curbing the 
autonomy of social groups and the growth of their demands on the state, created a receptive 
audience for the neo-Orientalists. Their argument, that tribes, mullah^ and maminks had 
demanded too much autonomy and created a crisis of govemability in Islam, sounded plausible 
because Westerners could discern a trend toward the same ills in their own society.
The irony of this conjuncture needs to be savored. When the consensus of social scientists held 
that democracy and development depended upon the actions of strong, assertive social groups, 
Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When the consensus evolved and
143 Turner disputes this interpretation of the non-existence o f revolution. (Turner 1978:67 & 73).
144 This is the very core o f  Sadowski’s argument (1993) which will be presented in the following paragraphs but 
adding other epistemological elements.
145 For a discussion o f such over-Weberian expectation about State and spurious causality, see the caustic reply 
of (Cammack 1992). Ayubi also regrets the over-emphasis o f Migdal’s “initial assumption that the state is an 
independent actor rising above society and completely autonomous from capital, social forces and interests" 
(Ayubi 1995: 451); Ayubi rather invites to separate functions from capacity within the state (ibid: 3).
146 For a critique of such a view, see (Zubaida 2003 [1995]: 37ff).
98
social scientists thought a quiescent, undemanding society was essential to progress, the neo- 
Orientalists portrayed Islam as beaming with pushy, anarchic solidarities. Middle Eastern 
Muslims, it seems, were doomed to be eternally out of step with intellectual fashion (Sadowski 
1993:19).
Practically it took an ‘adjustement’ of Middle Eastern civil society theories in the works o f 
neo-Orientalists to justify that Islam provides a tribal organization of society and not an 
integrated one, as is the case of the western world, with full secular individualism as basis for 
the realization of the ‘tru e ’ civil society. Let us assume for the sake o f the argument that it  is 
acceptable to conceive o f Islam as a cause (and not as a reason) and that actually (neo-) 
Orientalists do speak clearly of causes in the case o f Islam. So if  Islam was the direct cause (to 
be more precise, in  Aristotelian terms an efficien t cause147) for submission and quietism in 
Orientalism thinking, Islam now becomes the indirect (the Aristotelian form al) cause for a 
subversive, violent society therefore not reliable and mature for individual, secular, liberal 
democracy. Such a sketchy line of thinking should make one wary about adopting Orientalist 
and neo-Orientalist arguments for it brings to the fore all the ‘spurious causality’14* implied 
there. Islam was the cause of an internal feature, now it becomes the indirect reason for 
which AME societies are just the opposite of western societies. W e are here again in  the aporia  
o f  the ‘traditional’ being defined a contrario of the ‘modem’.
But this shift from a weak society into a strong society generates some paradoxes. Thus many 
authors cla im  that there have been no changes inside Muslim societies (in line with classical 
Orientalism, which portrays them as stagnant and quietist societies), but to justify the 
a c c o m m odation  to the dominant paradigm o f the need o f a strong civil society to obtain a 
democratic polity, some tend to see positive developments {eg. Kubba 2000), while others 
accommodate differently by stating that “though crvil society has been eroded in Islam ic 
societies there is little call for its return” (Gellner 2003 [1991]: 24). So civil society becomes 
more than a “slogan” (Gellner 1994: Iff), it becomes a truly telos that orientates the flow o f 
arguments according to the ideological position assumed by the writers.149 
Another paradox revealed by the shift from classical Orientalism to its revived form (neo- 
Orientalism) is that Muslim worlds equipped now with strong societies should be able to 
compete for more democratic politics, if  we were to follow general assumptions about civil 
society where a strong assodational life is a facilitator o f democratization. Actually, neo-
147 I am using here the word “cause” in Aristotelian terms: Aristotle conceived o f cause {aiiid) in terms of 
production, of being responsible for having made something. This is obviously very much a debatable use o f 
causation in terms of ideas, such as Islam. On Aristotle’s view of causes, see Pellegrin 2001.
144 The expression is from Cammack refuting Migdal’s argument (Cammack 1992).
149 In Kubba’s argument (about the ‘Awakening of Civil Society’), there is an implicit hope for changes in Iraq 




Orientalists argue that such strong societies do not qualify for civil society theories since the 
assembling and moving force is precisely Islam. Since the latter is seen as an atomizing force 
(Gellner 1994), secular-resistant (Gellner and others), and/or unchanging despite time and 
geographical scope o f  Islam, then w e are not dealing with the proper individualistic secular 
liberal definition o f  civil society. W e face the common tautology entailed in the Eurocentric 
critique of civil society: civil society in Middle East cannot be because it lacks its European 
characteristics. In other words, Middle East cannot be Europe.
3.1.5. Origins of neo-Orientalism
A quick look at the context in which neo-Orientalist theses emerged is fruitful. The implosion 
of the Soviet Empire had worldwide consequences in terms of regime changes. In a matter of 
months, former ‘allied* countries were given the possibility to choose for themselves a  new 
form of government, far from direct imposition by Moscow. Middle East was not really 
concerned by the Soviet gla cist except for South Yemen which actually was ‘democratized* by 
merging with North Yemen into The Arab Republic of Yemen.150 The latter provided, at least 
until the 1994 dv il war, much hope for the emergence o f democracy and of a viable civil 
society in the A M E .151
The first G ulf W ar (1991) was the entry point for the emergence o f democracy imposition in 
the region, though the results remained disappointing. So in contrast to quite successful 
transitions in certain countries o f Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East remained stuck in 
the starting blocks. Even worse, violence after FIS* electoral victory in Algeria from 1992 
onwards and the momentum gained by Islamic organizations in  Palestine, Lebanon and 
Sudan led some to believe that Islatnic/ist factions were inherently opposed to democracy 
and prone to use violent means (without, though, contextualising and stressing the origins of 
this political violence).152 Many hastily concluded that AME polities are resilient to 
democracy. So how to explain that difference? Islam was an easy target, as the cohesive 
elements throughout the region, as already pointed o u t
Sadowski sustains that it was in the interests o f  the USA to have autocratic regimes in  the 
Middle East but playing into their hands. This goes in line with the neo-realist view which, as 
stressed previously, is antagonistic to the democratic peace argum ent A quote from then CIA 
chief James Schlesinger illustrates this view: “D o we seriously want to change the institutions
150 For more on the history of Yemen (Carapico 1998a & 1998b).
151 Actually, indicators for democracy were quite good from 1990 to 1993 with founding elections, an open 
constitution guaranteeing basic individual rights and freedoms. Unfortunately, after the civil war (portrayed as 
north vs. south, but actually having more to do with in te rnal clique feuds) democratic expansion ceased. See 
Carapico 1998b and Schwedler 2002. For an optimist reading on Yemen in the early 1990s, see (Norton 1993: 
216).
152 On that matter, see Tuastad 2003.
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in  Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is not: over the years, we have sought to preserve those 
institutions, sometimes in preference to mote democratic forces coursing throughout the 
region” (quoted by Sadowski 1993: 14). A good cover and excuse for supporting autocracies 
is provided by counter-discourse emanating itself from Middle Eastern politicians or rulers 
themselves who confess, like King Fahd o f Saudi Arabia that “the prevailing democratic 
system in the world is not suitable for us in  this region, for our peoples’ composition and 
traits are different from the traits of that world” (ibid.: 13). This is the best cover for 
essentalist discourses o f  differences: ‘they* themselves declare that they are different and hence 
cannot be democratic.
A t a different level, Halliday explores the hypothesis that Islamism took over the role of arch­
enemy formerly held by communism after the end of the Cold war. Islam would appear as the 
“ideological substitute for the Cold War” (Halliday 2003: 109). Though there are some 
elements that could be justifying certain pa ra llels between Islamism and Marxism,153 Halliday 
dismisses the argument for three reasons: first it would homogenize the Muslim world; 
second Muslim countries pose no military threat at all and third, the liberal capitalist west has 
already its main conflictual drive, namely competition within western market {ibid.: 110-113). 
Independently of whether Islam is a real threat or not, it is important to point out that 
translations in western imagery of a threatening Islam is everywhere to be found in media and 
films giving at least some water to the mills of the argument o f necessary psychological 
differentiations.154
Is this simply the result o f a lack of knowledge? In their introduction, Diamond, Linz & 
Seymour Lipset, justify the absence of the Middle east in their D emocracy in Developing C ountries 
by the fact that “Islamic countries o f the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much 
previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition even to
153 Simply put, the main argument is that both imply a total form of control o f society and politics. The most 
eloquent supporter of such parallelism is Gellner (in particular 2003 [1991] and 1995) See the discussion in ‘Class 
Analysis', Modem Tintydapedia o f Islam (Halliday 1995). Note the troubling and most dangerous precedent whereby 
Marxism was framed with references to another religion, that of Judaism in the beginning of the 20th century. 
This would go hand in hand with psychological dimensions of the artificially created and inflated alterity 
Christian West vs. Muslim Orient
Waflerstein makes a short intrusion of this topic about the Red Plague, the Yellow Peril and Islamic terrorism 
though his main argument is to discuss the shorthand ‘west' for Christianity and ‘east’ for Islam in a hierarchical 
world-order problematic ([1999] 2003:24-26].
154 As a case in point, take this prominent PLO figure (but not belonging to the most visible elements), Khaled 
al-Ha$an (brother of Hani al-Hasan, Minister of Interior in 2002-03) known for being a pillar of Fatah, a 
staunchly secular nationalist party, but also for having sympathies for conservative Islamist ideologies. In his 
triple comparison Islamism, liberalism and communism, he concludes that Islam is indeed the alternative (see 
Sadiki 2004:241). This would be in line with our position, namely that there is a psychological ‘game’ around 
discrediting various ideologies by positing in extreme terms against one another. Usually it is Islamism which is 
paired with Marxism, here it is Islamism as the solution.
See also Geisser 2003.
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semidemocracy” (Diamond & al. 1988: xix-xx). Such an argument is o f  a peculiar kind. If  we 
were to have followed this line of thinking, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead would have 
then never written their Transitions from  A uthoritarian Pule: P rospects f o r  D emocracy (1986) since 
Latin America, too, for many, appeared to suffer from an Iberic disease preventing the 
Southern cone from being democratized. But to be fair, it is not just the Middle East which is 
portrayed as exceptional; Africa also seems to be all too often misrepresented in  social 
sciences (Bayart 1989).
But social science does not come out o f thin air, but rather is the result o f  individuals’ 
research on such topics. Again, researchers are not ‘free floating entities’ (to use the formula 
usually dedicated to ideologies), but do actually belong to a field, or to the champ, as Bourdieu 
defined it (see e g ,  I.ahire 1999), either o f academia, or o f policy-making. This belonging 
necessarily influences their positions vis-à-vis various topics such as area studies: as 
demonstrated in the case of American researchers of Latin America, closeness to political 
centres can influence views on the object o f research (Guilhot 2001 [2005]). This applies fully 
to Middle Eastern studies whose roots are in the colonial era and whose contemporary 
debates are increasingly and overtly linked to political developments. Recent calls from Pipes 
to subordinate even more Middle Eastern studies to political control (through funding) 
illustrate this promiscuity o f production o f knowledge with(in) lo ci o f  power.155 
It is important to distinguish between two broad types o f Orientalists (understood as person 
producing Orient-bashing view on the region — be s/he a specialist or not o f  the Middle 
East). First, the main sources are from western Orientalists. Either they are straightforward 
Orientalists or they are ‘refined’ Orientalists. The former aggressively denounce what they 
consider important shortcomings o f Islam (Pipes being the best example, followed by Crone, 
etc.). The latter employ more sophisticated approaches, but end up quite close to the former 
subgroups. One way o f ‘sophistication’ is that of hiding local ‘oriental’ knowledge (like 
Gellner (1981) with Ibn Khaldun), or o f producing convincing pieces o f writing about the 
Middle East before changing gradually the view (as in the case o f  Lewis). The second main 
types can be called the w estern ised  Orientalists (Asad 1986: 15), or ‘Oriental Orientalists’ 
(Sadilri 2004: 180ff), namely any researcher originally from the Middle East but who embraces 
an Orientalists’ interpretation. Examples o f such people have increased in the post-9/11 
w itch-hunt Ajami assuring the USA that their soldiers would be greeted with flowers i f  a war 
on Iraq were to be launched (Ajami 2002), Zakaria (1997) writing abundantly about illiberal
155 See many o f his articles on the matter under www.danielpipes.org. In particular, see 'Middle East Studies: a 
waste of money?’ in http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1133. For a discussion o f the funding problem, see also 
Brown C. 2005.
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democracies and giving advice on Islam to Huntington,156 Hamid Khalilzad former social 
sciences researcher and then special envoy for Washington to Afghanistan and Ambassador 
to Iraq by 2005, or Christian Lebanese having a poor view o f their Muslim brethren. The list 
could be much longer.157 Obviously one should question the psychological dimensions and 
reasons for these ‘westernized’ Orientalists to do so: some point out the phenomenon o f 
cognitive dissidence whereby a person inserted in a culturally different group will stress even 
in  an exaggerated manner the links that bind her/him to this group, in order to show a form 
o f allegiance.
Sadiki, in his interesting way of going back and forth between Orientalism and Occidentalism 
and the interplay between the two, points to one important reason for the existence o f such 
Oriental Orientalism: “oriental orientalism underlies the links between modes of knowledge, 
thinking, doing, and being in centers of power on parts of the west and the east. [ . . . ] ” 
Oriental Orientalism is evidence o f the potency of Orientalism as a discourse o f power.158 
More than four decades after decolonization in the AME, the battle for intellectual 
decolonization has yet to be won (Sadiki 2004: 181f). But whatever the reason for the 
existence of such oriental Orientalisms (cognitive dissidence, relation to power, cover for 
undemocratic practice, as put forward by the example o f King Fahd of Arabia, position 
within a field, or other), it is clear that such statements w ill be (over-)used as justification to 
stress that there are different cultural features that have an explaining power (although, le t us 
stress it again, culture is a process, not an independent variable, and that “the only differences 
among cultures is in scope and practice” (Hanafi H. 2002:182).
To conclude this section, there are three forms of immobilism implied in (neo-) Orientalist 
discourse. Islam (or for the sake o f our argument the Arab Middle East) will be portrayed as 
immutable and unchanging in terms of.
- Time (Islam of Abbasid time is the same as present day Islam)
Geographical distribution (Islamic practices in Morocco are similar to those o f Yemen 
or Oman)
156 See Huntington's acknowledgements for his Clash o f Civilisations to Zakaxia (Huntington 1996:14).
157 Some examples are more problematic. Sharabi (1988) has been accused o f being Orientalist in his 
Neopatrianby. A Theory O f D istorted Change In Arab Society. I would not put him in this category, for his study 
refrains from using generalizations and hypostatization as explaining force. Bather, he empirically shows how 
some personal, dyadic, and religious affiliations ate stronger than the loyalty to the nation or to a class, w ith the 
result that people tend to give priority to patronage and wosta mechanisms. He also demonstrates how internal 
security apparatus (mukhabarai) and "a two-state system prevail in all neopatrimonial regimes" (Sharabi 1988: 7, 
36f & 45). For another less culturalist view on the topic, see Tripp 2001.
158 An example of such potency is given in an article by J . Abu-Lughod (1987). How Orientalist fallacies become 
tangible realities -  or hyper-real a la Chakeabarty 2000) -  in the case o f the construction of an ‘Islamic city’.
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- Language, or rather the idea that Quranic language articulates definitively Islam in its 
worldly evolutions.
All three notions could be encapsulated in the following: *Islam , fix ed  in  one scripturalist 
interpretation, is a  to ta l system , providing an unchanging blueprint through lega l religious sanction (shari’â  
fo r  social, p o litica l an d  econom ic order.:m  Obviously such a sentence entails essentialization, 
hypostatization, simplification, and misperception. As such, it hides the variety of Islams (in 
terms o f  religious practices and interpretations), o f disputed interpretations of holy texts 
(Quran and hadith or tradition o f the Prophet) through ijtibad  (legal interpretation), o f a partial 
source for cultural practices and leaving legal space for non-Muslims citizens,159 60 changing 
across time and space, with differentiated sba ri’ah interpretations and enforcement.161 As for 
social, political and economic order, “Islamic forms o f political expression and organization 
are better explained with reference to the material conditions o f the people concerned that to 
anything specifically ‘Islamic’. In this reading ‘Islam* simply becomes a label used to convey 
mundane social grievances. The thesis here is that people have the capacity to choose their 
symbolic vocabulary according to their perception of their interests at the time” (Tripp 1996: 
51).162
So, undoubtedly there is a “misapprehension o f the sources of authority of the native culture” 
(Said 1988: 34). Eisenstadt’s project toward a “Reconstruction o f  Religious Arenas in  the 
Framework of *Multiple Modernities’” is an interesting effort to avoid the westernized 
references (Eisenstadt 2003 [2000]. Following this approach, some authors have shown the 
potential vitality o f a Muslim public sphere (Hoexter &  aL 2002; Salvatore &  Eickelman 
2004). Clearly many approaches to contemporary reforms o f Islam exist (Rodenbeck 2004) 
and they all point out that one should differentiate between different types of Islamism.163 
These approaches, though positive for evaluating without preconceptions as to the ‘disease* 
o f Islam, nevertheless, still tend to think in  distinct blocks of a (Christian) western world as 
opposed to a Muslim Oriental block, or to conceive the Vest* endowed with a distinctive 
culture o f that o f the orient As a  consequence, there is a lack o f discussion o f the interplay 
between the two.
Asad instead offers a  problematizing approach. In his Form ations o f  S ecular starting from the 
methodological question of V hat would an  anthropology o f secular(ism) be?*, he shows that
159 For a dose statement, see (Gellner 1995:17).
160 See the centurv-old differentiated religious courts during the Ottoman time, see Asad 2003a, and for 
contemporary practices see Chatelard 2003.
161 See (Burgat 2001: 84).
162 See also Ismail 2001.
163 For one such taxonomy, see (Ayubi 1991: 67-68)
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secular should not be taken for granted in our western societies, that much of the grammar 
and discourses o f our modem nation-states articulate and convoke religious narratives and 
reinterpret under different garbs the same religious ethos but with a new morality and legal 
forms. Secularization, in its study of Egyptian legal code reform, is linked to colonial 
experiences and so acquires a distinctive and negative taste to local populations (Asad 2003a). 
A sad also problematizes Sadiki’s pleas for a liminal approach of Islam (Sakiki 2004),164 and he 
does so not only in terms of mere discussions, but also pointing out the epistemological 
needs to think differently:
“For many Muslim minorities being Muslim is more than simply belonging to an individual 
faith whose private integrity needs to be publicly respected by the force of law, and being able 
to participate in the public domain as equal citizens. It is more, certainly, than a cultural identity 
recognized by the liberal democratic state. It is being able to live as autonomous individuals in a 
collective life that extends beyond national borders.”
[So] “if Europe cannot be articulated in terms of complex space and complex time that allow 
for multiple ways of life (and not merely multiple identities) to flourish, it may be fated to be no 
more than the common market of an imperial civilization, always anxious about (Muslim) exiles 
with its gates and (Muslim) barbarians beyond” (Asad 2003a: 180).
To sum up, we can propose a table showing the positions o f the various authors with regards 
to the discussion of the possibility of an AME democracy and civil society.165
164 Though I share Sadiki’s concern to spread different conceptions of Islam and his liminal efforts, I can see a 
lim it to that approach in the sense that it might not address the most important constituency. It is one (very 
important, it must be stressed) thing to convince western intellectuals about positive elements in Muslim 
traditions (such as Farabi's virtuous city), but it is quite another thing to address such questions to die wide 
masses of Muslim believers around the world, and not just in the AME (for a similar critique, see Utvik 2003: 
67). Other working along these lines are Laroui (1987, though, to be fair, his books were first published in 
Arabic), and Filafi-Ansaiy 2002.
165 The same could be done about studies dealing with dvil soaety in the west in general But, there would be






Table 4: Illustration o f the location o f selected studies on the *AME civil society’
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• Eick&Pisc 1996 
Smith C. 1995 ‘ Hallidav 2003
Let us note that works in quadrant I are not automatically ‘Orientalist’, though they would 
:end to be, as demonstrated later. For example, the recent article o f Tessler demonstrates that, 
jased on a  sample in  four Arab countries, there is no causal relation between political Islam 
md non-adherence to democratic practices, at least on the individual level (Tessler 2002). 
Similarly works assigned to quadrant III might end up presenting a distorted vision o f an 
\ME civil society and/or being outright Orientalist, though the majority o f  work here 
eviewed are not suffering from such Orientalist bias.
n the final analysis, this critical discussion points to the fact that the literature anyway had to 
leal with Islam as the central problem, whereas religion in the west does not really need to be 
>roblematized w ith regard to democracy (though it has sometimes been done but very few 
•eople would consider the argument valid). This benevolence should be scrutinized, as Smith 
•bserves in  his article for the E ncyclopedia o f  Islam , It may be the case, as he notes here, that far 
com a straightforward retreat of religious phenomena in the west, one should rather speak of 
itensification o f religious (Smith C. 1995).
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3.2. Locating Arab-Middle Eastern Civil Society
Next to orientalist discourses, there are also some positive approaches to civil society in the 
region. Such studies approach some of the conditions for its difficult growth, but also what is 
central in the emergence of a viable civil society in the AME. This part of the chapter 
discusses some of these themes (like the label ‘traditional’ and ‘secular*) and moves on to 
discuss three Arab intellectuals’ view, definition and operationalization of civil society. These 
are:
Azmi Bishara’s pessimistic conclusion about the existence o f a civil society 
Saad Ed-Din Ibrahim’s limiting (though operational) definition
Burhan Ghalioun’s optimistic and less ideologically tainted approach to civil society in  
the AME.
3.2.1. ‘Traditional’ (bis)
Even if  scholars have come to recognize multiple roads to modernity, there are not yet 
enough roads to the ‘traditional’, given that the ‘traditional’ tend to simply be identified as a 
mere negation of what the ‘modem’ is. The AME, or even Islam (here understood as a 
‘civilizational carrier’166), is “affected by one historical process, the world historic process” (of 
industrialization, urbanization, etc.). Therefore the socio-political responses offered by 
Islamic groupings are “a response to the breakdown o f traditional167 communities”, as 
Zubaida puts it (1993: xv-xvii). Muslim politics is also a m odem  form o f politics, though some 
concepts and formulations appear to come straight from a distant past.
Needless to say, such categories o f the modem and the traditional are very slippery. Counter­
examples of ‘traditional’ societies being more advanced in  terms o f  the realization of a civil 
society indicated the limits of the categories ‘traditional’ and ‘m odem ’, in die case o f social 
sciences. As Norton indicated in  die early 1990s, the best chance for civil society to realize 
was from the more ‘traditional* (or “backward” in his article) societies and states (Norton 
1993:216). The example of Yemen is a case in point (Carapico 1998b).
Put differendy, there should be equality of treatment w ith regard to modem and 
modernization, but also with regard to the ways in which Muslims conceive o f their religious 
texts. It does not make sense to conceive of Muslims as having to follow a  la k ttre the Qur’an, 
whereas “Christians and Jews are free to interpret the Bible as they please. [ ...]  On the one 
hand, the religious tex t is held to be d eterm in ate, fixed in its sense, and having the power to
ice por a discussion of how sociology has dealt with Islam as a ‘civilization’, see Amason & Stauth 2004.
167 I suggest to replace this ‘traditional* by what Eisenstadt calls usually ‘primordial-communal* (see, e g ,  in 
Hoexter 2002: 149, or Eisenstadt 2003[2000])
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bring about particular beliefs (that in turn give rise to particular behaviour) among those 
exposed to it — rendering readers passive. On the other hand, the religious reader is taken to be 
actively engaged in constructing the meaning of texts in accordance with changing social 
circumstances -  so the texts are passive” (Asad 2003a: 11). W hy then should one not go back 
to Marsiglio of Padova, Ockham, Franciscan or Thomist interpretations of Christian texts to 
understand the origins of a separation o f power church-state, or of new forms of 
representation? It would certainly sound strange to explain western democracy only with 
regard to theological explanations and not consider historical contingencies in  the gradual 
emergence o f democracy throughout the last three or four centuries. Islam, like Christianity, 
has also its vicissitudes and a complicated history o f shifting, clashing and evolving 
interpretations and ‘dogmas’ that one should be wary to subsume in  the political world, as 
frequent hypostatization on the topic of Islam tend to prove.
So, alternatively, one should look at internal Muslim strife for the ‘search for democracy’, 
following the recent work of Sadiki (2004). The latter is keen to show that, in  the line of 
Filah-Ansary (1999) Islamic thinkers have done their ‘homework* about political implication 
for faithful Muslims since the early centuries o f Islam (with a particular focus on al-Farabi 
(Sadiki 2004: 208-218). Closer to us and to the validity o f the argument, Sadiki stresses the 
importance o f 19* century modernists, such as al-Afghani and Abduh about concepts such as 
m afhaldt or common goods. Sadiki also notes how political vocabulary evolved in the late 19* 
and early 20* centuries to adapt to new political realities. Vocabularies originally endowed 
with a Quranic meaning, shift to adapt to current discussions and theories168. For example, 
hi^b used to mean a faction, a group (with a negative overtone169) but later became also 
understood as a (modem) political party. H urijyah  shifted from individual freedom to political 
freedom and right,170 istiq ld l from personal independence to national independence, sawt from 
voice to vote, watan from place o f residence into national homeland, nd ’ib, from deputy to 
representative of the people, etc. (Sadiki 2004: 206). Let us note that most of the current 
examples denote the same semantic changes that took place in  late 19* and early 20* 
centuries with the eruption of masses in politics and the increasing way in which intellectuals 
came to think and speak o f national communities as homogeneous groups part o f a distinct 
polity and hence destiny ^Terrier 2004). In other words, Islamic thinkers have just shown that 
there is nothing fixed and unchangeable in their vocabulary and hence in their mind, as some 
have tried to show (Lewis 1988). The following study of one precise word ‘secular’ w ill also
16a See (Sadiki 2004:206) who actually drew from a precise study on that matter on (Ayalon 1989: 27).
169 See Kedourie 1971 for a more detail account o f the inherent resistance to use the word in its new 
meaning.
170 For a comprehensive discussion of the existence o f ‘freedom’ outside the vocable burijyah, see Laroui 1987.
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show how one should be careful in drawing hasty conclusions about potential clashes 
between Islam (in this case, in its holy scripture, that of Arabic) and western liberal
It has been argued in m any places in the literature that Islamists are actually trapped in their 
struggle for power — let us assume that it is their objective for now171 - by the very existence 
o f states based more or less172 on bureaucratic, legal-rational and hence ‘modem’ means of 
doing politics (Tripp 1996). Outside the strict realm of the state, it can be convincingly 
argued, “Islamists have been insistent advocates of technological and economic development. 
But as importandy, they have been actively promoting values and attitudes favorable to 
modernizing change” (Utvik 2003: 64).
A s Asad puts it: “The way social spaces are defined, ordered, and regulated makes them all 
equally ‘political’. So the attempts by Muslim activists to ameliorate social conditions — 
through, say, the establishment of clinics or schools in under serviced areas — must seriously 
risk provoking the charge of political illegitimacy and being classified Islam ist* (Asad 2003a: 
199). The problem of licensing by the state is o f vital concern, as w e w ill demonstrate later in 
the Palestinian case, for civil society life and even more for NGOs.173 However, to close the 
circle, problems ‘there1 are magnified ‘here’ since we tend to fall into the trap of civil society’s 
proxy, and of not looking carefully enough at social activism of Islamic/ist groups (Hanafi H. 
2002:181).
3.2.2. Secular
To illustrate some of the difficulties ‘here’ and ‘there’, we will shortly dwell on the much- 
disputed concept of ‘secular’ through the evolution of its Arabic equivalent. The concept 
‘secular* appeared in western languages, following Asad’s genealogy in  the mid-19th century, at 
a time when concepts took a new meaning (nation, society, democracy, etc) through the 
gradual creation of nation-state based on majoritarian politics, but also at a time where new 
forms of subjection were established (Asad 2003a: 23f). The coining ‘secular’ came by 
“freethinkers in the middle of the nineteenth century [1851] in order to avoid the charge of 
being ‘atheists’ and ‘infidels’, terms that carried suggestions of immorality in a still largely 
Christian society” {ibid.-. 23 & n.6).
171 Which is not true for all o f the militant groups. For example, bi^b al-tabrirt will not fight for political control, 
but for the re-establishment o f the caliphate without further claim to power (see Barghouthi 1 .1996).
172 Yemen is an example o f how the government struggles to impose its authority in all of its territory. Whether 
its President All Abdel-Saleh does not have the means or does not want to implement a full control o f the 
territory is another question that remains difficult for western social science to grasp.
173 For a view on the difficulties for Palestinian NGOs based inside Israel to receive their license, see Payes 2003.
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Rather than adhering to the simple view that the secular is a mere separation of politics from 
religious, or a privatization of religion, secularism expresses itself through a variety of 
phenomena. “ [ .. .]  A  secular state is not one characterized by religious indifference, or rational 
ethics — or political toleration. It is a complex arrangement o f legal reasoning, moral practice 
and political authority. This arrangement is not the simple outcome o f the struggle of secular 
reason against the despotism o f religious authority” (Asad 2003a: 255). Secular and secularism 
took different turns according to the historical tradition of the state in  which it was codified 
and put into practice. The existence o f the different meanings between ‘secular’ and <lm cite> is 
a case in  po in t The French *lmdte*\s probably a  more precise sub-set o f the category ‘secular’ 
since it is more voluntaristic and jacobinist in  its implementation, as the recent law forbidding 
conspicuous religious signs in public institutions {[affaire du fou la rd ) recently highlighted. It 
would be a naive belief to say that European countries and the USA are fully secularized or 
that they are all in the same manner (Casanova 1994). Some countries adopted formal and 
legal separations o f the religious from the political, but the practices range from simple 
differentiation to quasi-hostility towards religion (Filali-Ansary 2002: 21). Suffice it to evoke 
the issues around the inclusion (or not) of religion on the Greek identity card, the massive 
presence of religious vocabulary in political discourses o f the USA, the controversial ruling 
about presence of crucifix in classrooms in Bavaria and Italy, etc. to notice that the religious, 
far from having been privatized, is still much present in western liberal public life. Put simply, 
“the concept o f secular cannot do without the idea o f religion” (Asad 2003a: 200).
The idea that religion was ‘thrown out* from the door only to re-enter by the window is also 
present in the translation o f the term ‘secular* in  Arabic. Far from falling into the trap o f 
Orientalism according to which worlds reflect an alleged ‘Arab mind1,174 the purpose of these 
short lines is to underline the shortcomings o f  simply exporting concepts without a prior 
good definition and understanding. So the argument is not about the exportability, or the 
possibility o f an internalization of a concept by an alien culture, but rather about the study o f 
potential problems arising during the process o f re-appropriation and re-interpretation o f 
ideas and norms originally from another culture.175 Empirical evidence from the field o f civil 
society promotion in Palestine should also clarify some the positions stated here. In particular 
the question o f ‘the secular* is of vital concern for present-day NGOs in  die Territories.
In Arabic vocabulary, d ie  notion o f secular first appeared in  the late 19* century (thus, 
simultaneously with its western brother) as ladiniyy, which is a neologism made of the negation
174 For a critique o f the etymological fallacy, see (Halliday 2003: 206): “Etymology, like genealogy, can become a 
servant of present concerns, not a determinant of transhistorical meanings.”
175 See e.g. Bayart (1989: in particular 50) for a discussion on re-invention and re-appropriation.
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‘non’ (id) and ‘religious’ (diniyy). In this case, làdiniyy literally means ‘a-religious’ or even anti- 
religious (Filali-Ansari 2002: 21). But the most frequent term is ‘almdniyy (or Hlmdnyytf16 whose 
roots comes from ‘dlam, Le. the ‘world’ (or from Hhnt Le. science, knowledge) and whose first 
appearance in a dictionary dates from 1870 (Asad 2003a: 206 n.2). The rule for the formation 
o f Arabic words is to go back to an initial root (most of the time o f three consonants) that 
represents a verb. In the case of ‘almdniyy there was no initial classical root ‘a-la-m a-na that 
would mean ‘to secularize’ but in recent years, people have started using such a verb.177 Let us 
finally note two other potential versions: dahriyy (from dahry Le. time, epoch, material) and 
IdHkdyy™ a straightforward transcription of the French laic.
So far we have just outlined the evolution of the way to express the notion of ‘the secular’ 
without stating the connotation of such words, which is where all problems starts. The 
problem we face here is that all of these Arabic words to express ‘secular’ include a negative 
connotation in a manner or the other. To any Arab, ‘almdniyy rings the bell to the notion o f 
atheist, infidel (note the parallel with the first usage of ‘secular’ as a way to avoid the 
accusation of infidelity), which is usually expressed as kufr (‘infidel’, or ‘blasphemous’) .179 The 
same remark applies for !ilmdnyyt. Dahriyy, which was used rather in the 19th century, since it 
stems from dabr (time, century, era) at first sight sounds close to the very root o f  secular 
(from the latin saecuhtm  for ‘generation, epoch, century’). But actually the connotation in 
Arabic is a very negative one, since it tends to mean “‘materialist’ or ‘atheist’, one who 
believed in earthly eternity, rather than divine retribution and spiritual life” (Smith 1995: 21). 
This goes in line with the frequent accusation o f Muslims towards Westerners for being 
trapped in a overly materialistic way of life.
One can wonder if  the fact that the concept of ‘secular’ in Arabic has such negatives 
overtones is not linked to the AME experience, which, contrary to the gradual process o f 
secularization in Europe, perceived secularization “as an ideology im posed  from outside by 
invaders, a product of European imperialism and its extension of a foreign culture initiated at 
the beginning o f the nineteenth century” (Smith C. 1995: 21, my emphasis). This view is not 
an isolated one. Many Islamic thinkers actually adhere to this interpretation and many signs 
indicate strong reversion vis-à-vis the secular. This, in turn, would indicate a situation of 
heteronomy, as discussed in the previous chapter in the part on Castoriadis (Section 1.5.):
176 See (Asad 200a3: 206ff, in. part. 206 n.2) where he discusses the differences between ‘ilmdnryy and ‘almdniyy. 
Though the former is used conversationally and is popular for its roots refers to Him - that is ‘science’, 
‘knowledge’ (as opposed to ‘religion’) - ‘almdniyy tends to be the standard version nowadays.
177 See (Asad 2003a: 207). The MawridArabtc-ÉngBsh Dictionary mixes the two elements by giving ‘dlmana, for ‘to 
secularize’, but for ‘secular’ the entry is Hlmdniyy (Mawrid 2001: 778).
178 See e.g. (Bishara in Ghalioun & al. 1993: 78).
179 See e.g. (Halliday 2003:126).
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imposing a too fixed understanding and practice o f secularism m ight be perceived by AME 
societies as a closure, or as their incapacities to chose they way they want to apprehend, 
define and legislate about their own laws.
For Sayyid Qutb, famous ideologue o f the Muslim Brethren in Egypt in the beginning o f the 
20th century, “secularism [ . . . ]  is a new religion that attempts to change the relationship 
between man and god, and therefore has corrupted people’s thinking about political and 
social systems, producing socialism liberalism and nationalism. A ny system based on these 
notions belongs to kufr, a n d  the ja h iliy a %x and hence must be overthrown” (quoted in 
Moussalli 1995: 98). This is a topos in the writings o f many Islamist thinkers who reject not 
only secularism but also, in  certain cases, democracy — dimuqratiyyah in  Arabic, another import 
from western language — for the same reason o f  being a western import (Sadiki 2004: 238) 
and, according to them, one should instead use the Quranic shura, i.e  ‘consultation’.
This small lexicographic excursus should highlight the caution with which concepts are to be 
used in certain contexts. Let us stress that the last negative remarks about secularism and 
democracy are not shared by all in  the region. Many AME intellectuals have done and 
continue to consciously call upon secularism as an important and .positive step in the agenda of 
political change, as we w ill stress later on. Actually since the beginning o f the 20* century 
there have been serious debates about secularization in the Muslim world. One famous 
example is the very controversial book o f A li Abderraziq, ‘Islam and the foundation o f 
power’ (1925, a year after the abolition o f  the caliphate in Turkey) where the author 
provokingly demonstrates that the Prophet w as no king and that there is actually a d ear 
division between the religious and the political. This book provoked much controversy, not 
least because its author was then shaykh (dean) o f al-A%hart the prestigious Cairo university 
serving as a sort o f theological centre o f gravity for Sunni Islam (Filali-Ansary 2002: in part, 
chapt III & IV).
Beyond the discussion o f  terms and o f  books generated around secularism, one should also 
look at the political reality to dedde whether ‘5600131* is alien to Islam, or at least to the Arab 
Middle E ast On that basis, one could easily argue that secularization actually took place in 
most of the AME states in  the 20* century: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, Palestine, 
Yemen: all have made substantial changes from  the 1950s onwards towards secular (here 
understood simply as a retreat of religion from  the public domain) politics. Rather, the 180
180 That is, ‘blasphemous’.
181 JdhUrjy refers to the pre-Islamic times. Pei extension, it means ‘ignorant5, ‘obscurantist’.
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current Islarmc/ist wave ought to be read as a re-increase of the religious phenomenon182 
which is a general trend around the globe and that should not be read uniquely in terms o f a 
feature of the Muslim worlds (Marty &  Appleby 1995).
Asad’s study on the Form ations o f  the secu lar abounds in the interpretation o f secularization (in 
Christianity, as well as in Islam) as a phenomenon reaching far beyond politics as a project 
including changes in morality, ethic, certain behaviors, knowledge, and discursive grammar 
(see in particular Asad 2003a: 25, 191 and 205ff). Mohammed Arkoun would speak of new 
“regime of truth” substituted by modem revolutions (Arkoun 2002: 40). Secularization also 
ought to be read with the yardstick of colonialism, not automatically conceived as imposition o f 
new  legal approaches but as way to re-modulate polities under colonial circumstances (Asad 
2003a: 214-218). Thus, as Asad’s major argument goes, secular is never a clear-cut process 
and it should not be considered as an acquis.
The interesting thing about this view [human beings being rational masters of their destiny] is 
that although religion is regarded as alien to secular, the latter is also seen to have generated 
religion. Historians of progress relate that in the premodem past secular life created 
superstitious and oppressive religion, and in the modem present secularism has produced 
enlightened and tolerant religion. Thus the insistence on a sharp separation between the 
religious and the secular goes with the paradoxical claim that the latter continually produces the 
former” (Asad 2003a: 193).
This passage, once more echoes the chicken-egg paradox previously highlighted with civil 
society and democracy: is democracy the result o f civil society or vice versa? In that sense, 
one ought to be wary in hastily concluding that secular is a pre-requisite for civil society and, 
in a further step, toward democracy. Adopting a too fixed view of the secular both here* (as a 
problematic concept) and ‘there’ (because it might miss important indigenous cultural 
resistance to certain concepts, though they might exist in practice, as highlighted in the 
previous case o f secularization in the AMK) would be a mistake. One therefore should be 
careful in defining ‘secular’ simply as l a d in g  that is as the non-religious. Negative definitions 
entail the risk o f circularity and of not evacuating the given element, despite the negation. Put 
differently, Iddiniyy (non-religious) is also d in ijy  (religious).
Far from discussing the same problem o f religious/secular, Beckamn also notes that 
circularity in theoretical arguments is in  general a bad thing to do and that in theories of civil 
society there is much circular thinking (Beckman 1997: Iff). The point here is that we fall into 
the same problem with a negative definition o f secular as being non-religious. One needs 
other elements of definition, as much as w e need cutting points to reach differentiation
182 The PLO, which is the prototype of a secular organisation in the AME world, is also suffering from such 
islamisation. See Legrain (2001a&b) for the gradual intrusion of Islam’ and the shari'ah into the future 
Palestinian Constitution.
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between, say, religious and secular, or civil non-dvil, as we w ill see in the following 
paragraphs.
3.2.3. Three Arab intellectuals on civil society
First, it must be stressed that from 1990 onwards, the topic has emerged massively both in 
academic circles and in public debates. The best evidence about the latter can be found in a 
series o f discussions in the most important international Arabic newspaper, A I-H ayat, a 
London-based daily. It published in August and September 1993 various articles 
demonstrating the need for the development of civil society in the region (Moussalli 1995: 
79f). The concept *m ujtam a* a l-m adan ijf (civil society) is now a common topic and is 
widespread in day-to-day parlance, and not just in  academic circles. W ith regard to academic 
publications in Arabic let us note a blossoming from the beginning of the 1990s.183 The 
following table184 gives an indication o f the gradual emergence of the topic. This comes as no 
surprise, since it coincides with die re-emergence en fo n t  o f the concept in social sciences in 
general. A  further analysis of the emergence o f the phrase in the Palestinian context confirms 
that the early 1990s were the watershed moment for its use (Section 6.2.3.).
Table 5: Occurrences o f  the phrase ‘civil society* in 9 MENA journals (1970-1988)
i
Nurrt>er of Reference 
to Civil Society 1
■1 “  — — — — — — —
I______:_____ _: ;; :
'L_____ :_____ _ _  £
i
i /
Lfi.n_.n fin flnn fL  n
1970 1972 1974 1976 1975 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
i
i
Y e a r of publcation
1 Here is a short list of titles referring to our topic that are not listed in our bibliography:
Sa’id Bensaid al-*Alawi (& ai), 1992. Cavil Society in the Arab nation, its role in  the realisation o f  Democracy, 
Beirut
- Sa’ad Ed-Din Ibrahim, 1993. G vil society and the democratic transformation in the A rab nation, Ibn Khaldoun 
Center for Study and Research, Cairo.
Mohammed Abed al-JaabarL, 1993. ‘Ambiguities o f democracy and civil society in the Arab nation’, al- 
mustaqbalal-arabi, n.197.
Personal compilation through an advanced research on J-STOR (a web search engine) of nine journals 
aling with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
114
Let us now consider internal AME discussions and definitions of civil society and see how 
intellectuals from the region (‘there’) conceive it.l8S I will concentrate on three alternative 
conceptions and definitions o f civil society. The first one will present a negative account 
about civil society based on the fact that individual rights are, according to this view, not 
guaranteed and therefore civil society cannot ex ist The second rejects such a negative 
interpretation and argues that there is an AME civil society, though with certain limitations as 
to exclude some militant (read Islamist) groups. The third opinion is more open and 
considers as false the exclusion o f some groups from civil society: rather, all sorts o f  
associations and organizations should be included under the label ‘civil society’.
Other views exist and can be found elsewhere in the analytical literature (most notably in 
Moussalli 1995), or in more programmatic literature, where Islamist militants define their own 
view of what is civil society for them (see Ghannouchi 2000).
Few words of definitions ought to be given to differentiate between Islamic and Islamist. 
Ayubi differentiates between five categories: Muslims, Islamic reformers or modernists (such 
as Mohamed Abduh), Salafists (Le. scripturalists or ‘traditionalists’, like Hassan al-Banna), 
Integrism (or fundamentalism186 - for whom Islam is seen in a holistic manner187), and Neo­
fundamentalists (those who are willing to take radical and immediate action to implement 
their programs). For Ayubi, only the last three sub-categories can be called ‘Islamists’, 
whereas the last two (integrism and neo-fundamentalists) can be correctly called ‘Political 
Islam’ since they propose direct measures to implement an ideology based on strict 
observance of holy scriptures and traditions (Ayubi 1991: 67f). Though Eickdman and 
Piscatori also distinguish between more conscientized Muslim and less so, they see ‘Muslim 
politics’ (note the difference with ‘political Islam1) as the “competition and contest over both 
the interpretation o f symbols and control o f  the institutions, formal and informal that 
produce and sustain them” (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 5). This is not far off Halhday who 
defines ‘Islamism’188 as a way to “refer to political movements, o f a mass populist kind, that 
challenge established, more secular, states” (Halliday 2003 [1996]: 236 n.6). Therefore, what
1851 owe the idea of distinguishing among various Arab authors from an artide by Bernard Botiveau (2002), 
though 1 will depart from his three-fold distinction (Ibrahim, Ghalioun and Jaabari) (Botiveau 2002), by actually 
positing Azmi Bishara as representing the idea that there is no civil soaety against the two views o f Ibrahim 
(restricted civil society) and Ghalioun (unrestrictive dv il soaety).
186 Many actually warn about the use of fundamentalism because of its possible historical ties to Christian 
movements.
187 This view is captured by the expression “Islam is the three *Ds” (dirt dawlah wa duniah> that is ‘religion, state 
and worldly life').
188 Islamization refers to politics “designed to alter law and social life in accordance with Islamic doctrine” 
(Halliday 2003[1996]: 236 n.6).
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matters tremendously is also the struggle over people’s imagination. For that end, references 
to Islam in a socio-political sphere capture the mind and imagination o f the masses,
a) A zm i B ISH A RA
Azmi Bishara is probably the best-known Israeli Palestinian (that is, a Palestinian not being 
from the Territories but full citizen of Israel — he is from a Christian family from Nazareth). 
Since 1996 he is a  member of the Parliament, the Knesset, each time elected on a different 
list, but originally close to the communist ranks. He holds a PhD from Humboldt University 
and is a specialist o f  political philosophy and history o f thoughts. He teaches in  the 
department o f philosophy and cultural studies at B ir Zeit University.
Bishara is very critical o f the notion o f civil society in the Arab world and develops the most 
critical and sceptical discourse of alL For him there is no and cannot be any civil society in  the 
Arab nation (al-watan al~arabiyy)y for the simple reason that an individual lacks basic freedoms 
and autonomy {al-tasyur al-datiyy) both vis-à-vis the state and vis-à-vis the biological or 
primordial groups (such as family, clan, tribe). For Bishara the latter is the more worrying part 
of the alienation of individual rights: he goes as far as speaking of the tyranny (ìstibdàd) o f  the 
clan (hamùla) and tribe ( ‘'ashtrah) as the main danger towards the fulfilment of a true form o f 
citizenship and political activism (Bishara 1996:10).
For him, civil society is based on the autonomy (autùnùmzà, or self-drive, self-impulsion, al- 
tasyyzr al-dàtiyy) o f individual and the basic premise o f pluralism, understood as “ the 
acceptance o f the legitimacy of the differences of opinions and of the ways to express them” 
(Bishara in Ghalioun &  aL 1993: 90, translation mine). In this reading, civil society has a 
precise and separate function which must be independent from the individual sphere (bqyyiii 
al-fardiyy) and from the public sphere (hayyi^ al-'dm ). But the problem is that in the case o f 
traditional Arabic societies,189 so argues Bishara, there are no individual rights that are fully 
guaranteed, and civil society cannot perform its precise function o f acting independently of 
the individual sphere. Therefore, if  civil society organisations (such as NGOs) are important 
elements for the emergence and consolidation o f  pluralism, they are not a sufficient condition 
to call it civil society (Bishara in Ghalioun &  al 1993: 91).
When discussing the question of Palestinian civil society, he makes a further argument that 
there is a political society but no civil society in  Palestine for two different sets o f reasons. 
First o f all, he notes the difficulty to speak o f  one Palestinian society, because o f the 
geographical fragmentation (West Bank, Gaza, Triangle, Naqab (Negev), Galilee, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon) and because of the many historical ruptures and traumatic experiences the
189 Which he simply defines as society before modernity (Bishara in Gahlioun & aL 1993: 89).
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latter has undergone (1948, 1967, 1982, 1987, etc). Because of these, Palestinian society has 
lost its coherence (Bishara 1995), and it is difficult to speak of one society. The second set of 
arguments are related to the fact that there is no proper state in the case o f the W est Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (WBGS) and since civil society is about counter-balancing the powers o f 
the state, there cannot be any civil society.
H e nevertheless acknowledges the existence o f some forms of social activisms and the
important role played by NGOs against the Occupation from 1967 onwards, but would label
such activism a form o f ‘political society’. He is still very critical o f the view that accords
N G O s the central place of civil society activism: “NGOs: this is not the civil society in
totality, God bless the very almighty.190 NGOs are not the almighty civil society, as some
researchers claim.” (Bishara 1995: 153). He invites us rather to conceive: o f NGOs as one
elem ent towards pluralism but denotes two further trends in NGOs, that of Islamic NGOs
w hich manage to have an important impact on the social basis, as opposed to the other
N G O s (read the secular ones) which fail “to reproduce themselves socially” (Bishara 1995:
152). For Bishara, this would explain why these secular NGOs needed, from 1989 onwards,
to m ove towards external funding to assert their existence. This is also one o f the reasons for
the professionalisation (ihtiraaf) o f some sectors of NGOs (Bishara 1996: 9).
T o discuss critically Bishara’s approach, let us quote another text by Bishara himself:
“Civil society comes from the word ‘dviT, that is ‘citizen’ (muwäün), and not from 
‘dvilizing/dvilization’ (madaniyyah or tamaddun), as some believe. Bürgerliche — in German from 
the term Bürger (‘citizen’ in German) and citizenship (mwvätinah), in the origin, is in a sense, 
citizenship in the city, of the Gesellschaft of the free dty in Europe or late Middle Ages” (Bishara 
1995:150 n.80 translation mine).
The centrality granted to dtizenship goes partly in line with the previous priority given to 
individual autonomy and p lu ra lism . But it indirectly hints at the problem o f such 
conceptualization. First, one can obviously disagree with such a ‘genealogy* making of 
citizenship the basis o f  dv il sodety: this might be true in the German tradition o f bürgerliche 
G esellschaft, but has little to do with the ju s  naturalis origin o f the concept stressed before. 
Though Pufendorf wrote in the line o f Hobbes, for Locke and Rousseau, speaking about dv il 
society is a way to speak about the State, or the way to govern together. The precise reasoning 
o f  Bishara reflects a rather Hegelian conception o f dvil sodety where the State is the end of 
this process of organising individuals into a polity. His subsequent disqualification o f the 
existence of a Palestinian dvil sodety on the reason that there is no real State also highlights 
the invisible primacy o f the State in his definition of dvil sodety.
190 ju lla  julaliahu!” Very ironical, because usually this expression is used only when speaking about God.
So one can object to Bishara a too fixed and ascriptive conception o f civil society, that is 
trapped within Hegelian and Marxist approaches. But one should be careful in following too 
strictly theoretical models. It does not make sense at the end of the day to say that there is no 
civil society but there is only a political society, just because one o f  the conditions for civil 
society is missing. Rather, let us think first in terms of open and not exclusionary manners, as 
Kamali does when proposing five conditions for the existence o f civil societies around the 
globe.191 Such a view preserves us from an over-deterministic theory and allows for a less than 
ideal-typical research. A  historical study of civil society shows that examples of civil society in 
the 19th century would find no place and grace in  our current definitions of the concept 
(Bermeo & Nord 2000).
Also, while reading the negative comments o f  Bishara one feels unease, because one feels a 
prisoner of a telosy or o f  too clear conditions that are historically linked to the emergence o f 
citizenship in a certain place (Europe, or German tradition) and at a certain time (from the 
Middle Ages onwards). Whatever certain conditions or criteria m ight be true in certain cases 
and precise circumstances, there should always be some space for flexibility. As pointed by 
Olivier Roy in the case o f western aid to Central Asian NGOs, it m ight be wrong to adopt a 
rather intransigent view towards the Hi%b at-T ahrir (a transnational and rather secretive 
movement calling for the re-Islamisation o f M uslim  society for the re-establishment of the 
caliphate) because it seems to go against pluralism: “However opposed the may be to 
pluralist, democratic values, the movement does represent a demand from the grass-roots 
level to resist authoritarian behaviour by state organs, and to create spaces o f solidarity and 
autonomy, if  not freedom. Even in this instance, it seems to me that ethnic, tribal and local 
identities192 cannot be kept out o f the activist agenda [ .. .]” (Roy O. 2002b: 136).
Thus, it is not so much the question ‘Is there a civil society in  the A rab world?’ that counts, 
but rather *which dvil society are we talking about?* In both cases (Bishara referring to the 
German/European traditions, and people dismissing bi%b al-tabrir from being part of civil 
society) there is an implicit model invoked to decide whether to be inclusive or exclusionary 
with regard to civil society.
Such calls for caution in  excluding/including w ill also be valid for a subsequent model (that 
of Ibrahim), which also falls within such determinism, though claim ing there is an AME civil 
society. This time the cutting-line, or excluding factors, will not be about the existence of a 
state or about the lack o f individual liberties in  the Arab world, but w ill deal with another
191 In three of the five conditions, the author adds the adverb ‘relatively’ when speaking of autonomy and 
freedom required for dvil soaety to exist See Kamali 2003, discussed later in Section 3.3.
192 Azmi Bishara would add clan {hamuiafy to this list
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element inherent o f the European genealogy o f civil society, n am ely that o f ‘civility’ which is 
indirectly present in the very notion of civil society.193
b) Sa’ad ed-Din IBRAHIM
Sa’ad ed-Din Ibrahim is an Egyptian scholar, and holds a PhD in political sociology from the 
University of Washington. He is a well-known figure both at home and abroad for having 
founded and for running one of the most active and dynamic NGOs in Egypt, the Ibn 
Khaldun Centre f o r  R esearch and Development publishing a monthly called C ivil Society. He 
published many articles in western journals (Journal o f  D emocrag, International 'Political Science 
Review) and in edited volumes about civil society and democratization in the Middle E ast He 
was arrested in 2000 and sentenced in May 2001 to seven years in  prison for financial 
m ism an ag em ent around a research project on elections, but later released in 2002.194 195He is a 
self-proclaimed defendant o f  civil society and a champion of democracy in Egypt155 
A str ik in g  fact in Ibrahim’s writings is that his approach to civil society seems196 to be slightly 
different when written in English than those in Arabic, as we will now see. In his English 
writings on civil society, Ibrahim displays a rather commonly used definition of civil society as 
a sphere differentiated from family, economy and the state. “Civil society”, so wntes Ibrahim, 
“is the totality o f self-initiating and self-regulating volitional social formations, peacefully 
pursuing a common interest, advocating a common cause, or expressing a common passion; 
respecting the rights o f others to do the same, and maintaining their relative autonomy vis-à- 
vis the state, the family, the temple and the market” (Ibrahim 2003a[1998]: 217). He openly 
and rather un-problematically steps in Putnam’s path by stressing that it  is the level of civic 
association that makes the difference “between development and under-development and 
between democratic and non-democratic practices [ . ..]” and speaks of the holy trinity 
composed of civil society, democracy and development (ibid.: 217f).
He is keen in m an y  places to stress that there are no incompatibilities between Arab political 
culture and democracy, or between Islam and secularism (“there are more Erbakans than 
there are Talibans” (Ibrahim 1997: 43)), and that one ought to consider Islamist populism in  
terms of a socio-economic gap between low and higher classes (Ibrahim 1996: 126) and in  
terms of international imbalances (Ibrahim 1997: 43).
Nevertheless, he shows clear limitation in his readiness to include Islamist groups within civil 
society, for two reasons. The first has to w ith primordial allegiances: according to him
193 See the condusion of this chapter.
194 See his appeal in Ibrahim 2003b. See also (Carnati 2002:213 n.l).
195 See his website www.democracy-egypt.oig/.
196 ‘Seems’ because I have not been able to get hold o f his theoretical texts on civil society in Arabic My account 
o f  Arabic texts relies on secondary sources. For the English sources, see his contributions in the bibliography.
119
“traditional loyalties to ethnic, religious, sectarian, and tribal groups would take primacy over 
loyalty to modem formations of civil society or to the state itse lf * (Ibrahim 1995: 34). This 
argument is indeed close to that of Bishara. The second is about the confrontational and even 
violent actions of certain Islamist organisations, which disqualify them from being part of 
civil society, or even to be in “intense confrontation” not only “with the state” but also with 
“civil society” in the case o f Egypt (Ibrahim 2003a[1998]: 227).
In his Arabic texts, the Egyptian sociologist does not make such a distinction as regards 
violence. The cutting point is simply primordial identity: “Civil society does not include 
traditional and inherited associations in society, which an individual is bom  to or from which 
he inherits membership compulsorily, such as tribe, clans, family and what is never included 
upon organizations that depend on religion, sectarianism of blood descent (Vry)”.197 This is in 
keeping with the effects o f resistance by ‘traditional* social affiliation upon ‘modem* patterns 
o f mobilization, in particular with individualism which, according to Ibrahim, possesses a 
stabilizing factor upon democracy (in Abu Amr 1995:11, translation mine).
Ibrahim*s rejection o f Islamist groups from civil society and the limits placed by primordial 
links ought to remind the reader o f the notion o f an over-powering society. Though he 
criticizes and openly rejects Gellner’s thesis, one should approach Ibrahim’s view with care 
since he tends to put all Islamists in the same category. Certainly some groups are fomenting 
violent actions, but Islamists tend to clearly distinguish in their activities between social 
charitable work and armed actions. It is therefore a limited view to put all Islamists in the 
same bag of violence-makers: In Egypt, for example, strands o f political Islam are very varied 
and have evolved a lot throughout the years.
So the will in the English texts to re-habilitate Islamic principles w ith modernity and 
democracy (or to shortcomings o f an excessively stark opposition ‘traditional* vs. ‘modem*198) 
goes against his disqualification of traditional and inherited organizations {al-tanyimdt a l* 
irtb ijyah  al-taqlidijyafi) (Abu Amr 1995: 9). How to explain such discrepancies and how to 
understand his rather negative approach to religious organizations in  Arabic more than in 
English (which are actually hinted at under the label ‘traditional*)? Maybe this is a sign of the 
different champs (fields a la Bourdieu) in which he evolves, both as political sociologist writing 
about democracy and M uslim  society to a western audience and as a social activist in  E gypt 
W ith the first hat of sociologist, Ibrahim plays a different role and uses a different vocabulary 
than the one he employs while wearing his second (Egyptian) hat that requires much more
197 This quote is taken from Abu Am i’s study on Palestinian civil society. See (Abu Amr 1995: 9).
198 See for example, (Ibrahim 1997: 42f).
120
care about what he says about his polity, given the repressive nature of the Egyptian State.199 
Therefore his attacks against religious groups can be a way to sing in the same tune as that of 
the State, i.e. repression against Islamist groups. There is no doubt that violent groups 
disqualify themselves from defining their activities as "civil society activism’, but there are 
probably some elements in Ibrahim’s argument that art, pro dorno.
W hatever differences he can make between English and Arabic versions of his theories of 
civil society, Ibrahim partly subscribes to the view that civil society leads to democracy, and 
even development. As such his approach denotes a clear transformative function o f civil 
society, which is far from granted and automatically correct In any cases, his position of 
addressing a western audience and of acting for the deepening of civil society in Egypt shows 
that writing about such topics is not contingent-free: what Ibrahim has to say and even more 
how to say it probably also depend on his status his position in various champs and his various 
roles as activist and as scholar.
c ) Burhan GHALIO UN
Burhan Ghalioun is a Syrian scholar who studied in Paris (Sorbonne). He is now professor of 
Sociology in Sorbonne-Nouvelle in Pans and deals extensively with questions of political 
sociology. He is the author o f a famous book (Le M alaise Arabs. E tat cen tre N ation, 1991) in 
which he rejects an all too stark opposition of state-society and invites one rather to conceive 
of the State as the emanation o f sodo-ethical principles guiding society200 and to study the 
State through its transformation ^son eleven#*) and its adaptation to complex national, and 
international, civic and political, cultural and material relationships (Ghalioun 1991: 9f). As 
many Syrian intellectuals, he has acquired his intellectual tools in the Marxist school, though 
departing from strict orthodoxy.
O f the three authors, Ghalioun adopts the most inclusive approach towards civil society in 
the AM E world. He distinguishes between the two concepts o f m ujtam a* ahahlijy (civic201 
society) and mujtama' al-m adanijy (civil society), the former being a much more widespread and 
popular concept202 and the latter a more recent introduction in the entry o f Arabic political 
vocabulary. Nevertheless, he does not see good reasons to put some organizations in the 
latter category on the pretext that their work is different or more im portant Therefore all
199 Since Sadat’s assassination (1981), Egypt has been under emergency law.
200 “Mais, plus qu’un simple appareil, l’Etat est pris, ici, comme l'incarnation des principes éthiques et sociaux en 
fonction desquels la société est organisée” (Ghalioun 1991: 9).
201 Literally the root 'aht means family, people and as adjective (ahByy) can mean familiar but in our case, civic, 
local On the tension between madam and ahU, see (Carapico 1998b: 4-8).
202 For example, the Ministry (now Commission) for NGO Affairs is called in Arabic 'Ministry/Commission for 
civic affairs’ {shu'un al-muna^amaat al- ahli^yali).
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organizations, whatever their nature and their orientation, should be included under the label 
‘civil society* as well, since they all have a potential impact towards transforming society.203 
For the Syrian sociologist, the “concept o f  civil society includes these inherited organizations 
(irtbiyyah) that Ibrahim excludes from his definition o f civil society’* (quoted from Abu Amr 
1995 p. 9, translation mine): no matter i f  they are linked to family, clan or tribe, if  they are of 
a sectarian nature, openly calling upon traditional forms of mobilization, social actions, and 
morality, all organizations have their space within civil society.204 So even if  one is bom  (by real 
(or putative) descent) to a social grouping, the socio-political work undertaken by such a 
grouping nevertheless qualifies such work to be labeled civil society work. Ib rah im  and 
BishSra would refute such ideas because participation is not volitional participation and does 
not guarantee basic individual freedom. For Ghalioun, what matters is the intention behind 
the work of such organizations.
In his discussion o f the usages of ‘civil society* in  the Arab world, Camau notes that in certain 
countries (in particular Algeria and to a certain extent Palestine205), civil society does not refer 
anymore to an intermediate sphere o f associations and social activism in general Rather, 
through a glissem ent sémantique — or semantic evolution — the notion o f civil society refers 
uniquely to certain organisations proclaiming their allegiance to pluralism, the rule o f law and 
democracy and thus creating a front-line against Islamist associations that do not belong to 
this new understanding o f  civil society (Camau 2002: 221). In other words, civil society has 
acquired a reflexive dimension that makes his definition dependent on the assumptions made 
in  the hegemonic interpretation. The fieldwork results will actually highlight the validity of 
this claim: very often civil society is not considered by  international donors on the basis or on 
the type of work done by various organisations, but recognition by donors will mostly come 
to organisations making open and conscious reference to the phrase ‘c ivil society*.
It is probably against such a reductive conception of civil society that Burhan Ghalioun’s 
approach should be understood. His claim is that the criterion o f inclusion into the category 
‘civil society* is the m ere socia l action f o r  a p ositive common good. In this reading, less (or not)
203 “Distinguer de celle-ci [mujtaena ' al-ahS\ une société «civile »  {mujîama’ madani) reviendrait à adopter une 
attitude discrim inante, du moins sélective, qui n’accorderait qu’à  certaines institutions seulement le droit de faire 
partie de cette société civile. Pour Ghalioun, cette distinction est erromée, car «  elle empêche de comprendre la 
nature des forces agissantes qui font bouger la société »” (Botiveau 2002:235).
204 Taken from (Abu Amr 1995: 10) where he draws (see footnote 4) from an article by Ghalioun Burhan 1992. 
Bina ' ai-mujtama * al-madanh d a w  al-awàmil al-dakhi&yyàh wa al-khàrijiyyah [The construction o f  civ il society: the role ofinternal 
and externalfactors]: al-mustaqbalal-arabïy n.158, nisàn, p. 109.
205 See, for instance, my interview with Mustafa BARGHOUTH3 (Director o f HD IP and UPMRC, Ramallah, 
22.02.03) in which he systemically opposed his organizations (and that of PIN GO, the Palestinian NGO 
Netowrk) to the Islamic ones with on the one hand “dvil society and the non-democradc associations” on the 
other. See, e.g., Section 7.2.3.
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attention is given to the ‘civil’ of civil society and it does not presuppose any particular form 
of polity (democracy or not, state present or not).
3.3. Conclusion
So w hy is it that Bishara’s civil society seems to be an unreachable holy grail for Arab 
societies, for Ibrahim it is about a group of happy few and for Ghalioun it is open to every 
social group? The three authors here studied suggest different cntieria o f inclusion/exclusion. 
The rather extreme view o f Bishara is too ideological and lacks flexibility to be 
operationalized. As Ibrahim points out, the matter o f die existence o f a civil society in the 
AME is rather, at the end o f the day, a question of empirical evidences (Norton 1995). But 
what are the decisive criteria towards inclusion in or exclusion from civil society? Is it 
violence (and Islamists o f Ibrahim)? Is it ideology (as in the case o f Hi^b al-T ahrirfi Is it 
primordial links (irtbiyyah)} Is it the reflexive actualisation of civil society according to western 
dominant assumptions?
For the first two elements (violence and ideological lack of toleration), one can quite easily 
spot the theoretical origin o f the cutting point I would argue that debates about the notion of 
violence and acceptation o f pluralism stem from the very presence o f the adjective ‘civil’ of 
civil society (Beckman 1997: 2). Diamond’s 1994 article in which he stresses conditions for 
being ‘civil’ go in line with the more recent view that Jeffrey Alexander offers about 
definitions o f dvil society. For Alexander, solidarity should represent the motives for civil 
society, but as long as they manifest in  ‘av ic ’ manner (Alexander 1997). The problem in 
Alexander’s view is that he never really defines what is civic or not and that he considers 
religious activism and solidarity as ‘non-dvic’.
Are not we facing here the consequence o f one of the blind spots of modernity and 
enlightened rationality where religion is now (falsely, or too simply) considered as a fully 
privatized domain? Is it  not exaggerated to exclude religious-based movements from dvil 
sodety? Certainly, Tocqueville’s dvil sodety was in many cases motivated if  not directly 
hosted by religious organizations. According to a widely-held view, it  has been argued that 
religion is the exdusive item  that disqualifies a group from being part o f dvil sodety.206 But 
many authors assume that 1) religion is simply a privatized matter in the west, though it is far 
from being the case (see Asad 2003a) and that 2) other religions (not to say straightforwardly 
Islam) are sources of violence. Arkoun warns about the blind spots inherent in labeling 
violence as linked to religion:
206 For a counter-view, i.e. religious organisations as means o f indusion, see Levine & Salvatore 2005.
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“When modem societies speak of violence as integral to religious traditions, they overlook the 
anthropology of violence in all types of societies, not least die most modernized and wealthy 
western societies. Violence cannot be linked exclusively with others — perceived, described, 
condemned as the barbarians, uncivilized and uneducated, ignorant of the true teachings 
provided solely by the religion, philosophy, and objective history taught in the public schools of 
modem laic states” (Arkoun 2002; 40).
Let us finally note the possible limitation provoked by primordial links that pluralism and 
social action might be culturally defined and differentiated. In many instances activists of the 
third world call upon collective rights rather than individual rights. W estern modem societies 
probably forget too quickly that they too had to struggle to obtain basic political rights before 
being able to benefit from individual rights and protection (see T.H. Marshall for a classical 
account (1992[1941)], see Hanafi H. 2002: 188 & 181). Along the line o f Hussein (1993), in 
which members of Arab-Middle Eastern polities have to evolve from the status o f subject into 
citizens?01 Harik notes:
“The practical wisdom of considering the political legitimacy of communal association in 
drawing up rules and policies are matters o f great importance for the viability of democracy in 
culturally conservative societies of the Less Developed Countries. Nevertheless, such concepts 
as democratic consolidation and civil society tend to deprive communalism from the political 
legitimacy it deserves. In fact, democratic consolidation has become a reference to the gains 
made toward the realization of the standards one finds in conventional Western democracy of 
liberal persuasion. In short, something akin to contrived or forced assimilation” (Harik 2003: 
30).
As a final response to the negative position o f  Bishaia about the impossibility for civil society 
to exist in the AME, one should adopt a non-determioistic approach (like that suggested 
about ‘communalism* in the previous quote). It is probably misleading to abandon civil 
society theories because one o f the theoretical conditions (in that case individual liberty) is 
missing. Bermeo and Nord’s rich study about the historical emergence o f  civil society in 19* 
century points to the limits o f such definitional determinism: if  we w ere to take the present- 
day definition of civil society to decide whether civil society existed in mid-19* century 
Europe, we would be left with a bleak picture and would embarrassingly conclude that civil 
society did not really exist then (Bermeo & N ord 2000). M utatis m utandis, such a critic can also 
be addressed to Bishara. As stressed by Ibrahim, it should be empirical evidence which 
determines at the end of the day whether or no t some of the religious groups belong to av il 
society or n o t
It is our contention that the previous theoretical discussions and later empirical evidences will 
generate firm grounds for the inclusion o f  Islam ic groups within civil society, both in terms 
o f theory and of practical support to NGOs. Kama1i*s five criteria for the existence o f civil 207
207 This dichotomy of collective vs individual rights w ill also be later stressed in the empirical parts of this thesis 
(see in particular Section 6.3.2.).
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society are a promising basis for a theoretical reformulation of this positive model of civil 
society (from the Arab worlds or not). His five conditions (Kamali 2003[2000]) are:
1) Relative autonomy o f a societal sphere from the state;
2) Relative autonomous access of some societal actors to the state or its elite;
3) Existence o f a relatively independent public sphere;
4) Legal and/or normative protection o f  societal agents and institutions;
5) Existence of a ‘solidarity sphere’ based on redistribution of resources.
Kamali stresses the importance of group and community belonging where Islam can provide 
integrative elements o f social justice and social redistribution (as embodied by %akat 
institutions)208 (Kamali 2003[2000] :97ff). Many authors have stressed this positive and 
optimistic capacity o f Islam (Laroui 1987:179; Salvatore & Eickelman 2004).
T o come back to the previous model of civil society as a source o f autonomy and democracy, 
the main decisive criteria should not be a more or less implicit comparison with a given 
m odel of civil society (as that of the western liberal polities), but the fact that it organizes a 
collectivity towards a better political participation, in accordance w ith shared open values. 
Autonomy is clearly outlined in Kamali’s conditions and does not need to be further 
elaborated. As for democracy, as long as organisations claiming to be part of civil society do 
not resort to political violence and mutually accept the constructive projects o f others, then 
they can be considered part of civil society. So, two more conditions o f inclusion should be 
observed to be part o f civil society:
A positive vision o f social participation based on the acceptance of certain rules o f 
toleration and acceptance o f basic rights;
* Self-imposed limitation upon resorting to political violence as a way to impose one 
specific project o f autonomy.209
Finally, one should adopt a rather sceptical view about some authors’ insistence on the ‘civil’ 
o f  the phrase civil society. Despite all the efforts to come up with differentiated definitions o f 
civil society, there are still leftovers (or very subtle hints) o f the original contrast civil society 
vs. state of nature, or put differently ‘civilized’ vs. ‘barbarians’, but this latter dichotomy 
possesses a very strong normative power. The case of dismissing arguments presented by 
Bishara and Ibrahim indicates that this exclusion capacity is reproduced at a variety of levels 
and for a variety o f reasons (some o f which will appear clearer in the last two chapters). *20
208 See, e.g., Benthall &c Bellion-Jourdan 2003 and Ghandour 2002 for a general presentation of %akaai. In the 
Palestinian setting, see Section 6.2.2.
200 In the case of Algeria, the leading Islamist party contending in the 1991/92 elections, the FIS, promoted the 
view that democracy was 'k uft (‘blasphemous’, ‘atheist’). In that case such groups would not be part of civil 
society, since it does not respect the vision supported by a large segment of the population.
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Therefore one has to keep a constant eye on the tendency o f some to argue about the 
existence of civil society not because there lacks a substance (that promotes autonomy and 
democracy), but because they dissociate the ‘a ril*  from ‘society*. Thus, a r i l  society does not 
really let one forget its historical origins and is somehow trapped in  one of its founding 
shortcomings.
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Ch apter  IV: Palestin ian  NGOs in  H isto rical  
Perspective
It is often said that Palestinian civil society has a long historical record starting at the turn o f 
20th century. It is similarly noted that NGOs have mushroomed since the early 1990s. Before 
starting the study of international civil society promotion to Palestinian NGOs, one has to 
understand how such entities have evolved in  a diachronic manner. Therefore parts of this 
chapter will focus on some o f the formal and informal constraints existing in Palestinian 
assodarional life, while also distilling some basic factual information on Palestinian NGOs, all 
o f which takes place against the backdrop p f  profound political changes within and around 
the Occupied territories.
In order to do that, some key developments in the history of the Territories w ill be put 
forward since the various occupations in Palestine have left durable traces in legal terms. The 
formal constraints consist first o f the legacy of four layers of occupation/domination; the 
focus will then move on to study the relations between Palestinian NGOs and what was the 
first indigenous form o f power and authority, namely the Palestinian National Authority 
(established in 1994). Finally, we w ill try to explain how the current Intifada and military re- 
occupation conditions the work and life o f NGOs.
A middle section w ill describe in more detail what are NGOs in present-day Palestine 
through the presentation of figures on funding and activities, and it will stress some 
evolutions that took place in the last ten years. As for ‘informal constraints’ on NGO life, the 
third sub-section of this chapter, one should understand by that the potential influence of 
geography, o f political party life, o f the changes in the fabrics o f Palestinian society, and of
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the massive increased presence o f foreign donors after the signing of Oslo (international 
context).
4.1. Legal Constraints
4.1.1. NGOs before the establishment of the PNA
Palestinian NGOs need to be understood within (or as a result of) the historical context of 
the various occupations that took place in the south-eastern shores o f the Mediterranean Sea. 
The legal and political framework set by the successive Ottoman (until 1918), British (until 
1948), Jordanian (for the West Bank)/Egyptian (for the Gaza Strip) and Israeli rules (from 
1967 onwards) over the Palestinian Territories have deeply influenced the course of local civil 
society and in particular NGO work. Some o f the policies towards non-state actors taken by 
each of these rulers still have some influence on what NGOs resemble today. NGO activism 
reflects the difficult and often conflictual relation to the existing authority for much o f the 
last century. Knowing that the oldest NGO still active was established in 1907 (MAS 2001a: 
20), it is important to discover what is the historical context
The Ottoman Law on Associations of 1907210 guaranteed for the first time the right o f 
association, but in  a limited manner. Associations had to inform the government about their 
purpose and intention (art 6); licensing was granted afterwards only (Curmi 2002: 96). This 
limitation has to be understood in  the context o f its period when the Ottoman Sultan feared 
centrifugal forces generated by the nascent Arab nationalism o f the late 19*-eariy 20* 
centuries (the Arabic Nahda, or Arab R enaissant) (Yapp 1987; Yapp 1996). Targeted 
associations for the Ottoman. Empire were nationalist ones (art 19). Thus, organisations most 
likely to be created in Palestine in this period were (or had to be) a-political and traditional 
religious charitable associations. Some o f these associations still exist today and are now 
affiliated with the Union of Charitable Societies. They represent a by-product of this legal 
framework whereby associations were established and guided by traditional and land-owning 
notables.
When the British Mandate was established in Palestine in 1922, a Constitution delineated basic 
rights within the M andate’s limits. The law on private non-profit making companies (of 1922) 
laid the ground for the formation o f many new associations that were willing to escape the 
rather strict control o f  Ottoman law. Until the promulgation of the recent Law on Civil and
2,0 According to Curmi, the law was passed in 1909, a  year after the new 1908 Ottoman Constitution was 
promulgated. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights mentions the same law, but dates it 1907 
(www.pchrga2 a.0 rg/ files/S&r/English/study 13 / Article%20.html).
This law is mentioned in  the current NGO law, art 43 as ‘Ottoman Law o f Charitable Organisations issued on 
29. Rajab 1327 A. H. (Muslim Hijrak Calendar).
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Charitable Associations (so-called NGO Law of April 2000) by the PNA, many NGOs were 
still registered under the regime of British law in order to avoid Israeli jurisdiction.211 3.4% o f  
the NGOs active today were established before 1948.
The Jordanian Kingdom administered the W est Bank212 from 1949 until 1967, but kept an 
important role in influencing NGOs until 1988 through the Jo int Palestinian-Jordanian 
Committee. The two applicable laws (from 1956 and the Law of Charitable Organizations 
number 33 of 1966213) were passed in Jordan, but were also regulating assodational life in the 
W est Bank. The Hashemite House based its influence on a network o f  important notable 
families, which could, in their turn, entertain a clientelistic network, at the cost of later being 
accused of quiescence towards Jordan214 after the dramatic defeat o f 1967 (Sahhyeh 1988). 
Despite the Israeli occupation from 1967 onwards, the Jordanian government kept paying the 
salaries o f many charitable organisations in  the West Bank until 1988, but the traditional 
families gradually lost their patronizing role and a new urban nationalist (pro-PLO) leadership 
gradually emerged from the 1970s onwards (Sahliyeh 1988: 47ff). When the Jordanians 
disengaged in 1988,215 only 2,000 out of the 21,000 employees who were previously benefiting 
from Jordanian finanrial assistance continued to be paid for by the Hashemite government, 
but only the ones working for religious endowment This forced many NGOs to look 
for new donors to compensate for the loss o f Jordanian funding. Around that period (which 
coincides with the first year of the first Intifada) European governmental handing gradually 
made its way towards NGOs, setting new priorities, by which solidarity funding gave way to a 
more development-oriented type of funding (Curmi 2002). The next chapter (Sections 5.3.2 
Sc 5.3.3) will deal more extensively with the meaning of this gradual sh ift To close this short 
section, it must be stated that 11.5% of the NGOs existing today were established between 
1949 and 1967 (MAS 2001a).
211 There stilt exist some ambiguities with this non-profit making company law. The new NGO law 
(01/04/2000) addresses membership organisations. Some 'non-govenrnientaT institutions might not qualify as 
chantable or community organisations and hence take advantage of the British law. Some organisations have 
registered under the new law, although without being a membership organisation. This is a way to ensure funding, 
since requirements on transparency and accountability are higher for associations registered under the new law 
(interview with MATTTN Group, Ramallah, 17/02/2003).
212 H ie Egyptians administered the Gaza Strip. No specific law applies there. Therefore the legal framework for 
Gazan associations is provided by the Ottoman and British laws.
213 NGO Law April 2000, A rt 43. On the Jordanian law and its effects in terms o f control, see Amawi 2005.
214 During the time of direct Jordanian administration (1948-1967), the King wanted to unify the West and East 
Banks under his rule. He did so by co-opting traditional notable families, by fragmenting the power o f the West 
Bankers and by controlling the opposition (for example, by having a common communist party ra ilin g  for unity 
with Jordan). See (Sahliyeh 1988:10-20). The success of the PLO, and in particular of its new guard around 
Arafat, has to be understood against the background o f the 1967 defeat and of the decline of pan-Arabism after 
the death of Nasser in 1970 (see Sayigh 1997; Sahliyeh 1988:43).
215 Hais disengagement coincides with the PLO Declaration of Independence (Algiers, Nov. 1988), and with the 
abandonment by the Jordanian King Hussein to rule over the future o f Palestine. See (Sayigh 1997: chap. 4).
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With the Israeli occupation (1967 onwards) and formation of the so-called civil (but of 
military nature) administration in the Territories, life was made even more difficult for the 
Palestinian NGOs. East Jerusalem organisations were forced to deal w ith the Israeli amutoi 
law (non-profit organisations) because o f  the Israeli annexation policy in  the Arab 
neighbourhoods o f Jerusalem. Some o f the small traditional charitable NGOs in East 
Jerusalem managed to remain under previous Jordanian legislation, but the largest ones were 
forced to register as amuiot,216 All other organisations of the W est Bank and Gaza were forced 
to follow the Israeli Military Order 686 which is a tougher version o f the Ottoman law of 
1907: a formal registration application has to be submitted to the 'civil administration’ before 
any activities could be undertaken by the association.217 As in the case o f the Ottoman time, 
any group with a nationalist orientation was thus forbidden to create its association.
Political parties (unless they were not openly nationalist218) were thus banned from the public 
life and significant political leaders were deported with the outbreak o f  the first Intifada  (1987- 
1993). To palliate this interdiction, political parties organised local associations dealing with 
topical or professional issues to escape Israeli wrath. Thus popular committees active in 
health, agriculture, woman, or in trade union, started blossoming all over the Territories. This 
type of activity, originally linked to leftist faction (Communist party, Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine or 
DFLP), was later copied by the dominant PLO faction, that o f Fatah, in  order to reproduce a 
successful model o f mobilisation.219 The crystallisation o f new organisations reflected a 
longer-term change in the composition o f the leadership inside the W est Bank, where an 
urban, nationalist background, from a new professional middle class220 (willing to function, at 
least in the beginning, as a relay for the PLO fighting abroad) replaced the older traditional
210 Interview with Majeed ‘ALOUSH, Board Member, Union o f Charitable Societies, East Jerusalem, 28.01.03.
217 See PHCR comments on the second draft of the NGO Law. 
www.pchrga2 a.0 rg/files/S&r/English/studyl 3/Article%20.htmL
The 'dvil administration’ refers to the Israeli military rule over the occupied territories. See Roy S. 2001a.
218 This explains why Hamas was first indirectly supported by Israel, as a way to divide the population and 
having defection for PLO support Israel tried to encourage in some occasions the emergence o f new political 
groups that would be resistant to the occupying force. One o f these attempts, known as the League of Villages, 
was led by Ariel Sharon in the 1980s (Brynen 1995: 27).
219 See Robinson 1997. The fact that Fatah created its own popular committees later is due to the fact that Fatah, 
as the leading faction o f the PLO was concentrating its efforts on the batdes fought outside the Territories. Only 
when it became clear that an independent inside organization could become a became a danger for die PLO 
leadership based in Tunis during the first Intifada (the inside popular forces were not willing to expect armed 
struggle abroad to be terminated to fight for independence), Fatah, thanks to Abu Jihad, a founding father of 
Fatah y started organizing local forces and created its own network o f local popular committees (see Sayigh 1997: 
618f).
220 The role o f higher (secondary and university level) education is here also very important. The fact that private 
universities were opened in the 1970s in the territories and that (mosdy) communist countries offered 
scholarships to Palestinian students for university degrees paved the way for a heightened degree o f national 
consciousness and political activism (Rosenberg 2002).
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elites. Many authors point to these new organisations as the backbone o f contemporary 
Palestinian civil society (Muslih 1993).
Let us just take the health sector as an example. The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief 
Committees (UPMRC), close to the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP, later renamed 
Palestinian People’s Party or PPP), was the first to be created in 1979. It had a clear leftist 
agenda, but the strict affiliation to the communists became apparent when some physicians 
w ith  another party orientation split from UPMRC to create two new medical associations. 
Thus the Union o f Health Care Committees (UHCC, affiliated with the DFLP) and Union o f 
H ealth Workers Committees (UHWC and affiliated with the PFLP) came in 1984 and 1985 
respectively, following the model of UPMRC. Finally, Fatah came last and created its own 
H ealth Service Council (HSQ in 1989. A ll o f these associations subsequently became 
form ally institutionalised and some of them became the key NGOs in the 1990s. Similarly, a 
cluster of five to eight associations differently a ffiliated existed in the field of agriculture, 
education, as well as in women and trade-union activities. A ll of these programmes were 
intended not just as a means for political mobilization but also as a local response to the lack 
o f  institutional development under the Israeli Occupation. To illustrate the importance o f 
N G O s as a means o f resisting occupation, it is enough to state that 47.5% of NGOs active in  
2001 were created between 1968 and 1993 (MAS 2001a). Only during the six years o f the first 
In tifada  (1987-1993), 18.8% of the active NGOs were created in  this short period (MAS 
2001a: 20). So, i f  in certain southern countries NGOs are very recent constructs with few 
links with the population, the Palestinian case is different, because many of these popular 
committees, resulting indirectly from long decades of civic activism, evolved into NGOs. It is 
therefore correct to insist on the vital role o f NGOs as crucial social actors on the Palestinian 
scene, but historically as subordinates to political parties. The latter, under the umbrella o f the 
PLO , were concentrating on organising civil society politically in the form o f mass movement 
and institutionalised NGOs.
To conclude, it is important to highlight the social changes that took place inside the W est 
Bank and Gaza assodational life and which reflect the shift from ex ternal domination over 
Palestinian politics until 1967 (Ottoman, British, Egyptian and Jordanian rule) towards an  
endogenous nationalist movement (PLO abroad and popular committee inside), and from an 
internal social hierarchy dominated first by land-owning traditional families towards the 
emergence of new educated and urban middle-class. As I shall argue, the object o f my study 
(NGOs active in  the 1990s) cannot be understood outside this evolving socio-political context.
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4.12 . NGOs and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
When the Declaration o f Principles was signed in September 1993, it was soon obvious that 
Palestinians would be given their chance to develop their own institutions, if  not their own 
State.221 The legal framing of NGOs* work took a turn that was to a great extent shaped by 
the nature o f the regime as embodied by the PNA.
The Cairo Agreements (May 1994) led to the establishment o f the PNA in the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho, and Oslo II (Interim Agreements o f September 1995) extended the Palestinian 
control to seven other Palestinian autonomous zones, the so-called Area A.222 Rapidly the 
PNA emerged as the structure set by the PLO to deal w ith daily management of the 
autonomous Territories. This organic but blurred link between PLO and PNA223 made it 
difficult to understand what were the exact strategies o f the Palestinian leadership with 
regards to the new administration: should the leadership use the already existing PLO 
ministries (based abroad in Tunis) and ‘import* them to the Territories, or should it create 
totally new ones using the skills and local knowledge developed by the embryonic public 
sphere bitterly fought for by the inside population, popular committees and NGOs? Or 
would it become a combination of the two? For many, and in particular for the NGOs, this 
was the crucial question concerning the PNA.
The theory was that the PNA positions should be equally divided amongst PLO returnees224 
and ‘inside* Palestinians.225 The practice turned out to be different key positions inside the 
PNA were rapidly handed to a majority o f  PLO returnees; or when there was a fair division 
(on the basis o f geographical origin) between minister and deputy minister, another 
mechanism was found to disrupt this 50-50 balance. Thus, for the health sector, Riad 
Za*noun, a Fatah returnee, was appointed a minister along with a vice-minister from inside 
(other prominent Fatah NGO members, like Anis al-Qaq from the Health Service Council, 
integrated into various ministries (see Rabe 2000: 85 &  277ff)), but a Higher Health
221 Although the second part should be obvious, some careful analyses o f the peace negotiations quickly 
observed that Israel was not really willing to give back lan d  for peace*, as suggested by the logic o f Oslo, but was 
a means to domesticate the PLO/PNA through daily administration o f  small autonomous zones. This is what 
certain people called an ‘autonomy without territories' (Debie & Fouet 2000:94).
222 Areas A represent 17.2% of Occupied Territories. In Areas B (23.8%), there is a mixed control (full 
Palestinian jurisdiction, joint Israeli-Palestinian internal security), where as on Areas C (59%), Israel has full civil 
and security control See (PASSIA 2003: 258 and 274).
223 The 1993 Oslo Agreement (or Declaration of Principles) is nothing but a formal recognition by the two sides 
of the existence of Israel and of the sole representative position of the PLO. The blurred line between PLO and 
PNA is partly due to this agreement The PNA is meant to be the gcrtionnairt o f the autonomous zones, but 
political negotiation is the unique resort of the PLO.
224 ‘Returnee’ will be used to refer to the PLO leadership which came back to the Territories with the Oslo 
process. They are different from the Gulf returnees (in 1991), deportees and economic deportees. For a 
discussion o f the differences, see Challand 2002 and Romani 2005.
225 See (Baron 2000: 624f).
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Committee, under the PLO supervision, was created. Another Fatah  returnee, Yousuf 
Awadallah,226 headed this committee (Rabe: 277ff). Another striking example o f PLO 
returnee control227 is provided by Chairman Arafat, who cumulated key functions as elected 
president of the PNA (in January 1996), chairman of the PLO and president of Fatah, the 
dominant party in the PLO coalition. Only after his death were the three positions conferred 
to three different people.
By the late 1990s, about 100,000 PLO members had returned from exile to Palestine since 
1994, providing the backbone and leadership o f the Palestinian National Authority. The so- 
called returnees have been accused of monopolizing power and o f controlling the allocation 
o f resources, leaving the people who had been living inside the Occupied Territories (the 
'insiders') with a scant portion of the pie. O f course, the claims are not clearly sustainable and 
groups cannot be considered as homogenous: in many cases returning PLO people used to be 
rather poor foot soldiers o f the ‘revolution* and were then employed in  low-level public 
service positions. In other cases, people from inside managed to make their way into the core 
elite groups of the PNA. Also a line should be drawn between the PLO  returnees (who spent 
m ost of the years abroad, or sometimes their whole life) and the deportees (who were activists 
inside the Territories expelled by the Israeli, mostly during the first Intifada) (Challand 2002). 
W hat can be asserted quite seriously is that the PNA has not been a very democratic and 
accountable structure. Rather it was characterised by the concentration o f power in  the hands 
o f  Arafat and by the setting of a largely clientelistic distribution o f  power, where the PNA 
became gradually synonymous with Fatah interests that blurred the line between insiders and 
returnees, and old guard vs. a younger generation.228 Parts o f the future dividing lines (and in  
some cases conflicts) between NGOs and PNA actually owe their origin to this institutional 
setting, as we will try to show.229
In the cases of cooperation between NGOs and the emerging PNA, frictions quickly 
appeared as a result o f the open will o f the PNA to systematically assert its control over those 
segments of civil society inside the Territories which seemed too autonomous and not
226 Interestingly, Yousuf Awadallah is now part of the Ministry/Commission of NGO Affairs, in charge of the 
strategic registration process for Health NGOs (PASSIA 2002). The creation o f ‘Higher committee* is a typical 
Arafatist technique to exert control over a variety o f clienteles (see Haddad 2000: 8-9).
227 According to Aburish (1998: 268), what matters to be appointed in key functions is simply doseness to 
Arafat.
228 This is still a burning question in the reforms that currently take place. Some saw around Arafat an old guard, 
mostly made of returnees and founding fathers of Fatah, with a younger generation that fought the first Intifada 
claiming more responsibility and political power. See (Challand 2002: 8-11). Things evolved rather quickly during 
the second Intifada, when it became increasingly difficult to see dear generational divisions. See on that issue 
Legrain (2003a) and (Taman 2002).
229 This was especially true for the first years after die establishment of the PNA. With the second Intifada, things 
evolved dramatically and it is hard to see where are the ‘insiders* and where are the ‘returnees’, at least in terms 
o f the here suggested articulation NGOs vs PNA.
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responsive enough to the PLO leadership based abroad. This trend began already during the 
Madrid negotiations (October 1991), where the PLO called each sector of NGOs to debate 
together the agenda, in 'technical’ committees.230 Thus the W om en’s Affair Technical 
Committee was created through the cooperation o f three major political factions to prepare 
for the negotiations (Curmi 2002: 106). To illustrate the independence of inside institutions 
and to show how NGOs already feared a centralized control of the PLO, it is worth noting 
that a group of NGOs still closely affiliated to leftist parties created the Palestinian Network 
o f NGOs (PINGO)231 in November 1993, well before the establishment of the PNA, but 
shortly after the signing of Oslo. Beside the Fatah and leftist blocs, there appeared a third 
informal block of NGOs, that was close to the Islamic organisations. It was bom during the 
1970s, and gained w ide support during the 1980s and mostly the first Intifada (Legrain 1997: 
165). As an opponent o f the Oslo accords, the Islamist segment gradually appeared as the 
main threat to the PNA, if  not to the PLO (to which it does not belong).232 23
When the PNA was established (July 1994), the already existing NGOs were called to merge 
with the new ministries, or at least to offer their service in the ministries. Many of the NGOs 
close to Fatah accepted the plea o f the PNA (Rabe 2000: 264-5); all others refused When the 
PNA elaborated a first draft of legislation on NGOs, PNA’s intentions became clear in 1995, 
a questionnaire was circulated to NGO staff where the PNA asked very sensitive questions, 
such as political affiliation, time spent in  jail, existence o f spying records, name of friends: 
none of which is o f  any relevance to freedom o f association, but much more useful for a 
mukhabaraP3 security apparatus willing to crack down on political opponents.
The response of the two opposing NGO blocks (leftist and Islamist) was conditioned by the 
attitude o f the PNA itself. For the leftist NGOs, the attempt to control them was done 
through the introduction of tough legislation. A tough legal batded ensued but the conflict 
remained in  that sphere o f actions. For the Islamist ones, a real crackdown on their charitable 
association took place as Hamas waged revenge suicide attacks in  1994 (after the Hebron
230 The success of this approach still remains to be discussed There were few technical committees created in 
the first years of the 1990s (Curmi 2002:106). Many NGO activists wete active in the Madrid talks, but it was 
rather on an individual basis.
231 To describe this Network, we will use the acronym PINGO, instead of PNGO which will be used to refer to 
the Palestinian NGO Project, initiated by the World Bank.
232 Legrain (1997:163) described how Hamas organisations, among others, benefited first from Israeli indirect 
support to undermine PLO support in the Territories and then how Fatah left the Islamic sector attack the 
‘impious* leftist bloc. This double (but failed) instrumentalization backfired since Islamist social and charitable 
networks arguably proved to be the most serious argument for wider enrolment in  and support for Hamas. See 
also Legrain 1990.
233 This Arabic term refers to security intelligence and political repression units. They are sadly famous 
throughout the Middle East and according to the leader of the Palestinian delegation in Madrid, this model 
seemed to have deeply influenced the Palestinian Authority (personal interview with Dr. Haydar Abdel Shafi, 
Head of the Palestinian Delegation to Madrid and former PLC member, Gaza City, 11/07/2000).
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massacre on 25 February of the same year) and even more in 1996 (when Yahya Ayyash, the 
‘Engineer’, was assassinated by Israel in January 1996).234 235Legislative framework was therefore 
irrelevant for many Islamic NGOs at a time where the PNA simply shut down dozens o f 
Hamas NGOs (especially in 1996 and 1997, and again later in 2001).
T he first draft of the NGO law that was presented in 1997 to the newly created Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC, elected in January 1996) reminded for many the very intrusive and 
restrictive Egyptian law  on NGOs (Hammami & aL 2001: 7).as All personal elements 
suggested in the 1995 questionnaire were later eliminated, but the PNA tried to centralize all 
sources of funding, either through PECDAR or through MOPIC236 (Curmi 2002; 113 & 116). 
T he PNA also intended to control who should be allowed to establish a NGO. The former 
elem ent was successfully removed from the law thanks to the serious efforts and lobbying of 
PNG O , but control o f membership remained. Although freedom of association is guaranteed 
by art. 1 of the “Law on Charitable Associations and Community Organisations”, the 
registration procedures (and in particular the art 4) gives the possibility to the Ministry of 
Interior (the leading ministry for registration) to refuse the establishment of a new 
association, thereby negating the freedom of association. One of the leading human rights 
N G O  (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights - PCHR) at that time lobbied for the 
abolishment of such l im ita tion , arguing that the art 4 reflect PNA’s intention to license rather 
than to simply register new NGOs, which should be considered, in the eye of the PCHR, as a 
“dangerous and tragic setback to the 1907 Ottoman law”.237 Despite all efforts by the PCHR 
and  PNGO, this article remained in the final version of the law officially published in April 
2000 .
It took thus three years to pass the law. One of the major points of contention between the 
PLC  and the Authority was to know which ministry should have the leading role in the 
registration process. For the legislator, it was obvious that the Ministry of Justice should be 
the guardian of legal registration. For Arafat, the role should be assumed by the Ministry of
234 Both of these waves occurred at key moments: Baruch Goldstein refused the logic of returning land for 
peace, as much as Hamas opposed Oslo -1994 is the first year of real autonomy. As for the assassination of the 
‘engineer’ Ayyash, and Hamas’ bloody response (weekly attacks in February 1996), they occurred during the 
period full of doubts that followed Rabin’s assassination (Nov. 1995) and the electoral campaign that saw 
Netanyahu’s victory over Shimon Peres (see Legrain 1997:165-169).
235 For a comparison the NGO law with references to other countries, see Husseini 1995.
236 PECDAR stands for Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction’. It was created at 
the time o f the Oslo signing and was meant to be abolished when a real Ministry of Finance was to be 
established but it still exists (Curmi 2002:113 n.42). The World Bank pushed for its creation and relies on 
PECDAR for donor assistance coordination. MOPIC is the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
(the equivalent of a Foreign Ministry).
237 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Comments on the second draft law, 
www.pchrga2 a.0 rg/ files/S&r/Enghsh/smdyl3/Artide%20.html.
The comments to the Draft are highly instructive as to the loopholes in the legislation.
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Interior (precisely headed by Arafat from 1994 until 2001 and in charge of the intelligence, 
mukhabarat). The law was passed by the PLC in  its third reading in  December 1998, but 
Arafat sent it back to the PLC with the amendment requiring registration by the Ministry of 
Interior. The quorum could not be reached in the PLC to overrule Arafat’s decision and the 
PLC finally endorsed the law, in the form desired by the PNA, on August 12, 1999. The law 
came into force when posted in the Official Gazette on April 1, 2000, as the Law of 
Charitable Association and Community Organizations, which repeals the previous relevant 
Ottoman and Jordanian laws (art 43).
Even though PINGO claimed to have successfully lobbied for a liberal NGO law, the fact is 
that the PNA has indeed the capacity to prevent registration because, as stipulated in article 4, 
applying associations must fir s t receive the approval o f the M inistry of Interior before 
becoming active. During an interview with the deputy director o f the Commission for NGO 
Affairs, I was informed that the registration process has been practically put on hold since 
early 2002 in the last year, because “the PNA prefers to revive non-active but already existing 
NGOs than having new NGOs established”.258 Thus, the fears expressed by the Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights were well founded and there are indirect possibilities for the PNA 
to oppose the creation o f new associations.238 39
Interestingly, PINGO was supported in its lobby by the W orld Bank which openly advocated 
for an open legislation and also financed some o f the activities o f PINGO, thanks to funds 
allocated in its NGO project ($200,000 specifically to the NGO law  drafting, as part o f $15m 
disbursed to NGO projects).240 It is apparently the first time that the World Bank (although 
doing it in a sub-contracting form) directly finances NGOs without any state intervention 
(Curmi 2002: 114; Sullivan 2001: 1). So it seems that the situation is not so easy for the 
NGOs to operate as a form of counter-power to the Authority, especially for organisations 
not close to Fatah.241 Maybe the fact that the PLC and the NGOs themselves242 have backed
238 Or how to create the famous GINGOs, or governmental NGOs. Interview with Khamis ROK, Deputy- 
Director, Commission for NGO Affairs, Gaza Gty, 02/02/2003).
239 Let us note that one o f the founders of the PHCR, Raji Sourani, was himself active in another human rights 
NGO (Gaza Centre for Human Rights and Law, GCHRL, created in 1985), which turned out to be too anti- 
PNA for Chairman Arafat Raji Sourani was arrested in 1995 and the GCHRL was put in the hands of allies of 
Fatah. Personal discussions with young civil society activists in Gaza City (who wanted to create a cultural NGO) 
also stressed the very difficult registration procedures (February 2003).
240 This $0.2m is a very small amount of the overall $15m dedicated in the first phase o f the project (1997-2001). 
A second phase has started in August 2001 (to last until 2004), with $16m allocated. Again, $1.5 m  is earmarked 
for a ‘NGO sector support programme’, according to the Palestinian NGO Project’s Newsletter (July 8). See 
PNGO 2001.
241 The PNA created its own network to counter-balance the growing role taken over by PNGO. See (Brown N. 
2003:113).
242 In the PLC itself, there are prominent figures of the NGO world: Hanan Ashrawi, Haydar Abdel Shafi (until 
his resignation in August 1998), and Hussam Khader. PNGO and the Union o f Charitable Organisations have 
been very active in die lobbying phase.
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off on Arafat’s claims (to register with the Ministry of Interior) is due to the anti-NGO 
campaign that took place by mid-1999. A t that time, the Minister of Justice accused certain 
NGOs of corruption by misinterpreting UNSCO figures about external funding for the 
promotion of the rule o f law (UNSCO 1999b). He falsely claimed that NGOs active in the 
field o f democracy and human rights had received more than the M inistry of Justice. The 
allegation happened to be unfounded, but it was interpreted as a means to deflect attention 
away from corruption problems inside the PNA itse lf (see Hammami &  al. 2001). These harsh 
attacks from the PNA can also be understood as a sign of irritation at the work of human 
rights NGOs which criticized law violations by the PNA itself.
M ost o f the NGOs were by the year 2003, registered under the new law  (approx. 80%); the 
ones that had not done so yet were the ones that were registered as a private non-profit 
company (which, in terms of organisational requirements, is very close to the NGO law). The 
law  is certainly very progressive with regards to other similar laws elsewhere in the Middle 
East. Nevertheless, on top o f the registration/licensing hurdle,245 there remain some indirect 
financial constraints set by the PNA on the work o f NGOs (e.g. monthly limits in  cash 
transactions with regard to announced budgeting (Curmi 2002: 114). Despite the requested 
financial and narrative reports due every year to the PNA, cases of corruption occur in the 
NGO sector. Thus, a leading human rights NGO (LAW) was caught in 2002 in an 
embarrassing situation where $4m out o f the $ l0m  disbursed between September 1997 and 
A ugust 2002 went unaccounted for (Ha’aretz 2003). This corruption scandal, whose effects 
w ill most certainly be bitterly felt by most advocacy NGOs, might provide further arguments 
for tighter control by the PNA on the work and activities of (opposition) NGOs.
4.1.3. Second Intifada and NGOs
A s the years of the second Intifada went by (it broke out in late September 2000), the situation 
became ever more uncomfortable for the PNA: it become the target o f destruction and 
subject to tough international pressures to reform amidst large-scale re-occupation of and 
m ilitary operation in all o f the autonomous zones. NGOs have thus become an object of less 
concern for the PNA, inasmuch as NGO work has been re-oriented towards relief rather 
than advocacy activities, some of which were previously aimed at reforming the PNA. 
Collaboration between the PNA and NGOs has increased in new sectors, since the 
emergency situation forces all actors to pull in  the same directions and to forget about 
internal dissents. The second Intifada has created a new sense o f unity, at least in the first three 243*
243 For a documented case o f the impact of difficult licensing in another setting, see (Payes 2003: 62) where she
explains the low number of Palestinian Israeli NGOs in comparison to Jewish NGOs inside Israel in terms o f 
the difficult registration process.
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or four o f the Uprising. With a massive return of the reform agenda from 2004 onwards, 
advocacy issues re-gained some o f its importance, as it was the case during the Oslo years.
Few changes took place in the political sphere o f the PNA. During the Cabinet reshuffle of 
October 2002, the Ministry o f NGOs, headed by Hasan Asfour since 1998, has been lowered 
in its ranking to a ‘Commission for NGO Affairs*. This is the result o f the introduction of the 
Basic Law244 Ju ly  7, 2002), which, in its article 65, limits the number of ministerial cabinet 
posts to 19. For the rest, the work done by the Commission of NGO affairs remains the 
same, w ith the already mentioned slow ing down in the registration process, which has, 
according to a m inistry official, nothing to do w ith the difficulties encountered by the PNA in 
general. Other PNA officials (in particular a t MOPIC, which supervises the Palestinian side of 
donors contribution) considered the relationships with NGOs to be good ones, especially 
with regard to the work done in the health sector.24S 246
But not all NGOs might subscribe to this o p tim ism . For example there are moments of 
tension with advocacy NGOs, more precisely with democracy NGOs pressing for more 
reforms inside the PNA, and the human rights organisations opposing the appointment of 
the new Ministry o f Justice in the last months o f 2002. But the main reason for tension has to 
do with the new competition to have access to funding, since the PNA has been “relegated to 
asserting itself as the Authority by battling w ith international donors over the right to be the 
conduit for emergency food aid to the destitute population” (Hammami 2002) during the first 
three years of the Intifada.
The sectors that suffered mostly are the ones linked to the Islamist groups. After a wave of 
suicide attacks in December 2001 and under strong international pressure to do so, the PNA 
decided, as it did in  1997, to crack down on Hamas affiliated institutions. Thus, A l-lslab , the 
largest charitable association o f H amas in  the Gaza Strip, was conspicuously shut down in 
December 2001.244 Other associations o f H am as and Islamic Jihad were closely scrutinized by 
the PNA. As of January 2002, 50 various Islam ic social welfare associations (close to Hamas) 
were shut down by the PNA247 and the assets o f  25 Islamic NGOs were frozen (ICG 2003a:
244 The Basic Law is the Palestinian Constitution, for the interim period. Although quickly passed by the PLC, 
Arafat refused to sign it. After the operation Defensive Shield and US strong pressures to reform the PNA, 
Arafat signed the law in Ju ly  2002. Since then, some legal progress has been made.
245 This is also stressed by Palestinian health NGOs. International donors active in health are more sceptical 
about such statements and underline the poor level o f  coordination in general (various interviews February 
2003).
246 According to a PLC member (Ziad Abu Ami) w ho checked Islab'% accounting book, there were no 
irregularities (misuse o f funding) or diverted funds (towards some military actions of Hamas) and thus no reason 
to shut it down. It was a mere political gesture by d ie PNA (ICG 2003a: 20).
247 The International Crisis Group goes so far as saying that these concerted measures to shut down such 
institutions cannot really harm Hamas, because o f the quality of its social services in comparison to the PNA’s 
weakness (ICG 2003a: 25).
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16). This move turned out to have a widely negative impact for all charitable associations, in  
particular the traditionally un-affiliated ones, which suffered from a lack of funding, because 
o f  the fear o f international donors to indirectly finance armed operations of militant groups.
4.2. Analysis of the Various NGO Sectors
I f  one counted around 2,000 associations during the first Intifada (Curmi 2002), the number 
seemed to have gradually but endlessly decreased in the 1990s, reaching about 1,000 by 
2000 24 *48 This decline has many causes. During the first Intifada, m any NGOs were working 
under-ground for fear o f being closed down by the Israelis. Thus severe Israeli legislation 
m ight be a reason for the decrease in  the number of NGOs. This can also be explained by the 
pulling out of Jordanian funding after 1988 and by the loss of credibility (and subsequent loss 
o f  funding and remittances249) o f the PLO in  1991 due to its support for Saddam Hussein in 
the  first Gulf War. According to two Palestinian sociologists, these two reasons (tight control 
o f  mass organisations by Israel and a drop in  PLO funding) might well have been the key 
turning point in the decline of mass-based organisation (Hammami & Taman 2001:17). 
Figures tend to confirm this conclusion. From 2,000 NGOs during the first Intifada (1987-93), 
the next number available on NGO is that o f 1,400 organisations by 1994, the time when the 
PN A  was established.250 Funding levels dropped significantly as w ell since the PNA was now 
the main focal point o f attention o f the donor community. Thus, external funding to NGOs 
(which used to received from $170 to $240 m  per year around 1990) decreased to only $100 
to  $120m in 1994 (Hammami 1995: 59). W orld Bank figures hint at an even more drastic 
decrease of funding for NGOs: i f  between $150m to $200m was distributed in the early 
1990s, only $90m was donated in 1994 and a mere $60m in 1996 (Sullivan 1997: 95).
F inally, the Oslo years were characterized by a turnover with the establishment o f many new 
N G O s: 37.6% of NGOs active in 2001 were created after the signing of Oslo (MAS 2001a: 
20 ). On top o f the already mentioned NGOs in the sectors of health, agriculture, women, 
education fields and trade unions, a new form of NGO appeared in this period: that of 
advocacy and research. By advocacy, one should understand NGOs active in the fields of 
hum an rights, democracy and peace promotion- If some o f these organisations were founded 
before the 1990s (Al-Haq, the pioneer in human rights was established already in 1979), the 
m ajority of these advocacy NGOs is a by-product of the Oslo years (Section 6.3). The most
24S Our own database indudes almost 900 NGOs, to which at least a hundred charitable NGOs from the
northern West Bank should be added. 1,000 NGOs seems a realistic figure.
249 Many Palestinians were employed in the Gulf region, mostly in Kuwait. This meant a first wave o f returning
Palestinians and the end of valuable remittances to local communities. More on the political meaning of this
shift in  the following chapter.
250 World Bank figures, quoted in (Rabe 2000: 257ff).
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recent advocacy NGOs are research centres on democracy, politics and public opinion, with a 
last strand o f organisations dedicated to peace promotion and/or people-to-people 
programmes.251
Despite the belief that the Oslo years were characterised by the ‘mushrooming* of NGOs,252 
evidence suggests that the overall number of NGOs has decreased during the Oslo years and 
that many changes have taken place in the various sectors.
Here are two tables illustrating that matter, one on the number of NGOs according to 
various sources dating from 1990 to 2004, and a second on the percentage o f  NGOs created 
in various historical phases.
Table 6: Number o f NGOs in the OPT 0990-20011
D a te N u m b e r of N G O s S o u rc e
1990 2,000 Cum ni 200 2
1994 1,400 W orld  Bank*“
1996 1,850 P IN G O 253 25467
1997 1,200*w
1999 1,200 C u rm i 2002*“
2001 982 M A S  2 00 1 a: 2 0
2004 About 1,000“ '
Table 7: Percentage o f NGOs according to their period o f establishment
D a te  o f  crea tion S o u rc e : M A S  2001a S o u r c e :  M A D A R  2000
Post O s lo  (1 9 9 4 -...) 3 7 .6 % 4 6 %
Before O slo 5 4 %
198 8 -19 9 3 1 8 .8 %
198 7 -19 8 0 1 3 .3 %
196 8 -19 7 9 15.4
1 94 9 -19 6 7 1 1 .5 %
Before 1948 3 .4 %
It is difficult to have official figures from the Ministry/Commission of NGO Affairs and 
therefore virtually impossible to decide which source is most accurate. In any case, it is 
correct to conclude that there have been important changes in  the landscape and composition
251 If dûs sector was the last to appear, it also seems the first one to harshly suffer from the second Intifada^ with 
most of their programmes being put on hold.
252 One research centre even spoke of “thousands’* of new NGOs recently created (BISAN 2001: Executive 
Summary), though this opinion is obviously out of touch.
253 Quoted in (Rabe 2000: 257ff).
254 PINGO Newsletter n.6, August 1996. This is most probably a hyperbolic figure. PNGO tends to exaggerate 
its figures, as a study produced by PNGO during the anti-NGO campaign in 1999, demonstrates. It then 
claimed that NGOs employ up to 25,000 people. This is far more than a thorough investigation done in 2000 
which concluded that around 10,000 people were employed by NGOs (MASa 2001:126 & 129).
255 Stanley Huron. Conference at the School of Oriental and Afidcan Studies, London, November 1999.
256 Based on PINGO sources.
257 My database on Palestinian NGOs. There are 888 NGOs to which should be added about 100 chantable 
organisations from the northern govemorates (Nablus Union of Charitable Societies).
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of NGOs after Oslo, 'with the apparition o f many new NGOs (300 out of 1000), and the 
disappearance of many more others (at least 1000 out of the 2000 existing as of 1990).
To know in which fields the different NGOs are active is a very difficult question, because o f 
the lack of literature on the topic. Two exhaustive studies exist (from 1994 and 2001) but use 
different categories that do not overlap. According to the 1994 study done by the W orld 
Bank, there were 1,400 NGOs active that could be split into four categories.258 
200 NGOs constitute the p ro fessio n al d evelo p m en talist sub-type. They are the secular 
NGOs active in health, agriculture, education, advocacy, and community service, as well as 
research organizations. Although many were historically linked to political parties, political 
affiliation has become very loose, to the point that they can sometimes be considered as 
independent (Sections 7.2.2 & 7.2.3). They are the most visible organizations for the 
international donors, even though they represent the smallest sub-type (14%) o f all o f the 
NGOs at the time o f the establishment o f the PNA.
The second sub-type is formed by the 500 ch aritab le  organisations. They are traditional 
forms of associations (in the sense that they are led by traditional and/or notable leaders) and 
politically unaffiliated (36% of all NGOs by 1994). The work done by the chantable 
organisations with, for example, orphans, deaf, or blind children remains an important 
contribution to Palestinian welfare and in particular in zones that are less covered by other 
NGOs. This sector certainly did suffer from the professionalisation affecting the secular 
NGOs, since donors turned their back (probably too hastily) off this more traditional forms 
o f  associations. This is not only due to less clear structures of management, but also due to 
the fear for external donors to fund m ilitan t Islamic organisations, although many of these are 
not linked at all with the latter type of organisations.
The third sub-type is that of the re lig io u s-b ased  organizations, which represent 400 NGOs 
(29%). They can be either Christian or Muslim organizations but w ith a more overtly political 
agenda. Hamas, through a vast network o f mosques, schools, and m edical clinics, controls the 
largest chunk of this sub-type. Their beneficiaries mostly receive its services free of charge. 
The Islamic Jihad also controlled dozens o f these (Rabe 2000:257-9).
The last sub-type is made of approx. 300 organisations (21% of all NGOs by 1994) which are 
the serv ice- an d  co n sum er-o rien ted  NGOs. This sub-type was meant to gradually 
disappear with the establishment o f the PNA, since they were part o f  the organizations set by 
the PLO and more specifically Vat ah from the late 1970s onwards to counter-balance leftist 
and Islamic NGOs. Their orientation covered issues such as education, transportation,
258 All figures and categories of this section are taken out of World Bank, 1996, Report No 16696 GZ, Annex 4, 
pp.1-3.1 rely on indirect source (Rabe 2000: 257ff).
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housing, agriculture, and even credit assistance (Rabe 2000: 258). Trade unions and 
professional associations are other NGOs o f this sub-type.
The next thorough study on NGOs was published in 2001 and was commissioned for the 
World Bank project on NGOs. One part of the study dealt with the relations between 
NGOs, PNA and the donor community (MAS 2001b), while the second one was a mapping 
o f NGOs (MAS 2001a). The World Bank and Welfare Association (running the NGO 
project) mandated a research centre in  Ramallah, the Palestine Economic Pokey Research 
Institute (MAS), which published its very detailed results in  two separate booklets (See 
Section 6.1.2).259 260Unfortunately, for the sake of longitudinal comparison, the categories used 
by MAS do not overlap with that of the World Bank’s 1996 study. For example, there is no 
distinction between the charitable and religious NGOs. Since the MAS study was done by 
local and quakfied Palestinian sociologists and researchers, it makes it even more interesting 
to see from their perspective what are the categories relevant for Palestinians, as opposed to 
the ones used by Western donors.
Table 8: Number and percentage o f NGOs according to the main type of activities
T Y P E “ 0 N u m b e r P e rc e n ta g e
Charitable Orqanisations 374 4 0 .4
Youth and Sport 282 3 0 .4
Culture 94 10.2
Relief 44 4 .8
D evelopm ent 45 4 .9
R esearch 32 3 .5
Train ing and Rehabilitation 25 2 .7
H u m a n  Riqhts 24 2 .6
O thers 5 0 .5
Total 926 1 0 0 %
It is striking to see how important charitable organizations are in  terms of the number of 
organisations counted, though figures are highly aggregated (many women, health and 
probably education associations are probably included under charitable). 76.6% of the NGOs 
are based in the W est Bank and 23.4% in Gaza (whereas the population of the W est Bank 
represents roughly 66% o f the total population). 60.2% o f the NGOs are urban-based, 29.3% 
are in rural communities and 10.6% in refugee camps (the distribution of the population by
259 Another research on *NGO mapping* was pubkshed in March 2000 by MADAR (Center for the 
Development and Study of the Palestinian Society) and commissioned by the Heinrich Boll Stiftung. However, 
results are less transparent than the MAS study which gives all the details of the questionnaire and extensive 
statistics (in Arabic only), whereas the MADAR booklet is a very simple booklet, with few figures. If MAS 
counted 926 NGOs, MADAR came up with the meagre figure of 575 NGOs, but it excluded “sports clubs, 
trade unions, cooperatives, professional unions” (MADAR 2000: 4).
260 Source: MAS 2001a.
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place of living is is follows: 56.5% in urban areas, 28.5% in rural and 15% in camps).261 The 
problem with this first table is that it is now impossible to identify which NGOs come within 
the charities category, e.g.y are there religious ones and non-religious ones. 96.4% o f all NGOs 
are legally registered.
The second table is indicative of the main field of activity of NGOs and the last column is
about which percentage o f funding goes to this main activity.262
Table 9: Topical activities o f NGOs and proportion of funding to these activities
Ty p e  of Activity
%  of N G O s  active 
in any of these
%  of N G O s  with m ain 
activities being...
Percentage of funding 
to this main activity
Children 40.2 20.4 16.6
Charitable and Relief 39.2 13.3 13.3
Elderly People 4.8 1.6 1.2
Fam ily Organization 5.8 0.5 0.1
Culture, Science, and Hum anity 56.2 10.2 2.4
Rural developm ent 11.8 2.8 6.9
Environm ental and W a te r 3.9 0.9 0.3
Health Services 25.7 4.9 32.3
H u m a n  Rights 8.6 2.6 2.5
Handicapped 10.7 4.4 5.5
Rehabilitation 26.4 3.5 1.7
W o m e n 17 1.8 1.3
Education and teaching 35.4 3.4 6.4
Religious Activities 12.5 1.5 1
R esearch Centres 9.2 2 4.1
Proselytism  (D a 'w a ) activities 5.7 0.6 -
Y outh 30 22.7 1.3
O th e r 6.7 3 3
1 0 0 % 1 0 0 %
It is interesting to see the contrast between the variety of activities and the main purpose o f  
each NGO. When it  comes to funding, this second table shows that certain topics might 
occupy a lot o f NGOs (culture, education, charities, and youth — column 1) but that less have 
their main activities in these fields (column 2). The contrast is particularly striking for the 
youth and culture sectors that absorb very little funding (column 3). On the opposite side, 
few organizations deal with health as the main activity (4.9%), rural development (i.e. 
agriculture, 2.8%), education (3.4%) and research (2%), but these three sectors absorb much 
more funding per NGO than the rest (almost half of the funding - 32.3% of all funding going 
to health, 6.9% to agriculture, 6.4 to education and 4.1% for research).
261 For figures on Palestinian population from the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics (PCBS), see see 
(PASSIA 2003: 267ff).
262 See MAS (2001a) statistics 4-2 (p.l 12) and 8-3, (p. 120). It is based on the response of 881 NGOs (out of 
926) for a total expense of$112m for 2000.
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The last table263 should finally help us to understand which sector employs most o f d ie people 
working for NGOs, giving us an idea o f the relative importance o f  each sector.
Table 10: Number and percentage of employees bv type o f NGO activity
T y p e  o f  A c tiv ity
%  of all 
N G O s
N b  of
e m p lo ye e s
% o f  all 
e m p lo ye e s
%  o f  w h ic h  
fe m a le
N b  o f
V o lu n te e rs
%  o f  w h ic h  
fema/e
Charitable 40.4 5,894 56.8 5 8.6 22,883 44.0
Relief 4.8 397 3.8 52.1 979 31.8
Youth C lub s 30.4 348 3.4 2 3 .6 21.740 7.5
Research 3.5 265 2.6 5 1 .7 318 30.1
Developm ent 4.9 2,605 25.1 50.4 4,510 39.8
Hum an Rights 2.6 237 2.3 4 3.9 234 24.0
Culture 10.2 271 2.6 5 0.9 12,415 38.4
Rehabilitation 2.7 301 2.9 5 1 .2 1,789 95.0
Other 0.5 57 0.5 5 7.9 68 3 4.6
T O T A L 100% 10,375 100% 5 4 % 64,936 3 1 .5 %
Again, the charitable sector is an important one, not only in mere numbers o f NGOs, but 
also because it employs more than half o f  those paid for by NGOs. The previous table 
highlighted that youth activities are very popular but requiring little funding. This is also 
confirmed here, w ith only 3.4% o f all employees being in  this sector. The fin a l comment is 
about the developmental NGOs, which, despite the fact that they represent only 4.9% of all 
NGOs, employ 25% of those working in  NGOs. This corroborates the fact that certain 
activities cost more than others (see previous contrast o f health, agriculture and education vs. 
‘cheap’ activities as youth and culture). A  rival hypothesis would be to say that developmental 
NGOs are simply much better at fund raising from large foreign donors, therefore being able 
to spend more and thus pay for more (and better) salaries (professionalization — on this 
aspect see Section 7.3). But for that further statistics will be required.
Interestingly, a majority of NGO workers are female (54%), something widespread in  Middle 
Eastern societies, which give a large opportunity for job sharing to women, especially for a 
highly educated population as it is the case for Palestinians, and where an important role is 
given to pre-marriage women in income-generating for the extended family (Rosenberg 
2002). The lower rate o f female job share, as in  the case o f youth centres (only 23.6% of 
women) is linked to the fact that in certain aspects o f life a gender segregation happens and 
limits the type o f work done (see later point in informal constraints).
Before going into the detail of the informal constraints existing on Palestinian NGOs, few 
words should be written about charitable organizations, since the latest study collapsed the 
two previously existing categories of charitable vs. religious NGOs. It is important to draw
263 See MAS 2001a.
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the line between the two types and even to understand what makes the difference between an 
Islamic and an Islamist264 NGO. By Islamic NGO, one should understand an NGO basing its 
general W eltanschauung on Muslim principles, as a Christian organization would do, with no 
more claims on the public importance of religion. On the other side, an Islamist NGO is one 
that serves the purpose or belongs to the galaxy o f militant Muslim organizations, which 
makes (or claims to make) of Islam the central political claim o f their activity265 and that 
openly challenges the current political order266. A  recent International Crisis Group report on 
Palestinian Islamic social welfare267 268drew the distinction as such: “‘Islamic’ refers to entities 
that are nominally or genetically Muslim, while ‘Islamist’ denotes entities which are self­
consciously so, and formulate explicit political or ideological objectives on this basis” (ICG 
2003a: 3).
It is certainly a difficult task to draw the line in practice between the two types in all cases, be 
it only on the difficulty to measure the degree o f affiliation o f an organization with a political 
party. The hunt against ‘terrorist’ organizations in a post-9/11 world makes it even more 
difficult to reflect with calmness on “who is who” in this field. Even international Muslim 
NGOs have paid the price of certain confusion around their activities.26* The only 
international Islamic NGOs still present with an office in the Territories is the UK-based 
Islam ic Charitable Society, which carefully monitors its potential partners before starting any 
pro ject Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan’s study o f Islamic networks o f aid stresses many 
similarities with non-Muslim western aid organizations, in particular their professionalisation 
(Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 79). It also underlines the fact that the Islamist group 
H am as probably uses 90% of its funding for social services which have a high reputation 
amongst the deprived Palestinian population (ib id : 106). But m ost o f the non-Christian 
charitable organizations operating in  Palestine are Islamic ones, working far from militant 
groups. Though most charitable organizations have a religious overtone (either in name, or in 
their main motive of action), some can be simply linked to a specific service delivery (health, 
education, etc.), or to a geographical zone (well-being of a village, or o f  refugee families from
264 See also the Section 3.23 for a discussion o f die differences.
265 1 insist on the aspect of ‘claiming* to make of Islam the central reference in their political struggle. Many 
students of Hamas have highlighted how it plays overall a nationalist game despite all the references to Islam. See, 
eg . (Legrain 1990:186f), Legrain 1997, and Hammami 2003.
266 1 draw on Halliday’s definition of Islamism previously discussed (Chapter 3), namely to "political movements, 
o f a mass populist kind, that challenge established, more secular, states” (Halliday 2003 [1996]: 236 n.6).
267 The report is highly informative on how Islamic NGOs are suffering because they are mistakenly seen as 
Islamist. Even in the case o f Islamist NGOs, it is difficult to prove that they misuse funding for military and 
violent activities.
268 Two leading international Islamic charities were closed or banned after September 2001: Al-Aqsa Foundation 
was banned in Germany, while the Holy Land Foundation (based in Texas) was shut down by Bush’s Executive 
Order 13224. See (ICG 2003a: 1).
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a common origin). The main difference between charitable (religious or not) and non- 
charitable organizations lies mostly in the internal institutional setting which tends to be more 
defined in the second case.
MAS study on Palestinian NGOs report that most charitable NGOs (like youth and sports 
clubs) are simply headed by a general assembly, whereas the “new ’" NGOs are managed by 
boards o f trustees or administrative boards.269 The study highlights also that the charitable 
organizations that are more active in rural communities and refugee camps, are “generally 
weaker in structure” than the NGOs based in urban communities. As example o f internal 
structure weakness, the report quotes the fact that 17.6% of all NGOs “do not draw up a 
timetable for the implementation o f their programmes” (MAS 2001a: 2) and that charitable 
NGOs neglect development and diversity in  their activities. It calls on other larger NGOs and 
the General Union o f Charitable Societies to share their experience and improve charitable 
NGOs* efficiency (MAS 2001a: 4f).
Another limiting factor for the charitable organizations lies in the lack of legal clarity 
concerning their work. Some o f them are legally registered as NGOs, but some o f those 
active in East Jerusalem are still under Jordanian legislation. Some of these charitable 
associations have a different source o f funding, because they receive money from the vpkaat 
committees. Zakaai (almsgiving, or mandatory tithe) is one o f the five pillars of Islam and 
constitutes between 2.5% and 7% o f anybody’s assets270 (Ghandour 2002; Benthall &  Bellion- 
Jourdan 2003: chapL 1-2). On top of the %akaaty there are also the sadaqa, a voluntary and 
supererogatory contribution. A ll o f these offerings are then re-distributed by local 
committees, which are in turn controlled and monitored by the Ministry of Religious 
Endowment {waqf). The problem is that there is a legal vacuum both in the Ministry o f W aqf 
(no minister have been appointed since August 1998271) and that, since mid-1997 a new law 
on %akaat committees has been expected to be passed by the PLC and to be promulgated by 
the PNA (Curmi 2002:108). The lack o f legal framework and the leadership vacuum seems to 
hinder the capacities of ^akaat committees, if  we look at the decline in numbers o f  such 
committees: by 1998 a PNA study counted 62 %akaat committees but a UNSCO study in
269 The quote continues: “ [the] study indicates that institution building in the new NGOs is stronger than in 
traditional organisations and has implications on the efficient provision of services and the successful 
achievement of their stated goals”. The study does not explain what exactly is constitutive of institutional 
building (MAS 2001a, Executive Summary (in English], p. 1).
270 For a short presentation on the %akaaty see Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Ghandour 2002, or (ICG 2003a: 
3). On the amount paid for as %akaaty see (ICG 2003a: 8 fn. 44) and Legrain 1997. ‘All assets’ means that income 
is induded.
271 The Human Rights Ombudsman for the PNA is currently investigating this lack of leadership and legal 
vacuum (Interview with Mazen SHAQURA, Director o f Gaza Branch, Palestinian Independent Commission for 
the Gtizens’ Rights, Gaza Gty, 01/02/2003).
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2001 counted only 30 o f these (with 16 being active in Gaza and only 14 in the W est Bank).272 
Nevertheless, the sums distributed by %akaat committees are very important as we w ill 
illustrate in the next chapters (in part Section 6.2.6)
Despite all these problems, observers are keen to underline the importance o f traditional 
Islamic charitable organizations and the professionalism of the Islamist NGOs. Legrain goes 
so far as to say that it is their “financial and moral probity that makes them so successful” 
(quoted in ICG 2003a). The ICG report also goes in that direction but suggests, as an elem ent 
for their success, the fact that they have maintained “very organic links with their 
constituencies”273 and that they managed to keep very compartmentalized sectors o f action, in  
the sense that no money dedicated to their social NGOs would end up being diverted for 
armed operations (ICG 2003a; 21). So, Islamist NGOs do not only aim at gaining “political 
support, but [they are] also the result of a conscious policy to build up Islam as the basis for a 
sense o f community to replace the sense of a nation shattered by the occupation” (Benthall &  
Bellion-Jourdan 2003 :105f).
External reasons for their success is that the international community has been very slow to 
respond to the drastic humanitarian food crisis, most notably the repeated call from UNRWA 
to stock up food in the Territories (see ICG 2003a: 25). Hamas and other Islamist N G O s 
have been prompt in distributing food for free or offering quality services (health, school w ith  
boarding) and have successfully occupied this emergency niche (Bocco & aL 2003). W ith the 
PNA infrastructures increasingly targeted and initially incapable of delivering aid, and w ith  
larger secular NGOs having difficulties getting out of the value-oriented activities developed 
during the Oslo years, Palestinians in dire economic situations can only turn towards the 
Islam ist because they are the fastest to deliver. Hence the high rate o f credibility o f this type 
o f  NGOs amongst the local population, according to a widescale survey done in 2002274 
(Heacock 2004: 26).
This last element permits one to further distinguish the charitable/Islamic NGOs from the 
Islamist ones: Islamist NGOs have not, apparently, had serious financial difficulties during 
the first years of the second Intifada and managed even to increase their work. On the 
contrary, charitable NGOs have suffered from diminishing locally-generated income and 
international support (Jamal A. 2000), be it from the Gulf region which might have preferred 
supporting Islamist ones, or from Western donors for fear of funding Islamist ones. Thus
272 See ICG 2003a.
273 This is the key element according to ICG (and other observers). Despite the level of professionalization o f 
secular NGOs, it is not sure they will succeed in competing the Islamist social network, precisely because these 
secular NGOs rely “primarily on foreign funding rather than grassroots participation” (ICG 2003a: 26 fa. 183).
274 Done in cooperation between MOPIC and UN CP. Relationship between the Poor and the Different Institutions
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where the West tends275 to blur the lines between Islamic and Islamist, the external Arab 
donor community precisely orientates funding on this basis.276
4.3. Informal Constraints on the Work of NGOs
We will deal here with the massive emergence o f an international donor community inside the 
Territories and internal Palestinian constraint (from physical ones, such as geography and 
territorial! zation, to more abstract problems, namely de-politicization, and social 
expectations/constraints). A word o f caution is here necessary.
Out of 38 international donors (be they NGOs or governmental) interviewed, only 11 of 
them had their office in the Territories opened before the Oslo years. Some of them were 
already financing projects from abroad, but it  is striking to see that all governmental donor 
agencies came w ith Oslo.277 The point is that there has been a massive increase o f  foreign 
donor presence inside the Palestinian Territories and o f  the money dedicated to Palestine. 
Paradoxically, the funding towards NGOs has decreased in the Oslo years, for the reasons 
that the main beneficiary of external assistance became the PNA, instead of NGOs.
As we have seen, NGOs that used to receive from $170 to 240m per year around 1990 
received only $100 to 120m in 1994 (Hammami 1995: 59). W orld Bank figures hint at an even 
more drastic decrease in funding for NGOs: i f  between $150m to $200m was distributed in 
the early 1990s, only $90m was donated in 1994 and a mere $60m in  1996 (Sullivan 1997: 95). 
In a 2001 study, all Palestinian NGOs declared an overall income of $112 m, be it generated 
locally or abroad. The Ministry o f Planning and International Cooperation estimates that 
NGOs have received an average o f $51m a year, which is about 10% of what the PNA 
received.278
The previous figures indicated that:
Overall external assistance (to PNA and NGOs) increased from $200m in 1990 to 
about $560m a year for 2000; but that
275 This is not true for all international donors. The UK-based Islamic Relief, which receives a large share of 
funding from the EU is very keen to check on the recipients record to make sure money will not go to Islamist 
groups. According to BenthaU Bellion-Jourdan (2003:106), the ICRC’s programme o f ‘smart aid* (through 
vouchers) seemed “to be deliberately aimed at providing an alternative source o f effective support” to that of 
Islamists circles.
276 As suggests Ghandour 2002.
277 Here the difficult question arises as to whether external assistance funding precedes political change or whether 
it follows it. The literature too often and unproblematically assumes that money spending will have an impact on 
the process o f political change. In the case of Palestine, there are obvious signs that money follow ed the 
breakthrough of Oslo.
278 Interview with Dr. Tmad SHA’ATH, Aid Coordination Director General, MOPIC, Gaza City 03.02.03.
These figures are the declared commitments and disbursements by foreign institutions. They certainly do not 
indude all o f the money coming from the Gulf States and in particular Islamist associations. It is believed that 
the Islamic NGOs have received $100tn in 2000 and at least $35m in 1999 (World Bank 2002: 58).
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NGOs receive now roughly half of what they received in 1990 (ca. $200m in 1990 and 
$100m at the end of the decade).
Even if  the number o f  NGOs has decreased in  the same period, it  means that there is greater 
competition within the NGO sector and that international donors can be more selective and 
demanding when disbursing any monies to NGOs.
This tends to confirm the insistence on the Palestinian side to underline how international 
funding has become conditional for NGOs. This conditionality, which is twofold, is, I think, 
also a sort of informal constraint.279
First, it is worth noting that the pattern o f  funding during the Oslo period has accelerated a 
trend which was already in place in  the early 1990s: the nature o f the work and internal 
organization o f the NGOs shifted imperceptibly from voluntary into professionalized 
membership, and from a work targeted at a  local constituency (popular committees) into a 
m ore defined set o f clients (through project funding).280 One example o f the slow changes has 
to do with more dear and hierarchical structures (such as decision chains and organigrammes) 
requested by funding organization to understand who decides what in  Palestinian NGOs. The 
im pact is that many o f these NGOs have been organized into local branches where popular 
committees were deciding on the locally required activities. Bureaucratization and centralized 
decision-making (required by donors) gradually made this local involvement useless or seem 
as negative in the good management of NGOs. This gradual change is simultaneous with the 
shift from regional funding (in the case o f Jordanian involvement until 1988) to more 
international sources o f binding, which mirrors the internationalisation of the Palestinian 
issue in the 1990s.
The second element has to do with the historical political party affiliation of NGOs during 
the Israeli occupation. Very often, international assistance was tied with the condition that 
funding should not be for political organizations.281 *It was thus often requested by donors 
that the composition o f NGO board of direction be cross-partisan. Nowadays, some NGOs 
are known for their continuing dose ties w ith political parties, while in other cases, they
279 The following issues will be dealt with more care and at more length in Chapters 6 & 7. We will nevertheless 
consider them here on a brief basis as a mapping device for later discussions.
280 Hammami’s article (1995:55) is the first to address this gradual change. For her, the end of the first Intifada 
was a period of growing tensions between leadership structures and party hierarchy vs. staff vs. community 
participation, and over political funding vs. donor money vs. community support. By 1991, in her view, most of 
the grassroots based organizations were professionalized, foreign funded, with target clients as opposed to 
working with a constituency, and more elite oriented.
For a re-actualised view and the link with donors, see Abdel Shafi 2004.
281 Many interviewed NGO activists highlighted this aspect. A possible verification of this argument would
consist of studying longitudinally the composition o f boards of direction.
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became truly independent (which can then translate into power tensions between party and 
NGO).
These two elements (professionalized and de-politicized) have had paradoxical effects in
NGOs. Although the theoretical literature on NGOs asstime that they should play a role in
the democratic process inside a given society (through the emergence of counter-elements of
power), the voluntary dissociation from the political elements (popular committee and
political affiliation) has in a way neutralized the political dimension o f NGOs. In the context
o f the current In tifada , this dissociation between p o litica l vs. civ il society was an object of worry for
many NGO activists who would like to be more involved in  politics but whose voices are
simply not heard since NGOs are often considered as not relevant anymore to the political 
282game.
Obviously these two elements (professionalization and de-politicization) cannot be ascribed 
on ly to the massive intrusion o f foreign donors. One has also to consider NGO work as a 
window o f opportunity for an increasingly educated society where there is a “negative 
correlation between the growing numbers o f academically skilled and the narrowed 
opportunities for the realization o f these skills in the under-developed local labour market” 
(Rosenberg 2002: 531). Therefore, the logic of bureaucratisation and the unintended 
consequences o f NGO work are overlooked by NGO workers, who, after the establishment 
o f the PNA, remain for a large part attached to opposition leftist faction (for the largest and 
most successful NGOs), with no hope o f finding a job in the dientelist approach of 
F atah¡Y N K. Rules to work in large NGOs become similar to those of the private market, 
whereby competition and qualifications take over voluntary spirit. But one of the 
consequences o f this privatization of NGO work (again, this is true mostly for larger and 
more active NGOs) is that NGOs thereby lose a vital voluntary component which was the 
backbone o f m any organizations. NGOs run thus the risk, in this process, o f  losing some 
elements o f popular accountability, which is replaced by that o f international donors.283 
The perversion o f not being accountable to a local constituency anymore but to foreign 
monies, has even increased with the second Intifada with the harsh impact o f closure, the 
collapse o f  the local economy and services, and the substitution of income sources by 
international donors. Some NGOs have re-directed their work towards service-providing but 
some continue to run programmes that do not respond to a real local demand but where they 
know that funding from international donors will be guaranteed (peace discussions, courses *285
282 Various interviews, both in 2003 and 2004.
285 This phenomenon has been thoroughly documented in the case o f some o f the women's NGOs. See Jamal
M. 2005.
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against violence at school, etc.). In other words, priorities might end up being set more as a 
response to a demand initiated by donors than by responding to a real need from the local 
population.
An example of the uncomfortable situation occurred in June 2002, when a wide array o f civil 
society leaders284 285signed a petition falling for an end to suicide bombings against Israeli 
civilians285. Although the petition sparked a healthy debate about the counter-productivity o f  
such attacks, signatories were criticized for two reasons. First, they were reproached for 
having taken the suicide bombings out of the context of an extremely violent Israeli campaign 
o f re-occupation and o f extra-judiciary killings that happened in Spring 2002 (Larzilliere 2003: 
114f). Second, many Palestinian criticized signatories because they accepted some (European) 
money (paying for the publicity around the petition), although, in  private, some of the 
signatories had a totally different discourse on suicide bombings. Even if  this duality o f 
attitude of some of the signatories is impossible to prove, this type o f criticism hints at the 
fact that the population generally perceives very quickly some o f the donors’ priorities as 
alienating more important local priorities (in this case ending the military actions). The 
criticism, to put it clearly, was not because some intellectuals and civil society activities signed 
the petition (public opinion is in fact very volatile about support for suicide attacks286), but 
because local population perceived this signing as mere opportunism to receive funding horn 
donors. This is obviously an extreme case o f the difficult situation for civil society activists 
which are caught between a rock and a hard place (or the two tiers of domestic and 
international spheres), and in which international donors might become a source o f 
heteronomy, since priorities are fixed not on the basis o f local priorities but on external 
actors’ ones (Section 7.5.2). One example o f the kind does no t suffice to make the 
demonstration, but similar small elements can contribute to a situation where the Palestinians 
feel they are not in a situation of autonomy.
O n a more tangible side, other elements set constraints on the work o f NGOs. Beyond the 
structural domination and the importance o f daily political developments, the Palestinian 
predicament is also influenced by geographical dispersion, not to mention the simple fact that 
the Territories do not represent a contiguous entity. Thus geographical non-contiguity (West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip), the undecided fate of borders, and o f the return (or not) of the 
refugees set indirect constraints on any institutions because o f the uncertainty of who should
284 Not all of the signatories were NGO activists, but a large portion of them. The academic sphere was also 
represented.
285 -AlQods (daily newspaper), June 19,2002. Available on www.amin.org/eng/uncat/2002/jun/junl9.htmf
286 See the various polls on that matter by JMCC (http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html). For an 
overview, see (Larzilliere 2003:94).
151
do what for whom  and where. Let us illustrate these types o f  problems with daily life 
examples.
The simple separation of about 80km separating the W est Bank from the Gaza Strip has an 
indirect impact on the work o f NGOs because of the social differences between the two 
zones (60% of G aza’s population are refugees, and hence in general poorer, whereas refugees 
represent only 30% in the West Bank). The distance has never really been the real problem, 
since many NGOs historically created branches in both parts of the Territories. The 
constraints have to do with difficult access and closure policy implemented by the Israel from 
1990 onwards, w ith a long period of closure in early 1996, after a wave o f bus bombings 
inside Israel Although a ‘Safe Passage’ was supposed to be implemented between the two 
parts,287 Israel m inimized movements between the W est Bank and the Gaza Strip up to a 
point where m any NGOs decided to formally split their various branches because of the 
difficulties (if not outright impossibility) for their staff to move from one point to the other. 
Large NGOs have thus been forced to establish autonomous entities in the West Bank and in 
the Gaza Strip. One downside o f this separation is that funding for Gazan organisations is 
made more d ifficu lt288 This is due to the fact that the vast majority o f international donors 
have their headquarters in the central zone around Jerusalem, Ramallah and Beit Lehem.289 In 
some cases, large NGOs have different legal entities in  each sector, one in East Jerusalem, 
one for the W est Bank and one for Gaza.290
The physical movement limitations increased tragically during the current Intifada. It is now 
impossible for a W est Banker to go to E ast Jerusalem without a special Israeli travel permit. A 
belt of checkpoints have erected at the entrance o f the major urban centres, the Gaza strip is 
cut into three (sometimes four segments), and 120 army road blocks protect the entrance to 
Jewish settlements. It is believed that three million Palestinians are somehow trapped inside 
about 300 different zones that are sometimes closed and isolated from one another.291 To 
respond to this, m any NGOs are trying to cope with a de-centralized working pattern, but 
that requires a lot o f financial means and only larger institutions can deal with this solution. A
287 Two corridors (from Erez to Hebron and to Ramallah) were eventually created by October 1999, but with a 
tight Israeli control on who could travel They were never, however, really operational, in particular die one 
through Ramallah.
288 Interviews with the Union o f Health Care Committees, Union o f  Health Workers Committees and ad- 
Dhameer Human Rights Association (Gaza, January and February 2003).
289 Two of the 31 international organizations interviewed up to early 2004 are based in Gaza City. The rest are in 
Jerusalem or Ramallah.
290 It has to do with legal problems: no name evoking ‘Palestine’ is allowed to be registered in East Jerusalem. 
Thus, the Union o f Palestinian Medical Relief Committees is called Medical Relief Committees in East Jerusalem 
and it also has a different legal structure for the Gaza Strip. This is an artificial separation because the work is 
the same in all three sectors (Interview with Hazem KHAROUF, Administrative Director, UPMRC, Beit 
Hanina, 29/01/2003).
291 See www.palestinemonitor.org and more precisely its Tact Sheet on Intifadd.
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strange case has to do with the total relocation of the NGOs: thus the ‘Ramallah Human 
Rights Centre* is now based in Nablus because of the inability of the staff (and most notably 
o f its director) to travel daily from Nablus to Ramallah.252
Other less tangible barriers, but barriers nevertheless, exist between NGOs. In a polity 
marked by high level o f  factionalism, political barriers are another form of indirect constraint 
for NGOs. It has been written, especially after the creation of the PNA, that NGOs were 
strongholds for the politicians opposing Oslo and/or the PNA.29 93 However true it might be 
for certain NGOs (especially the one linked to the left opposition294), this remains only 
pa rtia lly  true, for some NGOs are close to the Fatah, and some are collaborating with the 
PNA. Tamari argues in the same line as Hammami who was the first to speak of 
‘professionalization* in  the NGO sector. For Tamari, the problem is that NGOs managed to 
create an elite taken out of “the cadres of political parties which went private. Although many 
o f them have remained part of this political movement, in effect, they have been 
bureaucratized and professionalized**.295 A n opponent to that view , George Giacaman, 
believes the democratic deficit in Palestine to be linked not to the problem of NGOs and its 
supposed professionalization, but rather to the mere absence of strong oppositional parties 
(H am m am i 1995: 62). Salah Abdel Shafi explains such depolitidzation by the fact that there 
has been a decoupling of the political from the civil society and for which international 
donors probably contributed (Abdel Shafi 2004: 8ff).
I f  this argument is still debatable, there is no doubt that some NGOs (mostly the secular 
ones) can be characterized as Hammami has done. This trend has also been reinforced in the 
period of Oslo and after the creation o f the PNA, but the impact is now even more 
im portant Again, the dissociation that happened between a p o litica l society and a civ il society in 
the years 1994-2000, can explain why so m any NGO leaders are now longing for more 
political role. Many activists close to the People’s Party, to name few ones Mustafa 
Barghouthi, Khader Shqirat, Ibrahium Dakkak and to a lesser extent Haydar Abdel Shafi, are 
overtly calling for a re-politicization o f their NGOs, or at least to recreate stronger grass roots
292 Interview with Iyaad BARGHOUTHI, Director, Ramallah, 2.01.04. Before the current Intifda, it took 
maximum one hour to travel from Ramallah to Nablus, three hours by the end o f 2001, and up to five hours in 
2003.
293 Hammami (1995: 52) talks of a "coalition of interests between the left opposition and the NGOs". Usher 
(1995:18) is even more emphatic: "NGOs have traditionally been strongholds for political independents and the 
PLO le ft[ ...] Integration with the 'outside' was always going to be fraught with the Tunis PLO suspicious of the 
NGO's relative independence and the NGO's suspicious of Tunis' proclivity for control."
294 Hammami (1995: 59): "The impending arrival of the PNA and the seeming scramble of donors to support 
and strengthen it was, then, viewed by many NGOs with some trepidation, and by left-linked NGOs with 
outright suspicion."
295 Interview with Salim TAMARI, Sociologist at Bir Zeit University, East Jerusalem, 10/07/2000
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links with their constituencies.296 Thus the fact that political activism of NGOs was watered- 
down in the Oslo period towards more ‘professional’ and ‘developmentalist’ work, set an 
indirect constraint on their later activities, since they were partly politically neutralized. This is 
not a mere Palestinian NGO phenomenon; it has also been identified in other post-conflict 
settings where “quite frequently, for example, one may find in the field that the most capable 
people in the country (often those that have not fled already) work for external humanitarian 
agencies, keeping them as far as possible from the political scene [ . . (Strazzari 2002: 56),297 
A final informal constraint has to do w ith social mutations in Palestinian society at large. Two 
striking elements can have an indirect influence on the work o f NGOs. The first is the 
powerful rise o f Islamist movements, H am as being the most famous in the Palestinian case. 
Independendy o f the Islamist impact on politics, it is safe to say that the various Islamist 
factions gained popularity in the last fifteen years and have had an impact on social life in 
Palestine. Social contacts have suffered fiom  increased gender segregation and imposing the 
veil was a totem batde for the Islamists during the first Intifada (Hammami 1990). I f  the 
secular PLO leadership managed to curb some o f the sodal influence o f the Islamists during 
the Oslo years, it d id not manage (perhaps deliberately)29* to do so.299 For secular NGOs, this 
means that certain activities must be organized in  a matter that w ill not hurt social sensibilities 
and thus not jeopardize the credibility o f  their work. The director o f  one of the largest secular 
health NGOs (close to a leftist party) underlined the social reluctance and resistance in certain 
communities of G aza to introduce mixed gendered social activities and programmes. He 
stressed that many efforts had to be done to convince local leaders of the bien fon d e o f  their 
programmes. In that regard, he considered the simple fact that both young boys and girls 
could run together a youth club in  a refugee camp of the North o f  Gaza a sign o f a successful 
program.300
296 Mustafa Baighouthi, Ibrahim Dakkak and Haydar Abdel Shah launched a ‘National Democratic Initiative’ in 
the second half o f2002. Khadr Shqirat (former director o f LAW) after he resigned because o f the corruption 
scandal that nearly downed LAW, declared he intended to run for a high position in the FFF. In late April, 
Mustafa Barghouthi resigned (or was resigned by) o f the PPP to have a clear hand on the new political 
movement he is heading (secretary general oíM ubeutdarak).
297 See also the parallels drawn by Jamal M. 2005 in various eastern European contexts.
298 To illustrate this ambiguous position o f the PNA, the problem of general compulsory eursus in the two 
universities in  Gaza is a striking example. Although the PNA, which took over education in 1994, could decide 
on the eursus for Al-Azhar University. Although the PNA promoted a rather secular eursus, it backed off a few 
years later to copy the more religiously-oriented eursus along the lines o f the other Gaza University, the Islamic 
University.
299 The task is again an even more difficult one in the context of heightened violence in the Territories nowadays 
For example, the only café selling alcohol in the Gaza Strip (opened after 1994) was burnt down by Hamas’ 
militants in the beginning o f the current Intifada.




Another social change that characterized Palestinian social life is the re-emergence o f the 
tribalism in certain zones of the Territories. Exacerbated parochial and family reactions 
during the 1996 election campaign (Legrain 1999a) and the re-appearance of feud and blood 
killings in peripheral zones (such as Rafah, in the south of the Gaza Strip, or in the Nablus 
Govemorate) are examples of re-emerging tribalism and can be considered to be “corrosive 
o f the nationalist ‘modem’ ideology” (Usher 1997: 4), or as Fanon explained, a sign o f the 
powerlessness of colonized nations (Fanon 2002: 153f). For NGOs, this represents a new 
challenge that must take these local specificities into consideration. As stressed in the first 
section of this chapter, the emergence o f  a new urban middle class in  the 1970s was a key 
component o f the emergence of a new nationalist leadership. For NGO leaders who emerged 
precisely from this new professional middle-class, NGOs should be able to meet the 
challenge o f ‘traditional’ social affiliation by giving the chance to a new generation to make 
their way, independently of tribal or parochial affiliation. For one of the leaders o f the 
Communist party (PPP) and director o f the largest health NGO (UPMRC), the process o f 
“social emancipation” (Le., people from lower classes) that started in  the 1970s was put on 
hold with the creation of the PNA301 and should now be re-launched.302 
After this overview o f what is constitutive o f formal and informal constraints in  the creation, 
work and development of NGOs, one can confront previous analyses with a recent study, 
which precisely asked NGO activists what were in their eyes, die main source o f restriction or 
constraints. The result lies in the following table (MAS 2001a: 132).303
301 This is a common interpretation in the parlance of leftist parties, be they PFLP, DFLP or PPP: power in the 
Territories, in this interpretation, is monopolized in an alliance between the returning PLO/Fatah leadership and 
the local compradors (composed of the traditional notable and land-owning) families.
302 Interview with Mustafa BARGHOUTHI, President, Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, 
Ramallah, 22/02/2003. He resigned a few weeks later from his position at the helm of the PPP (see PPP 2003).




Table 11: Sources o f constraints according to NGOs
S o u rc e  of constraints according to N G O  (in % )
T y p e  o f N G O s
F ro m  th e  
d o n o r
F ro m  the 
P N A
F ro m  th e  
o c c u p a tio n
Fro m  local 
so cie ty
O th e r
Charitable organisations 57.8 28.4 38.5 14.8 5
Relief O rg. 23.8 19 6 6.7 0 5
Youth C lubs 36.9 24.6 4 1.5 35.4 4 .9
Research centres 22.2 44.4 55.6 22.2 0
Developmental org. 42.9 19 76.2 23.8 4.8
Law  org. 23.1 46.2 84.6 7.7 8.3
Cultural centres 28.6 28.6 38.1 33.3 10.5
Handicapped & rehabilitation 42.9 0 28.6 57.1 0
Total 43.5 26.4 47.2 22 5.2
As one could expect out o f an investigation done during the current Intifada, the continuing 
Israeli occupation remains the main constraint on Palestinian NGOs. Whatever the type of 
NGO, they all agree on this point about restriction. W hat is more interesting to highlight is 
that certain types o f NGOs encounter more difficulties than others in terms o f constraints set 
by the donors, especially for charitable, developmental and rehabilitation NGOs. The PNA is 
seen as a source o f constraints principally by research centres and law (hence human rights 
and advocacy) organizations, which were historically linked to leftist factions. This would 
reinforce the hypothesis that the tensions between the PNA and NGOs are based on political 
and/or partisan differences. Finally, the social local constraints are greater for NGOs working 
in the field of rehabilitation (possibly because of the resistance to some of the community- 
based rehabilitation programmes), youth clubs (see gender segregation debate highlighted 
previously) and for the cultural centres.
To complete this section on NGO perception o f constraints, an interesting round-table took 
place two months after the beginning o f the second Intifada. Both international donor 
organizations and Palestinian NGOs were discussing the impact of the Intifada on 
international funding in the Territories (Birzeit 2001). While representatives o f international 
funding bodies (EU, Ford Foundation, USAID, and UNDP) were calling for more clear 
indications from local civil society leaders to tell them what w as the Palestinian agenda and 
what to fund in the emergency situation, the Palestinian spokespersons were univocal in 
condemning all forms o f political conditionality on the donors’ side (see, e.g.t Ali Jarbawi’s 
intervention in Birzeit 2001: 54). The proceedings of the round-table ended with the bitter 
impression that the two sides do not understand each other (one calling the other to define 
priorities, while the other accused the first o f having a double language of support in speech 
but not in action). This indeed sounds recurrent and similar to the population’s criticism 
towards some NGO activists for the duality of attitude (as in the case of the petition against
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suicide bombers). Does the opportunity taken by local NGOs to criticize international donors 
represent a way to vent their anger for being themselves placed under the fire of criticism by 
the local population?
4.4. Conclusion
This last remark highlights the difficult and sometimes uncomfortable position assumed by 
Palestinian NGOs, which receive the majority of their funding from external donors. If 
international actors see in NGOs an important component to promote certain values and 
advance a form of political pluralism through civil society assistance, Palestinian NGOs must 
also address their local constituencies, or better respond to their demands and critiques. In 
that light, and after the previous considerations on civil society as a source o f autonomy 
(Chapter 2), NGOs cannot be studied but through the lenses o f socio-political mobilization 
in  the domestic arena and through the discursive and organizational interaction with 
international donors.
The task now resides in the analysis o f the donors’ view(s) on civil society promotion, how 
they treat differently die two Palestines depicted in d ie introduction, and how external 
support might influence the changes taking place in the some sectors of Palestinian civil 
society and briefly described so far.
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Chapter V  - International Donors an d  the 
P rofessionalization  of Civil Society  Prom otion
"La question du financement des ONG palestiniennes 
est intimement politique et doit se lire  à cette aune 
pour comprendre tes nuances du d èba f 
(Curmi 2002:113)
This chapter aims to define more precisely who are the donor organizations and how they 
conceive of civil society promotion. One needs to be aware of the differences amongst them 
to understand the potential variety of approaches to support civil society organisations, in 
general as well as in the case of Palestine. Thus we will outline some o f the most important 
and general trends in the evolution of the category ‘donors* over the last five or six decades 
before embarking upon a short discussion o f the donors specializing in civil society support 
W e will finally sketch the history and typicality of the donors in Palestinian territories. On the 
basis of the interviews done on the field, we will conclude with a  typology o f the various 
donors’ views on civil society and the implication it may have on their work with local NGOs 
themselves.
5.1. International Donors in Historical Perspective
Before analysing the nature and the composition of the field o f international donors in the 
Palestinian territories towards civil society projects, one needs to analyse the general trends 
that characterized the evolution of donor organizations over the last 30 years. However 
particular the Palestinian case might be, there is little doubt that the evolution o f the 
conceptions o f ‘foreign aid’ and ‘donor organizations’ will also be manifested in the current 
context
The idea of international aid as an instrument o f socio-political change dates back to the end 
o f World War II. Economic development was then considered the best way to reconstruct a
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viable international system — Keynesian politics also being applied to domestic welfarist 
policies at that time (Senisolla 1999). A id is intimately linked to the notion o f development, 
and directly to the post-World W ar II period, with the Marshall Plan as a leading market- 
driven developmental plan to prevent the further spread o f communism304 (Cooper & 
Packard 1997: 7f).
In an effort to categorize international development organizations (governmental, IGOs or 
NGOs) according to their activities and functions, Senisolla argues that they can be organized 
into five generations (1999: 92-94). The first is the w elfarist generation, created after 1945, but 
is mostly made o f international institutions set up as a result o f the Bretton Woods 
agreements. The second generation is developm ental and has its roots around 1960, with the 
new independent post-colonial states in  Africa as the main focus. The third model is that of 
partnership organizations in the South and p ro test organizations in  the North, a typical result o f 
the tormented early 1970s. The fourth generation is that of empowerm ent in the South and of 
politica l pressure in  the North, which started around 1982. Obviously, there are overlaps 
between the first four generations, which are far from being clear-cut categories.
A further contribution of Senisolla’s article is to suggest the emergence of a fifth generation 
of international development organizations. The latter rely increasingly on pub lic funds, and 
tend to be more sp ecia lised  in their action, w ith  a strong focus on advocacy, communication and 
research {ibid.\ 99f). This fifth generation was clearly created under neo-liberal and globa lisin g 
skies.
This brings us to the fact that donors are not just institutions that make funding available to 
implementing organisations, but they are also the vehicles o f  certain conceptions of 
development and o f aid that vary across time. One key feature o f  the last few decades has 
been the increased professionalization and specialization o f donor organizations. In 
particular, in the field of democracy promotion, there has been marketization305 o f these 
interventions, in  which NGOs, both northern and southern (Hudock 1999) have played a 
vital role306. A quick glance at Muslim charitable organizations operating at an international 
level leads to the same conclusions as regards professionalization and increased marketization 
of their actions (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Ghandour 2002).
304 For a further critique of die colonial ambiance in which development can be understood, see Cooper and 
Packard (1997). For a classical account o f how economic development was a pre-requisite for democracy in the 
context of the Cold War, see Lipset 1959.
305 See for example the unpublished paper o f Karam  (2000).
306 According to OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), there were only 30 projects directed to 
the support civil society in 1991, for a total amount o f $113m- By 1995, the increase, though sharp in number of 
projects (440), remains moderate in the amount o f funding ($391mio) (Van Rooy 1998:58).
The share o f funding to NGOs from OECD countries and NGO aid jumped from nearly 15% by 1988 to more 
than 20% by the end o f the 1990s (Kaldor & aL 2003:12).
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Let us now look more carefully into the internal distinctions of existing international donors: 
history, type o f  activities and funding mechanism vary according to the type of donors, be 
they governmental funding agencies, multilateral international agencies, and non-public 
organisations (NGOs, foundations and other trade unions. Finally, we will say a few words on 
the distinction between bilateral vs. multilateral funding and other technical definitions.
5.1.1. Governmental donors
M ost governments deal with Official Development Assistance (ODA) through a specialized 
agency. Either this agency is part o f die Foreign Ministry (as in the cases of US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Italy, France, Switzerland, Ireland, Netherlands) or 
formally detached o f it as in the cases o f Department for International Development 
(DfID)307 (UK), CIDA (Canada), SIDA (Sweden), DANIDA, (Denmark), NORAD 
(Norway). Each country has a different way to deal with aid money, but it is interesting to 
point out that in the case of the British government, from 1929 until 1961, aid was legally 
dealt with under the Colonial Development Act (1929). Only in 1961 did the responsibility 
pass to a Department o f Technical Co-operation before the establishment o f a full-fetched 
M inistry of Overseas Development in 1964.308 The French case is historically interesting: 
r é g e n c e  Française de D éveloppement this established in London in 1941 by General de Gaulle. It 
now  receives its funding and guidance from three ministries (Economy and Finance, Foreign 
Affairs and Overseas Departments).309 As in  the British case, it has its roots in  colonial 
history. In the case o f the USA, the main relevant donor agency is the American USAID, 
w hich President Kennedy established in  1961, at a time o f heightened tension in  the Cold 
W ar. Although formally independent, it is ancillary to the Secretary o f State.310 According to 
Tucker’s contribution about the genealogy o f  development thinking, there is little doubt that 
for Kennedy (as for Truman in the aftermath of World War II and the Marshall Plan), 
“development was at the centre of the political agenda” (Tucker 1999: 7).
N o matter the administrative differences in their affiliation to their government, the fact is 
that all of these development agencies are under the tight scrutiny o f  their executive body and 
thus can be used to serve national interests. For the USA, the ancillary purpose of such 
development agencies is publicly acknowledged: USAID website reads “U.S. foreign
307 The Department for International Development (DfID) replaced the former Overseas Development 
Agencies in 1997. The ODA was then part o f the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. It is now an independent 
body headed by a Secretary o f State with cabinet rank (see http://www.dfid.gov.uk).
See also the list o f abbreviations.
308 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk.
309 See www.afd.fr.
310 For more details, see www.usaid.org.
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assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign policy interests 
in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens o f the 
developing world.”311 312
Interestingly, some countries’ policies are highly exposed to domestic political changes. In 
countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, aid policy has indeed changed w ith  new 
general elections. In the case o f  the Netherlands, the parliament has the power to decide 
which countries benefit from privileged status (structural development partners) or not 
(bilateral aid). Palestine belonged in the ‘happy few* clubs of 22 countries receiving structural 
development aid but in 2001 it was relegated to the bilateral thematic aid to H uman R ights, 
Peacebuilding and G ood G overnance?^  It was made clear in interviews with Palestinian NGOs that 
the shift o f power in European countries313 could mean a quick and substantial drying out o f 
funding available to some programmes.314
5.1.2. Multilateral donors
Most o f  the multilateral agencies stem from the UN system bom  out of the Bretton Woods 
Agreements. But with the non-alignment movement (and its aftermath), new regional 
organizations saw the light from the 1960s onwards.
The UN’s most important agencies potentially active in  civil society promotion are: UNDP 
(UN Development Programme), UNFPA (UN Population Fund), IMF, World Bank, and 
UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development). As for NGO support, m any other 
UN agencies work now through NGOs and CBOs. UNICEF, World Health Organisation 
(WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), and many others actually work in close cooperation 
with NGOs, as the result of a policy stressing the need o f ‘good governance* (and its 
correlates of decentralization, non-state actors and multi-layered approaches).
In the field of development, the World Bank has acquired a central and leading position. This 
has to do with the fact that it has huge financial resources and that the USA have a 
predominant say in  the formulation of policies. An observer of the Bank sees it  as Man arbiter 
of development norms and development meanings”, by picking up and institutionalising new 
approaches to development, as it was the case for poverty fighting in the 1960s (Finnemore 
1997: 219). More recently, the World Bank adopted the concept o f good governance, civil
3U For an updated document on USAID’s importance of national interests and how it can work in the Middle 
East, see Docena 2004.
312 Interview with Jeannette SEPPEN, Deputy Head, Dutch Development Representative for die Palestinian 
Territories, East Jerusalem, 11.02.2003.
3,3 In all cases mentioned by Palestinian NGOs, it was a shift o f power installing right-wing coalitions. An article 
mentions an interesting correlation between right-wing policies and decrease o f aid (see Addison & aL 2003: ii).
314 Interview with Salah ABDEDSHAFI, Director o f the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Gaza 
City, 02.02.2003.
162
society and social capital (and later ‘ownership1) as key mottos for transformation. The 
adoption of these concepts is linked to “the World Bank’s influence on the creation o£ 
development orthodoxies, [that] has been mediated by shifts in the global economy” (Cooper 
& Packard 1997:22). Far from policy-making consideration, Guilhot also shows how, on the 
micro-level, the emergence of NGOs and civil society discourse inside the World Bank owes 
to a change of personnel and to a push from a research community and newly NGO milieu in 
the USA (Guilhot 2001:269-276).
A ll o f these multilateral organizations depend mostly on voluntary contributions from UN 
member (or associate) states. On top of yearly funding, some of these bodies must perform 
fund raising campaigns in order to meet the needs created by temporary crises and/or conflict 
situations. A short survey of three o f the UN system agencies (WFP, UNICEF and UNDP) 
shows that some of the UN agencies also now take private and corporate funding, as in the 
case of the World Food Programme315 and the UNDP.316
Another important multilateral donor is the EU and its role is becoming increasingly 
important. European integration provides further tools for multilateral spending and in the 
case of Palestine, EU is considered as the largest single donor. EU work either through 
medium and long-term strategies on sectoral issues, or on short-term issues through 
emergency funds (headed by its ECHO office).
A last interesting note to stress concerns the non-homogenousity o f the present findings: a 
recent paper of the W orld Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) stresses 
that right-wing donor governments are generally more parsimonious with regard to financial 
assistance to multilateral aid agencies (Addison & aL 2003: if). If needed, this proves how the 
international system allegedly a guarantor o f universal norms and values as well as o f 
international cooperation (as described by neo-institutionalists) or a promoting force for 
mitigating ideational factors upon the international system, still entails strong elements of 
ReaJpolitik, and that one needs to study domestic conditions under which aid money is given 
by international actors.
5.1.3. Non-governmental organizations
Although NGOs have become the recent targets or recipients o f international aid towards civil 
society, there is a long history o f northern NGOs being themselves donors. Many such 
organizations date back to the interwar period (characterized by the high hopes of pacificism
315 “WFP relies solely on contributions from individuals, private enterprises and governments to feed the 
hungry” (quote from http: / /www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=4). A list o f governmental donators is available 
on-line. The identity of private donors is disclosed under http://www.wfp.org/index.asp? section=l. Private 
funding is however a small contribution to the overall budget
316 See http://www.undp.org/annualreports/2003/engHsh/resources.pdf.
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embodied in the Kellogg-Briand Declaration) or to the World W ar II period or its immediate 
aftermath. Names such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC, founded by 
Quakers in 1917), OXFAM (Oxford Relief Committee for Famine Relief — established in 
1942), Catholic R elief Services (CRS, e s t  1943), die Cooperative for American Remittances to 
Europe (CARE, est. 1945, later re-baptized Cooperative for American Remittances 
Everywhere) and World Vision (1950) are good examples o f this type of NGO. Save the 
Children started even before, namely in 1919 in Britain before starting activities in the USA in 
1932, in the context o f the Great Depression. Needless to say, all are famous for their high 
profile in  international development.317 The internationalisation, or put more precisely, the 
gradual emergence o f  work done in southern or third World countries is itself a shift that 
started only in the 1950s with the Korean W ar (e.g. World Vision) and Middle Foct^m 
conflict (for example Save the Children, Oxfam, Quaker). A second wave of northern NGOs 
then active directly in Third World countries (as opposed to working at home first) emerged in 
the 1960s. For example Terre des Hommes was established in Switzerland in 1959 but 
worked directly in southern countries.
The five generations o f NGOs previously suggested by Senisolla (1999) was a historico- 
functional categorization. Another typology w ill be here suggested, which, once put in 
practice in  the case o f civil society support in the Palestinian territories might hint at different 
approaches.
a) Faith-based organisations
CRS, World Vision, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC Quaker — 1917), C antos 
Internationales (1951) are all organisations that are close to some religious institutions. Although 
most o f them originally stemmed from Christian organisations, Muslim organisations have 
also appeared from the 1970,s onwards, both as the result o f the increased consrientization of 
the Muslim community (see Eickelman &  Piscatori 1996) and o f  the suddenly wealth maH*» 
available after the Oil Crisis in the early 1970s. Most o f  the Islamic organisations started 
under state protection or regional institutions directly controlled by state members (such as 
the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference (OIC) from the Arab League). Non­
governmental M uslim organisations started only later from the 1980s onwards. An example is 
the Islamic Relief, a UK-based charity established in 1984 and which has a consultative status 
in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Though some prominent Islamic 
NGOs took bases in  Europe (Muslim A id in UK, Agha Khan Foundation in Geneva, Global 
Relief Foundation in the USA, etc.) most o f  them are, nevertheless, based in the Middle-East
317 For information on the cited organisations, see their web site.
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or more precisely in G ulf countries. In his study of Islamic NGOs, Abdel Rahman Ghandour 
lists more than 50 organizations, o f which 90% are based in the Middle East but operate 
internationally (Ghandour 2002).
b) Solidarity groups
By solidarity groups, one should understand organizations whose efforts aim at defending a 
very specific cause and aim but whose motivations are neither intrinsically religious nor 
political (i.e. that are . not formally affiliated with a religious or political institution). They 
would typically fit into
Senisolla’s third and fourth categories of NGOs (1999:92-94).
Examples of these are Terre des Hommes, MPDL (Movimiento por la  Paz, el Desarme y  la 
Libertad -  1981), PTM (Paz y  Tercer Mundo), Peace Brigades International (est 1981), 
Kurdish H um an  Rights Project (est. 1992). A ll o f them in their own manner are intended to 
create links of solidarity and direct help to countries and regions in need.
Though they might have started as the result o f spontaneous actions, some of these solidarity 
organizations might have evolved into a formally defined institution with large supporting 
administrative bodies, others might still remain rather small and less formally structured 
institutions but with a diffuse membership based on solidarity to a topic or national struggle. 
A n  example o f the former evolution could be Terre des Hommes International Federation 
which is active in dozens of countries, while the latter evolution is characteristic o f smaller 
support organizations from the left political matrix or from Diaspora solidarity groups (e.g., 
Palestinians based in Europe and federated into solidarity groups such as the Swedish 
Palestinian Solidarity Group).
One decisive criterion for this category is that their mission and their policy stem from the 
basis of the organization. The decision-making and/or sources of funding are rather the result 
o f  a bottom-up process inside the organization.
Some of these organisations are close to the following category, but either they are only 
loosely attached to a political party, or they do not aim in their function to promote sister 
political organization in a third country. Norwegian People’s Aid, although affiliated to the 
Norwegian trade union movement, is offering help to many non-political organizations in 
developing countries.
c) Political organizations
These are associations openly linked to political parties in northern countries. The German 
Stiftungen  or foundations are a case in  point, since they receive their funding according to the 
previous Bundestag election results. Other cases include the US twin organizations of the
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National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI — established in  1985) and the 
International Republican Institute (IRI, est. 1983).
Very often they rely on governmental funds (depending on election and/or representational 
strength). As such they can be considered with a top-down approach, unlike solidarity groups 
whose roots are more directly coming from the basis (bottom-up).
d) Professional development organizations
Fourthly, more recent organizations dedicate their international work with a professional 
approach to ‘development* (here understood in a broad meaning). Often these organizations 
focus on one (or a group of related) topic(s). Oxfam, Save the Children, or Médecins sans 
Frontières (MSF) are examples o f  this professional developmentalist approach. In some cases, 
it is difficult to draw the line between w hat might have been in  its inception a solidarity NGO 
but which, with time, became focused to the point o f  becoming a professional 
developmentalist organization.318 MSF was originally intended as a solidarity endeavour. 
However with the split in 1979 and the creation o f Médecins du Monde (MdM), there was a 
decision in  MSF to privilege “professionalization over dramaticization.”319 
Other institutions o f the kind are the F ord  Foundation (1936) which aims to “strengthen 
democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation and 
advance human achievement”,320 the O pen Society Institute created by George Soros in  1993, 
targets different activities (academic, health, media, women’s rights, etc.) but the overarching 
goal is to promote a Popperian ‘open society * (Popper 1966; Soros 2000).
They are not considered here as solidarity groups since they do not emerge systematically 
from popular activism, but rather reflect an intervention from above, either by a 
philanthropist or by a well-off individual endowing a foundation in  her/his name.
e) Advocacy organizations
Finally, recent organizations specialized in advocacy topics321 are included here. Their main 
aim is to focus on alerting a variety o f target audiences (from citizens, consumers, or policy- 
oriented institutions) on precise issues. Unlike service-oriented organizations, they support 
actions oriented at a variety of causes.
318 For example the Swiss Terre des Homines is a difficult case: it started as a bottom up organization with a 
strong solidarity philosophy. Nevertheless, it now claims to have adopted a professional development approach. 
In this author*s opinion, their funding pattern (large popular collect) and their local philosophy (to localize 
daughter organizations) make them closer to solidarity than professional organizations.
3,9 To use the wording put forward on the MSF web site, about the 1979 split w ith MdM.
320 See http://www.fordfound.org/about/mission.cfm.
321 Carothers rightly points out that advocacy NGOs have a “limited range of socio-political interests roughly 
conforming to American liberal agenda” (1999: 337).
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Some of the professional ‘developmentaJist’ organizations also entail some strong elements o f 
advocacy and calls for solidarity (such as Oxfam, or Christian Aid, with their strong stances 
on criticizing their governments’ policy formulation). However there is another layer o f  
NGOs active almost uniquely in advocacy issues. Famous examples are Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch and the more recent Transparency International, an 
umbrella organisation specializing in monitoring corruption.
K rill nva K lill (Teople to People’ — Norwegian organization) is an emanation of the 
Norwegian government and as such is a theme-oriented NGO active in advocacy and peace 
promotion within the Palestinian context The A merican D evelopment Foundation is also a case in  
point, since it is specialized in promoting the internal governance o f NGOs. The field o f  
intervention of such organizations tends to be very limited and specialized.
5.1.4. Some technical definitions
As stressed in the beginning o f the chapter, one needs to say a few more words about the 
technicalities defining the work of donors. Let us first note that most o f the following 
definitions come from large international donor organizations such as the OECD and or 
W orld Bank, reinforcing thus their indirect (at least in this case) influential role in setting 
benchmarks and decisive criteria.
a) B ilateral vs. m ultilatera l a id
By bilateral aid, one needs to understand the flows of funding that “are provided directly by a 
donor [country or organization] to an aid recipient [country or not]” , whereas multilateral aid 
is “channelled via an international organisation” and whose flows are “pooled by other 
contributions and disbursed at the discretion o f the agency” (OECD DAC 2003: 321-324).
T o illustrate the difference, let us assume that DfTD gives 50% o f its budget to multilateral aid 
and 50% to bilateral aid. The former would include aid to UNICEF, UNRWA or the World 
Bank NGO Project, while in the latter scenario, budget support would be dedicated to the 
PNA, or to a British NGO (say MAP UK) or directly to a Palestinian NGO, such as the 
Palestinian Hydrology Group.
b) T ied  fund ing
T ied  funding aid refers to “official grants or loans where procurement of the goods or 
services involved is limited by the donor country to a group of countries which does not 
include substantially all aid recipient countries” (OECD DAC 2003: 324).
Som e countries include conditions of tied funding for obvious national interest reasons (a 
certain amount of money will have to be spent in the country o f origin or through various
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national agents). I f  one wants to assess how much fund actually goes to the recipient country, 
one will have to look into the existence or not of this condition.
c ) L IC s, M IC s &  H ICs
Aid from northern countries is generally differentiated according to general macroeconomic 
indicators such as a GDP per capita, GNP or related Human development index. There is 
usually a three-way distinction, low-income countries (LIQ , middle-income countries (MIC), 
and high-income countries.322
One should, in a perfect world, help the poorest and less developed countries to reach a 
minimum standard o f  living in the first place. Many donor agencies state as a goal helping 
foremost the so-called least developed countries (Arvin & aL 2001), but in reality, this is not 
always the case. A  quick glance at OECD figures indicates that the percentage o f official 
development assistance (ODA) disbursed by OECD members to LICs varies a lot from  one 
country to another (OECD DAC 2002: 92-125). This might further indicate that ODA is also 
political in  terms o f the choice o f the countries supported, rather than aimed at ‘simply’ 
poverty.
More important to the point is that LICs are actually not given equal chances according to 
some authors. For some, the IMF’s policies are not paying enough attention to the structural 
shortcomings and difficulties facing low-income countries in  performing and actually 
implementing some o f the Fund’s requests. Put in a nutshell, the IMF is an instrument from 
higher-income countries and as such cannot entirely grasp the situation o f low-income 
countries (Killick 1997). Others have made the claim that in front o f the World Bank and the 
IMF, LICs and some MICs do not possess the capacity to dialogue with them, but rather 
appear as ‘quasi-states’ and thus threaten their sovereignty since they have “become 
dependent upon continued aid flows” (Williams 2000: 567).
d ) E m ergen cy  (hum an itarian ) fund in g  vs. long  term  developm ent fund ing 
The distinction between long-term development funding and emergency (also called 
humanitarian) aid is a very contentious issue. No clear line can be drawn either in the 
literature or on the field o f practice. If one has in mind categories such as conflict-resolution, 
peace-building, peace-enforcement, and post-conflict, there is no doubt that there will be little 
understanding as to where one category starts and where the other ends.323
In the words of the EU office for humanitarian intervention (ECHO),
Humanitarian aid is aimed first and foremost at the people of the third world and covers not
only short-term relief but also disaster prevention and reconstruction operations. Such
322 For a full description o f these categories, see Appendix IV.
323 For a discussion, see Strazzari 2002.
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operations last as long as is necessary and are targeted at the immediate requirements arising out 
of natural (e.g. flooding, earthquakes) or man-made disasters (e.g. outbreaks of war and 
fighting) and other exceptional comparable circumstances.324
For many decades, the International Red Cross was the only institution to intervene in
emergency situations (Pouligny 2003: 548). Later on, UN multilateral agencies were also given
leading roles in emergency situations (e.g. UNHCR, WFP). Gradually, NGOs also emerged in
this field of intervention, with the Trench doctors' (MSF and then MdM) as figu res de prou e o f
a new form of interventionism. Thus, there has been a professionalization of this field o f
intervention, not to say a mercantilization o f  these interventions (there are now regular
international fairs taking place in Europe on issues o f emergency intervention and
development).325
The EU created a special body to deal with such emergencies: ECHO was set up in 1992 to 
replace the Emergency Unit of the DGVIII (Pouligny 2003: 547). But it is important to 
underline that ECHO disburses most of its funding to NGOs and that its by-laws require that 
projects have to be implemented by northern NGOs (in partnership or not with local NGOs 
or state institutions). A n estimated 45 to 70% o f ECHO funding is now allocated through 
NGOs (Pouligny 2003: 547 n.7), highlighting the increasing role o f  NGOs in this field as 
well.
On top of regular long term development funding, a vast amount o f  funding is dedicated to 
emergency situations. One of the obvious differences in funding technicalities is that funding 
is meant for short periods (six months in the case of the ECHO). Yearly, ECHO spends an 
average o f 500m Euros. Between 1992 and 1999, “NGOs accounted for 56% of [ECHO] 
spending, UN agencies 25% and other international organisations, e.g. the International Red 
Cross Movement, 11%, the remainder covering direct action by ECHO or specialist Member 
State agencies”.326 In 2002, the share o f funding to NGOs increased to 62% of the contracts 
signed by ECHO (27% to UN agencies).327 328
Because o f the importance of rapid and effective emergency response, a platform of 
international NGOs and of the ICRC set up in 1997 a working group to define a 
‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards’ in humanitarian interventions, the so-called 
SPHERE Project325
324 See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl0001.htm.
325 See for example http://www.coUectif-asah.oig/salon_humanitaire/salon_humanitaire.php. (last visited early 
2004)
326 Ibid. http://europa.euint/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl0001.htm.
327 See ECHO 2002 report (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/rl0006.htm).
328 For a presentation, see http:// www.sphereproject.org/. For a list of the active NGOs and international 
bodies active in the definition o f the Handbook, see http://www.sphereptoject.org/links.htm.
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e) Im plem enting  vs partnersh ip  organ izations 
A final distinction deals with the notion o f partnership or direct implementation. 
Implementing organizations are those that realise their objectives directly with no (local) 
intermediary in their projects. If, say, Oxfam Australia decides to implement on its own a 
micro-credit programme in Uganda, or a health education campaign with no local partners, 
this is a case o f an implementing organization. If, on the contrary, it decides to run such 
programmes with, say, a local Ugandan organization (governmental or not), then it w ill be 
done in partnership .
ECHO funding cannot be granted direcdy to southern implementing organisations. It can 
only be given to a northern agency implementing directly or in partnership with a  southern 
NGO. One can take this as an indirect form o f tied funding (since a good percentage o f the 
money and, more importantly, the design process o f the intervention will remain in the hands 
o f northern NGOs). This will have, as shown later, concrete consequences in determining the 
agenda in any local case.
This last element o f partnership demonstrates that although a lot of the vocabulary of 
‘development* entails rather positive conceptions, the reality behind these words can be rather 
bleak and pale. It is not enough to invoke ‘partnership* to favour sustainable development in 
the south. Partnership, after all, can be real but also fictional.
Although there has been much talk in the last twenty years about partnership with the south, 
and about the need for a sustainable development, international aid is still partly given under 
the main idea o f decisions taken in  distant western capitals rather than on the spot itself,329 
and with still hundreds of ‘expatriates* being sent to crisis zones rather than relying on 
domestic human resources.
Many authors have now described in detail the contentious notions o f ‘development* 
(Karagiannis 2002; Guilhot 2001; Fine &  aL 2001; Munck &  0*Heam 1999; Cooper & 
Packard 1997), but a more recent trend in  the literature has been to critically discuss 
humanitarian engagement and the services it can render certain aggressive policies o f some 
powerful states or alliances. In particular this literature questions the neutrality o f certain 
humanitarian actors and the fact that NGOs responding to emergencies very often must 
work under highly political conditions (Duffield 2004). The recent example o f the 
humanitarian intervention of NGOs in Iraq is a case in point: international NGOs willing to 
work in post-Saddam Iraq had to register and be allowed in the country by the American 
Defence Department (ICG 2003b: lOf). 52
525 One just needs to look at ECHOs guideline on ‘Eligible Expenditure' to realise that See 
http: / / europa.eu.int/comm/echo/pdf_Gles/partnership/expenditures_en.pdf.
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5.2. International Donors and Civil Society Promotion
We will now focus out attention to the specific institutional setting dealing with the 
involvement of NGOs within these processes, either as actors of civil society promotion or as 
recipient organisations of such aid. This will thus match and complete the previous discursive 
framework discussed in Section 2.4.
NGOs have received funding well before the 1990s, though: the World Bank reports that 
between 1973 and 1988, “only 6% of Bank-financed projects involved NGOs” (Malena & al. 
1995: Introduction). NGOs are not new, but the scope of their involvement greatly increased 
since 1990, as is demonstrated by the following figures.
According to OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), there were only 30 
projects directed to support civil society in 1991, from a total amount of $113m. By 1995, the 
increase, though sharp in the number of projects (440), remains moderate as regards the 
amount of funding ($39 lm ) (Van Rooy 1998: 58).
More than 10% of total ODA (Official Development Assistance) from the Netherlands and 
Switzerland were spent through NGOs in 1994-1995. Canada, the USA and Sweden reach at 
least 6 or 7% (Van Rooy 1998: 34). Figures from the OECD indicate that contributions to 
NGOs amounted to $1,200 in 2000 and $l,137m in 2001 (OECD DAC 2003: 240f). In 1998, 
the amount reached $1,037m and $1,151m by 1999 (OECD DAC 2001: 196f). The share o f  
funding to NGOs from OECD countries and NGO aid jumped from nearly 15% in 1988 to 
more than 20% by the end o f the 1990s (Kaldor & aL 2003:12).
Two important and recent studies have assessed ten years of EU democracy promotion 
policies (Youngs 2001) and democracy promotion in the Arab world (Carapico 2002). The 
former demonstrates that if  the EU dedicates $80Qm a year on political aid (vs. $700m from 
the USA), there is tendency in both cases to favour human rights and good governance issues 
at the expense of democracy330 (Youngs 2001: 361 & 372). Carapico, for her part, concludes 
that foreign aid promoting democracy331 can be a mixed blessing, but a sure fact is that most 
o f the money in that framework goes to NGOs (Carapico 2002:188).
To accompany the increase in terms of funding, many donor agencies have started setting up 
special units dedicated to governance and civil society, though the latter is all too often
330 Youngs conceives of democracy promotion as a “triumvirate” made of human rights, democracy, and good 
governance. Democracy is the parent paum  of the three (Youngs 2001:372).
331 She defines democracy promotion as the act to "enhance legislative, judicial, and civic responsibility'’ 
(Carapico 2002: 379).
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equated and merely reduced to NGOs332 (Howell & Pearce 2002: 91). For the World Bank, 
the issue of NGOs started already in  the mid-1980s (Guilhot 2001: 276). Since then, with the 
emergence o f the leading concept o f  good governance from 1989 onwards, the idea of 
working through the informal economy reinforced the need to work on and through non­
state actors. The W orld Bank publishes regular reports on NGOs and potential work to be 
done in this field.333
Most of the governmental agencies also publish so-called grey literature, at the crossroads of 
academic research and in-field assessment reports. Three examples of such national research 
centres include Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for the UK, Environment & 
Development Challenges (EDC) for Sweden and the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) in  Canada. ODI is an independent think-tank which reflects upon 
development policies and produces assessment reports.334 It also provides information to the 
British Parliament and policy papers to DfED. It also publishes two influential journals, 
D evelopment P olicy R eview  and D isasters: The Jou rna l o f  D isaster Studies, Policy and M anagem ent In the 
Swedish case, it is not a formal research centre, but a newsletter entitled EDC published in 
cooperation with the University o f Lund (Sociology Dept) and the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA). It disseminates highly interesting reports and information 
made available for development professionals. Finally, the IDRC was created as early as 1970 
by the Canadian Parliament and provides feedback to CIDA, the Canadian International 
Development Agency335. UK D flD ’s created in 1996 a ‘Civil Society Department* (Benthall 
2000: 2) and one could also add institutions specializing in democracy and democratization 
issues, such as the International Centre For Human Rights And Democratic Development 
(ICHRDD) in Canada (independent, established in 1988) and the Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy (UK, est. 1992, as a non-partisan public entity).336
Some of the larger NGOs also benefit from this reflective production of knowledge. Oxfam 
produces a journal on development issues (Development in  Practice), and has published many 
excellent monographs dealing w ith assessment reports, guidelines, and manuals.337 Save the 
Children has co-authored some very influential edited volumes such as Edwards & Hulmes* 
Beyond the M agic B u llet and Too C lose f o r  C on fort. The SPHERE project offers clear guidelines
332 As shown already before: the operationalization o f the concept ‘civil society* is very difficult. We should 
hasten to add that under the label ‘NGOs’, one should also include the community-based organizations (CBOs, 
also labelled grass roots organizations).
333 See various versions: (Paul & Israel 1991), (Malena & al. 1995) and (Gibbs & al. 1999).
334 For more, see http://www.odi.org.uk/about.html.
335 http://webidxc.ca/en/ev-8513-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html
336 For more examples, see (Carapico 2002: 382).
337 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/ what_we_do/resources/index.htm.
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for emergency and humanitarian interventions around the globe. Its Humanitarian C harter a n d  
M inimum Standards in D isaster Response has been published under the supervision o f m any 
international NGOs, such as InterAction, Save the Children, Care International, Lutheran 
World Federation, etc.338
From this short overview, we can notice that civil society promotion is performed by donor 
agencies (be they governmental, multilateral or non-governmental) which benefit from a vast 
array of information about the work done elsewhere and which are supplied on a daily basis 
w ith codes o f best practice and lists of potential dangers to deal with while implementing 
projects. One can also conclude that there is apparently a rather high level of consdentization 
about the issue of aid impact, and in particular about the notion of civil society promotion. 
M any have also underlined some less positive developments concerning NGO and civil 
society support. First, w e must insist that the phenomenon is not a totally new one: NGOs 
(e.g. Save the Children, Oxfam and others) date back to the end of the World War I, or even 
before 1914 if  one considers the International Red Cross (1863) or the Young Men's 
Christian Associations (YMCA, established in 1844). Halliday also considers that non-state 
actors have had a role to play since the Middle Ages in Europe (Halliday 2001). W hat is new, 
however, is the scope o f  their involvement and their overtly acknowledged importance. B ut 
no t all take this phenomenon as a positive outcome.
F or Pouligny, this is an equivocal process where effects are not always those intended (2001). 
Central questions posed by Edwards and Hulmes are still Stirling a lots of debate on low 
accountability, or lack o f downwards accountability (Edwards M. & Hulmes 1996: 264). 
Chandhokee doubts that many of the international NGOs are sufficiently grounded by 
mechanisms o f accountability (2002: 48).
O n the definitional level, the World Bank adopts a very limited description of NGOs: NGOs 
are “private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests o f  
the  poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services or undertake community 
development” (Malena & ah 1995: Summary). Where are the trade unions? Where are 
religious organizations? Obviously, this is a very limited and mostly functionally lim ited 
definition of NGOs. This highlights the possibility for donors to put to the forefront only 
certain aspects of NGOs to make them suit their agenda (it is well known that the W orld 
Bank is not meant to do politics, but only economical management).339 Hence, the short cut to 
the magical potential o f  NGOs to act for the well-being of the communities. Related to that
338 For a full list, see http://www.sphereproject.Org/handbook/ackn.htm#l. See also Sphere 2000.
339 To ensure the neutrality o f the Bank, regulating articles made dear that the World Bank was “not supposed to 
implement non-economic measures” (see A rt III 5b, IV 10, and V 5c). On that matter, see (Williams &  Young 
1994: 85).
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problematic o f representaüvity is the critique made by Youngs who stresses that, in  the case 
o f EU democratization efforts, the focus has been too much on “western-style urban NGO 
elites and commercially-oriented governance work” (Youngs 2003: 137).
Civil society promotion and support is no simple, given, or linear process. One needs to be 
careful before adopting a mere celebratory tone in response to the exploding figures, number 
o f NGOs funded and volume o f aid disbursed towards NGOs for civil society support 
around the globe. Many pitfalls exist on this new road o f development
Data provided by the OECD itself underlines that there is an unequal distribution (or access) 
to funding for Northern NGOs. In a survey conducted in the late 1990s, the OECD 
concludes that the largest 20% o f NGOs have 90.5% o f the sector’s financial resources 
(Woods 2000: 31). This goes hand in hand with the conclusions o f the French sociologist 
Siméant who demonstrated how northern NGOs are facing the same market logic as private 
business, in order to access funding. Much more problematic is the fact that many NGOs are 
“involved with the Merchandising* o f [theirs] services and hence o f representations o f the 
suffering that [they] seek to alleviate” (Benthall &  Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 45). Siméant also 
argues that, though formally ^^-governmental, NGOs are at best tied to national logics or at 
worst dose to national government policies despite their internationalization (Siméant 2002) 
and therefore far from providing a  type o f social action independent horn state influence, as 
mirrored by much o f the NGO literature. A  doser study o f EC multilateral aid to LICs and 
MICs340 demonstrates that it is not systematically the level o f  income that shapes aid 
decisions, but rather other elements seem to interfere, most notably the bdonging or not to 
the Lomé Group (Arvin & aL 2001) proving — if  still necessary — th e, p o litica l dimension o f aid. 
What is taking place is a form o f specialization, or increased division of labor amongst 
donors, development agendes, and implementing organizations. There is now a true “aid 
industry” — to use the wording o f Van Rooy (1998) — characterized by a professionalization of 
the work done by these agendes (Pouligny 2003: 548). International Muslim charitable 
organizations function actually along the same logic o f professionalization (Benthall & 
Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 79-84).
But one should not immediately accept that process as a positive phenomenon. The very fact 
of ‘doing development’ remains highly political, either because o f the historical continuity of
340 See also Appendix IV.
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the state apparatus stemming from the colonial setting for certain countries, or by ignoring 
the socio-political context in which aid is delivered (Pouligny 2003: 551).341 
Similarly, the closeness (not to say the promiscuity, or subordination) of professional think 
tanks and even academic milieus to policy-making circles and governmental aid agencies 
provides food for thought in terms o f the shortcomings of the very idea of civil society 
support and democratization efforts. A recent study on the links between political science 
milieus and policy making circles around the area of Latin America studies, demonstrated 
how scholars and NGO activists have became, nolens volens, tools o f  national interests and 
subordinated to Washington's views and interests (Guilhot 2001).
This short historical excursus demonstrates that the way NGOs are massively supported is 
actually quite a recent trend in its ampleur. The vocabulary used around concept of community 
participation, grass roots involvement, and participatory appraisals are all new concepts that 
came during the 1990s and not before (see Chatelard 2004a; Brand 2001). Therefore one 
should question certain benevolent aspects o f civil society promotion.
Even if  die current trend of the World Bank is to insist on project ‘ownership’ as a new way 
to stress the involvement of communities at low-levels, it  might be more lip-service than 
reality. Similarly, recent documents about how civil society actors are selectively invited to 
promote US interests in post-Saddam Iraq reflects a rather crude instrumentalisation of the 
discourses of civil society and democracy promotion (Docena 2004:15-18).
5.3. History of International Donors in Palestine
5.3.1. Overview
Let us now look at the precise case o f international donors* involvement with NGO support 
in  Palestine. Are they characterized by the same professionalisation and division of labor? Do 
w e find the same categories of donors? W hat are their conceptions and approaches when 
dealing with civil society? Are there commonalities by which civil society support is given? 
Historically, local NGOs were often the result o f a paternalist vision of assodational life led 
by local elites, most often from rich land owning families in urban centres- The intrusion o f 
foreign funding (read regional first, then only international — Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3) to 
support charitable organizations coincides with the internationalization of the conflict in the 
Middle East after 1948 and even more so after the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza. No real figures or list of donors exist, to the best of m y knowledge, about figures made 
available to (proto-)NGOs before the 1970s, despite the presence o f  some donors since the
341 Again, international Muslim charitable organizations confirm the points: there might be a professionalization, 
even a de-politicization in some cases, but aid never occurs in a political vacuum. Aid in the Muslim world is 
actually political as any other type of aid around the world (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003: 82 & 155).
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1948 wax. We w ill nevertheless try to sketch the presence and role of external donors in the 
OPT in the following sections.
As highlighted in  the previous chapter on Palestinian NGOs, the legal framework and its 
evolution is h ighly important to understanding the establishment and evolution o f  dvil 
society organizations. To a certain extent, the same applies for international donors.342 In fact, 
international donors* space for manoeuvring was always limited by Israeli legal and/or 
administrative impediments.343 This is particularly true from 1981 onwards when Israel 
imposed on the W est Bank and Gaza the so-called ‘Civil Administration*, whose ‘civilian* 
characters exists only in  name and not in  fact, since it was subordinated to the military chain 
of command (Chagnollaud 1990: 52). The Civil Administration was an indirect result o f the 
first Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978, according to which Israel was to 
grant autonomy to the Palestinians (the latter being not consulted for that matter) (Roy S. 
2001a: 108-110). It promoted military orders when Ottoman, Jordanian and Egyptian legal 
bases were not sufficient for the policing o f  the Territories (Milhem 1998). That impacted as 
well upon the w ork o f international donors who had to report344 and coordinate w ith the 
Israeli administration for the final green light before implementing their projects w ith local 
partners. Roy thus narrates the example o f an operation o f Save the Children whose funding 
proposal in partnership with a Gazan NGO was vetted by the Israeli military government 
from 1981 to 1989 because the local partner was considered potentially too close to the PLO 
(Roy S. 2001a: 271).
A more detailed account about such Israeli limits upon international funding is given by
Benvenisti (quoted in  Nakhleh 1989: 120). According to the latter who studied 348 USAID-
funded projects between 1977 and 1983 in the occupied territories,
“It was shown that Israeli intervention caused a major shift in the allocation of projects and 
budgets [...]. The share of economic development-related budgets actually implemented is 
reduced from almost half of the original programme to less than one-third.**
In other words, Israel had a free hand in re-directing some o f the funding according to its
priorities and moods o f ‘development* plans. Hence, the title o f the famous book o f the
342 It might appear at first glance strange and exceptional to imagine powerful external donors (who are willing to 
mitigate between conflicting parties) constrained by domestic rules and limits such as those imposed by Israel It 
might well be that such limits and constraints on donors are now the norm, if  we compare them to the rules set 
upon donors willing to work in Iraq but who need to apply first to the US military administration for a ‘working 
permit’ (see on that matter ICG 2003b).
On humanitarian aid and ‘postmodern conflicts’, see Duffield 2004 who speaks of humanitarian aid as a form of 
political controL
343 The limits set upon international actors by Jordanian and Egyptian rulers over the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip are almost non-existent, or, at best, not mentioned anywhere in  the literature. Clear limits existed, but for 
local associations. For a discussion and the impacts o f such limits, see Chapter 4 and Milhem 1998.
344 This reporting duty was perceived locally as a form o f spying activity. For an example of bad reputation from 
one of the American NGO, see (Nakhleh 2002: 59).
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American scholar, Sarah Roy, The Politics o f  De-Development* where she shows in  a careful 
study of the political economy of the Gaza Strip since the beginning o f  the 20* century that 
Israel led a politics o f  promoting its own economical development while constraining the 
Palestinian economy to a point where the latter was not only under-developed but was simply 
“de-developing” (Roy S. 2001a [1995]).345
Foreigners had also to comply with this rule by providing funding that would not go against 
Israeli plans. The same still applies now in  the Territories, despite some elements o f 
autonomy granted to the PNA since 1994: over the months and years o f  the second Intifaday 
Israel has practically re-installed total military control over Palestinian civilian life. In 2004 it 
requested an entry permit for non-USA and non-UN international organizations into Nablus 
as w ell as for entry into the Gaza Strip. Palestinian staff o f international organizations also 
needed to apply for a special Israeli permit to work in Area C. Foreign staff and volunteers 
have tremendous difficulties in getting a working visa required by the Israeli Ministry o f 
Interior and any international organization willing to work openly in the Territories must be 
licensed by the Ministry of Social Affairs.346
Although constraints and reporting obligations have not, in the last ten years, been as high as 
during the 1967-1994 period, there are still serious limits and hurdles placed upon the work o f 
international donors by the Israeli authorities.
5.3.2. The shift from regional funding
T here have been western donors in the region since the 1948 war w ith the presence o f what 
are mostly religious organizations, such as the American Friends Services Committee 
(Quaker), Catholic Relief Services, and CARE. Their work was that o f  relief and help to the 
hundreds of thousands of refugees forced to leave their homes during the Partition War. The 
U N , through its UNRWA arm, was the main international donor in  the region, but has 
rem ained mostly an implementing organization. The massive presence of western donors 
w orking in partnership or funding local organizations only dates back to the mid-1980s and in 
particular from 1987 with the outbreak o f the first Intifada (1987-1993).
B efore then, the main donors were Arab regional actors. As for the emancipation o f a truly 
national and independent (from other Arab countries) Palestinian leadership within the PLO, 
it  took a long time for Palestinian NGOs to receive aid that was not tied to some political
545 Khan sustains that the trend was actually reinforced with the Oslo process whereby “the Israeli asymmetric 
containment led probably to the intended consequence of de-development” (in Khan & a l 2004: 50, his 
emphasis).
346 The latter must get a green light from the Israeli Ministry of Interior, which sometimes does not give its 
approval before the approval of the work by the Ministry of Social Affairs. This formal licensing procedure 
really impedes the work of international donors, and in particular Arab donors to work inside the Territories.
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patronage from a neighbour country or from the Arab League. The shock o f  the 1967 defeat 
had long-lasting consequences for funding made available in the Territories. Once the Arab 
states acknowledged that the “new PLO”347 would be the sole legitimate representative o f the 
Palestinian people in 1974 (Rabat Summit) and that the Occupation was now the m ain issue 
for the Palestinian question, responding strategies slowly emerged from regional actors. Thus, 
in 1978, at its Baghdad summit, the Arab league announced the creation of the so-called 
“Jordanian-Palestinian Joint committee for the support o f the steadfastness o f the Palestinian 
people in the Occupied homeland” (Roy S. 2001a: 151), in  short; called the ‘Jo in t Committee’ 
or ‘Steadfastness Committee’. Its aim was to make funding available for Palestinians o f the ‘ 
inside’ to provide basic infrastructures (water, electricity) and economic support to avoid out­
migration, but also to indirectly provide some channels of political influence (Sayigh 1997: 
479f). The hand was started in 1979. Although $!00m  was to be distributed annually w ith the 
agreement o f both the PLO and the Jordanian government,348 the total amount given between 
1979 and 1986 reached between $417m (Nakhleh 2002: 26) and $463m (Sayigh 1997: 612). 
This remained the main source with about $60m a year.
Although coming to less, internal PLO funds also poured into the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT). Most notably, the Palestinian National Fund was a mechanism whereby 
governments o f the Gulf countries raised a 5% income tax on the salary o f their Palestinian 
Gastarbeiter, the money collected was then handed to the PLO, which then re-distributed it  to 
its various factions (Karame 1997: 75). It is estimated that Fatah provided about $5Qm a year 
for its internal constituency (Sayigh 1997: 481). There was certainly also some Soviet funding 
for the Marxist factions of the PLO, but as in  the case o f Fatah, no exact figures are available. 
According to research conducted by Hanafi, Palestinian philanthropists channelled multi­
million figures to the OPT on a yearly basis. The most prominent example is represented by 
the Welfare Association, a club o f wealthy Palestinian businessmen that decided to provide an 
endowment fund after the shock o f  the 1982 invasion o f  Lebanon by Israel.349 The Welfare 
Association provided a yearly average o f  $6m for social organizations inside the Territories 
(Hanafi S. 1998: 64ff). This is the main source of *Diaspora Funding* channelled directly by a 
single organization to the OPT. Smaller amounts of remittances were (and are still) sent by
347 By ‘new PLO’, I mean the post-Shuqeiry PLO, whereby a new generation o f activists around Fatah and its 
leader Yaser Arafat took over after the failure of the older generation embodied by Shuqeiry to get rid o f the 
other Arab states’ patronage to resolve the ‘Palestinian question*. See Sayigh 1997.
148 The Jordanian government initiated another funding scheme in 1987, called Jordanian Development Plan*. 
For a critique, see (Barghouthî M. 1989:127), and (Nakhleh 1989:118).
349 For a description o f the circumstances of the foundation of the Welfare Association and a list of the 
members, see (Nakhleh 2002 & 2004).
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individuals or solidarity groups as my interviews with local NGOs demonstrated,350 It is 
worth noting here the solidarity groups based in the USA that send financial supports to the 
Territories. These include the United Palestinian Appeal (est. 1985 in New York (Nakhleh 
1989:121)), the United Holy Land Fund (est 1989), and the Arab Palestinian Fund (est 1985) 
(Hanafi S. 1998: 67) and the Jerusalem Fund (Nakhleh 1989).
The final source o f Arab institutional funding is that of the Arab/Islamic regional 
organizations. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD, based in 
Kuweit), Student Aid International (Kuwait), OPEC Fund for International Development 
(Vienna), Arab Gulf Programme for UN Development Organisations (AGFUNDO, based in 
Riyadh) and the Islamic Development Bank have disbursed, according to Nakhleh (1989 & 
2002), between $80 and $120m from 1977 to 1992.351 The particularity o f this funding is that 
these organizations are highly sensitive to political susceptibilities amongst Arab countries: 
the PLO support given to Saddam Hussein in the Gulf W ar in 1990-1991 proved to be a 
watershed for funding to the Territories: Gulf countries decided to immediately shut down 
the funding tap to Palestinian organizations. The parallel decision to expel thousands o f 
Palestinian G astarbeiter also meant the drying up of a substantial portion of remittances sent 
back to the OPT.352
Another crisis in the intra-Arab relations caused the rupture and collapse o f the Jo int 
Jordanian-Palestinian Committee in  1988. A t that time (the Intifada had started a year before), 
the PLO declared a Palestinian State from Tunis. Jordan decided therefore to disengage from 
any form of control o f the Territories and stopped providing funding to hundreds o f 
charitable societies. From one day to the next, 21,000 salaries that used to be paid for by 
Jordan, were now unpaid; the Jordanian government accepted only to continue paying for
2,000 staff taking care o f  religious and holy sites through its aw qa f (religious endowment) fund 
(Curmi 2002: 102). This last point gives us the opportunity to touch on religious funding. An 
important mechanism o f fund raising is that o f yakaat, or almsgiving, one o f the five pillars o f 
Islam. Each Muslim should pay personally every year a local committee a certain amount o f 
her salary (usually 2.5%). Xakaat committees then re-distribute its funds to needy people. 
There is an important flow of %akaat money travelling from one end o f  the Muslim world to
350 See for example interviews with UHWC, UHCC, and UPRMC. This is particularly true for the service- 
providing NGOs (see Section 6.2).
35t Nakhleh 2002. For 1977-1992, this included $42m from AF, about $40m from OPEC and $40m from 
Welfare association. Complete figures with details on who receives and the technical limitations put on such 
donations: Le. being recognized and officially registered organizations.
352 According to Sayigh, the “flow of funds to the OPT plummeted from. $120m in 1990 to $45m in 1992 (US 
reports) or from $360m to $84m according to the secretary of the Intifada committee” (quoted Grom Al-Quds al- 
A rabi August 23,1993) (Sayigh 1997: 657).
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the other end.353 In the case o f Palestine, an estimate 40% o f %akaat spending comes from 
abroad.354 Knowing that a yakaat committee in Hebron (with a population o f h a lf a million 
people) distributes an average o f $ lm  yearly355 the amount generated locally and sent from 
abroad to various %akaat committees are therefore not be neglected in our account o f  external 
donors (see Section 6.2.6).
We will discuss later the political significance of these changes in  external sources o f funding. 
But to conclude this section, two figures suffice to make the point that the main source of 
funding was, until the end of the 1980s a regional matter more than a western/international 
one. Using figures coming from various sources (Nakhleh 1989; Hanafi S. 1998; Curmi 2002; 
Nakhleh 2004), one can estimate the yearly contribution to the Territories from Arab regional 
institutions at about $60 to 80m. Figures from western donors are much lower. USAID, for 
the period 1975-1987, disbursed only $6m a year. Even if  European consulates (as the main 
European donors until the end o f the 1980s — see Curmi 2002) gave financial contributions to 
NGOs, western funding never matched that of regional origins in  quantity.
5.3.3. To international funding
This reality gradually changed over the years of the first In tifada  (1987-1993). European 
donors starting to occupy the front lines by giving more and more funding to NGOs. 
According to Curmi, there were up to 2,000 Palestinian NGOs (many of which were popular 
local committees and which later disappeared during the Oslo years) that was supported by a 
“grand m élange de solidarìté\ secours, professionalism e e t d e volon tarism i* (Curmi 2002: 102).356 
According to the administrative director o f a very large health NGO, the first non-Arab 
funding to his organization came during the first years o f  the In tifada  from Oxfam.357 This was 
the beginning of more massive and systematic western support to Palestinian NGOs.
Western support came first from Consulates (none o f the western governments were allowed 
to have an official representation in  the Territories) and then from western NGOs. According 
to Karamé (1997: 76), western involvement w ith NGO support became more 
professionalized, w ith the beginning o f  a cohort o f experts doing assessment needs and 
reports. From 1987 onwards it was also a time when European NGOs started to coordinate 
among themselves, fostering a model of coordination amongst international donors (ibid.: 76).
353 For a very detailed account on ^akaat and Islamic fund raising ‘industry’, see Ghandour 2002. Despite the 
provocative tide (‘Jihad humanitaire”) and a lack o f systematic quoting of his sources, the authors gives an 
interesting account o f how western fund raising methods are used by Islamic NGOs to get their funding.
See also the more recent Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003.
354 This is according to a 1997 study of Majdi al-Malki & Salim Tamari, mentioned in (Hanafi S. 1998: 64).
355 Interview with Majeed NASSER ed-DIN, Board Member, Hebron Zakaat Committee, Hebron, 21.02.2004.
356 Palestinian NGOs were supported “with a great mix o f solidarity, relief, professionalism and voluntary spirit 
at the same time.”
357 Interview in East Jerusalem, 28.01.2003.
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In the early days of the 1990s there existed three international NGO networks active in the 
territories:
- The European Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine, a
North American Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine
and finally, an
International Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine 
The most active was the European one which organized an important conference in 1992 
(funded by the European Commission), under the umbrella of the Network o f European 
NGOs in the Occupied Territories (NENGOOT).358
By the time the Declaration of Principles was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, 
there was an estimated 200 international NGOs active (either physically or through funding 
mechanisms) in the Territories (Cunni 2002). After Oslo, the number o f UN agencies jumped 
from three to reach 29 after 2000 (Barsalou 2003: 51). The increase of western funding 
promises peaked with the signing o f the Oslo accords and in  the subsequent donor-pledging 
conference in Washington (Brynen 2000). Obviously the larger share o f funding (roughly an 
average of $500m a year) was directed to the establishment o f the PNA. It is usually accepted 
in the literature that the amount of funding earmarked for NGOs dropped from about 
$170m around 1990 to $100m in 1994359 and subsequently to $60m in  1996 (Sullivan 1998: 
95). Hanafi estimates the flow of international aid to NGOs at around $63m for 1998 (Hanafi 
S. 2002:12). In comparison, the flow of regional Islamic institutions to sister organizations in  
the Territories is evaluated at around $35m for 1999, though the figure is likely to be higher 
(ICG 2003a: 14).360
5.3.4. And the shift from small NGOs to larger and new types of donors
T he number o f western donors in the 1990 varies according to authors. For Curmi, there are 
about 200, for Hanafi 130 (Hanafi S. 2002: 126) and for the W orld Bank 150 (Rabe 2000: 
257). I have gathered in my own database the list of 180 international donors (both western 
and Arab), o f which about 20 physically disappeared from the Territories sometime during
358 For a list of participant and overview, see
http://dontino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/0902dbab68fDd73d85256109006a85af?OpenDocumenL 
For the proceedings of the conference, see Brown A. & al. 1993.
359 Figures here differ. For (Sullivan 1998:95), funding in 1990 reached between $150 to $200m, and according 
to Hamm ami, dropped from $170 to $240m in 1990 to ca $100m in 1994 (Hammami 1995: 59).
360 It is very difficult to get exact figures on Hamas funding for example. Some estimations refer to $100m yearly 
for the whole of the Hamas structure, with a good 75% going to its charitable social network (see Finkelstem 
quoted in ICG 2003a). (Benthall & Bellion-Jourdan 2003:106) also speak of $100m o f yearly budget, with 90% 
going to its social service sector.
181
the Oslo years.361 Often the presence o f  small NGOs was substituted b y  governm ental offices in 
the Territories and specialized in  development (Sweden, Britain, Austria, Italy, Switzerland 
and probably France as well). Interviews with the Swedish and Swiss governmental 
development body (SIDA and SDC) mentioned that they used to finance as early as the 1980s 
projects in the territories but money was given to smaller NGOs.362 The task was reversed 
with Oslo and the establishment o f representative offices to the PNA: smaller NGOs 
retreated to an advisory role in  their home country and let their government office deal 
directly with implementation in Palestine.363
Another phenomenon related to changes in  the composition o f the NGO field is the 
emergence of larger non-govemmental funding organizations and/or specialized bodies.364 
This is particularly true for the North American NGOs. A t the time the first Intifada broke 
out, there were only five American USAID g ra n te e s  (S a ve t h e  Children, CRS, ANERA, 
AMID EAST, and Holy Land Christian Mission) (Nakhleh 1989: 117), whereas there are now 
almost 20 US grantees from USAID funds.365 Out o f the 37 international funding bodies 
interviewed for this research, nine have an  annual budget that is lower than $ lm , and out of 
the 28 going above the million-mark, 12 are NGOs, while 16 are governmental or multilateral 
donors. The four NGOs spending more than $5m a year are all from the USA.
USAID money has also sparked o ff the creation of sub-contractors managing programmes 
on behalf of the governmental aid agency. For example, Tamkeen, Maram and Rafeed are all 
new entities created in the last five years, which manage annual budgets of $5 to $10m on 
behalf of USAID. However, a large chunk o f this sum remains in  the State through US-based 
implementing partners (Rafeed’s implementing partner is ARD,366 Maram works with IBM 
Global Services and Tamkeen with Chemonics).367 The new institutional culture that has been
361 This does not automatically mean that they stopped funding projects. Some have indeed stopped their 
funding activities, while others are working as ‘invisible’ organizations, that is, from their home country with 
some field visit every now and then.
362 This is also the case o f  the Austrian Development Cooperation: Austrian-Arab society and North-South 
institute were present on the field before Oslo. Interview with Leo MOLL, Country Representative, Ramallah, 
20.02.2003.
363 Interview with Anne BRUZELIUS, Swedish Consul, East Jerusalem, 24.02.2003. She actually explained that 
in Sweden local NGOs and solidarity groups (such as the Palestine Solidarity Group - PSG) have a very 
important role in defining priorities and potential implementing Palestinian partners. In the Swiss case, there is 
no such advisory body; rather, Swiss NGOs applying for funding for a project in Palestine do it in Bern and not 
through the local representative office (interview with Fritz FRÖHLICH, Deputy Director, Swiss Development 
and Cooperation Agency (SDC), East Jerusalem, 18.02.2003).
364 (Brown N. 2003:165) notes about this period (early 1990s) that “[.. .]  grassroots organizations faced an 
entirely new set of opportunities: international donors flush with enthusiasm for all sorts of NGOs, suddenly 
discovered that Palestinian society was rich with organizations speaking in the prose of civil society.”
365 Source: personal database on donors.
366 See http://www.ardinc.com/htm/about_us/about.htm. ARD stands for ‘Associates in Rural Development’.
367 See http://www.chemonics.com/aboutus.
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introduced with such large entities is indeed noteworthy. For example, much of work done 
around civil society promotion takes the form and content of managerial consulting.
Two points are worth stressing here. One is that these implementing organizations set up th eir 
own affiliate institutions on the ground, providing relays and important networks. For example, 
Chemonics International’s West Bank affiliate is Massar which is also a consulting body for 
Tamkeen. A list o f Tamkeen and Massar clients368 show that there are strong inter­
connections between the two. The second point is that, although the work of NGOs tends to 
be specialized, the innovative element o f such implementing organisations is that they 
specialize not in a topic, or a field of intervention, but rather in the management o f projects. 
T he end result is that an organization like ARD, Associates in Rural Development’ based in 
Washington DC, manages a programme assisting the Palestinian Judicial System (Rule o f 
Law) funded by USAID369 between 1996 and 2004. At first glance, this may sound strange, 
bu t further research demonstrates that ARD is actually an associate in this project o f a  
Californian firm  called DPK Consulting, which is itself, an associate o f the Massar &  
Associates,370 the same organization working with Tamkeen and Chemonics. Not only do 
they work in close network (or dose circuits), but they also contribute to the spreading o f a 
rather procedural approach to aid which has to be managed more than built in partnership w ith 
local organizations. This might, eventually, become detrimental to the setting o f priorities 
responding to local needs.371 In any case, the specialization and increased division o f labour 
im plied by these large US consultancy entities confirm the trends in the change of aid 
disbursement witnessed over the last decade.
Providing funding, from whatever sources, is never a politically neutral ac t372 As Cumn states, 
“L a  question du financem en t des ONG palestiniennes est intm em ent politique e t doit se tin  d cette aune p o u r  
com pnndre les nuances du  deba t’ (Curmi 2002: 113).373 Let us just give few examples of the 
political dimension o f funding to illustrate this quote. For many years the largest source o f 
funding — the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee — was actually a means to channel 
support to one category of actors, not in terms of parties, or privileged groups, but to dusters 
o f  individuals and institutions willing to favor either a Jordanian patronage and potential
368 h ttp :/ / w w w .m assar .co m / d ist.h t5n .
365 http://www.ardinc.com/htm/projects/p_wbrol.htm.
370 http://www.dpkconsolting.com/p_wbg.htm.
371 Assuming again that development around questions of democracy has to be defined mosdy locally, in a drive 
towards autonomy. See Section 2.5.
372 A  close study o f aid provided by international Muslim charitable organizations reached the same condusion, 
but stressing the “conspicuous permeability between charity and politics” (Benthall Sc Bellion-Jourdan 2003:105 
& 155).
373 ‘T h e question of funding to Palestinian NGOs remains intimately political and must be read according to 
this yardstick to understand the nuances of the debates.”
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resolution of the conflict or groups playing along the lines of Fatah. Practically, this translated 
into funds being granted to “a notable class, with ties to Jordan and of the conservative wings 
of Fatah’* as pointed out in the case of agricultural NGOs (Robinson 1997: 53).
Many examples are there to prove the point: external regional funding was a form o f rent and 
a way to create patronage. Then NGO activists from left-wing associations Eileen Kuttab 
(Kuttab 1989: 134) and Mustafa Barghouthi were unhesitant to denounce the disappointment 
generated by the Jo in t Committee and the way it was handled (patronage, rent seeking and 
cronyism). In the words of Mustafa Barghouthi, such programmes “did not in  fact strengthen 
and reinforce steadfastness and the ability o f Palestinians to confront the prevailing 
challenges. Rather, they fed individualistic and sometimes corrupting tendencies” (Barghouthi 
M. 1989: 127). But, to make justice to pro-Jordanian and pro-Fatah supporters, it must be 
stressed that left groups themselves (and in particular d ie Communist Party) had their own 
forms o f  rent (Sayigh 1997: 613).
Another important source of regional funding, namely that o f  the PLO and in particular o f 
Fatah, is worth mentioning. If now Fatah has to deal with the Islamic bloc as the main 
domestic contender, back in the 1970s and 1980s, it was the turn of left-wing parties 
(communists,374 PFLP and DFLP) to challenge Fatah’s hegemonic position inside the PLO. 
The first years of the 1980s saw in particular the struggle around the control o f an important 
component of civil society, namely trade union organizations, many of which were led by 
communists. Fatah created its own General Federation o f Trade Unions o f August 1981 to 
counter-attack communist influence in this milieu. This happened at a time where the Joint 
Committee was sending large flow of funding inside the territories (Sayigh 1997: 476f & 480). 
Interestingly, since 1982 there have been no internal elections in  the various national trade 
union federations. A related field o f contention between Fatah and left-wing movements have 
been the student organizations, university trade unions and youth clubs, all vital places of 
recruitment for political factions (Sahliyeh 1988:101).
Islamic groups (inspired by the Muslim Brethren o f neighbouring countries) were already part 
o f this factionalist struggle over the control of civil society organizations, but to a much lesser 
extent until the outbreak of the first Intifada and the creation o f  Hamas in February 1988. 
Though they run important social services and charitable organizations (most notably in the 
Gaza Strip with Sheikh Yassin’s Islamic Assembly (al-mujamma* al-islam i, created from 1973 
onwards), they were not taking part in the direct struggle against the Occupation in the first
374 Palestinian communists of the WBGS were gathered under different names. First it was the Jordanian 
Communist Party (JCP), then from 1982 the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) and in 1991 its name changed 
to Palestinian People’s Party (PPP). See Taman 1992.
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years of their existence. Rather they were instrumentalized by Jordanian conservative forces 
(through funding) to u n d erm ine  communists’ (seen as “infidels”) hegemony in  Palestinian 
society by using its networks in mosques and in the Islamic university of Gaza (Legrain 1997: 
163). Majdi al-Malki’s interesting study o f clan structures (hamula) in three villages during the 
first Intifada also shows that access to funding (from PLO and in particular from Fatah) or to 
an NGO-sponsored development activity were also at the origin o f power struggles inside 
villages (Malki 1994:119-126).
Another theme l in k ed  to political leverage or influence emerges with the large amount o f
western funding in the late 1980s. Obvious doubts are raised about the true intentions o f US
funding at certain crucial moments of negotiations. First when the Camp David agreements
were signed between Egypt and Israel (1978), many Palestinians feared that funding would be
tied to accepting the plan of autonomy for the Palestinians. Similarly, when Jordan promoted
its Jordanian Development Plan, there was a  strong sense amongst Palestinians that:
“US assistance [was] tied to nurturing Palestinian acceptance of a US ‘negotiated solution*, and 
that the improvement of the Palestinian quality of life under occupation is nothing more than 
an acceptable camouflage for the imposition of US-initiated solutions” (Nakhleh 1989:119).
Many observers have expressed similar reservations about the massive aid given after 1994 to
buttress the acceptance by Palestinians o f the Oslo agreements, despite the serious problems
and biases on the road to the promised peace (Hanafi & Tabar 2002; Le More 2004;
Lasenscky 2004). Similarly, the Road Map and post-Arafat talks seem to include the same
carrot-and-stick approach to aid (Nabulsi 2004).
In short, an analysis o f the implication o f donors within the Palestinian context stresses that 
there has been:
- A specialization and/or professionalization in the types of organizations involved (fewer 
and fewer solidarity groups, but thematically-oriented donors);
- A tendency towards a significant increase in terms o f the size and volume o f funding 
given by donors,375 which also constraints local organizations to scramble for funding 
(and increases the marketization o f aid through the survival o f predom inantly larger 
NGOs);
- A govemmentalization of the sources of funding (with all that this means in terms o f 
power of governments to influence the political negotiations of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict);
375 The average funding from the 37 interviewed funding bodies reaches $3,7m a year.
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- The shift from regional to international origin o f funding was paralleled in local terms by 
a general shift from mass-based into elite approach to civil society work done by 
Palestinians themselves (Jamal M. 2005:10).
5.4. Presentation of the International Donors’ Sample
5.4.1. Who are they?
a) Governmental bodies and m u ltila tera l o rgan izations
By far this, governmental and multilateral organizations are the most important donors for 
Palestinian NGOs, in terms o f funding made available annually and of their massive presence 
with the start o f the Oslo peace process. A ll eleven governmental representative offices of the 
interviewed sample were established after the signing of the Declaration o f Principles, but 
half o f them were already providing aid since the mid-1980s (in the case o f the Italian, 
Swedish, Austrian and Swiss development agencies).
The sample includes either representative offices that have direct responsibilities over 
development activities (Dutch, Austrian, Italian and Irish governments) or specialized 
development agencies active on the field (as is the case for the British DfID, Swedish SIDA, 
Canadian CIDA, Swiss SDC, Australian Aid, USAID, and the Norwegian NORAD). 
Multilateral organizations had a  small presence before Oslo but their visibility increased since 
the mid-1990s, in  particular thanks to the important role played by the EU.
b ) So lidarity  groups
Included under ‘solidarity* organizations that have either from their way of working, or 
through the types of programmes they run in Palestine a very important grass roots 
dimension, or have dear and often declared political preferences in terms of partners chosen. 
It is the case of Norwegian People’s Aid, Terre des Hommes International, Medico 
International (which generally refuse governmental Binding, and work in very dose 
partnership with Palestinian NGOs, since they have no office in the Territories),376 and the 
two branches o f Oxfam377 (GB and Quebec). Finally, an NGO specialized for assisting 
Palestine such as Medical Assistance to Palestine (MAP UK) w as also placed in the ‘solidarity’ 
category.
Our sample entails six solidarity organizations. But there are many more organizations 
concerned by solidarity work: many Spanish and Italian solidarity NGOs are operating on the
376 Interview with Sabine ECKART, Emergency Coordinator, MEDICO International, Beit Hanina, 21.02.2004.
377 Though Oxfam is professionalized as any other development organizations, they were placed in the 
‘solidarity* category for two reasons: first, the type o f programs run are very often innovative and not 
reproduced by other donors (e.g. assistance to the Bedouin population), and second, the constant commitment 
to critical assessment on the ground makes it a very particular case.
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ground but were not interviewed Similarly, many French, German, British and Scandinavian 
solidarity groups could have been included, but many of those are simply not established with 
an office in the Territories. Rather, they work through direct local partners on the ground. Let 
us finally underline that, as stressed in the historical change, m a n y  o f the smaller solidarity 
NGOs disappeared during the Oslo years and have either ceased to fund or now operate 
from their home countries.
As for other Diaspora groups sending collective remittances, their efforts are difficult to 
measure since they do not operate as other ‘visible’ organizations do with a coordinator and 
an office on the ground Interviews have stressed that they send usually small amounts o f 
money but with a high impact on the ground since they can be used freely (e.g., as core 
funding).378 A n interesting approach deliberately taken by SIDA, the Swedish Development 
Agency, is to involve the largest Palestinian solidarity group in Sweden into the programme 
design and monitoring: thus the Palestinian Solidarity Group has been involved for now more 
than fifteen years and operates as intermediary between SIDA, the governmental agency and 
its local partners, such the Union o f Palestinian Medical Relief Committees.379
c) Professional developm entalist organisations 
Seven NGOs form the group of so-called professional developmentalist organizations. These 
include two ‘mammoth’ organizations (CARE International, Save the Children USA), with 
respectively a budget of $15m and $8m for 2003380, as well as the smaller American 
Development Foundation (active in internal governance). Two medical organizations, 
M édecins sans F rontières (MSF), and M erlin (H ealth in Crisis) are included in this category: despite 
the fact that they tend to be urgentistes (emergency organizations), they also run long-term 
development projects, or couple emergency programmes with a vital long-term aspect (such 
as training o f local staff). F in a lly , two specialized bodies geared for NGO support in Palestine 
complete our seven NGO samples o f developmentalist organizations: the Welfare 
Association and the G erm an Fund. Both were created specially for the Palestinian territories 
during the Oslo years and aim at strengthening local structures to make of them viable and 
strong interlocutors for the PNA. The Welfare Consortium is actually a conglomerate o f 
three international NGOs (British Council, the UK-based Charity A id Foundation, and the 
Geneva-based Welfare Association) managing a multi-million fund given in two successive
378 See for example, the interview with Dr. Rabah MU HAN A, President of the Unions of Health Work 
Committees (UHWC), Gaza Branch, Gaza Gty, 30.01.2003.
379 See interview with Ann BRUZFJJUS, Consul, SID A, Jerusalem, 24.02Z003. See also Jeppson &Lindhal 
1995.
380 Interview with Earl WALL, Country Director, CARE International, Beit Hanina 17.02.2003 and with Jennifer 
MOREHEAD, Manager o f Information Unit, Save the Children US, Ar-Ram, 13.0Z2003.
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phases (1997-2001 and 2001-2004) by the World Bank.381 The German Fund consists o f 
financial support provided by the German government (GTZ) to support smaller NGOs in 
the territories and is run jointly by the main German Stifiungen  on the ground (KAS, FES, 
FNM, HBS).
d ) F a ith -based  organ izations
There are four faith-based organisations in  my sample, one Muslim (Islamic Relief UK) and 
three Christian (World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, and Diakonia).382 International 
Muslim organizations faced a hard time after 9/11 and some o f the organizations that used to 
fund local NGOs were shut down not only in  the USA (Holy Land Foundation being the 
most notorious case in  December 2001), but also in France, UK, Germany (al-Aqsa 
Foundation) and Switzerland.383 Many o f these organizations have most probably no lin k s  
whatsoever with ‘terrorist’ networks, but can not work anymore freely to support local 
chantable organizations. More indirect roads must probably be taken now to send their funds, 
and some o f them are beginning to send material such as hospital equipment to their local 
partners, as stressed by some Palestinian NGOs.384
Christian organizations do not, obviously, face the same problems. There are dozens o f 
Christian organizations in the territories, and — needless to say — Jerusalem is their nucleus. 
Though now only 2 or 3% of the Palestinian population is o f Christian faith, millions and 
millions o f Christians come to Palestine's holy places not only to preserve holy sites and its 
cultural heritage but also probably to stop the Christian out-migration haemorrhage.385 
Though Christian organizations claim to work across religious distinction, there is a strong 
concentration of their organizations around predominantly Christian populated areas such as 
Jerusalem, Beit Lahem, and Ramallah (historically a Christian town, as opposed to its Siamese 
neighbour o f  al-Bireh largely Muslim by population), as well as some small villages near Jenin.
381 More will said on the Wodd Bank-NGO programme in Section 6.1.
3821 also interviewed the administrative director o f the Caritas Baby Hospital in Bethlehem (Edward 
DABDOUB, Beit Lahem, 20.01.2004). Though the Hospital is entirely funded by Caritas International (and in 
particular its Swiss and German branches), he could not speak about the rest o f  Caritas’ funding activities in the 
Territories.
383 In Europe, some o f the organizations were not formally shut down but their assets were frozen. It is believed 
that the US-based Holy Land Foundation raised up to $13m o f funding in 2000. See (ICG 2003a: 1-6).
See also http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/text/1219indict.htm for a detailed list 
Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, Lyon (France)
Association de Secours Palestinien, Basel (Switzerland)
- Interpal, London (UK)
- Palestinian Association in Austria, Vienna (Austria)
384 See interviews in Hebron with the Patient Friends Society (10.02.2004) and with Ihsan Charitable Society 
(11.02.2004).
385 On the issue o f Palestinian Christians and out-migration, see Sabella 2004.
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Thus, a private American university was created not in Jenin itself, but just outside, in nearby 
Christian villages.
It should be noted that there is a very good level o f coordination amongst Christian 
organizations. A ‘Jo int Emergency Relief of the Christian Organizations’ was formed to 
respond to the most urgent needs during the second Intifada?*6 some special convoys o f  food 
were prepared under this umbrella. To stress the fact that, despite claims o f non- 
discriminatory support across religious groups, there is a tendency to favour their Christian 
minorities which is demonstrated by some international NGOs which reported serious 
tensions about the goal of their first humanitarian convoys during the operation ‘Defensive 
Shield’ in April 2003.” 7
e) Political organizations
There are five political organizations in the sample of interviewed donors. Apart from three 
German foundations, Stifiungen, (Konrad A denauer Stiftung, Friedrich E bert Stiftung, and H einrich  
B oil Stzftung), and the Norwegian FAFO (Institute for Applied Social Science), the National 
Democratic Institute is only non-European political organization in  Palestine.
A ll are directly affiliated to political parties or trade unions (as is the case of FAFO), and as 
such, deploy activities in direct relation with the political process (such as inter-party dialogue 
in  the case o f NDI or election-oriented projects), welfare and human rights promotion. A ll o f 
them are rather small organizations.
f) QUANGOS or GINGOS?
Two more interviewed donor organizations were not ‘pigeon-holed’ in one o f the previous 
boxes. They are formally two international NGOs, but which are entirely dependent on 
USAID funding. Their strategy and plan of actions are decided directly by the US 
development agency. Though they both claim to have space for independent steering o f their 
activities, the fact that they have to follow procedural guidelines o f USAID (as in the case o f 
the anti-terrorism waiver — see Section 5.4.3.d), and that they are flanked by US-based 
implementing and financial partners make o f them not real NGOs, but ‘quasi-NGOs’ 
(QUANGOs) or even governmental NGOs (GINGOs). The two are Tamkeen, established 
in  2000 and is in charge of the civil society projects, and M aram (2001) running health 
activities.
Before the creation o f  these two GINGOs, USAID was distributing directly its funding to 
partner local NGOs. However at the end of the 1990s it was decided to confer on *387
346 This includes Catitas, the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, the 
Lutheran World Federation and the Mennonite Central Committee.
387 Private communications with international actors present in the various convoys around that time.
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implementing agencies the tasks o f managing the amounts dedicated to NGOs.388 This form 
of outsourcing now has two layers: one in Washington (or elsewhere near decision centres in 
the USA) that provides global and strategic consultancy, and general reporting financial 
support, the second is another NGO based in the Territories and doing the interface work 
with applying local NGOs. It is probably not by coincidence that both QUANGOS adopted 
an Arabic name to make have a greater cou leu r locale but this almost backfired since the PNA 
tried to shut down Tamkeen in the early months of its existence.389
In the case of Tamkeen, the implementing partner is Chemonics International, based in 
Washington since 1975 and active in 50 different countries.390 The implementing partner of 
Maiam is a sub-branch of the multinational IBM, namely IBM Global Services.391 More will 
said on this outsourcing approach at the end o f this chapter.
g ) L ate  com ers (2001-2004): H um an itarian  a ss is tan ce  
It took almost two years after the outbreak o f the Intifada  to witness the arrival of a new type 
of international donors and actors: that o f humanitarian assistance. In the first year and a half, 
NGOs already established adopted emergency measures and programmes. But with more 
ECHO funding and other emergency funding available after the 2002 massive destruction of 
Palestinian infrastructures by Israeli troops, new organizations arrived around 2003. For 
example, the French Prem iere Urgence started its activities in  the second half of 2002, but as an 
implementing organization (not in partnership with local ONGs) in  the field o f food security. 
The same applies for new comers, such as the Spanish A jccion contra e l Hambre (since mid-2002 
in food security), and the Canadian M édecins du  M onde active only for a short period in  the 
Territories.
It should be stressed here that humanitarian intervention tends not to take place w ith local 
partners, but emergency NGOs act directly as implementing actors. The case of Merlin- 
Health in Crisis who works with two local health NGOs, is probably an exception, but its 
strong partnership dimension is due to the fact that another British health organization 
(MAP-UK) worked as a guiding and intermediary agent between the two.392
348 This seems to be a general USAID policy. The local civil society Officer seemed to regret this state of affairs. 
Interview with Martha MEYERS, Civil Society Project Manager, USAID, East Jerusalem, 11.022003.
389 Tamkeen* means ‘empowerment* and ‘Maram’ means ‘positive efforts’, ‘endeavour*. The fact that they had 
adopted an Arabic name can maybe explain the strong reaction of the (then still) Ministry (now Commission) for 
NGO Affairs in June 2001. At that time, the Ministry threatened to shut down TAMKEEN because it felt 
exduded from the decision process of who would gets funding among Palestinian NGOs. On that affair, see 
(Biown N. 2003:253 n. 29).
390 See more on http://www.chemonics.com.
391 See http://www.maram.info/ and http://www.usaid.gov/wbg/partners.htm.
392 See interview with Nathalie HOGG, Project Coordinator, MERLIN -  Health in Crisis, Ramallah, 10-022003.
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h) Short overview : w hat do they give, since w hen, and how?
The following table gives a short overview of the type of the 37 international donor 
organizations interviewed.393
Table 12: Type o f donors, years o f work in the OPT and average budget











Avr. Budget for 
NGOs
Solidarity 6 1962 1979 1989 10 $1,875,000
Faith-Based 4 1966 1980 1984 26 $3,625,000
Development 7 1972 1985 1987 28 $4,242,857
Governmental 11 1964 1989 1995 30 $4,775,000
Political 5 1971 1991 1995 4 $210,000
Multilateral 2 1979 1989 1989 105 $8,750,000
Quango 2 2000 2000 2000 43 $7,000,000
As we can see, solidarity and faith-based organizations have longer experience in funding w ith 
Palestinian NGOs since the two categories have been active since approximately 1979 and 
1980. At the opposite end, governmental and political donor organizations became actively 
and personally involved in the territories only with the establishment of the PNA and the 
Oslo negotiations, these being the vital precondition for the establishment of a representative 
office in Palestine.394
In terms of spending besides the much larger contribution of the two GINGOs and o f the 
multilateral donors (UNDP and EU’s contribution through ECHO), governmental donor 
agencies give NGOs an average of $4.7m per year,395 an amount very dose to that of the large 
professional developmentalist organizations. In this latter category, the increase in CARE 
International’s budget over the last six years is very impressive: from $800,000 o f aid 
dedicated to Palestinian NGOs in 1998, its 2000 budget rose to $1.4m to $4tn in 2001, $6m in 
2002, finally skyrocketing towards an incredible $ 15.5m396 in 2003. This single contribution 
made by CARE for 2003 is much larger than most individual bilateral governmental 
contributions to NGOs.
393 Information taken out o f my interviews.
394 Israel gave lots of trouble to countries establishing a representative office to the Palestinian Authority in East 
Jerusalem. Many were operating before the Declaration of Principles through their Israeli embassy.
395 'I'he sums are calculated on the basis o f the information collected during my interviews. These sums are 
indicative only. The amounts are an average of different fiscal years, with some indication for 2002 and for other 
organizations from the year 2003. Nevertheless, it should give a sense of the proportion of each donors’ 
contribution.
All contributions were converted in US dollars, with a conversion rate taken at the time of the interviews.
396 Interview with Earl WALL, Country Director, CARE International, Beit Hanina, 17.02.2003. The number of 
its staff has increased by 35 units because o f the second Intifada and 75% of the 2003 budget was dedicated to 
emergency, the rest being devoted to development funding.
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Faith-based organizations do not lag very far behind in terms o f  annual contributions, w ith an 
average o f $3.6m followed by solidarity donors ($1.9m a year). Political organizations make a 
much modest contribution (around $0.2m a year), but it m ust be stated that they fund other 
types o f organizations and projects, mostly smaller NGOs and specific research projects, thus 
requiring less funding than for large service-providing activities.
The previous table gives only a short overview, a snapshot one could say, of what donors give
and since when. Obviously the work of organizations based in  Palestine for a long time has
changed over the years. Here is an example o f the evolution o f international donors* work:
Terre des Hommes [TdH] came to Palestine in 1973. It came to deal with cases having to do with 
malnutrition. [...] Then it changed with a new programme in Gaza Strip. In 1984, it opened its 
first nutritional project in Gaza. Unlike in the West Bank, it was a day-care centre. The services 
were provided in a centre in Gaza Gty. Then they moved to the south because of the need So 
another project as a branch of the Gaza project started in Khan Younis.
In the 1990s Terre des Hommes started its developmental approach: a total review of the work was 
done. That is when I started working with TdH. They sent people from Switzerland to do some 
evaluations and recommendations. The centre-based project in Bethlehem was closed and it was 
decided to move to the community where most of the beneficiaries were. So we started a new 
project in Hebron in 1994. At the same time we began a totally new approach to address 
nutrition problems: we spoke more about nutrition than malnutrition; we also spoke more 
about community awareness to raise the level of education of the community. We focused less 
on curative services and did more towards providing preventive services. [...] This was also the 
time where we started the localization process where two of our office where gradually turned 
into autonomous local entities with NGO status.397
Similarly, the work o f  other NGOs such as CARE (active since 1948), Oxfam GB (1950) and 
Catholic Relief Services (1961) have also evolved tremendously over the decades, and it is 
only recently with more funding available to northern NGOs o f  this type, that they axe doing 
more ‘professional developmentalist* work.398
The 37 international donor organizations interviewed belong probably to the m ost active 
ones in the field o f  advocacy and health support399 Interviews were done in the early months 
of 2003 and 2004, at a time of deep humanitarian crisis throughout the territories. This might 
explain why, according to information gathered during my interviews, there has been a 
spectacular increase o f funding to Palestinian NGOs. O f the 37 organizations (probably a 
third, or a fourth o f all NGO donors400) I have interviewed, I reached the approximate total
357 Interview with Khalil MAROUF, Director, Terre des Homines, Ar-Ram, 19.02.2003.
398 This is also why the categories we suggested before are not fixed but rather fluid and changing over time.
399 For a description o f how the sample o f international donors was built, see Section 1.4.
400 According to our own database on donors, our sample represents roughly a quarter of international donors. 
Here is a short overview of the geographical provenance of the larger database on international donors (for a 
total of 172 donors).
Origin of donors Number % o f total Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
North Am erica 39 22.7 23.8 23.8
Europe 102 59.3 62.2 86.0
Multilateral 18 10.5 11.0 97.0
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amount of funding disbursed for NGOs of $160m. The figure seems almost too high to be 
believed, knowing that there are many other large international donor organizations I have 
not contacted because they are active in fields unrelated to health and advocacy.
The figure should probably be reduced by 25% because of the possibility that certain funds 
were counted twice (e.g. from DflD sources and then again in  Oxfam GB). However, 
unfortunately, it is almost impossible to calculate the figures more precisely. Even taking 25% 
off the total estimate, we are left with 3125m a year for Palestinian NGOs. Out of this, again 
one has to deduct administrative costs for funding organizations. So it is probably realistic to 
estimate that $100m was given in 2002 and in 2003 for Palestinian NGOs active exclusively in 
the field o f health and advocacy. These two fields of activities represent, according to our 
general database of 900 Palestinian NGOs, about 20% of all NGO sectors. Other vital 
sectors such as agriculture, education and women’s support are also likely to have attracted 
many millions of dollars of aid over the last three or four years.401 By extrapolating from the 
interviews, the total amount of external aid to Palestinian NGOs could reach an amount as 
high as $300 to $400m a year. This represents the current overall yearly average of 
international aid to Palestine for the Oslo years, but including multilateral aid and aid to the 
PNA.
A t this point and thanks to the information so far gathered, it is certainly correct to state that 
Palestinian NGOs have again become major and very important actors in providing vital 
resources and knowledge to their constituency. Similarly, the role of donors in such a 
situation can only increase due to the massive budget allocated to Palestinian NGOs.
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5.4.2. How do they work?
We need now to look at how these international donors work and how they go about with 
such large amounts of money. The devil is in the detail, as a popular maxim says. W e will 
dwell on some o f these details to understand some o f the mechanisms that preside over the 
distribution o f  funding. Moreover foreign involvement in attempts to solve the Palesrinian- 
Israeli conflict is locally perceived as very important and a lot of resentment is felt and 
expressed by the local population. Therefore anything than could be interpreted as a form of 
external control is very quickly over-interpreted by locals. And as we will see, many o f the 
donor mechanisms are far from clear and transparent
a) Implementing organizations or partnership with Palestinian NGOs?
For most organizations ‘giving aid* by sending international experts and expatriates who then 
do most o f the work is, fortunately, a practice o f the p ast Instead, along with the creation o f 
a dogma o f ‘sustainable development’, a larger share o f  participation has been granted to 
southern NGOs (as stressed in  the third and fourth types o f NGOs presented above 
(Senisolla 1999: 92-94)). There are now many cases o f  real partnership between northern 
donors and local NGOs. There is even an interesting case where partnership is reversed, since 
it is a Palestinian advocacy NGO that provides the training (the jargon would say ‘capacity 
building’) to northern NGOs.402 But this is a notable exception rather than the norm.
Most o f the northern NGOs working in  Palestine work in partnership with local ones, and 
foreign governments rely either on local or northern NGOs to implement their projects. The 
humanitarian and emergency sector is probably the only one where partnership, at least in a 
first phase, seems not to have been totally internalized. Similarly, ECHO still requires projects 
to be submitted and implemented by northern NGOs, in partnership with Palestinian 
institutions or not: Palestinian NGOs cannot therefore apply on their own to ECHO 
projects. This sometimes leads to clashes about the agenda while implementing projects in 
tandem, or it  can lead to a mere token presence of a Palestinian NGO in the implementation 
process.403 As stressed by some Palestinian NGO activists, this way of doing things is often 
perceived locally as a form of non-trust towards local capacities; doubts are therefore put 
forward by Palestinians as to what kind o f  sustainable development this model can lead to.404
402 This is the case o f the MATTTN group, specialized in International Humanitarian Law and monitoring of, 
a.o., Israeli violations o f trade regulations with the EU. See interview with Salwa DUAIBIS and Susan 
ROCKWELL, Partners, MATTTN group, Ramallah, 17.02.2003.
403 The other way is also possible. In one case, a European NGO regretted that the project could not be totally 
implemented by their local partner but that they had instead to spend some o f the budget to pay for the salary of 
an international staff doing anyway little for the implementation o f the project itself. Interview in February 2004.
404 Interview with Jack  KHANO, External Relations Director, Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, 
Beit Hanina, January 2003.
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In conclusion, despite the fact that ‘partnership* is on the lips o f everybody (and more 
importantly provides a door to accessing international funding), it does not mean that it 
automatically occurs. It is safe to say that at this point most o f the implementation is carried 
out by Palestinian actors, but the decision process (and strategy planning) still belongs largely 
to external donors. Which is not unproblematic,
b) A  true multilateralism?
A large amount o f  international monies earmarked for Palestine is channelled through 
multilateral instances. A large part of all funding to Palestine is dedicated to UNRWA, as a 
UN multilateral agency specialized in providing basic services to Palestinian refugees (in the 
Territories and neighbouring countries). As for the other UN agencies, there are two 
newcomers with the second Intifada (OCHA and the WFP), but neither of them are donor 
agencies strictly speaking. The first is a coordinating platform for international organizations 
and the second implements most of its food distribution on its own.405
Two multilateral organizations do actually make funding available to Palestinian NGOs. The 
oldest one is UNDP, which channels and controls a yearly budget o f $60m. The vast majority 
is dedicated to the building of infrastructures and to the payment of the salaries the UNV 
(UN-volunteers) scheme. A ma-rimum o f 5% goes to NGOs and civil society programmes. 
The Palestinian office of UNDP used to be mainly funded by the Japanese government until 
the beginning o f the Intifada. The origin o f UNDP’s civil society funding now comes mostly 
from the USA.406 A  deeper scrutiny of the programmes funded stresses that most o f the 
UNDP money goes to an already well favoured club o f NGOs: MIFTAH (of Dr, Hanan 
ASHRAWI), BIS AN Centre of Izzat Abdel Hadi, and AMAN (a coalition of different NGOs 
of which MIFTAH).
The second large multilateral organization giving funds to local NGOs is the World Bank 
formally involved in the Territories since 1993.407 Since there is no sovereign Palestinian state, 
the World Bank works in the Territories through the so-called ‘Trust Fund for Gaza and 
West Bank’. In ten years, an overall $460mio has been allocated to the Territories,408 o f which 
only ca $15mio were granted to the two successive Palestinian NGO Projects (not to confuse 
with PINGO a network o f local NGOs). Phase I of the Project ran from 1997 until 2001 and
405 The WFP does actually mobilize local NGOs for food distribution, and has initiated governance programs 
tied with food distribution. See Abu-Sada 2005b.
406 Interview with Munir KLEIBO, Governance Programme Analyst at UNDP, Jerusalem, 19.02.04
407 For more on the origin and history of the World Bank in the Territories, see
http: //lnwebl 8-woridbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/0/ CAC30AD46403EE2D 85256943004A4C3 5?OpenDocument




the World Bank provided about 10mio$ out of the total $15.5mio spent (Sullivan 2001: 22); 
die Phase II (2001-2004) included a contribution o f  $8mio of the World Bank. Other 
contributors, such as the Italian, Saudi and British government, completed the funding in 
both cases. The management o f  the PNGO trust was awarded in 1997 to the Welfare 
consortium (see Sullivan 2001: 24ff).
One o f the problematic aspects of the PNGO Project (we w ill also deal with that in the 
following paragraphs) is that Italian funds dedicated to this multilateral PNGO Project must 
be spent mainly in  partnership w ith Italian NGOs. There do not seem to be any similar forms 
of tied funding o r national preferences in  the case of Saudi Arabia, but such a practice sheds a 
different light on multilateral funding which is therefore rather bilateral (or nationally 
preferential) with a mere multilateral outlook. As the case of UNDP proves it, multilateralism 
does not exclude a  very strict form of selectivity,
c ) T ied  fund ing
A similar problem arises in the cases o f  so-called ‘tied funding* which demonstrates that 
though funding is earmarked for Palestine, part o f it w ill actually remain either directly in  the 
hands or under direct control o f  a given donor. There are a few cases of direct and openly 
tied funding to one specific national origin. Two main examples might reveal the reasons for 
such practices.
The first case is that of USAID funding, which involves giving large amounts o f aid to 
NGOs. For example, the Tamkeen project (‘Empowerment o f  Civil Society5) was originally 
endowed with $33m for a five-year period. However, only half ($16m) will be given direcdy in 
the form o f grants to NGOs; another $8m is earmarked for ‘capacity building* and 
‘institutional strengthening*. The final S9m w ill go to the ‘machinery*, as this was described by 
USAID Civil Society Director, namely administrative costs for Chemonics International 
(based in Washington) and for Tamkeen own administrative costs (25 staff). Though the head 
of USAID Civil Society excuses the large amount o f money remaining in US hands, she is 
keen to stress that most o f Tamkeen staff are Palestinians. However, she omits to say that 
most o f the computers, vehicles and furniture paid for by the grants must be of American 
origin. At the end o f the day, probably much more than $9m w ill remain in the USA. This 
technique is probably a way to ensure that the American legislator votes in favour o f such 
massive USAID credits to ‘foreign aid*.
The second case o f tied funding is the Italian contribution to the PNGO Project, a Worid 
Bank project to support Palestinian NGOs which is managed by the Welfare Consortium. In 
order to apply successfully to the project, the local NGO wanting to take Italian funding must
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apply in partnership with an Italian NGO. This is most probably due to the fact that direct 
funding to Italian NGOs through their central government is scarce. Thus, the Italian 
government makes sure that its money w ill benefit their national NGOs.409 The problem, in 
the end, is that there are not so many Italian NGOs active in the field and peripheral smaller 
NGOs lack the direct contact and access to these capable of securing funding from the 
PNGO Project This was stressed by a village-based charitable NGO in the Hebron district. 
The Tarqumia Charitable Society board member I interviewed was keen to underline this 
unequal access to international NGOs. W hen asked if they applied to the Welfare Association 
Trust Fund, he replied:
“Yes, o f  course, i t  is a dream fo r us [to ge t such funding). But all [international] associations are 
in Ramallah! I t is easier for them  to be all in  Jerusalem, to circulate. It is easier and more open in 
Jerusalem  and Ramallah. [ . . .]
You can apply to Ta’an>oun [W elfare consortium that manages the grant] but under one 
condition: to b ring  in a partnership. B u t you have only two [Italian partnership! organisations 
here in the d istrict. So they can 't supervise all these activities. A ll subm itted a proposal but you 
need a partnership. They have the m oney, the funds, but there are difficulties for us in finding 
the partners”410
Therefore the problem of tied funding is twofold: on the one hand, it gives the wrong 
impression that large amounts o f  funding are made available for Palestinian development 
whereas, in fact, this funding remains in Washington; on the other hand, it limits the 
flexibility for funding to reach each single part of the Territories. In both cases, the result is a 
biased formed o f international aid, and in  particular in  the first instance, it means that 
strategic decision-making is not taken in accordance with local needs. According to Nakhleh, 
the problem does not only lie in the amount of tied funding but with the type o f projects put 
forward by certain donors, and — in particular — USAID. In his words, “it is amply dear that 
US assistance is tied to nurturing Palestinian acceptance of a US ‘negotiated solution*, and 
that the improvement of the Palestinian quality of life under occupation is nothing more than 
an acceptable camouflage for the imposition of US-initiated solutions** (Nakhleh 1989: 118). 
So tied funding would be also about a form of conditionality linked to the support of certain 
preferred approaches to the peace negotiations.
5.4.3. Funding mechanisms
The way that aid is actually also show us how such indirect steering o f the work o f NGOs can 
take place. I will therefore now look at mechanisms of project or core funding and then at 
issues of consortium and contracting.
409 P erse there is nothing reprehensible in such a practice: it is just a matter so far o f how the lines of credits are 
put forward by the Famesina back in Rome.
4,0 Interview with ‘Izzo Al-GHRAYIB, Head of Administrative Board, Tarqumia Charitable Society, Tarqumiya, 
10.02.04.
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a) P ro ject and program m e fund ing
Most o f the funding is provided through pro ject funding. This means that money is not used 
for the general administrative costs o f the NGO, but will go towards financing the activity 
suggested and paying some staff to directly (and in theory uniquely) implementing the activity 
proposed in agreement between the two parties (donors and implementing NGOs). One key 
feature o f the project (as opposed to the programme) is the short-term scope o f  funding. 
Most o f the projects are usually one year long, which is the timeframe set by the constraints 
o f fiscal budgeting. Some projects are even shorter than that, with projects of six or nine 
months in the case of ECHO).
It is not rare to hear complaints from local NGOs that credit lines m ust be spent within the 
time frame o f the project, although not all of the money has been used according to the 
planed budget I f  many NGOs end up with strong and bad consumenst habits (new furniture 
and Xerox machines, computers and in some cases — that is in  very large NGOs — vehicles), it 
is partly due to such budgetary constraints where money must be spent before the end o f the 
project
Only in the case of programmes can local NGOs develop a longer-term approach. Programmes 
usually run over two or three years and allow for a more systematic development o f the 
NGOs* activities. Some international donors are now considering offering longer-term 
funding, up to five years, according to a Scandinavian donor.411 This obviously requires a 
different planning of activities, but would give NGOs a better chance to achieve their stated 
goals, especially in a sector like health and advocacy where it would be unrealistic to expect 
changes in  terms o f better health planning and larger popular participation to take place 
overnight
While all 37 interviewed donors declared that they offer project funding, only 18 of them give 
programme funding. Some Palestinian NGOs lamented an indirect and perverse effect of 
project funding: that o f fashions in projects at the expense of long-term needs. A  small health 
organization specialized in breast cancer screening complained that project funding usually 
offered by donors is “too short-lived” and that this leads to the mentality of “the flavour of 
the year”, whereby one donor might “decide now to focus on that aspect” and then change 
its priorities the year after.412
411 Interview with Hind KHOUR.Y, Program Advisor, NORAD, Jerusalem, 01.03.2004. To be fair to other 
donors this was the last interview I conducted and the agenda of international donors, when compared to the 
dates of the first interviews, in early February 2003, had tremendously evolved after the LAW corruption 
scandal, where 40% o f international funding disappeared form the official account o f the largest Palestinian 
human rights NGOs named LAW. More on the LAW affair in the paragraph c) on Consortium.
412 Interview with Carole JA ’BARI, Director of the Patients Friends Society Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 21.02.04.
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In order not to put all the blame on the shoulders of donors, it must be clearly stated that
donors also feel the dangers o f project funding. One small international donor actually
condemned the attitude of Palestinian NGOs as more prone to surf on the waves of
fashionable topics, the latest trend being the rule of law:
"Every day there is a new NGO wanting to work on the rule of law. Rule of law is one of our 
main topics, many NGOs [concentrate] on that, but there is no [underlying] concept behind 
[this topic]. It is only [a] project here, or [a] project there. That is why I prefer to work with the 
PLC and work with the [PLC] committees directly”413
But a counter-example taken from a Palestinian NGO, which felt that donors have in recent
years tried to steer the work of advocacy NGOs away from certain hot political issues brings
us back to the vexata quaestio o f what provokes what in the first place. In this case, the
Palestinian NGO feels that donors are reluctant to hind certain types of advocacy campaigns.
One local NGO director wondered rather cynically whether it would not be easier:
“to get around that [problem] by creating some silly programmes to feed the serious 
programmes [that donors do not want to fund].
Uke what?
Ya’ni, like having something about... humm... non-sense workshops here and there, you know. 
Through that, maybe, you can sustain other programmes by providing enough funding. It will 
be easier for you to get support for silly programmes.
I know so many publications [done by advocacy NGOs] that pollute this environment without 
being discussed or even read by [anybody]. It is easier to get funding on that. Easier to dose the 
project drdes. All these nice workshops in hotels, here and there, maybe I don’t want to 
generalize, it is much more than that In the centre here, when we start the week, we have so 
many  invitations. If we’d go we would not work! Just going to workshops!414
Strange situation where a voluntary goal displacement must take place to ensure the
sustainability of a local NGO.
b) Core funding
I f  project funding can symbolize the end of a continuum with programme funding 
occuppying a point somehow in the middle, core funding would be at the other end. Core 
funding implies that allocated funding by a donor can be used freely for any type o f legitimate 
expenses o f the NGOs. This means that part o f (or all of) the core funding can be used to 
pay for electricity bills, furniture, staff salaries, as well as for its programme activities. Project 
funding limits the space o f allocation o f funding, while core funding gives a free reign over 
financial resources.
From the interviews, it is to be observed that 11 international donors (out o f 37) declared that 
they give core funding to their local partners, while 7 others would give (in very exceptional 
cases) small amounts for core funding. The rest (19) offer only project or programme
413 Interview with Dr. Canaan ALTIGAN, Resident Representative, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Ramallah, 
21.02.03.
414 Interview with Issam ‘AROURI, General Manager, Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.02.04.
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funding. On the Palestinian side, ten interviewed NGOs acknowledged receiving regular core 
funding and six others to have some core funding under the form of small contributions of 
individuals and/or solidarity groups. The vast majority (36) declared not having any type of 
core funding at a ll
Some Palestinian NGOs seem reluctant to accept core funding, fearing that it would in  the 
long-term bind their activities to the w ill o f the donor.415 Interestingly, there are some 
northern European countries that are now introducing core-funding elements in their budget 
line (Holland, Sweden, Switzerland), while others have already done so for many years 
(Christian Aid, SIDA, Konrad Adenauer and Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Diakonia). Often this is 
linked to the creation of a donor consortium,
c) Consortium
A donor consortium is a structure through which a group o f  Tike-minded’416 donors 
temporarily put their financial resources together to provide multi-year funding to Palestinian 
NGOs, considerably reducing the financial and narrative reporting requirements. This usually 
applies to NGOs having a good working capacity and large enough to handle very large 
funding schemes.417
The trend to create consortia is now spreading quickly. This is paidy due to the bad 
experience encountered during the corruption scandal o f the largest human rights NGOs in 
the Territories (LAW). For many years, LAW  benefited from double (in some cases triple) 
funding from international donors for the same programmes. Thus it  is estimated that 40% of 
the funds granted from 1997 until 2002 were unsupported, and that the donors’ monies were 
used to buy a local radio station and to provide help to a money exchanger in Ramallah.418 
When the scandal broke out, donors decided to give out essential information about where 
their money was going amongst themselves, in order to avoid such problems. The other 
consequence is that a group of Tike-minded* governmental donors learnt from that lesson and 
decided to provided longer-term funding through consortia but only after the local NGOs 
have made a proper sector-wide and deep assessment report on the need o f new 
programmes.
415 This is for example the opinion of Rita GIACAMAN, Bir Zeit Public Health Department, Ramallah, 25.02.04
416 A very frequent topic now on the lips o f some government funding bodies.
417 Indeed the five organizations declaring having a consortium are MIFTAH, Gaza Community Mental Health 
Project, UPMRC, MEZAN, and the PICCR, all very robust NGOs. Two other ones were likely to join the small 
club: the AMAN Coalition for Transparency and Accountability and the Democracy and Workers Right Centre. 
These last two elements would not negate the hypothesis that this consortium requires only already very well 
established and respected NGOs.
41* See Haaretz 2003. Information also from Hind KHOURY, Programme Advisor, NORAD, Jerusalem, 
01.03.2004.
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Other cases o f consortium existed w ell before the LAW scandal and this does not 
automatically mean that donors are governmental ones. In a case o f a consortium that existed 
well before the outbreak of the LAW  scandal, a group of non-governmental organizations put 
their means together to support one of the largest health NGO.419
d) Grant, contracts and  loans
Different types of legal binding agreements exist between a donor and a local NGO. The 
most common is a grant, whereby a memorandum of understanding is signed between the 
two parts describing projects to be implemented and the time-frame in which funds w ill be 
disbursed (by the donor) and spent by the NGO. Money does not have to be paid back by 
the NGOs. In the case of loans, funds are made temporarily available to an NGO which w ill 
have to pay back for all (or part) o f the total amount One problem arising with the grant is its 
limited time frame which implies a lack o f flexibility and the capacity to foresee well in 
advance what the financial needs ahead w ill be.
If grants are at one end of the spectrum of types of agreement between donors and NGOs,
the other end consists o f contracts. In a nutshell, contracts are very restrictive for implementing
NGOs. Terms and conditions are carefully defined in a contract and the NGO has no
freedom to change parts of the implementation (or the people implementing it). For a grant,
what matters is the programme with its overall objectives. The way that the NGO
implements the latter is of less importance for the donor. In-between there is the cooperative
agreem ent; which is a grant to an organization with some space of freedom for the NGOs. This
three-way distinction is mostly applied by USAID beneficiaries. The description given by
USAID civil society director is eloquent in  terms of space of freedom left to local actors:
‘W e  have three mechanisms. O ne is the contract (which is h igh ly restrictive). W e define the 
service and w e m ake sure the service is  provided. Second, there is the grant w here we tell the 
NGO: "This is the programm e, ju st let me know w hen you do it and how” . Finally, the 
cooperative agreem ent is som ehow in-between. We buy the organisation’s programme bu t we 
don’t tell them: ‘W e  want you to do this and this!” A t the sam e time, we have substantial 
involvem ent Substantial involvem ent means clearance on the key personal, reporting 
requirements, certain aspects o f  their programm es, etc.”420
The reason behind these very restrictive conditions is linked to the question o f support to
armed groups in the Territories. To make sure that no US tax payers* money goes to what the
State Department has defined as terrorist organizations, Palestinian NGOs must sign a waiver
stating that funding w ill not go to support terrorist infrastructures and that their services will
419 This is notably the case of UPMRC, who had a consortium a few NGOs (mostly) giving multi-year funding 
to the health organisation. Interview with Jack KHANO, External Relation Director, UPMRC, January 2003.
420 Interview with Martha MYERS, Civil Society Project Manager, USAID, East Jerusalem, 11.02.2003.
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not benefit ‘terrorist individuals or organizations’.421 Thus, all projects submitted to USAID 
funding are controlled and vetted by US officials. Project details include not only the type and 
location o f  activities, but also details o f  all the personnel involved. USAID can then vet the 
whole organization or the participation o f certain Palestinian individuals.
Therefore, the various types o f contracts provide an escape for not signing the waiver. By 
having a contract, this gives more legal guarantees to USAID that money will not be misused. 
This is a purely American technical question (so far). The interview with the other American 
quasi-govemmental organization, Maram (active in the field o f health), also stressed this legal 
technique to avoid signing the waiver. They sign 50% of grants and 50% o f contracts. As 
Maram’s director put it blundy:
“Our way to deal with the anti-terrorism waiver required by USAID is to split between grants 
and contracts. In our cases, we have an approximate 50-50 percentage of both. To put it 
simply: the advantage of the contract is that they do what n>e want In grants, they do what they 
w ant”422
This can be interpreted simply as a way to bypass the very difficult question o f signing or not 
USAID’s waiver about terrorism. But, from the point o f view of donors as regards whether 
they feel they can chose whatever programmes and partners suit them, it gives a sense o f the 
potential lack o f freedom left to Palestinian partners. Were US funding a tiny and scant 
proportion o f international aid, the issue would not be that im portant But USAID is by far 
one of the largest single donors in the region with regard to civil society projects and dozens 
of local and international NGOs depend on its funds, therefore rendering its way to ‘do 
development’ very influential for many years to come. This, again, gives a sense o f how little 
space for manoeuvre the local NGOs have.
5.4.4. Coordination Mechanisms
A final question about the way international donors deal with civil society promotion is that 
of their voluntary and coordinated interactions. There are broadly three levels of 
coordination.
a) Inter-governmental coordination mechanisms
There are literally dozens of coordination mechanisms coexisting in the Palestinian territories 
that involve mostly governmental and multilateral organizations. The most central ones are 
the Ad- Hoc Liaison Committee (major donors in general), the Local Aid Coordination 
Committee (local donors and PNA), the Joint Liaison Committee (PNA, Israel and major
421 The formulation about what consists o f ‘terrorism’ and who should not benefit from services was so loose 
and ambiguous that Palestinian NGOs refused to sign die waiver in the first months of its introduction.
422 Interview with Dr. Umaayeh KHAMMASH, Director, MARAM IBM-Global Services, al-Bireh, 25.02.2004.
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donors) and the various Sector Working Groups423 (PNA, local NGOs along UN agencies 
and international donors). Most of these coordination mechanisms (established in 1993 and 
1994) either collapsed (because Israel refused to join the JLC), or could not work properly 
since the PNA itself was in many points of the Intifada on the verge of collapsing.424 
The central worthwhile aspect underlining this issue is that the Secretariat, or executive body 
of the main international coordination mechanisms (LACC and AHLC) are controlled mosdy 
by Norway, the World Bank and the UN Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories 
(UNSCO). UNSCO itself is in a very uncomfortable situation since it has a very deep 
knowledge o f  the Palestinian problems but is politically tied to higher interests. Some 
international donors see that silent subordination manifested in  the indirect control o f  
OCHA, which should, in moments o f humanitarian crises such as those of 2002 and 2003, 
take the lead and coordinate with other UN agencies. It was not capable of doing so for the 
simple reason that it was the last UN organization to arrive in the Territories and that it was 
under the order of UNSCO.425
In other words, some of these mechanisms are not there to coordinate and enhance 
international work towards aid and development, but rather to con trol and steer it on certain 
topics only. A  deep sense of frustration was expressed by many governmental bodies during 
my interviews, where people would think that coordination is “fake”, “as bad as that o f the 
Palestinian egomaniac NGOs”, or at best “totally useless”.426
b) International NGOs coordination mechanisms (AIDA) >
The second level of coordination consists o f international NGOs assembled in the so-called 
Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA). They are mostly non­
governmental organizations meeting monthly in the plenary session taking place in Jerusalem, 
with a certain number o f sub-committees. AIDA counts about 50 members and has been 
until the Intifada serving more as a platform for exchanging information than purposing real 
coordination amongst donors.427.
If it coordinates in some way, it is probably because some Palestinian NGOs actually assist in 
these monthly meetings and/or are asked to provide some feed back or talks about current 
problems in  the territories. One of the most active types o f Palestinian NGOs taking
423 There are 15 Sector Working Groups gathered around four main themes: Infrastructures, Economy, Social 
Sector and Institutional Building. See (Mokoro 2003:39). For a full list of the topics, see (PASSIA 2003: 315).
424 For more background information on these mechanisms and an analysis of them, see (Le More 2004). I am
thankful to Anne Le Mote for sharing with me her deep knowledge in understanding such complex 
mechanisms. ...........
425 Interviews with several international donors who preferred to remain anonymous.
426 Quotes are actually taken from interviews with donors.
427 I followed many of their reunions in 2001 and 2003.
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advantage o f AIDA’s meeting in  order to network with international donors has been the 
Palestinian NGO Network (PINGO), a 100-professional NGO strong coalition. It is striking 
that there was never an invitation sent to other NGO platforms, such as the Union of 
Charitable Societies, or to some o f its individual members.
A second problem in the selectivity o f the Palestinian partner is the fact that it almost always 
meets in East Jerusalem, making it  very difficult for West Bankers (needless to say impossible 
for Gazans) to reach. Two international members of AIDA actually vehemently complained 
about this over-concentration on the W est Bank and on Jerusalem  in particular.428
c) P a lestin ian  coordination w ith  in ternational actors a t  the local level 
A positive change towards a better general interaction between Palestinian NGOs and donors 
took place during the second Intifada  w ith the setting o f dozens of local emergency 
committees. In most largely populated areas, local authority, NGOs and charities sat together 
and created local cells to coordinate the most important services to the population (health, 
water, electricity, food). It is difficult to assess if  in the long run this will improve local 
governance and a better interaction between PNA and non-state actors. One certainty is that 
each single govemorate and the city o f the W est Bank and the Gaza Strip had to respond to 
an increase segmentalization of life, since hundreds o f  roadblocks impeded freedom of 
circulation forcing local actors to survive with local resources.429
After the terrible scares left over by the Operation Defensive Shield of spring 2002, these 
local committees coordinated on a much better and systematic manner with international 
donors and actors. For example, a full and systematic contingency plan was put up in the 
early months of 2003 because o f the fear that Israel would gear up another massive scale 
intervention in the territory during the USA-led war in Iraq. Eventually no such invasion took 
place, but it remained that some o f these local committees w ere very active in mobilizing 
international actors (and in particular AIDA members)430 in order to define priority areas of 
intervention. It has to be underlined that PINGO was very active in coordinating with 
international donors, reinforcing its strategic alliances with most o f  the donors.
5.5, Donors* Approach to Civil Society — A Typology
This final section w ill offer a typology of the donors’ view  on civil society in general, and 
analyse how they conceive civil society promotion in the Palestinian setting. The analysis is 
based on the interviews made with international donors in  the Palestinian territories and the
428 See interviews with Islamic Relief and Norwegian People’s Aid both based in Gaza City.
429 See in particular Signoles 2002.
430 See PINGO 2003.
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typology is defined through certain key elements of the interviews recoded so as to offer a 
spatially differentiated table on donors’ views o f civil society and Palestinian NGOs.
The idea behind the creation of such typologies or taxonomies is to link with the previous 
warnings made in the chapters dealing with civil society in general (Chapter 2) and with civil 
society in the Arab Middle-Eastern (AME) context (Sections 3 .13  and 3.1.5). The contention 
is that the way discussions about AME civil society are shaped and informed might also have 
an influence upon the world o f donors’ praxis. Put differently, different theoretical 
conceptions, understanding and interpretations of civil society, in  general (Chapter 2) and in 
the Arab Middle East (Chapter 3), could eventually influence the W eltanschauung and praxes o f 
international doors while implementing civil society promotion activities. It is as if  the general 
discussions about civil society in general and in the AME would function as meta-framing, or 
as indirect framing for international donors.431 The purpose of such taxonomies is to assess 
how international donors conceive o f civil society promotion and assess whether there is a 
link with previous theoretical discussions about the possibility for civil society to arise in the 
AME.
It is the backbone argument of this thesis that for concrete civil society promotion to have a i
positive effect towards the creation of spaces of democratic participation and the definition 
o f collective autonomous projects (Section 2.5.), it needs:
• To insist on the varieties of form and content o f civil society (rather than mere 
numbers of specialized NGOs);
• To instil a real participatory element in the activities promoted as much as possible.
The more ‘bottom up’, the better; |
• To take the evolution of the forms and contents o f civil society into consideration;
• To discuss and realize the potential risks of civil society promotion.432 !
These general considerations (providing the horizontal axis - for a full list of the variables, see
Appendix II) are backed off by previous general discussions and conclusions reached in  the 
thesis. In particular, it was shown in Section 2.1 that civil society is a supple and evolving 
concept and that some o f its thematic priorities are contingent upon the historical situation in 
which the concept is defined and used. Section 2.2 (democratization) warned the reader about 
simplistic expectations that few NGOs (and in particular advocacy NGOs) can suffice to 
reach a democratic condition, and that economic development is not sufficient to reach ■
4311 draw here the understanding o f  ‘framing* from  the social m ovem ent literature , w hereby fram ing is i|
understood, simply, as “a  schem ata o f in terpretation” (Benford 1987: 23 ). See a lso  (Tarrow 1998:109-114). T h e  !
taxonom y is by no m eans an  attem pt to understand w hat makes social m ovem ent w ork.
432 These elem ents are addressed by  the variab les 1-6 listed  and described in  A ppend ix  II. ,
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democracy. Similarly, civil society should not be automatically considered benevolent Section 
2.3 (IR literature) stressed the variety of possible approaches but also some o f the 
shortcomings when dealing with civil society promotion in a transcultural context. Section 2.4 
highlighted the limits o f certain developmentalist dogmas (and the institutional conditions 
that favour their diffusion); instead, it insisted on the needs to build realistic organizational 
capacities o f ‘southern’ NGOs and to focus on the local conditions in which civil society 
promotion takes place.
On the second level of differentiation, namely civil society promotion in the Palestinian 
context (providing the vertical axis),433 it has been argued that for civil society promotion to 
have a positive effect in Palestine, it needs:
• To insist on the social diversity (in terms of resources, population, education, access 
to labour market, movements, etc.) within the Palestinian territories;
•  To insist on the diversity of civil society organisations active in the Territories 
(working through smaller projects with a variety of local organisations, instead of 
working only with very large projects and mammoth local NGOs);
• To grant real space of decisions and partnership for local actors to define both the 
content and modalities of projects implemented;
• To give a chance for long-term funding in order to avoid frequent unrealistic 
objectives and changes due to fashions;
• To increase the chance for local actors to set priorities, even more so in cases of 
hardship and heightened conflict;
•  Priority should be as much as possible that of the local population, and not that of the 
donor;
•  To pay attention to the symbolic dimensions o f donor-local NGO interaction, and in 
particular how the message and framing of civil society promotion take place.
The considerations about the Palestinian setting are drawn from previous discussions. First 
there is a need to distinguish between the Two Palestines and think the means and contents 
of civil society promotion according to the various local configurations (Section 1.2). Second, 
the description o f Palestinian dvil society in  a historical perspective pointed to the diversity of 
local organisations (such as the charitable organisations) that can potentially benefit from 
international aid (Section 4.2) and to the reflexive knowledge that Palestinian civil society can 
produce. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrated that many Palestinian institutions have the
433 These elem ents are  addressed  by the variab les I-X  listed  and described in A ppendix II.
206
capacities to define their priorities (thanks to the research centres) and the potential means to 
improve collective action in the Territories.
As for the symbolic dimension, Section 2.5. (civil society as a source o f autonomy) 
highlighted the fact that civil society should have the capacity to give and agree on its own 
laws and to do so in  an open manner with regard to language and means. Therefore, it w ill be 
assumed that a variety of local civil society organisations (as long as they respect the 
conditions described in  Section 3.3) should also be granted a space of decisions in  the 
definition of civil society promotion, instead of having an imposition by external actors o f 
certain norms and o f a given vocabulary (as pointed, t.g. in Section 3.2.2).434 
These elements, all discussed in various sections of the thesis, function as a rule o f thumb, or 
as elements to assess how far international donors grant space for local civil society 
institutions as a locus towards democracy and autonomy. They were transformed into a set o f  
questions asked to each donor of the sample. Donors were asked such questions either 
direcdy or unobtrusively, and information was also taken out o f their annual reports, printed 
reports, and/ or web site, for the cases where direct responses were missing. Their answers 
have then been coded into simple index items, separated along two axes, and aggregated 
together to produce the following graphs (for the methodology used, see Appendix II).
The following attempt at creating typologies is also an application o f  the method suggested in 
Chapter 3, whereby the unpacking of ‘civil society’ ought to be done through the 
materialization of two axes of differentiation:
The first axis, horizontal, serves to unpack the constitutive elements and qualities o f 
civil society in general (and o f the place and role o f NGOs in this general approach) 
and
The second, vertical, to unpack some of the Palestinian specificities, contexts and 
difficulties in the work of NGOs and local civil society.
Obviously, in  making  these claims, I invite the reader to consider the following models more 
as heuristical tools to Visualize* very abstract notions, to start making sense out o f individual 
cases, by positioning donors* views in relation to one another.
Let us note from the outset that this is a purely qualitative study o f the data gathered. A 
variety of items were chosen to distinguish amongst donors how they conceive civil society in 
general (horizontal axis) and Palestinian NGOs in particular (vertical axis). Scores were then 
added together in two indexes to produce one single result on the (X) axis and the same was 45
454 W e will com e back on this aspect in Section 6.1 and in  the conclusions, in  particu lar, Section 7.5.4.
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done for the vertical (Y) ordinate.435 Horizontal scoring dealing w ith the overall conception of 
civil society of donors includes elements o f differentiation like multi-layered vs. homogenous, 
changing vs. stable, bottom up vs. top down approach, etc. Vertical axis elements instead deal 
with how local settings are thought to influence or constrain the work of local NGOs. The 
two axes are inspired from the discussions elaborated in  Chapter 3, and are the result of the 
advocated necessity to reflect on the conditions for the possible emergence o f  an AME civil 
society.
The table should be read as follows:
Each dot (which represents a single donor) expresses the relative position of the 
donor’s view on civil society. The horizontal location symbolically expresses the donors’ 
differentiation on civil society in general, and the vertical location, its capacity to 
differentiate NGO support within the Palestinian civil society environment 
- The righ t end o f the horizontal axis indicates a lack  o f  differentiation  within the concept 
o f civil society in  general (symbolized by the minus mark *-*), while the le ft end o f this 
same axis implies a more elaborate an d  differentiated  approach to civil society in general 
(marked with a plus mark *+*).
The vertical axis differentiates the way donors approach aid to NGOs by taking 
various elements o f differentiation o f the local setting of civil society into consideration. 
The top  end o f  the axis means that little consideration w ill be p a id  to loca l specificities and 
potential hurdles on the way to N G O  work in Palestine (symbolized by the minus mark *- 
*),. The bottom end o f the vertical axis means, on the contrary, that more attention is paid 
to local aspects o f  NGO support general (marked with a plus m ark ‘+’).
435 For a thorough descrip tion  o f  the variab les chosen  and the m ethodology underp inning the construction o f  
the following graphs, see A ppendix II.
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Table 13: Spatial differentiation o f  donors' views on (Palestinian) civil society
i
< - Differentiation of views on civil society in general-^
♦ 37 inti donors to P A L --------Linear (37 inti donors to P A L ) !
W e can see, in the first general graph, that donors are widely spread across the space, but that 
they are mostly in two quadrants. The ‘south-western* one is that o f the donors that adopt a 
differentiated view o f both civil society in  general and o f the work and roles of local NGOs in 
the Palestinian context. The second most populated quadrant is the ‘north-eastern* one, 
characterized by a lack of differentiation in  relation to both civil society and the local setting. 
It is quite logical to have such a distribution since differentiation in one paradigm should also 
imply some effects and reflections for the other dimension. Inversely, it is not surprising that 
a  lack of differentiation on one of the two axes will lead to a lack o f reflection to the second 
aspect. A trend line was added to visualize the overall pattern of distribution.436 
A  finer reading of the first graph would lead us to see three cluster zones. The first one in the 
bottom-left comer w ith 6 or 7 donors having both a very differentiated approach to civil 
society and to local NGO work. The second zone is that o f the dozen donors placed close to 
the centre o f the graph. A third cluster o f  about 10 donors is located in the north-eastern
436 It is not m y intention to  do a regression analysis o f  the data, since the aim is no t to  pred ict a certain  form o f  
pattern , but rather to h igh ligh t how donors’ v iew s on  civil society are different. Therefore, I did not judge it 
necessary to explore furtherm ore a possible consistency o f  patterns. T he num ber o f  donors is anyway too lo w  to 
d raw  any statistical conclusions from this m ed ium -n  sam ple. As for 'deviant cases’, the three cases in  the south ­
eastern  quadrant are p robab ly an example o f  v e ry  standard civil society prom otion but run either by  a local s ta ff  
w ith  very good know ledge o f  the Palestin ian setting , therefore adapting 'standard’ projects to local priorities.
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quadrant, characterized by a lack o f differentiation o f both civil society in general and local 
specificities.
In an attempt to put forward explanatory variables, donors were split into two groups. The 
first one is composed of the larger donors (whose annual funding dedicated to local NGOs 
reaches $2m or m ore, and which are represented by a triangle), and a second group o f smaller 
donors (less than $2m a year, symbolized by a shadowed square). Moreover, two trend lines 
were added, in order to make the comparison between the two groups easier.






j A  23 largest donors ■  14 sm aller donors !
Linear (23 largest donors)-------------------------------L in e ar (14 sm aller donors) i
In the first place, despite some overlaps between the two groups, larger donors are mostly in 
the top half o f the quadrant, when not in  the north-eastern quadrant. Most o f the smaller 
donors are instead located in the bottom-left comer, which seems to indicate that smaller 
donors tend to have a more refined approach to civil society support in general, but that they 
are also more conscious of the local settings and possible difficulties that might arise in the 
work of local NGOs. One possible conclusion regarding this ‘sensitivity* about local hurdles 
would probably be that the programmes implemented have a better chance o f succeeding 
since they are better tailored to local needs and specificities. The assumption is that this type 
o f approach would give dvil society promotion activities a better chance of succeeding and 
having a positive impact in the long run.
210
The two trend lines also confirm the differences between the two subgroups. For the largest 
donors, the intercept is almost at the centre o f gravity and the slope is not steep, whereas for 
the smaller donors, the trend line has a much steeper slope. Its intercept also points to a more 
differentiated approach to civil society, reinforcing the potential validity of the size of donors 
as an explaining variable in this model.
A final distinction, regarding the donors* view, was based this time on the geographical origin 
of donors. The first group is composed o f 14 non-European organizations (and represented 
by a diamond), made up of American, Canadian, Australian and multilateral donors. The 
second group (symbolized by a dash in the graph) is made up of 23 European donors. Each 
group has its own trend line.
Table 15: European vs. non-European donors and their views on (Palestinian) civil society
Again, we can clearly see that the two groups are differently located, with European donors 
much more evident in  the bottom half, whereas non-European donors (US, Canadian, 
Australian and multilateral organizations)437 are mostly located in the northern half, indicating 
a lack of consideration towards local specificities, even though they display a good level of 
diversity in terms o f the conception of civil society in general. The difference in the trend line
437 1 have included the W elfare  Consortium  in  the non-European group . E ven i f  it  is a  consortium m ade o f  a 
Swiss-based Palestinian N G O  and two B ritish  organizations, the W orld  Bank actually has the lead  o f  the p ro ject.
211
is here more pronounced, with a steeper slope and much lower intercept point in the case of 
European donors.
So what is it that internally distinguishes donors in their views? Let us first reflect on the 
general elements o f civil society (horizontal axis).
First of all, there is a tendency for some donors to conceive of dvil society as a rather 
homogenous layer o f organizations with clear and simple functions. They do not grant space 
to smaller organizations that would address only very local, not to say parochial issues. 
Second, and related to this, some donors tend to conceive of civil society as having a driving 
logic close to that o f the private sector, where NGOs “sell programmes” and are here to “do 
business”.438 This view holds that civil society also serves a privatization end where NGOs 
take over some o f the roles of the state. Third, there are donors who want a multiplication of 
the type o f NGOS, while others expect plurality in mere numbers o f organizations, despite the 
risk of duplication o f activities generated by such an approach.
As for the stumbling points of the local context, there are three main types o f differentiations
The first one deals with the problem of the existence of two Palestines. While some donors 
acknowledge the differences within the Palestinian territories and therefore adapt their 
programmes accordingly, others do not and consider Palestine as a homogenous block. In 
this latter view , there is no reason to distinguish between the W est Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
between central zones and peripheries,439 between urban and rural regions and amongst 
refugees and non-refugee population. A sub-element is the aspect of the historical evolution 
and changes that took and take place within the field of NGO activism in the Territories.
The second aspect deals with issues o f  partnership. Based on the assumption that it is 
eventually the Palestinian population which will have to work for a more democratic polity, 
donors were differentiated according to the level of partnership they developed with their 
local partners. In this light, some donors grant greater space of decision to local NGOs in the 
design and implementation of programmes, whereas other donors tend to decide most o f the 
planning and actually ‘outsource’ only to their local partners for the implementation.
Finally, some of the technicalities o f funding also contribute to distinguish donors in terms of 
how much to understand and try to respond to Palestinian needs. Tied funding, the existence 
o f only short-term funding and the imposition of activities that do not receive general
438 A ll phrases in  quo tation  marks are actually taken from  m y interviews.
439 For the d iscussion  o f  th e  necessity to speak o f  various centres, see Section 1.2.
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support (here, I am thinking o f the controversial ‘people-to-people* activities440) are all 
elements that make each donor unique in this approach to civil society promotion within the 
particular case of Palestine.
For all these reasons, donors are spread in the various scatter plots. We could certainly 
multiply the variables (European vs. non-European, large vs. small donors, governmental vs. 
non-governmental funding, etc.). But the main point was stressed that donors do actually 
have very different approaches both to civil society in general and to the context in which 
Palestinian NGOs evolve and work.
To make these distinctions clear but in another form, it suffices to give quotes of three ideal- 
typical approaches o f donors.
On the very bottom-left, we can find Terre des Hommes, which has actually voluntarily 
bestowed part of its programmes to two Palestinian NGOs they have actually created through 
their policy o f ‘localization’. During the Oslo years — slightly quieter and more opportune for 
long-term planning — TdH decided to create, out of some of its regional offices, two 
autonomous Palestinian NGOs meant to run their own programmes. The locali2ation 
process started around 1996 by giving gradual independence to its local staff, up to the points 
where two new Palestinian entities were created- Thus since 1999, there is an lA rdh alTtfaT  in 
Hebron and an ‘A rdh al-Insaan* in Gaza. Both are now registered as local NGOs with the 
PNA, and although they still receive some funding from T ern d es Hommes, their budget is 
covered by their own means and by their own fund raising activities. A  quick look at the work 
o f  the two new local NGOs seem to indicate that their work is a very important one for 
covering topics and zones that are usually overlooked by most of the donors.441 This is a good 
example of how international donors can help to build local strength and particular 
knowledge o f the field to contribute to the definition and implementation o f the local 
common good.442
The second case is taken out of the central cluster. CIDA adopts very different types of aid to 
NGOs with large programmes and smaller local initiative projects distributing funding to a 
variety of smaller NGOs. Despite the distinction within these programmes, CIDA’s
440 T hese are jo in t Israeli-Palestinian activities b an g in g  simple citizens o r adolescents together. T he program s 
w ere  boycotted in  the late 1990s by the Palestin ians because the latter perceived such  activities as prom oting the 
fa lse  notion that there w as a real equality and norm alization between the two sides. M ore in Section 7.5.2.
441 See, for example, the w idely recognized capacity o f  the two institutions to  p roduce good local need 
assessm ents. T hus, the n u ta tio n  report from  the G aza entity was highly in fluentia l am ongst donors to re­
o rien tate  their w o rk  in  th e  current Intifada .
442 L e t us note that the tw o  local NGOs o f  T erre des Hommes are also very  active in  policy defin ition and are 
invo lved  with various m inistries to enhance public health  for children. In terv iew  w ith  K halil M A RO U F, 
C oun try  Representative, T erre D es H om m es, A r-R am , 10.02.2003.
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approach443 tends to be rather monolithic. It put a strong emphasis o f the success o f peace 
agreements during the Oslo period and in the last years on the reform issue, but all o f which 
through a top-down approach and concentrated in the urban zones of the Territories. In a 
sense, smaller local initiatives are balanced by more ‘mainstream’ activities (hence its central 
position on the various graphs).
The third and final case consists o f USAID Civil Society programme that we can identify as 
the point on the far right In that case, the vocabulary adopted is that o f business where 
NGOs should think in terms of contracts, managerial processes and reporting mechanisms. 
Also little attention is paid to local differences between rural and urban, central and peripheral 
zones. The fact that it does not leave much room for the Palestinian beneficiaries in the 
design process as well as the existence o f large amounts of tied funding means that it is 
difficult to expect a high impact on the lower couches o f Palestinian society,444
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter has shown that many changes took place under the label of ‘donors’ and 'aid’ 
(increased professionalization and specialization; less solidarity funding but more 
governmental funding; imposition of strict rules of funding mechanisms; privileged short­
term funding through projects, rather than long-term programmes and core funding; limits of 
tied funding, etc.). These changes can be seen as a source for the gradually limited space o f  
manoeuvring o f local NGOs, whereby p riorities are defined through technocratic means, in 
particular through the donors* apparatus that contribute to a form o f division o f labour that 
eventually limits the capacity of local NGOs to give a decisive impetus in defining priorities 
for their communities.
The chapter has argued and demonstrated that the ways in which some of the international 
donors conceive o f democracy promotion (through the concrete example o f civil society 
promotion thanks to local NGOs) can be read as one o f  the p o ssib le reasons for the negative 
results and for the failure for civil society to flourish in the Arab world. It is, therefore, not 
due to some form o f cultural resistance (read Islam, or an ‘Arab mind*) or to the resilience of 
autocratic regimes, but also to a narrow conception of civil society that some international 
donors enforce through their activities, and the lack of space granted by donors and funding 
mechanisms (projects vs. core funding, tied aid, contracts vs. grants) to the local recipient 
NGOs.
443 CIDA's approach needs to  be d istinguished from  som e o f  th e  Canadian dono rs active in  the T erritories: 
Oxfam Q uebec, for exam ple, adopted a m uch m ore d iversif ied  and bottom -up approach  to civil society 
promotion.
444 Let us note that T am keen, USAID subcontractor fo r c iv il society projects, h as  a m ore differentiated 
approach and ends up being  close to the cen tre , even  i f  in  the north eastern  quadran t.
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The interesting but indirect conclusion o f this point is that the ways in which theoretical 
discussions about the lack o f democratization in the Arab Middle East are conducted will end 
up influencing the content of the programmes and projects implemented. In other words, the 
over-concentration o f much of the literature on criticizing ‘what went wrong" by spotting the 
absence of some local prerequisites445 further contributes to the impoverishment of the 
theoretical content o f civil society in  the region.
It is, therefore, important to refer to better-informed empirical research stressing the variety o f 
Arab civil society or the relative richness o f a Muslim public sphere in  order to conduct a 
thorough revision o f what an Arab civil society might look like before embarking on civil 
society promotion, or other democratization efforts, based on the reductive vision that there 
is no civil society there.
Therefore, the pervasiveness o f (neo-)Orientalist themes within the broader literature (Section
3.1) on the Arab Middle East has a rea l (albeit indirect) influence on donors" conceptions o f 
civil society and democracy. This may translate in practical terms, into programmes funded by 
donors which conceive o f local recipients as being devoid o f any form of democracy, and, 
therefore, reinforcing the idea that certain values have to be ‘exported’.446 We are now back to 
this problematic view that civil society is uniquely a western product, and that it is alien to 
non-western cultures (and from which arises the need for culturalist explanations — Section
1 .1)  .
But at the end of the day, it might not be a difference o f cu ltura l values that reinforces the 
notion that V estem  views’ on civil society are different to ‘Arab’ ones; this study points out 
instead that it is ‘simply* a difference in the conceptions of civil society and how it can be best 
implemented in die Palestinian case. Gradually, the different views, because of the magnifying 
effect of day-to-day work and of the large amounts of money spent by certain donors, end up 
clashing.447 And since the most important sources o f funding towards civil society promotion 
stem from the western shores o f the Atlantic, this translates into the increasing influence and 
power of rather managerial and procedural visions of civil society/democracy, at the expense 
o f more sensitive and variegated programmes that would take local variety and richness into 
consideration. This would then indicate that the very need to export civil society does not 
stem from cu ltural differences between the V est’ (which, anyway, is far from being homogenous,
445 For an interesting discussion of this, see Beilin 2004.
446 Some examples in the coming chapter (‘civil society at work*) will also illustrate this aspect
447 And we would be here back to the need for an explanation, that many would understand in cultural terms.
215
as shown in the previous graphs) and the Arab world(s), but is rather due to the need to 
promote institutional isomorphism448 around a specific and limited view of civil society.
This last consideration takes me, in turn, to invite the reader to reflect on a much broader 
theoretical framework, namely, the very theoretical foundations o f democracy. To understand 
how international efforts towards democracy promotion might have a better chance of 
succeeding, two important steps w ill have to be undertaken. On the one hand, the limits o f an 
excessively procedural conception of democracy need to be rethought with regard to some of 
its substance (to avoid the limits or a managerial or procedural approach). On the other, 
students o f the Arab world would do well to find inspiration in studies of the local 
particularities that critically distance themselves from an a-historical hypostatixation on 
cultures or religion, in order to better feed back the reflections on democracy with original 
substantial inputs, and to reorient the production of knowledge (professionally-oriented or 
academic) about such issues towards a less systematically negative stance on AME societies.
448 In the sense that civil society promotion should take a rather standardized form through, t.g , NGOs working 
on a variety of issues but through rather limited means (advocacy, capacity-building, and with the same padance, 
etc.) instead of drawing on local varieties and local expertise. On this aspect, see Section 6.1.
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Chapter  VI: Civil Society At Work
‘ In an interdependent modem world, traditional cultures’ do not 
spontaneously grow o r develop into ‘modem cultures 
People are pushed, seduced, coerced, o r persuaded 
into trying to change themselves into something else, 
something that allows them to be redeemed.0
{Asad 2003a: 154)
Civil society is not a  fixed and clearly defined concept, neither in its Euro-Atlantic cradle, nor 
amongst AME intellectuals. It is a disputed concept that has been and is constantly re­
interpreted in a variety of ways. It comes as no surprise that the different models and 
approaches o f civil society adopted by donors reflect such a diversity o f views (Section 5.5). 
Let us now look more into detail how, when, and by whom the concept o f ‘civil society* has 
been ushered in, interpreted, and re-adapted in  the arena o f  Palestinian NGOs.
To do so, we w ill look at three different aspects of the use of ‘civil society* about and by 
Palestinian NGOs. The first section (6.1.) w ill deal with how the discourse o f civil society has 
been promoted in the last ten years in the Palestinian field, but mostly by international donors 
and local NGOs (with a very short survey o f the academic production on civil society). The 
second section w ill study one sector o f the service-providing NGOs, namely that of health 
(6.2.). This is a sector where NGOs have a longer existence and experience and where they 
are historically closer to political parties. To contrast this case, the third and final section o f 
this chapter will be dedicated to cause-oriented or advocacy NGOs (6.3). The latter are 
younger and they very often focus on specific causes, such as human rights protection, civic 
participation and democratization. In both service-providing and advocacy NGOs, we w ill
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use elements of the interviews to stress, as in the case o f international donors, a typology o f 
views on civil society, its main important elements and problems. Attention w ill also be paid 
to how local actors perceive international aid and to d ie perceived problems arising in the 
course of interaction between international donors and local NGOs.
The purpose of these three subparts is to demonstrate that despite a formal variety o f views, 
there tends to be only one version of civil society privileged by some of the local NGOs and 
international donors. This reduced and reductive version, though discussed in a variety of 
ways, actually becomes a sort of fixed dogma.
We will explore how this can be the case, and how the historical context under which local 
NGOs evolve actually shape(d) and influence(d) the discourse about civil society. To avoid 
simplification and ju gm tn ts  a  I’cmporte-piece, one needs to look a t historical changes in  general 
(occupation until 1994, State-building until 2000 and re-occupation with the current Intifada), 
within the two sectors (health and advocacy), and at the way some o f the international donors 
contributed to fix some dogmas about ‘civil society’.
6.1. Palestinian Production of Knowledge About Civil Society
In the previous chapters, we have addressed the question of the local AME views on civil 
society: are the three models of Bishara/Ibrahim/Ghalioun (Section 3.2.3) present anywhere 
in the Palestinian views on civil society? How do donors* views on civil society interact with 
local parlance? Are they influenced by the latter or is it the contrary? To answer these 
questions, we will analyse the literature produced by NGOs and international donors449 on the 
question of civil society as a touchstone.
6.1.1. Literature at the crossroad of academia and research centres
It would be absolutely beyond the reach o f this dissertation to assess the academic teaching 
about the concept o f civil society in all o f  the eight universities scattered across Palestine. I 
w ill therefore rely on a specific type of literature produced by intellectuals who often stand at 
the crossroads of academia and applied research in specialized research centres. Palestine, 
widely known in the Arab world for its high level of education, is probably quite a unique 
case. Dozens o f research centres exist throughout the country.450
The literature covered through the study o f  Bishara, Ibrahim and Ghalioun’s view on civil 
society is actually the result o f such research centres, and in  particular of the focal points of
449 This type of literature will be called ‘grey literature*, because it has a dual function of policy-orientation and 
some sorts o f academic writing.
450 Romani counts about 40 o f them (Romani 2003). M y database includes 29 o f them.
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Bir Zeit and Ramallah, where MUWATIN plays a pivotal role.451 Interestingly, most o f the 
research centres were bom at the end o f the first Intifada at a time where large funding 
amounts were made available with the signing of the Oslo agreements. As a study about 
research and the teaching of sociology in the Palestinian Territories stresses, most o f the 
agenda of such research centres is “often defined and imposed by the vision of a variety of 
foreign donors”452 (Romani 2003:112-115).
Though one needs to qualify such statements (there are some examples of greater 
independence in research centres453), it is a fact that most o f the themes dealt with by such 
research centres very often cover predominantly external actors* interests in the region. This 
was already the claim of Tamari in his panorama on social research at the beginning o f the 
Oslo euphoria (T am ari 1994).454 A cco rd in g  to Romani, almost a  decade later, it is still the case 
with topics dealing principally with ‘regional peace plans*, ‘conflict resolution*, ‘management 
o f the refugee problem*, ‘better economic p lan ification  for a sustainable development* 
(Romani 2003). Though some of these issues are of vital importance for the Palestinian 
polity, the tone in which topics are addressed can hurt feelings of the Palestinian public 
opinion, as the ftequent uproars caused by the non-mendoning o f the refugee question in 
Abu Mazen’s speech in Aqaba (July 2003),455 or by the quesdon marks provoked by the 
Geneva Initiative since its launching in December 2Q03.456
The increased geographical separation between towns virtually shut down and hermetically 
sealed by the ‘Israeli matrix o f control* (Halper 2000; Larzillière &  Leveau 2003: 26-36) adds 
to the impossibility o f a unified research agenda. Moreover, the logic o f project-based where 
good money can be made by social scientists in research centres reinforces the trend towards
451 The NGO Muwatin (‘Citizen' in Arabic) was established in 1992, “at a critical juncture when, for the first 
time in their history, Palestinians were able to govern themselves while seeking to establish an independent and 
sovereign state. [...] Founded by a group of scholars and academics, Muwatin, whose main focus is on issues of 
democracy, is the first o f its kind in the area”. See the website: www.muwatin.org/about/abouthtmL 
Broadly speaking it is a think tank leaning towards the left side of the political spectrum.
452 “Les politiques scientifiques sont souvent définies et imposées par la vision des divers donateurs étrangers, 
gouvernementaux ou non, au rang desquels de nombreuses institutions nord-américaines et européennes.” 
Romani adds the example of Nablus’ Center for Palestine Research and Surveys (established in 1993 and 
specialized in polling) was funded up to 80% by the Ford and Rockfeller Foundations (Romani 2003: fn. 7).
453 This can be asserted in the case o f MUWATIN which published some very critical texts about external 
influence (Nakhleh 2004), but also from the Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies but which struggles to 
receive international funding and recognition despite the originality of its work. See later analysis (m this chapter 
and Chapter 7).
454 Quoted in Section 1.2.
455 At the tripartite summit (US, Israel and PNA) in the Jordanian city o f Aqaba, the then Prime Minister Abu 
Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) did not mention the issue of the right of return in his official statement. The right of 
return is the cornerstone o f any Palestinian political settlement to the conflict.
456 For a deeper analysis, see Nabulsi 2004.
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an “academic space that is fragmentalized from within and paradoxically organized and 
polarized from without” (Romani 2003).457
But again, one needs to qualify such statements for two reasons. First, it is not always a clear- 
cut situation (in the sense that the boundaries are not always d ear between the inside and the 
external actors, as we will show later), and, second, one needs to take a step back to the image 
of two Palestines. In this light, one should add that such analysis of the production of 
knowledge and its relation to power rather belongs to the f i r s t  Palestine, that o f an urban, 
highly educated m ilieu  and close to policy-making cirdes. Such condusions, I believe, could 
never be reached for the disenfcanchized second Palestine where a strong resentment against 
external imposition o f topics, agendas and vocabulary exists and has been exacerbated over 
the last years.
But, generally speaking, it is an understatement to say that there is a hiatus between externally 
influenced (if not determined) agenda o f such research centres and the much more 
widespread popular references to the nation a list struggle and to the growing ‘Islamization* of 
public repertoire*58 (Larzilliere Sc Leveau 2003: 36ff; see also Legrain 2001a&b; Hamzah & 
Larzilliere 2005). There is an urgent need for the vast layers o f disenfranchized Palestinians to 
refer to performative language o f resistance and reform rather than elaborate critical and 
reflexive discourses (Hamza & Larzilliere 2005). On the side o f NGOs, there have been 
strong signs towards a re-centering o f both activities and languages about the ‘local’ (Abu- 
Sada 2005b).
This is w hy some observers interpret the current Intifada not just as a revolt against continuing 
Israeli occupation but as deeply shaped by an internal uprising against what are perceived as 
corrupt elites that are totally cut off from their social constituencies (Heacock 2004). This is 
surely not the best place to debate the reasons of the strength o f the Islamic arguments within 
Palestinian politics. Nevertheless, this hiatus between the two Palestines and the strong 
external influence upon research centres can, in my view, be interpreted as potentially 
important source o f  heteronomy459 for the Palestinian population, which in turn translates
457 “L’absense d’instance nationale d’organisation de la recherche scientifique laisse alors conclure à un espace 
académique éclaté à l'intérieur, et paradoxalement organisé, polarisé, de l'extérieur. Les centres de recherche existant, 
fonctionnant, et recrutant essentiellement sur la base de projets ou programmes de recherche à court ou moyen 
terme, les chercheurs entrent dans une logique de chasse aux primes, où les mieux positionnés et pourvus en 
ressources cumulent de nombreuses activités et salaires. » (Romani 2003, his emphasis).
458 Let us note that this phenomenon is not just an epiphenomenon linked to the current Intifada, but is the 
result of much more profound and long-lasting change within Palestinian society. See in particular various 
articles of Legrain (2001a; 2001b; 2003b).
439 On heteronomy, see Section 2.5 and the final chapter (Section 7.5). See (Roy O. 2002b: 126) for similar 
conclusions in Central Asia. He also stresses the risk of artificially importing values and institutions from a 
western model that might be both less universal and less democratic than it claims — which can be read as a case 
o f heteronomy.
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into a preference for the Islamic répertoire rather than externally sponsored buzz words and 
related hot topics.460
We will now look to whether international donors have the capacity to influence to the extent 
described by Romani (2003), the course and content o f debates and production of knowledge 
about civil society by studying the ‘grey literature’.
6.1.2. Grey literature: promoting limited visions of civil society
This part w ill focus on some key documents produced in Palestine dealing with civil society, 
with a direct focus on NGOs. Grey literature here refers to the type of documents intended 
to influence policy-making circles or the work of actors involved in very specific issues — in 
this case civil society. Out o f the variety of items published on the topic, one of the most 
visible and active in promoting its views has been the World Bank with large amounts 
dedicated to research and publications. W e will concentrate on these publications,
a) W orld Bank and NGO Project
The World Bank, thanks to its PNGO project managed by the Programme Management 
Organisations (PMO) o f the Welfare Association Consortium (see Hanafi S. 2002; Sullivan 
2001: 24f), has been at the forefront o f the battle for a strong NGO sector. Originally 
intended to “make die PNA, various NGO Networks and local NGOs work better 
together”,461 it adopted a rather macro-approach to the question o f NGOs. It puts together 
different networks of NGOs (PINGO, Union of Charitable Societies, Forum for NGO 
Union in Gaza Strip, and the Forum o f NGO Unions in the Gaza Strip462) to coordinate as 
much as possible with the PNA. As seen in Chapter 4, this was no easy task and the passing 
o f the NGO law was a lengthy and tormented road. This is one o f the reasons why so much 
of the focus of the World Bank literature with NGOs has to do with the question o f the 
relationship between NGOs and the PNA, but hiding thus other vital elements of the topic. 
The World Bank and its PNGO project has funded three types o f writings or reports on the 
issue of NGOs in Palestine that will have long-term resonance in the landscape of Palestinian 
NGOs. Let us now analyse each o f these three publications: Sullivan, Conference 
Proceedings, and BISAN. 4012
440 BISAN, in its executive summary for the World Bank stresses this danger o f having to follow too much 
international conditionality at the expense o f developing strong ties with the social basis (BISAN 2001).
441 Informal interview with Sima KANA’AN, Deputy Head of Office, World Bank, Ar-Ram, April 2002.
442 For a list see Walid Salem’s intervention in (Shadid & Qutteneh 2000: 59). The Palestinian Union of NGOs 
in Gaza is actually non-operative since 1998. It was established in 1996 and initially received funding from the 
Ministry o f Finance. See Abdel Shafi 2002, or www.pngo-project.org/research/pdf/needs_assessment.pdf.
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Denis J . Sullivan’s publications: managerial approach to civil society
Sullivan, an American scholar formerly affiliated with Northeastern University and now with 
the University o f  Michigan, was hired as a consultant by the W orld Bank to produce different 
reports on the PNGO project. He published in 1995 an article in which he developed the 
view that “a Palestinian civil society, perhaps, [was] in the process of being developed” 
(Sullivan 1995: 99). Thus, he held that there still a lack  o f that civil society or that it was 
absent until that po in t Therefore, in his opinion, civil society, w ith a leading role devoted to 
NGOs, was still to be built Such view is a rather standard view  of the development and 
democrati2ation literature at the beginning o f the 1990s (see Sections 2.2 & 2.4).
The first contribution of Sullivan about the World Bank PNGO Project was published under 
the auspices o f the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA)463 in 1998, at the time where the PNGO Project was finalized. There appears in a 
collection of papers of uneven quality on ^Policy Analysis* in PASSIA’s series on Civil Society 
Empowerment (PASSIA 1998), a short manual designed to “provide training seminars for 
Palestinian NGO professionals, practitioners and university graduates** [ibid:, ii). Though most 
of the papers explore either theoretical points, or the role o f Palestinian NGOs in general, 
Sullivan*s paper is the sole contribution that presents one international donor for NGOs.464 
The paper is a simple description of the origin o f the W orld Bank’s Trust Fund for 
Palestinian NGO (later called the PNGO Project), or, a sort o f  showcase for the PNGO 
Project
Sullivan publishes again with PASSIA in  2001, but a whole book on the subject (Sullivan 
2001). It is a review o f Phase I and its two temporary extensions (July 2000 until June 2001) 
and suggests changes for the Phase II o f the PNGO Project (2001-2004). It is also flanked by 
comments o f three Palestinian NGO activists. It highlights the uniqueness o f the World 
Bank*s approach to work directly with NGOs and the key ro le put forward by this model: 
local NGOs have become, in die World Bank’s eye, a vital “mechanism for service delivery” 
in the “deteriorating socio-economic situation for Palestinians in  the West Bank and Gaza 
coupled with the Palestinian Authority’s unwillingness or inability to take on most social 
service delivery” (Sullivan 2001: 1 & 5). The tide (lWorld Bank PNGO Project. P rom  Service 
D elivery to Sustainable D evelopment) reflects the view that NGOs are substitutes and play a 
complementary role to that of the (proto-)State. As in the case o f  the conference (see infra) y
443 PASSIA is a Jerusalem-based NGO dedicated to research, training and public debates. More on this 
organisations in the following pages.
464 One could have expected other donors' intervention. One of the reasons o f this unique presentation might 
be the fact that at that time the finanrial contributor to PASSIA’s series of seminars on civil society 
empowerment was USAID. See Acknowledgements, page ii.
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what is further suggested to deepen the role of NGOs is to increase the “professional 
credentials o f the Palestinian NGO movement*7 (ibid.: 49). No mention is made anywhere to 
the voluntary spirit o f local organizations, and of much smaller local charitable organizations. 
Though critical to the project in certain technical and political aspects,*55 Sullivan’s 
contribution is positive concerning the PNGO Project It is probably regrettable that no real 
alternative voices were taken into account in what seems to be a ‘semi-official7 review o f such 
a large project for local NGOs. The vast majority of applicant NGOs (91%) actually were 
refused PNGO funding and many organizations I interviewed expressed strong criticisms 
towards the project for being, according to some, very selective in  its grant awarding phase/*6 
Strong criticism*57 is also absent from the three Palestinian comments following Sullivan’s 
text: all o f  them are actually working in  organizations receiving major funding from the 
PNGO Project itself. It would be self-defeating for them to shoot themselves in the foot, and 
illustrate the two-fold problematic tendency of ‘activity assessments’: some focus only on 
some bureaucratic and quantitative measures (in terms of beneficiaries), rather than in  terms 
o f qualitative impact, and/or other reports are made by inner personal or individuals whose 
independence is not really affirmed.*58
Proceedings of the 2000 International Conference: PNA vs. NGOs
The Welfare Association Consortium organized in consultation with the World Bank in 
February 2000 a three-day conference in Ramallah entitled ‘Palestinian Governmental!N G O  
Relations: Co-operation and 'Partnership? (for the proceedings, see Shadid & Qutteneh 2000). It 
assembled eight different panels of important local and international figures, with a large 
number o f PNA officials (Ministers and high civil servants), NGO practitioners (from 
Palestine and from other developing countries), local and international scholars as well as 
World Bank Headquarters officials.465 7869
Most of the debates and tones of the speakers indicate some serious tension between NGOs 
(or some o f them) and the PNA. This is o f no surprise in view of the tide of the conference 
and of the time it took place namely when the NGO Law, though passed by the PLC, was
465 Thus, Sullivan mocks PNA’s attempts to control as much as possible NGOs’ work when the Ministry o f 
NGO Affairs made a “strong case that it should be in charge [of a Resource Center for NGOs]. Imagine the 
irony, a governmental body seeking to direct and manage a center for non-governmental activity!” (Sullivan 
2001: 59).
466 Most frequently, NGO activists who did not receive funding from the PNGO Project had the impression 
that the dices were loaded and that many application conditions were tailored so that the identity of those 
NGOs which would receive greater finding seemed to be determined in advance.
467 Criticism is also missing from the World Bank's Implementation Completion 'Report (World Bank 2003).
468 Often ‘external’ assessment persons are suggested by both donors and local NGOs which then have to agree 
on the individuals. They are not truly independent o f or alien to the organizations.
469 For a full list and proceedings, see http://www.pngo-project.otg/research/resources.html and 
http://www.pngo-project.org/research/pdf/conf_.En.pdf.
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still under revision by the President office, and when the Ministry of Justice launched an 
abusive campaign against NGOs for allegations of corruption and high spending (Hammami 
& aL 2001:1-20).
Independently o f this problem, it is striking to see how the discussions actually are shaped 
along the simplistic lines of divisions between democratic NGOs versus the autocratic PNA, 
which, in a nutshell, takes over the narrative of the NGOs loosely affiliated to left-wing 
parties (and we w ill come back to that later, in the ‘narrative’ debates). When not trapped by 
this view, then the discussion adopts a rather technical and cold view on the necessity towards 
between sectoral coordination, increased professionalization o f NGOs, enhanced service 
delivery and regulation framework or even “the importance o f maintaining a business-like 
approach in all aspects of development cooperation”.470 None o f the speakers talked about 
(nor mentioned) the second Palestine.
Despite very rare references to the variety o f organizations concerned under ‘civil society and 
its potential role in democracy building,471 there are almost no critical remarks on NGOs 
except that of an outsider underlining that “there is no [automatically positive] correlation 
between the number of NGOs and democracy”.472 Moreover, the question o f the Palestinian 
population’s needs and priorities is tragically absent, reflecting an elitistic (or top down) 
approach to the role of NGOs. The same happens on the panel session dealing with 
D onor’s, Palestinian Government’s and NGO’s Perspectives on Funding for the NGO 
Sector’: out of seven speakers, only one is Palestinian and he talks about the UN, the World 
Bank and PNA definitions of development. Again a Palestinian view on donors could have 
been helpful and, furthermore, a bottom up view is totally absent o f the discussions.
O f course, it is difficult to reach definite conclusions about views on civil society through the 
analysis o f  a conference proceedings. Nevertheless this meeting resonates with similar 
overtones in the conclusions of the studies of Sullivan (managerial approach to civil society) 
and of the *Best Eastern mentality’.473 This expression was used by a Palestinian NGO activist 
to criticize some o f the elite NGO leaders who spend a lot o f their time in hotels, going to 
one conference after another, but having lost the sense of everyday life for Palestinians.474 
The list o f conferences held in Palestine on topics related to civil society, democratization,
470 Peter Bacuk, Deputy Head of the Representative Office of Norway, in (Shadid & Qutteneh 2000: 77).
471 See Mustafa Barghouthi, in (Shadid & Qutteneh 2000: 7 & 40).
472 See Jala Abdel Latif, Inter-African Group (Ethiopa), in (Shadid & Qutteneh 2000:47).
473 The expression was coined by putting two critical remarks of smaller advocacy NGOs interviewed for this 
research. The two NGO leaders were actually very critical of all these conferences held by bigger NGOs 
producing lavish publications and meeting in 4- or 5-star hotels, such as the ‘Best Eastern’ in Ramallah.
474 Interview with Nassif MU’ALLEM, Director, Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, Ramallah, 
21.01.2004. On the same occasion he also scorned the sense of “superiority” o f Palestinian “elites living in the 
disgusting central zones around Ramallah and Jerusalem”.
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NGOs, or good governance, is a very long one. As one NGO director said, “if  we were to 
respond to all conference invitations, we would spend our weeks only in touring hostels” .475 
One can wonder whether all these conferences will actually meet the declared objective of 
disseminating positive views about NGOs to the largest Palestinian audience possible, and in 
particular to our second Palestine. Maybe they have another purpose, not that o f 
communicating to the Palestinian population but rather communicating to an elite group of 
society leaders a very peculiar and limited comprehension o f the role o f NGOs as an 
“innovative and frequently cost-effective [actor] in the delivery o f services”.476 
In other words, despite the positive intention of favouring a dialogue between PNA and 
NGOs, such a conference shuts out wider popular participation in the debate and reinforces 
dominant views about issues of NGOs and civil society. Finally , it is worthwhile stressing 
how the international donor organizing the conference was actually reformulating the left- 
wing narrative, according to which NGOs are seen as the main source o f democratic 
opposition. Except with a slight change — i.e. that NGOs are also seen as effective service 
delivery organizations and professional institutions.
BISAN: a way out o f the ‘state o f nature*?
BISAN Center for Research and Development (established in  1989 and led since its 
foundation by Izzat Abdel Hadi) was commissioned by the PNGO Project to execute a 
thorough study o f the *Role of NGOs in Building of Civil Society* — in Arabic47̂ . This very 
systematic study (Bisan 2002) with a questionnaire distributed to 207 NGOs provides 
interesting insights into the perceptions within NGOs of the difficulties encountered. It 
sometimes sheds a raw light on institutional weakness (such as total absence of financial and 
administrative procedures for about a 25% of the NGOs) (Bisan 2002: exec, summary 6). 
Again, the report authored by Izzat Abdel Hadi478 tends to concentrate mosdy on managerial 
dimensions of NGO work (as the MAS studies479).
The part on the substance of building civil society’ is a very strange one: it essentially argues 
that NGOs are “essential to manage [the] transition from relief to development, and from
475 Interview with Issam AROURI, General Manager, Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.02.2004.
476 Quote from Rex Brynen at the 2000 Conference, in (Shadid & Qutteneh 2000: 79).
477 See http://www.pngo-project.org/research/pdf/bisan/index.htmL
478 Izzat Abdel Hadi was also one of the three Palestinian contributors to Sullivan’s 2001 review book. 
Incidentally, he was the only Palestinian speaker at the PNGO Conference in die panel on donors and local 
NGOs. We will make reference to him again for other key reports.
479 The World Bank also commissioned two more reports for its PNGO project to MAS (Palestinians Economic 
Policy Research Institute) to perform of Mapping o f NGOs (see MAS 2001a &2001b). Figures from these two 
booklets were discussed in Chapter 4 and do not add significant elements to our demonstration on ‘civil society 
at work’. It is rather a statistical presentation o f Palestinian NGOs.
For the whole list o f PNGO research project see http://www.pngo-project.org/progiams/research.html.
225
natural society to civil society” (BISAN 2002: exec, summary 6). It is quite surprising to read 
such statements on the eve o f the 21st century, three or four centuries after its common usage 
in the contractualist literature. How can we explain such a stark and negative view on 
Palestinian NGOs?
Interviewed about this aspect, Izzat Abdel Hadi insisted that
“We [Palestinians] don’t use the concept of civil society as in the Western terminology because 
the sodo-historical contexts are different.”
[ • » ]
I don’t think we have a civil society in Palestine and even in the Arab world I think we are 
managing transition from relief to development, from natural society notion (which means 
factionakst, clannish, familial) into more democratic, accountable and transparent sector.
Asked to elaborate on his distinction between civil society organizations (CSOs) and
community-based organizations (CBOs), which are in  his eye, part o f the natural society, he
responded:
“There are many criteria to do that [distinction]. CSOs have, if  you want, more elements or 
aspects of civility. More than CBOs.
Like, CBOs are more factionalized, narrow geographical, individualistic, or tribal, family or 
clannish based But actually, CSOs have the same characteristics to a certain extent, in Palestine. 
You know, we talk here about the mujtama al-ahlL We don’t call it dvil sodety al-mujtama al- 
madani.
[•••]
I f  I want to apply my model: their linkages (CBOs) are more familial than dvil society’s. I can’t 
recognize them as dvil society. This is based on my ideology, civility is democratization, 
tolerance, respecting the law, etc This is my definition.
[. ■ •] Some [others] say we are a traditional sodety so we have to include charitable sodeties 
family groups, local authorities, etc in dvil sodety,
For me: NO!”480
His kind o f interpretation is actually a reminiscence o f the restrictive views o f  Bishara on dvil 
sodety in the Arab context, but with an almost harsher conclusion. We w ill explore later 
some o f the reasons why he comes to present such a view (in the part about social agenda 
and different narratives). But it should be noted that this interpretation of a faulty or 
incomplete dvil sodety fits the agenda o f  the World Bank in two ways.
First, the study highlights strong managerial shortcomings within NGOs. Portraying smaller 
NGOs (in Bisan’s vocabulary ‘CBOs5) as stuck in natural sodety allows one to call for more 
help from ‘dvilized’ actors. N ot innocently, larger professional NGOs are described 
elsewhere in the study as helping to "manage [this] transition towards dvil society’. Therefore, 
dear and differentiated roles are granted to Promothean larger "dvilized’ NGOs to help their 
smaller CBO counterparts.
480 Interview with Izzat ABDEL-HADI, General Director, BISAN Centre for Research and Development, 
Ramallah, 28.02.2004.
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Second, the very idea of an Arab world stuck in the transitional phase (not to say bluntly in a 
state of ‘natural society’) implies and reinforces cultural dichotomies not so unfamiliar with 
neo-liberal universalist values conveyed, for example, by the World Bank. “We have a liberal, 
civil and m odem  world on one hand that must come to help out the autocratic, uncivilized) 
and traditional Arab society”, so could be the line of larger donors to justify their aiding, 
which is even reinforced by the fact that it is local Palestinian actors themselves who claim 
that there are different cultures and that civil society does not exist either in Palestine or in 
the Arab world.481
In both cases the solution goes through international aid and the implicit import o f 
exogenous models and through the increasingly professionalized and managerial NGOs. 
BIS AN is certainly on the safe side for many years to come (in terms of research and work to 
do and, probably, in terms of funding as well): its very duty is to lead and develop CBOs into 
CSOs and to promote the light of civil society to other Palestinian NGOs.
There are other surprising passages (rather patronizing in their implications) in BISAN’s 
executive summary: for example it points to the potential negative danger o f conditional 
funding (imposed by donors) and the duty of NGOs “to develop a developmental agenda, 
which responds to the local community needs and priorities” (Bisan 2002: 9). Despite the 
indirect call for donors to respect local needs, such a statement contributes to the conceiving o f 
local community as void and empty of visions and capacities to develop their own priorities,
b ) O thers texts on civ il society
The World Bank and the PNGO Project are not the only institutions producing and 
commissioning research and publications on the topic. Some research centres publish their 
own studies (such as MUWATIN, RamaUah Centre for Human Rights Studies) and even a 
few NGOs not active formally in research or advocacy topics produce their own reports on 
the matter. Let us look, briefly, at this type of literature and see i f  they bring up new elements 
to the discussions on civil society, which have so far concentrated on managerial and rather 
elitist descriptions o f the role o f  NGOs and on the conflictual relationship with the PNA, but 
omitted to talk at large of their link with the local population.
UNDP and BISAN: Planning the future o f civil society
BISAN was commissioned to do a position paper on civil society by another major 
multilateral donor in the Territories, UNDP. BISAN’s involvement in various international 
networks dedicated to themes parallel to that of civil society might- explain why it is constantly 
asked to produce such papers. Izzat Abdel Hadi (head o f BISAN) is an active member o f five
481 See previous considerations on ‘oriental Orientalists’ (Chapter 3, in part Section 3.1.5).
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international networks: "Social Watch’, the "Arab NGO Network For Development’, the ‘Civil 
Forum’, the "World Social Forum*, and "Our World Is N ot For Sale’482 and was recendy 
chosen to create a Civil Society Index under an international umbrella project led by 
CIVICUS.483 This might explain why BISAN is once again requested to publish a position 
paper on civil society. Certainly, the previous publication for the PNGO Project and Izzat 
Abdel Hadi’s participation in the setting up phase o f the PNGO Project did not go unnoticed 
by UNDP’s Palestinian office.
In any case, the commissioned paper is part o f  a UNDP initiative to discuss in an
international conference the question o f development in  Palestine. Three Palestinian
institutions (Ministry of Planning for the public sector, PALTRADE with the Ministry of
Economy for the private sector and BISAN for civil society institutions) produced position
papers to discuss possible socio-economic improvement Interviewed about the initiative,
UNDP’s representative presented it as follows:
“To improve socio-economic conditions, we will be conducting an Arab international forum in 
September 2004 with other UN agencies to help the Palestinians to come up with a socio­
economic development plan that does not respond only to the emergency and relief but also to 
development for the three years [ahead] (2004-07) and helping the Palestinians to cope and be 
prepared for the declaration of a Palestinian state”
[...] It is a plan for socio-economic plan to help to achieve the goals.
[...] There will be workshop first locally and then to Dubai. The same [procedure will apply] for 
the civil society paper [which] will be presented in Kuwait”484
The tone denotes first of all a rather patronizing attitude, that o f international organizations
whose mission is to "help’ the Palestinians to come up w ith good ideas for long-term
development Second, the approach chosen to improve development will certainly be again at
a macro-level and managerial one (in light of who were asked to contribute with position
papers). Finally, one could question what the phrase ‘prepare the Palestinians to cope with the
declaration of a State’ means: Who will declare the Palestinian State? Cope with what other
external intervention?
But leaving this last polemical point aside, the diagnosis posed by UNDP and other UN 
agencies is highly problematic because it  does not really consider the overall situation of 
continuous colonial occupation on the one hand, and does not seem to be aware o f other 
international reports stressing that the majority of the disenfranchised Palestinian population 
has very clear ideas about solutions to come back to real and long-term development, on the
482 On BISAN's activities see its web link: http://www.bisan.otg/index/units/Advocacy.htm.
483 See BISAN’s web and CIVICUS portal:
http://www.bisan.org/index/units/projects/csi/csLhtm, http://www.dvicus.org/new/default.asp.
Interestingly, CIVTCUS is also a dialogue partner o f the IMF, the sister IO o f the World Bank in Washington, 
about dvil sodety's importance in meeting the Millennium’s objectives. See 
http://wwwimf.org/ external/np / tr/2004/tr040930a.htm.
484 Interview with Mounir KLEIBO, Governance Programme Analyst, UNDP, Jerusalem, 19.02.2004.
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other. In the fifth report on Palestinian Public Perceptions on their L iving Conditions to assess the
impact of international and local aid, it is thus clearly stressed that:
“Job creation485 is not seen in itself as the most effective manner to reduce poverty as 
Palestinians seem to realise very well that there '«.’ill be no improvement in their Uving conditions without 
the ending o f the military occupation and the closures associated with it.
Even increase humanitarian aid is not looked as a response (only 2% think it should increase), 
vs 28% for job creation, and 50% for ending occupation,” (Bocco & al. 2002: 43, emphasis 
mine)
In the light of such clarity from the Palestinian population,486 one can wonder what are the 
purpose and usefulness o f such position papers? Much o f  these papers are probably not only 
about ‘helping7 Palestinians to come back to development plans but indirectly aim at creating 
an jhabitus4*1 o f responsiveness to the new conception o f civil society by major international 
organizations: that of a managerial, service-providing and very elitist class. Certain local 
NGOs serve as a relay to bring in within the Palestinian public sphere such new conceptions. 
Let us note that there is nothing intrinsically western or Arab about such values, but it is 
about favoring a managerial culture at the expense o f more participatory and bottom up 
processes that civil society embodies in general. As for the other potential track of habitus (on 
“preparing the Palestinians to cope”) instilled in local NGOs through such papers and 
conferences, it could be interpreted as a means, through NGOs, to prepare the ground for 
the bulk o f the population, and to get ready to swallow a bitter pill of an internationally- 
designed peace plan.488 
Mustafa Barghouthi’s many outlets
Another prolific NGO leader is Mustafa Barghouthi. Nevertheless, he presents a totally 
different line than that o f Izzat Abdel H ad i Mustafa Barghouthi is a founding member and 
the president o f  UPMRC (a very large health NGO), director of HDIP (Health, 
Development, Information and Policy Institute), former member489 of the leading troika of 
the Palestinian People’s Party (former PCP), and runner-up in the 2005 Presidential elections 
under the banner of the National Initiative. He is a shining and often quoted example o f  this 
younger generation o f the Palestinian leadership from inside the Territories which emerged in
485 Job creation was promoted by many donors in the current Intifada as a way to alleviate poverty amongst 
Palestinians.
486 Bocco’s reports (ed.) are based on a representative sample of all Palestinians' origin and place of residency. 
For sampling methods and description o f the interviewed population, see their very detailed methodological 
introduction.
487 Habitus (in the sense put forward by Bourdieu) should be understood as one o f the constructivist movements 
whereby the external becomes internalized. See (Corcuff 1995: 32). Differently formulated, it “is a set of 
acquired patterns of thoughts, behaviour, and taste, which is said [ .. .]  to constitute the link between social 
structures and social practice” (Marshall G. 1996: 209).
488 On such a possibility, see Nabulsi 2004.
489 He officially left the leadership and the party in 2003 for “lack o f time and availability”. See the official press 
release in (PPP 2003). The reasons of his departure are much more political. Mustafa is one of the three 
founding fathers of a new political movement, called al-mubadarab, the National Palestinian Initiative.
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the 1980s from a professional middle-class milieu. He made himself a name, along with 
hundreds o f other activists, thanks to NGO and grass roots work in local popular committees 
(Hiltermann 1990; Robinson 1997).
Mustafa Barghouthi later become known to international actors for his outspoken position on 
the necessity of keeping alive the legacy of NGO activism bom during the first Intifada 
(Barghouthi M. 1989) in the Oslo period and to protect NGOs from the centralizing and 
autocratic tendencies of the nascent PNA after the signing o f the Gaza-Jericho agreements 
(Barghouthi M. 1994). He is thus a t the forefront for the creation o f  an independent 
Palestinian NGO Network (later named TIN GO3) in 1993 and 1994 when the PNA was 
becoming reality.
His vision o f civil society and the role paid by NGOs in it is very different to those promoted 
by the publications of UNDP and the PNGO Project490 for the simple reason that its aim is 
very different. Published in a different political context (emergence o f  the PNA, and 
definition o f basic rules and principles o f governance under a Palestinian authority), it lays 
stress on the importance of an independent NGO sector as a check and balance against the 
PNA. Mustafa Barghouthi draws on the popular legacy of resistance to Israeli occupation and 
the importance o f service-delivery o f  NGOs for marginalised Palestinians to justify the 
deepening of NGOs* independence w ith the ideological justification of a need a “vibrant and 
creative civil society” (Barghouthi M. 1998: 9) for a more democratic polity.
While the 1994 document was written at a time where the PNA was not yet based in 
Ramallah (and in the other main towns of the West Bank) and therefore presents the 
potential ‘enemy’ o f NGOs under the traits of the PNA, the 1998 document points to two 
dangers for independent NGOs: the PNA is still in the front line, but the growing influence 
of Hamas and other “traditional and fundamentalist forces” is stressed (Barghouthi M. 1998: 
6). Both texts are actually rich accounts o f the diversity of civil society actions (and not just of 
the role o f  NGOs) and of some o f the dangers existing amongst NGOs where “the support 
and endorsement for the values and principles of civil society is not automatic, spontaneous 
or guaranteed by all NGOs” (Barghouthi M. 1994:4). Therefore, for him, NGOs are essential 
survival tools for democracy, in the wake o f the dual risk of undemocratic forces embodied 
by the PNA and the “ fundamentalist forces”.
Finally, Mustafa Barghouthi is also behind a web-portal palestinem onitor, hosted by HDIP. 
Though previous texts offer quite subtle accounts on the diversity of civil society, the website
490 He acknowledges the parallel and very important role played by political parties, trade unions and other 
representation bodies within civil society (Barghouthi M. 1994:1; Barghouthi M. 1998: 7).
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is auto-proclaimed as ‘the voice o f [Palestinian] civil society’.491 The same type o f  self­
appointment does also exist in  PINGO, the Palestinian NGO network in which Mustafa 
Barghouthi has been for years a leading figure. Many times, press releases or statements of 
PINGO have the problematic reputation for speaking on behalf o f the entire civil society: 
statements such as ‘we, Palestinian civil society, condemn...* are very frequent We will come 
back later to this phenomenon of the ‘appropriation’ of civil society (Section 7.2.3, eg..), but 
let us note that this rather simplified account of NGOs as the unique guarantor o f democracy 
within civil society has served and passed into some of the international donors (as in the case 
o f the PNGO Project conference 2000).
c) PASSIA’s seminars on ‘Civil Society Empowerment*
A final important source o f  texts about civil society is the Jerusalem-based PASSIA 
(Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs) and founded in 1987 by 
D r Mahdi Abdel Hadi. PASSIA has acquired a solid reputation for the quality and variety of 
the research it publishes. It organizes highly regarded round-table discussions, news 
conferences and talks. It provides also any students o f Palestine and workers in the region 
w ith quality information and resources (diaries, maps, historical files, etc.).
Since 1997, it runs seminars and training courses about ‘Civil Society Empowerment* with the 
purpose to provide specific “training to key personnel in civil society organisations (CSOs)’* 
and helps Palestine with “institution building** and the “establishment of an effective civil 
society”.492 Looking at the content o f the first volume (Tolicy Analysis’) which entails two 
main fields (Part I: concepts o f  pluralism, democracy, civil society and policy-making &  Part 
II: policy analysis in  general and in the Palestinian case), one can notice that it  covers very 
basic and important domains o f democracy that are frequently violated by the PNA itself 
(separation of powers, accountability, basic freedoms), but actually remains very brief about 
the topic o f  civil society: only four pages are dedicated to the topic (PASSIA 1998: 17-21). It 
nevertheless manages to condense in  such a limited space an array of four definitions 
proposed by Michael Walzer, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Keane, and Adam Seligman.
Apart from the first seminar, the topics o f the later seminars have been (m reverse 
chronological order, from 2004 to 1997: Management Skills, Communication Skills, Strategic 
Planning, Strategic Management, Train the Trainer, Monitoring & Evaluation, Advocacy and 
Lobbying, Fundraising & Public Relations, Project Management, Conflict Resolution Sc 
Negotiation in Organizations, Leadership Skills, Strategic Planning, Policy Analysis, Media 
and Communication Skills, Media and Communication Skills, Strategic Planning, Policy
491 See www.palestinemoniror.oig.
492 See www.passia.org/seminars/intro.htm. All o f the texts here analyzed are in English.
Analysis.493 As one can see, most o f the topics raised are again of managerial content and 
dedicated to increasingly professionalized staff
PASSIA has thus partly494 become an NGO for NGOs, or multiplying NGOs by providing 
specific training for Palestinian NGO employees. How can we account for such a difference 
of approach within the same institution that on other topics provide very thorough and high- 
level studies, but remains stuck on technical and managerial dimensions of civil society? 
Maybe the response lies in the origin o f funding for this series on civil society empowerment 
USAID. The Civil Society section of USAID has been funding PASSIA since the inception of 
the programme in  April 1996 for a total amount o f $1.2m495 through an agreement, which, 
one will recall, is a type of understanding (between USAID and the partners) between a grant 
(where the NGO is free to chose its activities) and a contract (highly restrictive conditions 
decided by USAID). In the words of Martha Myers, in an agreement,
“We buy the organization’s programme and don’t tell them: W e want you to do this and this’.
At the same time, we have substantial involvement Substantial involvement means clearance on
the key personal* Reporting requirements, and a view on certain aspects of their programs.”496
One can wonder whether this series o f seminars on civil society cannot be considered as a 
form of outsourcing passed on by the international donor onto the shoulders and mouth of a 
local NGO. In any case, the conception of civil society promoted by USAID belonged to the 
furthest right and top comer o f our scaling attempt (see Tables 13-15). In the light o f the 
context o f the seminars and of the positioning of USAID w ith  regard to civil society in the 
Palestinian context, this example of civil society seminar ran be considered as a  concrete 
example of promotion of isomorphism in terms of values (in this case managerial ones) from 
a donor to a local NGO. The argument is not whether it is correct or not, or even a  good 
thing to conceive o f civil society in managerial terms, but that a  donot succeed in promoting 
its views in the work of local NGOs. This case of isomorphism is later amplified through 
seminars, courses and lectures to Palestinian participants, who, in  order to succeed, need to 
write “a final assessment essay. The goal is to incorporate what th ey have learned  and the their 
practical experience into a coherent project” (PASSIA 1998: 2, emphasis mine). The stress 
indicates one possible way to promote an habitus about certain values and norms.
Let us note counter-factual elements of this indirect guidance and imposition o f certain views 
of civil society. Recently, PASSIA (like other research institutions in the region) have
493 For a presentation o f the civil society seminar, see http://www.passia.org/seminars/iatro.htm.
494 It thus kept its role o f plaque toumante', as a very important debating place for many intellectuals.
495 Interview with Martha MYERS, Gvil Society Project Manager, USAID, East Jerusalem, 11.02.2003.
496 Ibid.
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produced very critical debates497 498and texts (some even simplistic critiques) on die issue of 
international aid and what is perceived as external steering intentions. The most obvious 
example is the book of Nakhleh on the Myth o f  Palestinian D evelopment: P olitica l A id  and  
Sustainable D e c e i t  where harsh criticism is addressed to two very important donors (the 
Welfare Association499 and the EU).
How can we interpret such a rebuke o f international aid? Many observers interpret the 
current Intifada not only as an uprising against the lasting occupation, but also as an internal 
uprising, for the failure of the Palestinian leadership to improve significantly the situation on 
the ground. Therefore, one could read such critical publications as a way to vent anger at 
international actors (among which donors500) for having insisted too much on the survival of 
the peace process rather than providing a long-lasting and locally sustainable form of polity in 
the Territories. It gives an opportunity to many Palestinians to distance themselves (at least in 
words) from quite embarrassing international godfathers.501 Each sector of the Palestinians 
has its own Intifada — each with a different target group.
6.1.3. F ram ing  the circle and  then going in to  circles
The idea of ‘framing the circle* is about offering a model of how certain limited visions of 
civil society are produced. Going into circles, instead, deals with how such views are sustained 
as leading interpretations. There is obviously some resistance to the imposition of dominant 
interpretations, and in some cases, alternatives manage to come across, expressing hereby 
different socio-political agendas.
a) Resisting the first step
We have seen that there is a transmission o f certain views about civil society from donors 
down to local NGOs, but also that some local NGOs* views were also reformulated and re­
utilized by international donors (as is the case for the left-w ing narrative* about civil society). 
How can we now come up with a model for such exchanges?
The point is not that different values have to be inculcated. Instead, the interaction between 
different actors where little negotiation is done about the content of the programmes and
497 An example took place in PASSIA’s roundtable discussions with the talk about Reform and Decentralization 
in February 2004 (http:// www.passia.org/index_meettngs.htm).
498 First published in Arabic by MUWATEN and then in English by PASSIA. Both editions appeared in 2004.
499 A club of rich Palestinian philanthropists, based in Geneva. See Section 5.3.2.
500 Adel Samara’s vitriolic pamphlet against NGOs is another example of such criticism (Samara 2003).
5011 have come across many examples o f the dual attitude of NGO activists: harsh (and populistic) 
denunciations fin Arabic) of the Geneva Initiative, but softer (English) reactions; ambivalent difference o f 
vocabulary when denouncing suicide attacks in Arabic or English; the heavy-loaded debate around the petition 
calling for the end o f suicide attacks within the Green Tine in June 2003 is also a case in point: the petition was 
attacked by many because it was funded by the EU and some saw willingness to  sign it as a sign o f giving in to  
external pressure or temporary opportunism (see Larzilliere 2003).
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based on the asymmetrical relation o f  donor-recipient, makes it much more likely for local 
NGOs to make a step towards the donors rather than the other way around. Once the first 
step has been taken, or put differently, once a relation of power has been defined, it is easier 
to go about by following the same mechanism: first the local partner is spotted and known 
(and hence the fact that it is pretty much always the same institution writing grey papers for 
international donors), and second, this agent has, in turn, its own source o f power in the local 
community since it often redistributes down money to local partners (intermediary function 
of the *NGO for NGOs’, or multiplying NGO).
In the case o f a transmission o f vision about civil society from local actors to international 
donors, donors are in the comfortable situation o f  choosing the elements of narratives that 
would fit with the overarching explanation® required.
This ‘first step* problem seems to be a  real one (in the sense o f consciously observed) in die 
case o f Palestinian NGOs. Many have claimed and some still Haim not to receive US funding 
(or more precisely USAID funding).502 The reality is different since many in fact take some 
USAID funding despite their claims to  the contrary. Another means of getting away from 
what can be described as a sense of culpability, is to stress that money is not received direcdy 
from USAID but through intermediary organizations (such as Save the Children, CARE, 
World Vision, CRS, etc.), which are usually /»»-governmental ones. This is, for Palestinians, a 
way to save face vis-à-vis their local constituency.
Two more mechanisms exist to soften the first step crisis.
The first is to go public against USAID and to harshly criticize the ambiguous nature of 
political aid from the US government Thus, in the beginning o f the second Intifada, PINGO 
(the Palestinian NGO Network) discussed the possibility to boycott and to stop taking 
USAID funding. Widespread publicity was given by PINGO to these internal debates. 
Eventually, some local NGOs were in  a  position to give up such a vital proportion of their 
funding (and here, the large envelope o f American funding for local NGOs takes its 
importance by flooding and surpassing any other donors in  the Territories). Many just 
continued with US monies. Similarly, w ith  the Terrorism Waiver crisis in 2003 onwards, many 
NGOs went about denouncing publicly this form o f conditionality and voluntary 
subordination required by the US government. Eventually most of the receiving NGOs 
ended up either signing or reaching a different agreement (contracts, grants, agreements, etc.), 
where signing d ie  waiver was no longer necessary but which gave a more predominant voice 
to USAID in the definition of the project or programme.
502 See die discussion o f most expected public speeches (MEPS) as a source of heteronomy in Section 7.5.2.
234
The second method has to do with the end of direct USAID’s funding; until 1999-2000, 
USAID was disbursing some of its contributions for cm l society directly through local 
partners. After that it created its pseudo-Palestinian branches (Tamkeen, Rafeed, Maram) 
which names could hint at local institutions and whose staff are mostly Palestinians, but with 
backstage direction through Washington-based consulting partners (Section 5.3.4).
Once the circle has been framed and once the first step has been taken, it is then easier to go 
into circles and continue along the same line. Roca observes in general that international UN 
Summits or large international conferences represent a very good opportunity to selectively 
chose which southern NGOs will be invited; therefore organizers (mostly northern ones) 
have the right o f first selection. Once the smaller southern NGOs are in, they are often 
obliged — or feel obliged — to caution the inviting parties (Roca 2000). The asymmetrical 
relationship is now formalized and can continue.
Some are recalcitrant and resist such an approach. However, institutions which do not take 
any form o f US money (to name but one controversial source o f funding for its ambiguous 
role in die Israeli-Palestinian conflict) are few, and those who have an internal funding rule 
(e.g. having 50% o f their budget through local funds or local voluntary contribution) to 
prevent important donors to steer indirectly the course o f their work are even less. O f course 
there is a cognitive dissidence dimension where many claim not to take any US funding, 
though having in reality some. Another watering down technique is that described previously 
under the label o f Voluntary goal displacement’, where local NGOs cynically take US funding 
but with the firm intention o f diverting it from US objectives. In that sense local NGOs tend 
to escape the structural asymmetry through conjectural opportunities. But in the long term it 
is not clear who is better off.
b) Setting the tone: Texts, and training courses on civil society
Certainly, some key texts and driving views on civil society are important starters in the 
process o f establishing a model o f reproduction of views through interaction between donors 
and NGOs. This is not to say that one o f the work previously mentioned set the tone at once 
for the rest of the production about civil society. Nevertheless, in the cases of commissioned 
writings about civil society and Palestinian NGOs, international donors can influence already 
the type and content o f reports by selecting one precise author. Surely, a Ramallah-based 
research center will probably reach different conclusions than a smaller organization based in 
a refugee camp o f the periphery, or at least they would probably stress different priorities. 
With a quick browsing o f the type o f consultancy work written about civil society, one notes 
that it is very often the same group o f  four or five individuals writing most of the reports;
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Sullivan (World Bank, Welfare), Izzat Abdel-Hadi (World Bank, UNDP), Khalid Nabris
(Welfare Programme, Save the Children), Tom Lent (Welfare), and a few other individuals.
This is not to say that there is a single line shared by all o f these consultants. There is space
for divergence, but the point is that they present and relay visions that are over-emphatically
those o f central urban zones and lack a better and more profound anchorage in rural and
peripheral zones o f the Territories.503 Moreover a quick glance at some of the networks
around USAID’s funded partners also points to the fact that there are other contact points
between some o f these actors. The previous description o f  USAID’s subcontractors with
(semi-)local institutions also demonstrated how things were going into circles.
Another subde mechanism of pre-defining interactions between certain donors and NGOs is
that o f  training courses given about proposal writing, or the need for NGOs. In the last ten
years, some international organizations have offered the possibilities to local personal to
follow ‘crash courses’ on topics dealing with dvil society promotion, role o f  NGOs and the
more technical question of proposal writing. The PNGO Project offered in  the beginning of
its first phase assistance to smaller organization because
“Most of the [donor] organisations are foreign-based and therefore, they will not understand 
the needs as we do, the social cultural and political networks that exist as we do. Usually, they 
will want their proposals in English, with log frames, impact assessments, and needs assessment 
All these are very difficult [things to achieve] for small organisations. [...]
How many organisations can do a log frame? Not many! Not even I can do that! I need an 
expert to sit for three days to do that!
It is a nightmare! That is why the Welfare NGO Project perceived that the World Bank is not 
totally on this one and the Welfare Association will be a resource centre. So we will help NGOs 
to develop their capacity, especially in proposal writing, in defining and in achieving what we 
call best practices. We help them to find funding, even on smallest basis.”504
Though the starting intention o f the Welfare Association is a noble one (enable smaller
organizations to cope with the ‘technitity’ of proposal writing, it is done in a way that
reinforces top-down importance of aid, and is explicitly based on the assumption of the
recipient organizations are void o f any ‘best practices’, and ‘resources’ to cope with the jungle
of in te rn a tional aid. To apply for PNGO fu n d in g , local organizations must come up with a
complete proposal including detailed budgets and cumbersome administrative jargon.
c) Alternative views and interactions
Let us now contrast an alternative way for international donors interacting with similarly small 
o rgan iza t io n s . Norwegian People’s A id (N PA) is a membership-based organization 
established in 1939 by Norwegian Labor Unions and working w ith Palestinian organizations
503 There m ight be an  excellent knowledge o f  the second Palestine, but som etim es it is the usage o f  exam ples o f 
this second Palestine w h ich  can be problem atic because they are paternalist, o r slightly contem ptuous w ith  their 
regard.
504 Interview  w ith D r. R afiq  HUSSEINI, D eputy D irector G eneral, PN G O  P ro ject, W elfare C onsortium , A r- 
Ram, 06.02.2003
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(not only in the Territories) since 1985. Its annual budget is quite large for this type o f
solidarity organization, namely $2m a year. Its funding policy in  the Territories is to aid some
larger organizations but also to provide smaller amounts to smaller, community-based
organizations in remote zones o f the Territories. In that case, NPA does not apply fixed
criteria on the conditions to receive funding,505 nor does it request an extensive and complete
proposal to consider financial support These smaller local organizations just need to come up
with a succinct concept paper (one or two pages) and then the project will be discussed w ith
the Norwegian organization. Then only will a proper proposal be built, but in  close
collaboration. When budget is agreed, a small element o f core funding can be added w ith the
purpose to offer training for the small organizations but in the direction it estimates most
important Therefore, the approach is different than the model offered by the PNGO project
where following the course before receiving any fund is a sort o f pre-condition. NPA is fully
aware of the difficulties and some of the dangers created by their way of doing:
[...] I don’t think we have a very western strict definition of what is democratic organisation. 
What is more important to us is progress; more than what is democratic or not If we have [a] 
partnership with an organisation that has and shows progress [as regards] that kind of values, 
then we consider this more important If they give the impression to be really committed, then 
ok. It will be re-evaluated What matters especially is their relation to their community.
Take the badawi [Bedouin] community. They are all from one, or two tribes actually. We could 
say "They are tribal, the head has two wives!” Still, we work with them. I don’t think there are 
women on the board It is important for us, but we will not decide not to work just because 
they don’t have a woman on the board! If we see progress, then it is OK.
[ » • ]
So [this work with] very small community-based organisations (women and land organisations) 
has been very interesting for us. But we spent a lot of energy to find smaller ones. It would have 
been much easier to go to the big ones and they would have done it for us. We have been 
concerned with which types of organisations. So we did distribution with badawi villages (food 
parcels, 400 parcels). All of our partners are locally anchored”506
These two examples — PNGO Project and Norwegian People’s A id -  represent the two ends
o f  a continuum in  the way support cap be given to local NGOs in the design process o f a
proposal. One the one hand a rather fixed model is explicitly exposed to local NGOs which
have to go to the donors; on the other, the donor seeks out different types o f organizations
and once the later submits a concept paper with basic needs defined, work is done commonly
to elaborate a funding proposal
There are many more cases in the first type of interaction than in the second. Very few 
donors actually make this effort of adapting to smaller organizations, except maybe the
505 There are preferences based on, e.g., priority to  m em bership-based organizations and com m unity-based 
organizations which g ear m ost o f  their activities towards activities concentrating on  wom en and children. F o r 
longer-term  partnership and larger budget envelopes, NPA has in th is case som e criteria about the organizations: 
it m ust have an elected board, regular elections, in ternal functioning rules, etc.
506 Interview with G udrun BERTINUSSEN, R esiden t Representative, N orw egian  People’s A id , G aza C ity , 
03.02.2003-
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German Fund, the Canadian Local Initiative and Save the Children which give very small 
grants. The tendency is rather to provide courses and training, and then local organizations 
come to follow a training course: Tamkeen offers such courses in its Capacity Building 
Programmes.507 AMIDEAST, one o f the implementing partners for USAID Civil Society 
programmes, and specialized in  education activities also runs courses on Troposal Writing’, 
‘Business and Report Writing*, and Troject Management*.508 Though the focus for such 
courses tends to be rather on the linguistic level, formulation and content are also approached 
in some of its courses.509
Let us finally note that most o f  these courses are done with USAID funding or by US-based 
organizations, where a different view on civil society was already stressed in  Section 5.5. It is 
also worthwhile pointing to this consultancy and managerial culture, much more widespread 
in North-American institutions. Chemonics provides the backstage machinery and 
networking back in  Washington: its associate MASSAR510 then relays and performs the job in 
the Territories and Tamkeen implements and selects grantees. It is therefore all about a form 
of ‘expertise* and managerial culture511 implied to set the tone. W hat ‘trickles down* might not 
be values about civil society going from local donors to the population, but rather a 
managerial culture, from Washington to a  small club o f local NGOs.
So eventually, the key aspect in the interaction donors-NGOs is not so much about a diffused 
western model that would be ‘exported*, but rather well a whole mechanism of disciplinary 
discourses (about very restricted managerial approach to civil society) and o f  habitus teaching 
that takes place in these forums, courses, seminars and brochures. Local NGOs serving as 
multiplicators to replicate or redistribute this form o f expertise, are also a vital part of this 
disciplinary process: knowing local tricks and social anchorages, they can give a slightly 
different twist to the content, but the core o f the message (a managerial civil society) remains. 
Then gradually, these views will be dispatched further.
The role of the m ultip licato r N GO s (such as BISAN, PASSLA, Ma’an, etc.) becomes vital in 
this transmission process. Not only do they function as a relay between donors and the local 
arena, but they also serve as an indirect bottom up filter. Though the very nature of these
507 “In addition to ta ilo red  assistance, T am keen  conducted  a series o f  w orkshops on grant proposal 
developm ent, includ ing how  to create financial p lans. From  D ecem ber 2003 to M arch 2004, our team  delivered 
workshops in  five locations throughout the W est B ank and G aza to  m ore than  100 CSO representatives.” See 
http ://www.tam keen.org/ tam keen l/resource_center/ index.asp .
508 See and http ://w w w .am ideast.0rg/0 ffices/w estbank/schedules/def1ult.htm #ptd and
www.armdeast.org/program s_services/m stitutioQ al_dev/avil_society_strengthe£iing/ default,htm #TAM K EEN . 
309 Information received  from one person (on cond ition  o f  anonym ity) tem porarily in  charge o f  such train ing at 
AM IDEAST
510 Let us note that M A SSA R  is also invo lved  in  PE C D A R , one o f  the three authors o f  the position fo r UND P.
sn It would be in teresting  studying the profiles o f  th e  h igher echelons personnel in  such organizations. 
TAM KEEN’s head is  a  Palestin ian  A m erican  h o ld in g  a  PhD  in  M anagem en t
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multiplicator organizations is precisely to be in touch with lower-level (some would say 
community-based organizations) and multiply the dissemination of key values or 
programmes, it does not mean that they are still representing them and that they express the 
same view. It is striking to see that in most of international conferences, or on roundtables 
hosted by large donors, it will pretty much be the same types of local organizations present: 
either some o f these multiplicators, either some elite NGOs512 (Hanan Ashrawi, Mustafa 
Barghouthi, Eyad al-Sarraj, etc) going into circles in one of the many conferences held in the 
region.
In a videoconference organized in February 2004 by the World Bank to discuss a position 
paper on the role o f  NGOs in the World Bank’s activities and linking Washington with Cairo 
and Palestine, only five local organizations were actually present. Very few observers o f local 
NGOs would claim that the presence at this videoconference of BISAN, Early Childhood 
Development Centre, Union o f  Agricultural Work Committees, MEND (a tiny democracy 
and non-violence oriented NGO) and a professor from Bir Zeit University would be 
representative o f  the whole o f Palestine, though the intent was to have a true discussion 
between the W orld Bank and local population. Undoubtedly, with such a meagre 
representation, the staff of Washington might conclude that there is a real need to build a 
vibrant civil society in Palestine. Again, the second Palestine was conspicuously absent.
6.1.4. Different socio-political agendas
How to make sense of the previous statements and evidence presented? The point is not 
about judging a type of view on civil society as good or bad. Rather, it is a relative endeavour 
to stress internal differences in the models and views o f civil society promoted by the variety 
of actors, and how international donors do have certain opportunities to set the tone for local 
actors to relay and promote some of these views.
It would be a m istake to consider that boundaries between ‘international’ donors and lo ca l’ 
NGOs are clear-cut and tangible: some international donors have local Palestinians as head or 
country representative and inversely few local NGOs are run by non-Palestinian ‘westerners’. 
This might explain why some donors have a vision o f Palestinian civil society that is more 
detailed and subtler (as stress in chapter on donors).513 But one needs to, again, resist 
generalization because some Palestinians sitting in international donors’ seat tend to
512 On the transform ation  o f  civil society activism  into an NGO elite , see A bdel Shafi 2004.
513 The show o f  som e international donors is, in  som e cases, tun b y  local staff. T he opposite is  also true, 
whereby local N G O s h ire  professional foreign proposal writers.
T o  be com plete, fu rth er research should also b e  done on the backstage o f  the international donors* apparatus to 
underline the process o f  fabrication, o r m ingling o f  different views on  civil society and how consensus is forged  
about any concept — th at endeavour rem ains an  alm ost impossible task for students o f institutions.
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reproduce these views of separate and different cultures between a modem west and a 
traditional Arab-Middle East. Thus, one Palestinian working for a very large international 
NGO totally dissociated himself from his Palestinian co-nationals by speaking as i f  he was a 
foreigner to the situation: “We believe that the Palestinians fell short in communicating their 
cause outside, especially in the humanitarian dimension.” A lso, he insisted that “we [here at 
this international organization] brought a new development concept, which was missing here 
and which they did not have here before”.
The argument made here is not truly that of a constructivism paradigm: principled values 
might well indeed be transmitted through long-term and subtle mechanisms; yet, one of die 
problems with such constructivist views is that it often assumes a similarity of conditions in 
which international donors and local NGOs interact and also tend to de-historidze the 
different contexts in  which the two actors implied interact.
So far from saying that there are ‘good* and *bad guys’ in promoting certain views on civil 
society (but that there are only different types o f  interpretations) , the following lines w ill consider 
the conditions and potential reasons for which some local actors have taken on them  to relay 
similar values to that of some o f the donors. In other words, one has to look at various 
agendas to make sense of these differences. According to the existing socio-political agendas, 
local actors will stress different répertoires. Let us now consider some of the reasons of the 
actors we have mentioned here so far.
a) BISAN & PASSIA: How to make sense?
Which reasons can explain the positions o f Izzat Abdel Hadi or PASSIA’s seminars about a 
specific view on civil society? It will be argued that their attitude might not automatically 
reflect their real views on the topic, nor that they are to be considered as ‘westernized’ 
intellectuals, having ‘internalized* particular views and definitions on dvil society. The first 
point is dismissed by the fact that PASSIA’s seminars are not representative o f  all its 
academic interests and publications; rather the civil society empowerment series is just one 
element coexisting amongst other topics and publications dealing this time with more local 
priorities and defending the views o f  a large variety o f  actors (religious, political, 
governmental, etc.). The second argument is dismissed because, as argued in the first page of 
this thesis, the views of an internalizations of values assumes different blocks and cultural 
entities that silently coexist next to each other, an assumption that has been so far avoided in 
this thesis. Simply, in the case of Izzat Abdel Hadi, it is probable that BISAN’s director 
simply and genuinely believes in what he writes.
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But Bourdieu’s notion of ‘champ" (or field) is of interest here to give more grounding to the 
reasons why PASSIA and BISAN might have actually hosted and promoted such limited 
(managerial) views on civil society. Bourdieu’s emphasis on the variety of capitals (economic, 
cultural, social and symbolic)514 whose accumulation individuals compete for in a given 
field515, provides interesting motivations to analyse the posidon o f the two NGOs. Not only 
does writing a report or organizing a series of seminars on civil society provide a non- 
negligible economic capital, but it also enhances social and symbolic capital o f the involved 
actors: socially, these NGOs are meant to play a leading role towards their sister organizations 
and fellow country (wo) men through courses and lectures given to other NGOs. In other 
words, such writing or course giving includes a strong element o f  networking with dozens of 
institutions. Symbolically as well, this enhances their social position since it gives them the 
chance to appear through podium discussions, lectures and conferences on the issues that 
matter to them.
But one o f the problem with that is the cultural capital which, it  w ill be argued later, might 
not be at all enhanced through such moves, or even hurt the reputation of the organizations 
on another level (or another champ), that o f the Palestinian domestic politics. By competing 
in  a rather exclusive manner within the field o f international donors, some local NGOs tend 
to forget about their domestic role and anchorage: gradually, a position enhanced thanks to 
international trophies might become a double-edged sword when claiming to fight more on 
the domestic field. This is will be further discussed (Section 6.2.6) and circumstantiated in the 
last chapter.
b) M ustafa Barghouthi’s exam ple o f the left-wing narrative o f emancipation
His account of civil society is rich and much more detailed than m any texts about civil society 
produced in Palestine, and he is far from adopting a too benevolent view o f civil society for 
he points at dangers of lack of representativity within NGOs, and loss of direction according 
to local needs (Barghouthi M. 1994). He also insists on the need to include as much a variety 
o f types o f organizations within the civil society struggle to make it succeed. Yet, Mustafa 
Barghouthi’s views are too deeply entrenched in internal narratives o f  Palestinian politics that 
he, it will be argued here, fails to be fully inclusive o f most segments o f the Palestinian 
population in this defence of civil society. In other words, his plea to include NGOs and a
514 See (Durand & W eiler 1990 :194ff).
515 For a thorough discussions o f Bourdieu’s cham ps, see (Bourdieu 1 9 8 0 :113f): “L es champs peuvent donc se 
défin ir com m e des «  espaces structurés de positions (ou de postes) dont les propriétés dépendent de leur 
position dans ces espaces et qui peuvent être  analysées indépendem m ent des caractéristiques de  leurs occupants 
(en  partie déterm inée p ar elles) » (Bourdieu 1980 :11 3 ). For com ments see (L ah ire  1999).
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diversity of actors within civil society is mostly a p ro  domo argument, rather than a genuinely 
inclusive calL But what is exactly this left-w ing narrative* of emancipation?
This is a shortcut to express the dominant view in the left political spectrum o f Palestinian 
parties (including the PFLP, DFLP and the communist PPP) and promoted from the late 
1980s onwards. Prominent examples are found in texts of Mustafa Barghouthi (1989; 1994; 
1998), Eileen Kuttab (1989) and Rita Giacaman (1995; Giacaman R. & aL 2003). The core of 
the argument is found also in many studies by foreign authors (Hiltermann 1990; Craissati 
1996; Robinson 1997). Under this view , popular committees and more structured 
professional organizations around health, education, agricultural and women activities are the 
backbone of a civil society that not only resisted Israeli occupation until 1993 but also laid the 
ground for proto-national institutions on which the PNA was to lay its foundation from 1994 
onwards. But one stumbling aspect o f  this historical evolution (favoured by the fact that 
Israel forbade nationalist political parties in the Territories, so people gathered in 
‘professional* clubs and associations to have the possibility to engage in political activism), is 
that this model o f  popular committees and professional associations mostly occurred within 
secular, left w ing and broadly Marxist circles. It also entailed a strong emancipatory vision for 
women and individuals to stand up no t only against the Israelis but also against the local 
landowning bourgeoisie and patriarchal conservative forces within Palestinian society 
(Robinson 1993 &  1997). This mobilization model was later copied by Fatah, the dominant 
PLO faction, whose leadership concentrated most o f its efforts outside the Territories but 
which realized that local support had to be fostered as well, not to lose political hegemony 
within the Palestinian territories (Sayigh 1997).
But one has to keep an eye on the fact that this narrative has so far been portrayed as a left- 
wing vs. Fatah competition. In reality, this thesis is based on a vivid and important reality 
because without the work of all these local organizations (left and also Fatah when they later 
joined in) no basic infrastructures would have been developed by the Israeli military rule in 
the Occupied territories. These organization are involved in another constitutive and highly 
debated narrative o f Palestinian identity: the question of the divide between an insider vs 
outsider516 leadership (Tamari 1994; Abdel-Hadi M. 1999; Lindholm Schulz 1999; Hanafi 
S.2001). Though the question is a burning one — for some it is a taboo, for others it is 
inherently part o f the Palestinian predicament o f being refugees and ‘out o f place’, therefore
SIfi Interestingly the insider-outsider debate lo st m u ch  o f  this strength as an  explanatory device to understand 
Palestinian po litics d u rin g  the Oslo years, b u t a f te r  a  y ea r  o r two o f  the second Intifada, it re-gained m uch  
im portance, though  som etim es in  a caricatural m an n er ( e g . Sh ikaki 2002). F o r a critical discussion o f  th e  1990s, 
see Challand 2002 an d  during  the second In tifada  see  L egra in  2003a, and about the concept o f  ‘returnees* in 
general, R om an i 2005 .
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not so important -  it has served as a dividing in the territories since 1994 between those 
inside power circles and those outside o f it (Challand 2002).
Since most o f the PLO returnees provided the backbone of the PNA and that many insider 
activities (and in particular much of the left political spectrum) were not rewarded by 
positions within the nascent authority, the left-wing narrative partly overlapped with that o f 
the insiders but whose say was denied in  the domestic political scene. However one should 
note that the Palestinian political arena includes more than mainstream nationalists (Fatah) 
and the secular left. Therefore the narrative of the left hides as much as its highlights.517 
It comes therefore as no surprise that this narrative suggested by left-wing activists actually 
insists not on a purely political progressive-conservative axis of reasoning, but on the issue of 
democracy. Mustafa Barghouthi and consorts are, in this line, the only democratic forces in 
the Territories. As civil society organi2ations where they have their origin and where they 
continued to perform important service-delivery functions, they should fight to preserve vital 
civic liberties against an increasingly authoritarian PNA. The counter-narrative put forward by 
Fatah and by the PNA (which absorbed most of the Fatah NGOs into its ministries and 
other national committees) is that NGOs did play a very important role as resisting 
occupation and ‘de-development’ (Roy S. 2001a) but after the PNA was established, there 
were no reasons for these NGOs to continue existing and should therefore dissolve into the 
Palestinian Authority.518
Therefore the debates of the PNGO Project (and conference proceedings) described above 
enter in this clash o f  narratives between left-wing and Authority, or, put differently, between 
‘democratic’ civil society and the autocratic PNA. The problem with such simple opposition 
is three-fold. First, the political map has changed and there has been a dramatic popular 
disaffection for left-wing parties.519 Second (and related to the first), the new duel now 
opposes the PNA (alias Fatah) to Hamas (and the Islamist nebulous). Third, the political left 
still active within NGOs has not adapted its vocabulary and its narrative to the new situation 
and continues to refer to a situation which was true ten years ago.
Whatever the grounds for keeping such a narrative alive,520 it cannot deny the existence of 
elements of positive civil society outside the two spheres of left groups and PNA. There is a
5,7 A nother PhD research  also points to  the fact th at the evolution o f  N G O s h ides deeply conflicting v iew s on  
the control and construction o f a political centre. S ee  Abu-Sada 2005a.
518 See the discussion about the absorption o f  the H ealth  Services Council in to  the M inistry o f  H ealth around 
1994. See Craissad's (rather Hirschmanian) m odel o f  inclusion/integration (C raissad  1996: 115 ,123 ).
519 See public opinion po lls conducted by the Je ru sa lem  M edia and C om m unicadon Centre from  1994 onw ards 
at www.jmcc.org.
520 O ne can see som e elem ents o f  truths in  the question  o f  the societal m odel and  dem ocratic polity em bedded  
in  this left-w ing narrative.
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whole world out there in the Territories that would probably not identify with either of the 
two, and affairs o f corruption like that o f die LAW NGO which actually demonstrates that 
this narrative was probably somewhat benevolent: instead o f accepting this narrative or an 
heroic profile o f  NGOs’, one should also stress some o f the ‘ambivalent profile o f NGOs’ to 
use the terms coined by Palestinian sociologists (Hammami &  aL 2001:11 & 16).
6.1.5. Charitable organizations: a conspicuously missing element 
If, with reference to the introduction’s distinction between two Palestines, these over­
represented NGOs that we dealt with so far could be said to belong to the first Palestine (for 
the location, and for their visibility in  terms o f constant and decisive interactions with 
donors), the second Palestine is conspicuously missing, and in  particular smaller NGOs that 
do not benefit from the institutional backup to let them play in  the larger entities’ court. Put 
simply, smaller NGOs, charitable organizations and/or Islamic ones521 52are totally absent from 
die radar screen o f larger interaction schemes so far described. However, in a view where 
democracy is power of the demos, indiscriminately o f social, political, religious or economic 
backgrounds, and where civil society is seen as a source o f democracy and autonomy, the 
Voice’ o f the second Palestine is actually not relayed at all in the mechanisms described so far. 
What views do they have on civil society? Do they not produce texts on the matter? Let us 
assume for a while that chantable societies are the voice of the second Palestine. This is a bit 
o f a shortcut, certainly, because the leadership o f many of these charitable organizations very 
often are associated with an urban educated class. Nevertheless, they often convey and relay 
messages from rural Palestine and many CBOs active in refugee camps and remote villages of 
the West Bank and Gaza axe usually gathered under the banner of the charitable society
* 522unions.
It is probably an understatement to say that these charitable societies and their peak 
associations have not fought the same battle as their urban secular and NGO partners. To the 
best of my knowledge, a production o f texts, brochures, books and thorough studies 
comparable to these studies until now does not exist in as elaborate a form as other texts 
studied so far. But it does not mean that there are no opinions and views on dvil society in 
this part o f the checkers. The following parts of the chapter (Sections 6.2.4 to 6.2.6) will 
demonstrate that a  very articulate view actually exists in  many charitable organizations, but 
they are simply not very often relayed or spread, because o f  faulty or scarce means of
5211 exclude th e  Is lam ist N G O s w hich w ould  have anyw ay no  in terest in  h av ing  interactions w ith  th e  donors we 
are dealing here  w ith .
522 Interview w ith  N o ra  Q O R T , B oard M em ber, P a lestin ian  G eneral U nion o f  the Charitable Societies, 
Jerusalem , 21 .01.2004 .
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communication w ith donors, or because of the lack of reflexive communication of other 
NGOs (like Mustafa Barghouthi’s efforts to use the phrase of civil society for both internal 
political purposes but also to enhance his position with donors). In a nutshell, although some 
o f the charitable organizations speak the content of civil society, they do not use the phrases o f 
civil society (as the following study of health organizations will prove).
Instead, charitable organizations concentrate mostly on local help and their efforts have been 
highly appreciated during the current Intifada . In a period when the local becomes the most 
important resource, both in terms of economic network (see Heacock 2004; Malki 1994), and 
political ideology by an over-determination by the national (Hamzah & Larzillière 2005), this 
form of self-help is highly appreciated and its different rhetoric resonates with the local 
population. Despite this, it would be a mistake to conceive of charitable organizations as 
trapped only in ‘the local’. When interviewed about their conception of civil society, most of 
them came up with some textbook d e f in i t io n  of civil society, highlighting, among others, the 
relay-role they should play for better democratic governance, and the structuring role they 
have for their constituency.
The point Ís to illustrate the fact that even smaller organizations (like charitable ones) have 
the capacity to articulate sound and clear concepts. It all depends on who are their 
interlocutors. W hen needed they ran ‘click’ or ‘connect* to the répertoire required by the 
situation. But international donors have little interactions with them (if so, it is often through 
larger and/or multiplicator organizations), and do not think o f them as potential resource 
partners or as input-givers to publish grey literature on issue o f civil society.
To conclude these paragraphs, one ran note how most international donors have overlooked 
the peripheries and how they have tended to systematically draw on a tiny group of NGOs 
from the first Palestine to infer or instil a strategic mapping o f civil society action. This can be 
detrimental to the large majority of NGOs, which are much smaller but also active in rural 
and more deprived zones, therefore serving a different type o f actions (see also Section 6.3.3 
& Table 26).
Let us now turn to two types of NGOs, health service-providing organizations advocacy 
NGOs, and see whether there are also contrasting views about civil society and if so, how 
these differences are articulated and motivated.
6.2. Service-Providing NGOs: The Case of Health
As has been many times stressed in  this dissertation, one needs to assess the historical 
evolution and the differentiated sodo-geographica! conditions under which actors act before 
embarking on any kind of generalizations. We will do so with our health organization sample,
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in order to understand better some o f the charactensd.es o f  the sector and some of the 
trajectories taken by a variety of its NGOs. “[...] The structure, function and capacity of the 
health system [of the Palestinian territories] has been shaped largely by the country’s complex 
political history” (Giacaman &  al. 2003: 59).
Let us address first the complex history o f different types o f  health organizations. There are 
about 200 such organizations in the Territories. But health is a far-reaching concept that 
includes many aspects, such as primary, secondary and tertiary health care,523 physical, mental 
and psycho-social well-being, that can also include rehabilitation for handicapped, health 
education and prevention (smoking, drugs, etc.), and pharmaceutical cares.
For obvious reasons of space and time available, the research decided from the outset to 
concentrate on organizations offering primary health care (PHC), or a combination of 
primary health care with another health component Nevertheless, a small sample o f 
organizations not doing primary health care were selected to provide further and deeper 
information about the sector. Therefore few hospitals and research centers dealing with 
health where also interviewed.524 We w ill then stress three different visions o f health and how 
it can relate to our main problém atique o f civil society and civil society promotion in the 
Territories, and to understand how this discourse o f ‘civil society’ at work might enhance, or 
to the contrary, impede health service provision to local populations.
6.2.1. Diachronic presentation of the health sector
a) General evolutions
In the last 50 years or so, there have been three main types of health providers in the 
Territories, The first ones are the governmental services that have been run by four different 
governmental actors: the Egyptian government in the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian in  the West 
Bank from 1948 until 1967, the Israeli government from 1967 until 1994, and the Palestinian 
National Authority which started its take-over in Gaza and Jericho from December 1994 
onwards (Giacaman R. 1995: 11). The second type o f health actor is UNRWA, which, since 
its creation in the aftermath o f the 1948 War, provides health and also education to duly 
registered Palestinian refugees. By 1992, UNRWA had 168 clinics and health centres
523 Prim ary H ealth Care (PHC)’s definition is genera lly  that given in  the A lm a-A ta D eclaration. PH C “is  essential 
health care based  on  practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable m ethods and technology, m ade 
universally accessib le to  individuals and fam ilies in  the community through the ir full participation an d  at a  cost 
that the com m unity  and country can afford to m aintain  at every stage o f th e ir developm ent in  the sp irit o f  self- 
reliance and  self-determ ination." Secondary H ealth  Care is interlinked w ith PH C , but involves a “m ore advanced 
diagnostic and therapeutic means” (like labs, sm a ll surgery, beds fo r in-patients, etc.). Finally, T ertiary Health 
Care (TH C) covers m ore complex treatm ents, tra in ing  o f health staff. H osp ital treatm ent is typ ica l o f  the THC 
level. See (E ade &  W illiam s 1995: 631-636).
524 Though they w ere  included in the full list o f  interview ed organizations, th e  questionnaire w as adapted to their 
profiles. T h ey  are m arked  w ith a (*) in  the list o f  interviews (Appendix I).
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throughout the Occupied Territories (Haq 1993: 10), but only about 70 of them in the late 
1990s (Curmi 2003: fn. 6). The non-refugee Palestinian population o f the Territories can turn 
to a third type o f actor, that of the non-govemmental sector, be it non-profit or private- 
oriented*
The development o f health NGOs has two historical roots. First, the recognition by Arab 
countries o f the PLO as the sole legitimate representative organization for the Palestinians in 
1974 paved the way for PLO patronage of organizations inside the occupied Territories, but 
meaning also factionalism within the Palestinian communities along the lines of political 
parties. In the same swing, a Palestinian National Fund (also established in 1974, to which 
Palestinians from outside were handing over 5% of their salaries) provided financial resources 
for the inside population (Curmi 2002: 99ff).
The second root is the signing o f the Camp David Accords in 1978 between Egypt and Israel, 
which shook many Palestinians fearing that any just and long-lasting solution would not be 
supported from Arab brethren countries, but rather that large international actors would 
impose a solution on the Palestinians or that the Israelis, under Likud PM Begin, would force 
some fake ‘autonomy plans* upon Palestinians (Roy S. 2001a: 108f). As one health activist 
retrospectively put it:
‘Disillusionment [about the 1978 Accords] spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza: there 
would be no military overthrow of Israel, the occupation would continue, and community 
resistance to survive this occupation must be intensified” (UPMRC 2003:7).
Three years later, the so-called Civil Administration was extended to the whole o f the
Territories and meant the direct Israeli control; in the case of health, the whole health care
system was not placed under the direction o f the Ministry of Health but under the command
o f the Ministry o f Defence (Giacaman & al. 2003: 61). Besides the fact that Palestinians had
no say in the running of governmental hospitals, Israel did actually little to develop health
infrastructures (Odeh 1989: 71). On the contrary, the number o f governmental hospitals
under Israeli rule dropped from 20 in 1968 to 14 by 1992. Three o f the six hospitals closed
down were converted into a police station, a military HQ and a prison (Haq 1993: 12). In
terms of investments in the health sector, if  Israel was spending $306 p er  capita on its citizens,
it  had a p e r  capita expenditure on health o f $30 in the W est Bank in the late 1980s, which even
decreased further in 1991 to a mere $20 (Mash’al 1995: 90).
These various examples show that Israeli military rule actually did very little to develop health 
infrastructures in  the Territories. Instead, local popular initiatives, gathered around the logic 
o f political parties, started from the late 1970s to organize basic health services to the local 
population. This is the origin of the so-called popular committees spread throughout the
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West Bank and Gaza and divided along sectoral or professional activities. Put in a nutshell, 
what the Israelis were ‘de-developing’ (Roy S. 2001a) and undoing in the Territories, popular 
and professional Palestinians committees were re-doing and trying their best to develop with 
their own means and visions.525
To orientate the reader, let us give some figures in terms o f bed coverage and hospitals in the 
temtories at the end of the first Intifada, right before the PNA took over from 1994 onwards. 
It is estimated that by the time the DoP was signed in  1993 and around the period when the 
PNA was established, NGOs were providing 60% o f  primary health care services and about 
49% of secondary and tertiary care” (Barghouthi M. 1994: 6) and the totality of disability care 
in the Territories (Shawa 2001: 16).
With the advent of the PNA many organizations actually closed down some of their clinics, 
either because other health infrastructures were set up by the PA, or because funding was 
diverted towards the PNA, and this meant the closing down o f the tap for local NGOs. 
UPMRC, the health NGO linked to the c o m m u n is t  party, had 31 PHC clinics in 1992, 28 in 
1995 (Jeppson & I-indahl 1995: 2) and only 25 by the end o f the decade (UPMRC [2001: 6]). 
UHWC, linked to the PFLP, also shut down some o f  its clinics. The UHCC, affiliated with 
the DFLP, seems to have suffered m ost with 15 clinics closed at the beginning o f the Oslo 
years, down “from 32 in 1992 to 3 in 1999” (Rabe 2000: 277ff). Health organizations closely 
affiliated with Fatah literally merged w ith the nascent PNA and many of its staff gained a job 
in the PNA administration: Anis Al-Qaq, former head o f  the Health Service Council, became 
active in  the Health Ministry (Rabe 2000: 85 & 265). With the emergence o f the PNA, 
according to a health NGOs, “over 70 percent of non-governmental primary health clinics526 
and 1,000 kindergartens were shut down in the W est Bank and Gaza Strip” (UPMRC 2003: 
32). Another source reveals that 99 NGOs527 (out o f 1011) were closed down between 1993 
and 1997 (Shawa 2001: 46).
By the end o f  the decade, the distribution of health institutions in the WBGS can be 
summarized in the following two tables (Table 16 & 17528).
525 On this sector, see  R obinson 1993.
526 There are no figures to  confirm  such  a  h igh  proportion  o f closures o f  p rim ary  health care centres. I t is 
probably overstated , in  o rder to reinforce the ro le  o f  NGOs- L e t us bear in  m in d  that the current Intifada  is  a 
time o f re-growth o f  som e N G O s and sooner o r  later, peace negotiations w ill resum e and again , priority w ill be 
given to build ing state-infrastructures.
527 Shawa speaks o f ‘th ird sector organisations’ ra th er than N G O s, quoting a  report published by H D IP in  1998.
528 Figures taken  o u t o f  (D W RC 2001 :18 ). D W R C  actually takes h is figure from  the M inistry o f  H ealth  1998 
Annual Report. In form ation  also  taken from  the M in istry o f  H ealth  (N ovem ber 2004).
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Table 16: Number and type o f prim ary health care fPHC) centres in Palestine (\ 998-2003)
;
Governmental UNRWA NGOs Total
Gaza WB Gaza WB Gaza WB Gaza W B TOTAL
1998 35 300 17 34 40 104 92 438 530
2000 43 316 17 34 40 145 100 495 595
2003 54 337 17 34 32 145 103 516 619
Table 17: Distribution o f hospitals and clinics in Palestine
Governmental UNRWA NGOs & Private
West Bank 9 1 28
Gaza Strip 5 0 7
Total 14 1 35
The e m e r g e n c y  situation bom out o f  the second Intifada intensified the number o f closures, 
and increased territorialization (in particular after the massive Israeli operations of 2002 
onwards). The Territories have now become a chaplet of small islands, or Bantustans, with 
little possibility to move, even for m edical staff, despite protection in theory guaranteed to the 
latter by the Geneva Conventions. Therefore it has become even more vital to decentralize as 
much as possible health care centres in  order to be able to respond to each of these pockets 
of sanitary needs. Many efforts went in  this direction and on all echelons of the health care 
services. In terms of hospitals, there was a 30% increase in terms of number of beds available 
between 1999 and 2003 (see Table 18).529
Table 18: Comparison o f number o f beds bv health providers (1999-2003)
Governmental UNRWA NGOs Private Total
Gaza WB Gaza WB Gaza WB Gaza WB Gaza WB TOTAL
1999 896 1009 0 38 314 1094 36 258 1246 2399 3645
2003 1462 1152 0 58 416 1073 39 479 1917 2762 4679
An overall increase might however not be sufficient, since not all govemorates are equally 
equipped in terms of hospital (secondary and tertiary health care). Lack of mobility meant 
that hospitals which used to refer certain cases to larger or more specialized centers could not 
do so anymore. Just to cite two examples: a small private hospital just outside o f Beit Lahem 
received many cases of trauma injuries which had to be treated immediately, though many 
times patients were either not covered by health insurance, or had no money to pay for the 
treatment expenses. A few kilometers away, a rather rich hospital but specialized in early 
childhood care (sponsored by Christian European churches) would not take casualties above
529 Inform ation taken  from the M inistry o f  H ealth ’s web site. See 
ttp://www .m oh.gov.ps/annual/2003/5_hospitals/2003_H ospitals_W .pdf
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the age o f five, even i f  they were children. The same hospital has observed that i f  before the 
second Intifada , 40% of its patients were from Beit Lahem’s govemorate (40% from Hebron 
and the rest from the West Bank), it jumped to 83% (with a mere 17% from other 
govemorates) .53°
The same applies for NGOs: those with national reach were able to use their various PHC 
centers to provide direct care. Another solution was to organize mobile clinics whereby a 
local NGO would organize day visits in remote villages, which gives the opportunity to 
provide basic care and to move to villages whenever it is possible. Field hospitals were also 
organized during the most intense Israeli operations, most notably in Nablus where local 
NGOs established a care point in one of the central mosque. Decentralized and rather 
informal networks of health specialists were also occasionally mobilized thanks to a  telephone 
hotline whereby, e g ., midwives and nursing staff would be called upon to help mothers to 
deliver in  case there was a curfew or strict travel ban imposed in  some of the villages.530 31 
But smaller NGOs were simply trapped in their constituency and could no longer reach as far 
as they did before. Thus, one small Jerusalem-based organization very active in breast cancer 
screening, deplored a tragic fall-out in  terms of the long-term efforts to provide screening and 
prophylaxis campaigns throughout the W est Bank: 75% o f the targeted women before 2000 
were from all over the West Bank, but the number dropped to 25% with the second 
Intifada,'532
b ) PN A  and  W orld B ank sec to ra l p lann ing: p rivatized  or state-led  sector?
PNA has the lead over health policies since 1994, but its work has to be supplemented by 
NGOs for many reasons, one being that it cannot really operate freely in Zone C and in East 
Jerusalem.533 As for many other activities, the health sector has been largely guided from 
outside, through various donor coordination mechanisms and in particular by the World 
Bank, which published in collaboration with the Ministry o f health various developmental 
plans (World Bank 1997a; 1997b; 1998).
One o f the consequences of such health sector reform has been the increasingly privatized 
approach favoured by international donors. It certainly aims at improving “the efficiency and 
the quality o f [health] services, the sustainability of present financial arrangements and equity 
and accessibility to services” (World Bank 1998:1). But for some, such outside-driven health
530 Interview with Edward DABDOUB, Administrative Director, Caiitas Baby Hospital, Beit Lahem,
20.01.2004.
531 Interview with Dina NASSER, Executive Director, JUZOOR Foundation For Health And Social 
Development, Ar-Rana, 16.02.2004.
532 Interview with Carole JAT3ARI, Director, Patients Friend Society in Jerusalem, Mount o f Olive, 21.02.2004.
533 It partially does so since 1997 when it took over the Maqassed Hospital See Curmi 2002.
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sector reforms have “missed the forest for the trees” (Giacaman & aL 2003: 60), by offering 
often only “quick fixes” and too much of “technical assistance” which is a sort o f tied 
funding with 20% remaining in the country of origin {ibid.: 65). The main reproach is that it 
failed to apply a broader systemic analysis and was divorced from the socio-political context 
of Palestine (ibid.: 60,66).
One key example is the question o f health insurance coverage. The main system is the 
governmental which is compulsory for PNA employees, but large segments of the population 
are without insurance. Around 1998, it was estimated that 48% o f the population was covered 
by some health insurance,534 but “40% of total health expenditure on medical care” came 
direcdy from individuals’ pockets (Giacaman, & aL 2003: 62).
With the current Intifada and the dramatically worsening socio-economic situation, the 
insurance question has become an even more important and burning issue, A  study of 
Palestinian needs in the second Intifada  notes that despite the fact that now 35%  o f the 
population (slightly more than in 1998) covers by its own means the costs of health care 
services, “half o f those who cover their own expenses are under the poverty line” (Bocco & 
aL 2002: 76).
This kind o f situation certainly supports those who argue that privatized health services 
should be introduced only with the utmost care, and even more so not in difficult times such 
as those prevalent now in the Territories. But linking to the question o f the visions of civil 
society, surely a rather managerial vision of civil society could help in implementing such 
privatized projects.
6.2.2. Overview of the 129 health NGOs
But before going into a deeper look and deeper study of the views that various types o f health 
organizations have about civil society, let us say a few words about the types of organizations 
providing health services in the non-govemmental sector in the current times. Out of the 
nearly 900 NGOs included in our database, 129 (14%) are active in the health sector. Many 
other organizations actually provide some health, but only as a secondary activity (and 
therefore do not appear in this analysis). The average year o f establishment o f a  ‘typical’ 
health organization is 1983, which confirms the fact that service-oriented NGOs are older 
than the PNA. Their dates of creation range from 1882 (in the case of two hospitals, one in 
Jerusalem and one in Gaza), 1905 (another Christian hospital in Beit Lahem), to 1999 for the 
most recent ones. 29 new health NGOs (22% of all health NGOs) were founded in  the last
534 This figure does not include registered refugees who benefit anyway from free basic health care services from 
UNRWA.
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decade (1994-onwards535). In terms of geographical distribution o f health NGOs, the 
following table536 indicates a rather good proportion between the number o f organizations in 
the W est Bank and in the Gaza Strip (60 - 40%) considering the population balance (65% - 
35%).537
Table 19: Geographical distribution o f 129 health NGOs
Geographical distribution Total % of total Average year of foundation
West Bank 77 60% 1980
Gaza Strip 52 40% 1988538
T o ta l-ave rage 129 100% 1983
In terms of activities, the following table (Table 20) indicates that rehabilitation work and 
primary health care are by far the most important priorities inside the sector.
Table 20: Main type o f activities o f  129 health NGOs
Main type of activities Number Percentage
Rehabilitation & Handicap 51 40%
PHC 40 31%
Hospital539 12 9%




As for affiliation to larger unions and networks, five institutions (4%) are part o f PINGO, 
and 33 (26%) are members to one o f the regional Union of Charitable Societies.
We w ill now split these 129 into three subtypes (Table 21) according to the outreach they 
have. The first subgroup will be made o f the larger NGOs w ith a national range o f actions, 
the second subgroup is constituted by medium-size NGOs which in general do not have a 
national outreach. Finally, smaller health organizations based only in one location will form 
the third subgroup.
535 The most recent NGOs are from 1999 in the case o f health. The Commission of the NGO Affairs did not 
have any list o f recent NGOs, but I was told that, grvsso modo (since this interview could not be taped), the 
priority for the PNA was not to register new NGOs but to “revive non-active NGOs”. Interview with Khamis 
ROK, Deputy Director, Commission o f  NGO Affairs, Gaza City, 02.02.2003.
536 Tables 19,20 and 21 are taken from the author’s databases on Palestinian NGOs.
537 Figures taken from PASSIA 2004, which quotes the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
538 The difference is due to the fact that registration procedures were much more difficult during Egyptian rule 
than under the Jordanian regime: except the Arab Hospital formally established in 1882, a ll other health 
organizations in the Gaza Strip where founded after 1967, but about 80% o f them from the time of the first 
Intifada onwards.
539 This includes only hospitals that have the status o f registered NGOs.
540 This includes only organizations specialized in  health dedicated to women and/or children. Many more 
women organizations which might have a health component, but not as their main activities, are not included in 
this list.
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Table 21 : Relative size of health NGOs
1 Total Number I % of total Nb. In West Bank Nb. in Gaza Strip
Large ones 15 12% 11 4
Medium ones 14 11% 11 3
Smaller ones 100 78% 55 45
7ofa/ 129 100% 77 52
We will now give a short description o f these three categories.
a) L arger health  NGOs m  the current I n tifa d a
The main health organization, that is officially a non-governmental one, is the Palestinian Red 
Crescent Society, which has branches in  all of the main populated areas. It was established, as 
a national entity in 1968541 under the auspices of the PLO and has health infrastructures in 
five countries.542 For many years it was led by Fathi Arafat, the brother o f Yaser Arafat, but 
was replaced recently by Younis al-Khatib who took over as president. It is a national society 
of the International Federation o f Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.543 The PRCS 
operates inside the Territories 20 branches active in  26 localities544 and has a staff o f  2,400 
people, running 26 PHC centres and more than 100 ambulances.545
Other big NGOs include UHWC, UPMRC, and UHCC. Though some o f them are formally 
registered under a different name in  the West Bank (compared to their name in the Gaza 
Strip),546 they are originally from the same matrix, that o f  the popular committees and 
originally affiliated to political parties. AH three organizations insist that they are formaHy 
independent from the political parties, but it is a fact that they have remained in a very close 
orbit
Other organizations were included in this category for the large number o f employees they 
have. The Gaza Community Mental Health Project, and Health Development Information 
and Policy Institute (HDIP) are good examples. None o f them is formally working in the 
whole o f the WJÖ and GS, but their programmes are those o f fuUy professionalized entities, 
whose work is meant to influence (through report publications and/or formation) on a 
national basis.
541 Some local branches existed before that, as was the case since 1948 in Jenin. See (BenthaH & Bellion-Jourdan 
2003:65ff).
542 Despite its re-centring upon the OPT after 1995, the PRCS still has health infrastructures in Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. It also has offices in France, Italy and Canada. See
http://www.palestinercs.org/prcsindepth/prcs.htm.




546 This is the case o f UPMRC, registered as Medical Relief and Development in Gaza (see UN SCO 1998).
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A short survey of their number o f staff547 *indicates that these big NGOs (what could be called 
the *Big Sisters’) were founded on average in 1976, and employ each on average 175 persons 
on top o f a few hundreds o f voluntary workers. All o f them are urban-based (though they 
have some branches and centres in  rural areas), and benefit from highly structured 
organizations with a number of staff now taking care o f purely administrative staff. Some o f  
these larger NGOs even produce high-quality books and publications or in some cases films 
on video, and offer some o f this information management as services to other
,  CJfi
organizations.
b) M ed ium -size  h ealth  organ izations
The medium-size health NGOs employ on average about 80 staff and are rather large 
institutions. Nevertheless their reach is only regional. They are older than the big ones, with 
an average year o f foundation in 1970.
Some prominent cases are the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip (headed by Dr. 
Haydar Abdel-Shafi), Ardh al-ltfal (Gaza City), Ardh Al-Insan (Khalil), the Bethlehem Arab 
Society for Rehabilitation and some o f the Patients Friend Societies. The various Patients 
Friends Societies are not part o f a unified movement and each of them is totally independent 
and shares no common resources except their name. Their W elianschauungen also vary a lot 
from place to place. Finally, some hospitals registered as NGOs are included here because 
they are draining from a basin bigger than a single locality. This is also the case o f al-Ihsan 
Charitable Society (in Hebron), since it  has a training function for other rehabilitation NGO 
from the W est Bank.549
Some o f them have a more or less refined administrative apparatus, but less developed than 
the b ig ones. For example, i f  the NGOs Ardh al-ltfal and Ardh al-Insan are the authors of 
important reports on the question o f  malnutrition, the diffusion of such texts w ill be limited 
to professional a id e s  and with a simple text format presentation, whereas the larger NGOs 
would probably make a book, a videoconference and brochures about it, at least they would 
seek conscious visibility through such publications. This small example of the publication 
strategy serve to contrast the means at disposition of the different organizations.
c) S m alle r NGOs: from retrea t to n ah d h ah  (rena issance)?
Finally,the rest o f health NGOs are induded under the heading ‘smaller ones’, though this 
could be slightly misleading, since some might employ up to 50 staff, even though their
547 Information taken partly from UNSCO’s various NGO directories (UNSCO 1998,1999a, 2003) and partly 
completed by interviews with individual organizations.
544 UPMRC has thus its own video-unit and since 1999, as a ‘Media Production Unit (MADA)’ (Mada [2003]).
549 Interview with Iyaad SUROUR, Public Relations Officer, Ihsan Charitable Society, Hebron, 11.02.2004.
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vocation is a local one. In terms of year of foundation, this category is the most recent since 
the average year is 1986, though, as it w ill be pointed out later, this needs to be assessed in the 
light o f the differences amongst the types of location.
They represent more than three fourth of the health organizations (78%) and are therefore 
very important for certain types of actions. They are more diffused in Gaza (45 NGOs) than 
in the West Bank (55 of them), and they are much more active in the non-urban setting than 
the previous two categories: all 37 health NGOs based550 in refugee camps (RC) or villages are 
actually ‘smaller NGOs’.551 The profile of activities is also different 77% of the 30 NGOs 
based in RC have rehabilitation/handicap as their main priority.
According to the database gathered, at least 21% of health organizations are benevolent 
societies, affiliated with one of the Unions of Charitable Societies.552 That means that they are 
rather small entities, dispersed throughout the communities (also in villages). One o f  the key 
characteristics — an actual requirement of the by-law on NGOs — is that charitable 
organization’s board o f directors should be voluntary. This line o f separation professionalized 
NGOs vs. voluntary charitable organizations is only indicative, since there are some 
exceptions to the rule.553 Charitable organizations are older than PINGO affiliated health 
NGOs (in terms of average year o f establishment), but this is mostly the case for urban 
charities, since the ones established in villages and refugee camps were, in average, established 
from 1990 onwards (see Table 22).
Table 22: Compared average year o f  foundation
Y e a r of Foundation (b y  type of location)
Refugee C a m p s 1992
Village 1990
Urban 1979
A ve ra g e 1983
Y e a r of foundation (by type of affiliation)
Charitable Unions 1977
P IN G O 1987
Others 1985
A ve ra ge 1983
Let us note that some of the %akaat (almsgiving) committees include health activities. The 
Hebron %akaat committee I interviewed was keen to present its work in the field o f health. 
Not only do they cover insurance fees and certain hospitalization expenses for needy people, 
but also they run their own small medical laboratory, which allows to diminish the costs of 
treatments for some patients. Zakaat provide therefore vital resources in the middle of local
550 are speaking here o f the type of locations where the organizations were registered.
551 This is not to say that none of the *big ones’ or Medium-size NGOs is not active in villages or refugee camps. 
Source: our own database on Palestinian NGOs. See previous footnote.
552 There are four regional Unions of charitable societies, three in the West Bank (Nablus, Jerusalem, and 
Hebron), and one in Gaza. At the summit o f these regional unions, there is the Palestinian General Union of 
Charitable Societies, based in Jerusalem.
55J Interview with Nora QORT, Board Member, Palestinian General Union o f the Charitable Societies, 
Jerusalem, 21.01.2004.
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communities. On average between 1992 and 2000, the Hebron Zakaat Committee disbursed 
yearly $1.05m, which is a very important sum that is well beyond what any of the larger health 
NGOs would spend in the Hebron district554
6.2.3. Linking health with civil society: Alma-Ata Declaration and the 
emergence of ‘civil society5
After this descriptive introduction to the health sector, w e w ill now move to the analysis o f  
health organizations and their usage o f the concept ‘civil society’, in particular, how the latter 
appeared in a historical continuity. It might appear at first sight awkward to associate civil 
society with the provision o f health services. O f course there is the ‘obvious* link between 
NGOs and civil society (but that is a  matter of ‘evidence* only in the last ten years), but there 
is a much stronger link which depends on the definition given to the concept o f ‘health*.
As health activists like to put it, health is more that just physical well-being or the absence o f  
disease. Since the Declaration of Alma-Ata and the UN conference dedicated to the question 
of Primary Health Care in September 1978, it is common to include in the concept of health 
(as a short cut for primary health care) the fact that it is “a state of complete physical, mental 
and social wellbeing [.. .]** and is “a fundamental human right and that the attainment of the 
highest possible level of health is a most important word-wide sodal goal whose realization 
requires the action of many other social and economic sectors in addition to the health 
sector” (§1, Declaration of Alma-Ata 1978).555
However, the 1978 Alma-Ata Declaration did not mention civil society, for some rather clear 
reasons. First, the concept o f civil society was not yet ‘reborn* and was not in the parlance o f 
a time when the Cold War was at its height. Second, this international conference o f the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) was pushed forward by the Soviet Union, at a period 
when it became clear that the US-led efforts to eradicate m alaria were doomed to failure. 
Instead, pushing for a conference on PHC was a “natural forum in which they [the Soviets] 
might demonstrate to the underdeveloped world that their form of socialism could 
accomplish what other political systems could not** (lits io s 2002: 716). This was translated 
into some abstract call for “economic and social development, based on a New International 
Economic Order**556 (§ 2), but in much more practical terms, “primary health care is the key
5M Interview with Majeed NASSER Ed-DIN, Board Member, Zakaat Committee al-Khalil, Hebron, 12.02.2004. 
The figures, available on their brochure (Zakaat 2001), were confirmed during the interview. Another source 
mentions that Tulkarem Zakaat Committee (a city north of the West Bank) disbursed $1.3m in 1998. See Curmi
2001
555 See WHO web-site for the full text of the Declaration: 
www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaiation_alniaata.pdf.
556 A vague enough formulation to satisfy *East’ and ‘West’, but that was in vogue in the 1970s in international
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to attaining this target as part of development in the spirit o f social justice” (§ 5 of the Alma- 
Ata Declaration). In its final article (§ 10) which set the year 2000 to attain an “acceptable 
level o f health for all the people for the world”, civil society is not mentioned, but is around 
the corner “It urges governments, WHO and UNICEF, and other international 
organizations, as well as multilateral and bilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
funding agencies, all health workers and the whole world community to support national and 
international commitment to primary health care ad to channel increased technical and 
financial support to it, particularly in developing countries” (WHO 1978: §10).
This call of Alma-Ata will have an important impact upon various health activists in Palestine 
as well, as a universal effort that concerns each single individual. Some of these activists have 
actually linked the Alma-Ata call with their national call for Palestinian autonomy. The 
discourse of civil society has served as a useful entry-point in that process.
‘Civil society’ is actually a recent concept in the narrative o f Palestinian NGOs. An attentive 
study o f texts produced either by NGOs (such as reports, brochures), NGO activists, and 
even scholars demonstrate that the concept of civil society actually appears in Palestine 
between 1992 and 1994. But the more interesting discovery is that it is only the phrase ‘civil 
society’ itself which is new, since the notions and the substance included under ‘civil society* 
are actually present well before the emergence of the phrase.
The riming o f  both Alma-Ata (1978) and of the introduction of civil society (1992-1994) 
coincides with turning  point in the history of health NGOs. The first moment coincides with 
the birth of various popular committees, and the second with the arrival on the horizon of 
the PNA. Put in a nutshell, the idea is that the way local popular committees and later some 
of the NGOs have portrayed themselves has evolved from one narrative into another. Both 
spirits o f Alma-Ata and of civil society were invoked as universalizing repertoire on which local 
NGOs could draw to project their particular stance. The connection (‘branchem cnt a la 
Amselle 2001) to civil society is particularly interesting for our demonstration, since it took 
place at the same moment where ‘civil society’ was becoming ‘popular’ throughout the world 
(and not just in  Palestine), and because it offers a good framework for considering the 
changes taking place within the health sector itself with the creation of the PNA.
Let us make the various narratives clearer. First, there are two successive moments (a &  b) for 
these NGOs using expliddy the concept o f civil society from the mid 1990s.
a) When NGOs that were providing services (in health, agriculture, education, and the 





occupation), they portrayed themselves as popular movements resisting colonial 
occupation.
b) NGOs later portrayed themselves as popular-based movements (hence endowed w ith 
a strong legitimacy) and resisting, on top o f the leftovers of the Israeli occupation, the 
autocratic tendencies of the nascent PNA.
So by their *branchement* or connection to this new international rhetoric of democracy from 
below associated with civil society, NGOs expressed their new particu la r political position b y  
projecting it onto the universalistic répertoire of ‘civil society*.
The current stress on the manners through which local organizations portray themselves does 
not intend to assess whether they were or were not what they claim to be (or to have been). 
Of concern to us here is what this gradual shift in narradve reflects, namely a change in the 
overall political context (end o f Occupation and creation o f the PNA) but also the beginning 
of the intrusion of international donors into Palestinian forms of collective action. The 
purpose is to unpack and shed light upon the moment where répertoires invoked by local 
organizations started changing and what this critical juncture meant for various socio-political 
actors. It is argued that the branchement to the rhetoric of civil society reveals the increasing 
impact o f external aid upon local civil society organizations. In this watershed period, there 
are elements o f continuities, a key turning point, and finally, the emergence o f a new 
vocabulary. -
The problem, as we will demonstrate later, is that the increased reference to civil society as a 
means o f reinforcing their position in terms of domestic politics, w ill gradually and 
surreptitiously draw NGOs using such vocabulary away from their original mission, namely 
serving their grass roots constituency (see Tables 23-25 and 27-28 on models about situations 
of autonomy and heteronomy). But before that, let us see what are the elements o f  continuity, 
of connection, and of renewal
a) Permanence of narratives
A corpus of documents and articles557 produced between 1988 and 1993 demonstrate that, 
although the phrase ‘civil society* never appears formally, the ideas and notions it embodies 
were actually part o f the narrative of certain Palestinian NGOs. Here are some examples of 
narratives proposed by Palestinians, which do not entail ‘d v il society* but many elements of 
its substance.
Mustafa Barghouthi (1989:128):
557 The corpus includes Barghouthi M. 1989; Kuttab E. 1989; Nakhleh 1989; Odeh 1989; Haq 1993; IPHC 
1995[1992]; Barghouthi M. & Giacaman R. 1990, and Mash’al 1989.
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“These [mass-based] organizations [are] the entry point — as actors — into  society for those 
sectors o f  society that were m ost oppressed and disadvantaged.“
“It is w orth  noting that w hile popular/mass-based activities have proved a success, it is difficult 
to envisage the development o f a genuine popular movement without democratic principles 
being app lied  and practiced. It is precisely these democratic principles that im part to our 
popular m ovem ent its special characteristics.”
Here mass-based organizations (implied are a certain sector o f NGOs) are agents o f collective 
actions, as long as they stick to democratic principles. Undoubtedly these are vital elements of 
civil society. Eileen Kuttab (1989:135):
“From the start the emphasis w as on ‘development from the bottom up’ and ‘from the bases* 
through th e recognition o f  values and human potential and a democratic process w hich is 
partic ipatory and decentralized. [ . . . ]  Some o f the key elements in this social process are the 
developm ent o f  self-respect, increased self-confidence am ongst the co-operative members 
through gro up  identity, and solidarity”
Collective action, decentralized, and development: Putnam would probably like to make this
sentence his. C ivil society is not mentioned but one can recognize various elements usually
tied to the concept nowadays. Another passage of the same author proves to have a view of
what could be Hegel’s description o f civil society and of the sphere of needs (B eduifnisse):
“W ith the help  o f the grassroots organizations, people are m anaging to establish an 
infrastructure that is aid ing them to survive. In this respect the society itse lf is shifting from a 
society based  in  individualism to one w here collective activity is the prim ary concern and is 
exem plified in  the activities o f  the grass-roots organizations” (Kuttab 19 8 9 :137).558
In another source, Rita Giacaman (1995[1992]) adds to the substance of civil society but
without citing it:
“In the Palestin ian context, the national struggle was instrum ental in giving rise to, and fueling, 
various types o f  social movem ent, including student m ovem ents, a voluntary work movement, 
w om en’s, health , and agricultural m ovem ents.” (p.10)
“Com m unity and grassroots activity, solidarity and com munity action, began to appear on the 
agenda in  ideological terms, and voluntary, grassroots activities began to characterize the late 
1970s” (p.13)
Here the project becomes that o f a nation under occupation. Finally, for Jihad Mash’al 
(1995[1992]: 89):
“The resultant deterioration o f health  conditions and health services created a situation where 
the responsibility for caring for the health o f Palestinian has shifted to the Palestinians 
them selves, through the creation o f  non-governmental, independent, Palestinian organizations.”
In other words, though ‘civil society* is never formally mentioned, many of its elements (grass
roots participation, social responsibility, self-reliable population, community action, etc.) were
already invoked by Palestinians. It is just a matter of wording, or of packaging.
The spirit of Alma-Ata (captured by the shortcut ‘Health For All*) has strongly influenced the
imaginary and actions of the first health activists in the Territories. As the first medical
538 Such view , interestingly, goes against A zm i B ishara’s statem ent that there axe no and can be no ind iv idual 
liberties in  Palestin ian  society (see Section 3 .2.3).
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popular committee, the role of UPMRC has been and remains important559 The Union o f  
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees were the historical pioneers in that matter, when few 
physicians decided in 1979 to join their efforts and started voluntary medical work in 
Palestinian villages during their free time. Most o f them were close to the Communist Party 
and many o f  the founding fathers o f UPMRC studied in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rumania, 
Czechoslovakia and other places o f the former Soviet Bloc. The two others left wing health 
NGOs (UHWC and UHCC) are actually groups o f physicians who were part o f UPMRC and 
later split to create their own movements (dose to two other Marxist parties, namely the 
PFLP and DFLP).
This common matrix will have an important consequence on these three large health NGOs. 
Although UPMRC seems to have the lead on the production of this emandpating narrative 
of a “health as entry point”,560 the historical monopoly o f UPMRC w ill fire back. Political 
rivals of UPMRC who were part o f  the same narrative o f sodo-political emancipation 
through NGOs until the end of the first Intifada but affiliated to other political parties, w ill 
actually use the same argument of d v il sodety to attack UPMRC and in  particular its leader, 
Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, in the years to come, as w e will see in  Section 7.2.3.561
b) Connection or ‘ b r a n c h e m e n t  (1993-1994)
Through the short overview o f the previous texts, the turning point for the emergence o f dv il 
sodety is 1993. This comes actually as no surprise for two reasons. First, this is a rime where 
the first In tifada  is coming to an end, not just because retrospectively we know it ended in 
1993, but because many authors point out that there was a moment o f reflux after 1991, in 
particular w ith the beginning o f the multilateral peace negotiations in Madrid (October 1991). 
1993 coinddes with the signing o f  the DoP, and the pledging conference towards the 
establishment o f a nascent PNA. This all meant an internationalisation o f the Palestinian
559 With regard to Alma-Ata, the objective of ‘Health for All’ is frequently quoted in UPMRC work and 
publication. See for example UPMRC 2001. These last years, UPMRC has also been a leading organization to 
disseminate information for health organizations of the developing countries. See for example The People's Charter 
fo r  Health in coordination with the People's Health Assembly. UPMRC translated and distributed the text in 
Arabic. See http://www.upmrc.org/content/publications/publications_d.html and
http://www.phmovement.org/ pdf/charter/phm-pch-arabic.pdf.
560 This would require much mote profound analysis. But it is a striking fact that during my interviews, most of 
Health NGO personnel I questioned about the model of dvil society in the field of health gave the example of 
Mustafa Barghouthi. But again, most of die time, references were not positive, rather, they served for other 
health activists as a way to dissociate themselves from the role o f leading (and for many invasive) role of 
UPMRC in the field o f health.
W1 Many examples could be found in my interviews with other health activists. Almost all o f them mentioned, 
directly or not, UPMRC and/or its leader. When people were attacking UPMRC, they were very often 
articulated in terms o f dvil sodety. One anonymous quote can serve to epitomize the point: “There is a trend 
within NGOs, led by prominent figures, within NGO movement, that political parties are no longer necessary. 




question with an even greater variety o f actors involved. Most notably, large IGOs such as the 
World Bank and IMF took a preponderant role in shaping and leading some o f the flows 
towards the Palestinian Territories.
Second, the question and the phrase o f ‘civil society’ became very popular in the Arab world 
and debated beginning in 1992.562 The list of texts discussed in the chapter on the Arab- 
Muslim Civil society (Section 3.2.3) were from the same period: m any  references drew from 
debates originally published in 1992 in Beirut The books published in Palestine about civil 
society all date from 1993 onwards (Ghalioun & aL 1993; Abu Amr 1995; Bishara 1996). 
Another important article was also published in 1993 precisely about Talestinian Civil 
Society’ (Muslih 1993).563
The book published by the International People’s Health Council (IPHC 1995 [1992]) is a
case in point: this collection of articles is the proceeding o f a conference held in 1992 where
UPMRC hosted international health activists from around the globe. In none o f the nine
keynote speeches564 and 12 country analyses,565 is the phrase ‘civil society’ explicitly
mentioned, though many times the spirit of civil society was invoked. Thus, grassroots,
community-based organizations, call for greater NGO influence in national policy-making, as
well as invoking the democratic mission of mass-based organizations as opposed to state-led
centralization, but no occurrence o f the phrase ‘civil society’ can be found. The only place
where it appears is in the editor’s note566 and in the small introduction on ‘The Palestinian
Context’, written two years after the conference (IPHC 1995[1992]: x, xii). So if  in  its final
form (the book was eventually published in February 1995), its two-page introduction
manages to uses three times the phrase ‘civil society’ in half a page, it never appears in  120
pages o f  text produced by various speakers. It could be concluded that this very book is a
witness to the process of ‘branchem ent or connection that took place in these years. The
introduction to the book under scrutiny now expressly mentions civil society:
“ In  sp ite  o f  th e  em erg in g  P a le s t in ian  A u tho rity , N G O s, in c lu d in g  those w o rk in g  in  h e a lth , h ave 
a n  im p o r ta n t ro le  in  th e  b u ild in g  o f  c iv il so cie ty  in  P a le s t in e  — w h ils t  re s is tin g  Is ra e li o ccu p a tio n . 
[ . . . ]  H ea lth  N G O s are a c t iv e ly  in v o lv e d  in  th is w o rk . In  a d d it io n  to  th e ir  e ffo rts  to  b u ild  c iv il 
so c ie ty  in  P a le s t in e , th e y  a re  m a k in g  su re  th at a ll th o se  w o rk in g  in  health  p la y  a  m a jo r  p a r t  in  th e  
p o lic y  m a k in g  p ro cess”  (IH P C  1 9 9 5 [1 9 9 2 ]: xii).
562 See also Table 5.
563 There are two counter-examples pre-dating 1993: Taman 1990 & 1992 uses the concept in two rather short 
artides in the Middle-East Report (MERIP).
564 Speakers from South Africa, Palestine (2), USA, Canada, Zimbabwe, India, England, and Belgium.
565 Analyses from India, Namibia, Latin America, Philippines, Palestine, Nigeria, Nicaragua, South Africa, 
Bangladesh, United States, United Kingdom, and El Salvador.
566 The editor is Jean Lennock.
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Let us note that at the same time — i.e. at the time where the PNA was active only in Gaza and 
Jericho (1994) — Mustafa Barghouthi was publishing a short pamphlet (already discussed) 
about Palestinian NGOs and th eir R ale in  Building a  C ivil S ociety (Barghouthi M. 1994). The step 
was then not just the fact o f a foreigner editing the conference proceedings, but rather a  
documented case of the sudden apparition and lasting invasion of the new entry in the 
political vocabulary of Palestine: civil society,
c) N ew  vocabulary
So now, there is a whole set of words and expressions that emerged around 1994, exactly at 
the time when new challenges emerged on the road to building an autonomous Palestinian 
state. Civil society is the leading example, but other concepts became as important in the 
following years. ‘Empowerment* (though already mentioned by Nakhleh in 1989 but only in  
the wording of a foreign NGO’s objective, that of the Mennonite Central Committee) 
‘participatory schemes’, ‘civil society organizations*, ‘democratization’, etc., are all examples o f  
this new paradigm.
‘Civil society* has made different paths in the parlance o f Palestinian NGOs. Some adopted
the concept very early in the Oslo years, some later, and some simply do not use i t  But in the
mouth o f a public health researcher, the occurrence of the concept of ‘civil society* provided
a unique opportunity for NGOs which were facing (at least in  the left-wing narrative567)
severe cuts in their budgets since priority was now given to the PNA:
“On one hand, some needed to survive. Some co-opted the discourse but did not change. Some 
[others] co-opted the discourse and were co-opted by the discourse itself. It is true! [...] We 
need to remember that it was an inevitability. If they had not scrambled [for funding], they 
would have dosed!”568
But let us detail now what are these different paths taken by civil sodety in  the field o f health 
NGOs. We will now offer a typology o f views on d v il sodety expressed by about two dozen 
health NGOs. These views must be seen as part o f a wider context, involving the narratives 
of political activism that unites as much as it divides Palestinian factions and Palestinian 
NGOs in  the Territories.
The following pages are based on the analysis of the interviews carried out with about 20 
health organizations. The excerpts used to illustrate the three models of ‘dv il sodety’ in the 
work o f  health organizations are taken out o f the transcriptions o f the interviews,569 or in
567 Some observers express reservations about the view that all o f a sudden there was a dire and severe cut in 
funding for Palestinian NGOs because the international flow o f money was redirected towards the new-bom 
PNA. This is not only the case of non-left NGOs but also that o f international observers.
568 Interview with Rita GIACAMAN, Head o f Environmental Health Unit, B ir Zeit Public Health Department, 
Ramallah, 25.02.2004.
Let us note that the scrambling for funding had to be through the usage o f ‘civil sodety’ and concept related.
569 Most o f the interviews were fully taped and transcribed. Only six of them were not taped (at the request of 
the interviewees).
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some cases from annual reports or activity reports quoted to complement the interviews. 
Because of the diversity of types o f respondents (directors, presidents, PR officers, vice- 
directors, programme coordinators, etc.), of language abilities (English or Arabic, both by the 
interviewees and the interviewer) and availability of printed documents, the following analysis 
will consist mainly of a discourse analysis.
6.2.4. First model: ‘health as entry point* as an explicit message
The first model is that of an explicit alliance o f  civ il society within health agenda. This means that the 
broad agenda o f civil society is expressly mingled and ‘married* with the issue o f  health 
programmes. In the formulation o f the man who can be considered its ‘founding father*, 
health organizations (like other professionally-based popular committees) can be an “entry 
point — as actors — into society for those sectors o f society that were most oppressed and 
disadvantaged’* (Baxghouthi M. 1989:128). This intends to stress the usefulness of the health 
agenda to promote changes beyond physical well-being. Again, the spirit o f the Declaration of 
Alma-Ata (1978) and the ‘socialist* efforts to redeem poor underdeveloped societies, among 
others, by providing adequate health care, can serve to explain the popularity o f this mingling 
of discourse o f civil society with health service provision. It is not just about curative 
technical medicine, but about a larger and alternative vision o f primary health care which 
takes the socio-political context of occupation into account, as framed already in 1990 by 
Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman who quotes the Alma-Ata Declaration (though 
without referring to ‘civil society*) (Barghouthi M. &  Giacaman 1990: 80, fii.27 84).
As an example, the following excerpt o f an interview should give a better understanding of 
what is meant by ‘marriage* o f civil society with the health agenda. This NGO, specialized in 
mental health and in particular psycho-traumas as consequence o f torture, runs a programme 
for Palestinian police forces:
“On top of our regular Community M ental Health Department (which oversees the clinics, the work 
of professionals and the issues of treatment (medical)), we have a Training and Educational 
Department. It covers all the training courses (short-term training courses). We [also] offer 
training courses to police and intelligence officers (on human rights and mental health: namely 
the impact of torture on prisoners).
[...] I think civil society has two roles to play: 1) to provide professional needed services for/in 
the community, and 2) [it has a] role in the democratization of the society. By democratization,
I mean also the political level.”570
In this case, the idea is a straightforward case of spill-over. By raising awareness amongst police 
forces (accused o f torturing prisoners), this health NGO hopes to contribute towards a
570 Interview with Salah ABDEL SHAFI, Director, Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Gaza City,
02.02.2003.
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stronger dedication of all parts o f the Palestinian polity to human rights issues, and 
democracy.571
Within this first category o f c i v i l  s o c i e t y  a s  a  s p i l l - o v e r  m e ch a n is m  (that allows one to pass 
from a specific health agenda into a broader agenda o f  individual's empowerment and 
therefore potential socio-political changes), one needs to distinguish between those who use it  
with an underlying politica l agenda (read, political party agenda), and those who make only 
general reference to socio-political change without implying a political agenda, 
a) U nderly ing  po litica l agen d a
In this first subcategory, one can find unsurprisingly the main health NGOs that were 
historically affiliated to leftist political parties but whose lin ks might- have become rather loose 
over the years. This is the case o f UPMRC (Gaza and W est Bank), of the UHWC (West Bank 
and Gaza), HDEP, and Bir Zeit Public Health Department.572 In the case of UPMRC and 
UHWC, dais is no surprise, since they are both close to the PPP and to the PFLP: in  the first 
case Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi was member of the politburo o f  the PPP until April 2003 and 
Dr. Rabah Muhana is both president o f the UHWC and a member of the Central Committee 
of PFLP. HD IP is another outlet of Dr. M. Barghouthi, and the person interviewed for the 
Bir Zeit Public Health Department is Rita Giacaman, a well known left-wing activist.
To move away from the individuals, but within the content o f  this political agenda, here are 
two quotes to illustrate this phenomenon:
“We care about [...] giving good health care to people who need it, underprivileged, 
marginalized. [...] We believe in social justice, that is why are in non-profit and non­
governmental sector. Otherwise, we would be in private sector. [...] If you look carefully, the 
ones involved in UPMRC, especially the founders, the volunteers, the leaders and those who 
work in it, have come from a certain group of the society: the under-privileged groups. They are 
mostly sons of villagers, of refugee camps. They are not from the same group that produced 
nurses and doctors in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the privileged groups in the society. They come 
with this strong sense of responsibility. [...] So the issue of social justice, with the coming of the 
PNA, became linked to the issue of civil society, democracy, democratic needs, and democratic 
governance. [...]
Being an instrument of change in a broad sense for democratic reform is acceptable.”573 
In this line of thinking, the establishment of the PNA stopped the further emergence of this 
new professional middle-class (Robinson 1997). It is therefore the duty, in the vision of 
Mustafa Barghouthi, and of some other health organizations, to continue this social change.
571 He later adds further elements, such as “the message of democracy, pluralism, separation of power, respect of 
the rule o f law, etc.” (ibid.).
572 Unfortunately, the interview with the representative of the UHCC, the other large left-wing health NGO, did 
not offer enough substantial insights into the possible links between civil society and health. A quick look at 
UHCC website indicates that civil society is also mentioned, but maybe less systematically as the other two, 
UPMRC and UHWC.
573 Interview with Dr. Mustafa BARGHOUTHI, Director, HDIP (and President of UPMRC), Ramallah, 
22.02.2003.
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Hence so much of the focus put by such an organization on youth programmes, as 
embodiment of this new (lower) middle-class that still needs to arrive into power one day. 
Youth activities were also the focus o f this part of the interview with a leader of the UHWC 
in the West Bank;
“Yes, they [youth activities] are part of the social work. That is why we have developmental 
components and work in rural areas, in west of Beit Lahem and in the Old City of Jerusalem. 
We have our centres like Nidhal and Juzour Centre in Beit Sahour, working inside the 
community. It is an important component to keep the link with the community. Not necessarily 
out of factionalism, but to serve the community/1574 
Let us note that all o f these NGOs with a rather open political agenda are large NGOs,
established in 1979, 1985, 1989 and 1993. UPMRC and UHWC’s annual reports574 75 in  their
Mission/Vision statements both cite goals of “holistic health care” to promote “the personal
and collective maturity necessary to build a civil society in Palestine” (HWC 2002).
As we will argue later, this use o f ‘civil society7 in their professional developmentalist
discourse is detrimental because it is intimately linked to the history of the left-wing parties
and of their internal demarcation from each other (see infra).
b) “Neutral” socio-political agenda
In the second category, we find three NGOs belonging to medium-size organizations (Ardh 
al-Itfal and Juzoor) and a large one (the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, 
GCMHP). They are also much younger organizations (established 1991 for GCMHP, 1996 
for Juzoor and 1999 for Ardh al-Itfal). This goes hand in hand with the logic o f the Oslo 
years where NGOs became “professionalized”, to use the expression of R. Hammami (1995). 
The political agenda of certain health NGOs is watered down, if  not attacked by these three 
organizations for undermining common work and better-coordinated efforts on the ground 
where quality-health intervention is highly demanded in the context of the second Intifada™  
Another interviewee, joking on the fact that his organization used to be part of a Swiss NGO 
and therefore “neutral”, insisted that;
“Of course, we perceive health not only as maintaining [a] basic health service, but it is [also] 
the people’s right to receive affordable services. It should not be only in a one-way [manner 
where] technicians are giving. No! [instead] people should be part of the plans, of the 
prioritizing of the needs. [...]
People have to fight for a better health system. This is what we could do. We are fighting for 
that We are now pushing, for example, Yatta Disabled Society to push for their rights. We gave
310,000 for them to structure [their demands] and push for their rights.”577
574 Interview with Dr. Majeed NASSAU, Deputy Director, Union of Health Work Committees, Beit Sahour,
20.01.2004.
575 HWC 2002 Annual Report (HWC 2002) and UPMRC 2000 Annual Report (UPMRC 2001).
576 Interview with Dina NASSER, Executive Director, JUZOOR Foundation For Health And Social 
Development, Ar-Ram, 16.02.2004. Note how the name of the NGO itself if  not just about health, but also 
about social development.
577 Interview with Mohammed Mahmoud JABR, Executive Director, Ardh al-Itfal, Hebron, 10.02.2004.
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In this case, it is not about supporting overt political change, but to favor a sector-wide 
approach (in this case disabled groups) to have a greater say in the political process. In other 
words, it is not about the emergence o f a younger layer of the population, or favoring people 
with a given political agenda (or identity), but rather to stress the need for just mechanisms o f 
representation and deliberation amongst Palestinians.
Another example is that of the health NGO whose full name is already hinting at this implied 
message: “Juzoor Health Foundation for Social Development” which is based in  the West 
Bank and was established in 1996. Finally, the very large GCMHP of the Gaza Strip was 
founded in 1991 by Dr. Eyad Saraj whose political activism during the Oslo years was not a 
partisan one, but is known for his independence (he is thus jailed once by the PNA for having 
criticized it too).578 His aim and that o f  his organization (now led by Salah Abdel Shafi) is to 
improve the rule of law and the respect of human health integrity, both physical and 
psychical.
6.2.5. Second model: Indirect civil society, with a hint of paternalism
The second type o f vision and usage o f ‘civil society’ in the parlance of Palestinian NGOs is 
that o f the organizations where the notion of ‘civil society’ is either absent from the 
professional health work, or where it is only mentioned as a general motivation, but not 
directly inserted in the context o f health work.
This is the case o f Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip (led Dr. Haydar Abdel-Shafi, a 
physician and well-respected independent political figure o f the Gaza Strip).579 * When 
questioned whether the concept of ‘civil society’ was not used too much in a top-down 
manner to serve to control, he responded:
‘No. It should be a bottom-up process. Civil society is concerned with civil affairs pertaining 
[to] the welfare of the community. This is civil society. In essence it is political because its 
objective is safeguard the interest of the population. But there is no active and direct 
involvement in politics. In its activity, towards welfare, it can really become political. But it does 
not engage itself in political activities.”530
His vision of civil society is therefore that o f a civic engagement towards the welfare of the 
community. Having been for decades close to the Communist party, this comes as no 
surprise for Dr. Abdel Shafi.
More interesting is the case of a small NGO, representing refugees originally from the same 
town and organized as a community-based organization in  the Gaza Strip. The Family
578 See http://wwwicj.org/news.php3?id_article=3353&lang=en.
579 Dr. Haydar Abdel Shafi was Head of the Palestinian delegation to the multilateral peace talks in Madrid 
(1991). He was elected in the PLC in 1996 (best results in the Gaza Strip), but resigned two years later because 
of the corruption within the PNA. His organization, the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip, has nothing to 
do with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society.
S8° Interview with D r Haydar ABDEL SHAFI, President, Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip, Gaza City, 
02.02.2003.
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Association of Majdal (jamViyah ahaaliyyah majdal) started in 1976 as a cultural centre (to feed
the collective memory about Majdal581) and from 1994 onwards, it began offering a variety o f
education activities as well as basic medical care through voluntary work. After the return of
PLO members in 1994, the association reorganized itself with a board o f 13 members,
belonging to different political factions, and with a mix o f three ‘returnees’ along ten
‘insiders’, with elections held every two years. When I asked him what was the ‘philosophy’ of
the association, its secretary general responded:
“[This] reformed alliance was based in order to reform civil society. It is not just about politics, 
but also to develop social life and recuperate the loss of education during the Israeli direct 
occupation.
[■•*]
We must concentrate on social dimension of education, on how watching TV, on the relations 
with groups, how to speak with one another, how to be open to others, to be open and loyal to 
the society at large, how to be positive with one another.
All in all, it is about teaching how to be positive social being.
It is like Pavlov; it is a kind of reflex to train to become calmly positive person, sbakhs [Arabic 
for ‘individual’, ‘person7], and muwatin [‘citizens’ in Arabic].”582 
O f course, beyond the paternalist assumption that the association has to teach its members
how to behave, the definition o f the overarching role of the association is rather dose to the
definition of civil society put forward by certain left-wing secular activists (in terms o f social
change, and leading role assumed by NGOs). This evidence reinforces the idea that civil
sodety does not need  to be explidtly stated, but in some cases, it is only the expression which
is missing, not the concepts or substance behind it
This model of Family Associations is well spread in the Gaza Strip and in the W est Bank. 
Such organizations perform important roles of mediation between the community and the 
PNA.583 The two family organizations I interviewed gather each at least 10,000 members and 
are therefore very important to serve as relays of local interests They might not be 
professional in their structures, but at least they have a strong membership-basis. Moreover 
they are usually based in peripheral zones, which are much less covered by international aid, 
although supporting such organizations could help to cut the grass from under the feet of 
militant religious groups.584
581 Majdal is the name of a Palestinian town now inside Israel, and whose inhabitants had to leave in large 
numbers during the 1948 War.
582 Interview with Zakaria al-BATOUSHA, Secretary General, Family Association of Majda, Beit Lahiya, 
01.02.2003.
583 Interview with Khamees al-BATTRAN, Chairman of the North Gaza Branch, Family Association of Jaffa, 
Jabaaliya Refugee Camp, 01,02.2003.
584 One of the organizations interviewed explicitly stated this role they could have.
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This burning question of the rivalry o f  certain smaller NGOs with those belonging to militant
Islamist groups585 was also addressed by a Board member o f the Palestinian General Union o f
Charitable Societies. For her, many o f the charitable organizations in the Territories fell into
lethargy after the disengagement of the Jordanians in  1988 (and because of the sudden drop
of financial assistance from Amman). The second Intifada has forced them to react and to
respond to the challenges, which are two-pronged: on the one hand, the work of some
charitable organization stopped properly after 1988, and even more so after the arrival of the
PNA. On the other hand, the dynamic involvement of both large secular NGOs and of the
Islamic (in some cases Islamist NGOs) forced charitable organizations to react This led to
what she describes as an “awakening” (*n a k d b a tìo f a sector o f the charitable sector.586 While
she regrets that charitable organizations are overlooked by a large majority of international
donors (despite their longer historical involvement amongst civil society organizations and
the fact that important sectors of activities are almost exclusively covered by the charitable
associations — as in the case o f elderly care), she is also very keen to criticize the attitudes o f
Palestinian NGOs to follow certain fashions:
“It looks like the global terminology [of civil society] is impacting even the local organisations 
and local scene. People always try to follow and jump on die bandwagon, as they say, in order 
to make hey where the sunshine!
[■•■]
I know many organisations that came to existence because [of the themes] of democracy and 
civil society. Can you convince me that there can be democracy in this part of the world 
overnight? This is ndiculouA But some people wanted to try. If you look at the numbers of these 
organisations doing conflict-resolutions, civil society, and this and that It is not out of 
conviction only: it is because donors have money. It is opportunity. People are opportunists! 
People want to make hey while the sunshine! But this is impacting, you know.”587 
Without negating vices of the charitable sector {t.g. clientelism and political patronage), Nora
Qort notices that some charitable organizations are renewing their activities and their way of
working, which very often means getting specialized in a specific field of intervention and
potentially professionalize part of the staff. Still, they are very active and important in rural
setting and could serve as a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the Islamist organizations recruiting in the
same turf o f marginalized areas.588
Finally, another small health organization can be included in this subgroup. The Patients’ 
Friends Society o f Jerusalem is specialized in breast cancer screening. It does not use the 
concept o f civil society in any parts o f the interview or anywhere in its presentation
585 Hamas, as the leading Islamist organisation in  the Territories, runs dozens of NGOs dedicated to social 
activities (education, kindergartens, orphans, health, women’s clubs, etc.). See Chapter 4.
586 Interview with Nora QORT, Board Member, Palestinian General Union o f Charitable Societies, Beit Hanina,
23.01.2004.
587 Interview with Nora QORT, Board Member, Palestinian General Union o f Charitable Societies, Beit Hanina,
23.01.2004. Emphases are hers.
™ibid.
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material.589 However, there are few elements that related to the issue of civil society. When 
asked about the vision of health being more than physical well-being, the director insisted 
that:
“Over the year, working with breast cancer and screening it was my dream to start a support 
group. It is not just health, you have to address other issues. Women would come here, as a 
major center, databases. See all the books we have. We did research as well. So there is a real 
need for psychosocial need. So we created the first support group in 2000 (called the "Breast 
cancer survivors and patients’).
That is just an example of how to change people’s life, change their empowerment possibilities. 
Empower women and get them to go out as advocate. So as a small way, yes!”590
Health is therefore more than physical and the vocabulary ("empowerment’, ‘advocacy1) is
very close to that o f the previous category (explicit use of civil society but with a politically
neutral agenda), except that civil society does not appear at all.
6.2.6. Third model: No ‘civil society5, but another strong message
The fin al approach to the issue of civil society in the health sector is characterized by the total
absence o f the concept ‘civil society’ but by the presence of a very different type of message.
In this third subgroup, we find a variety of health actors, ranging horn the pious Zakaai
Committee o f Hebron and Ihsan Charitable organization, to the veiy small village-based
Tarqumia Benevolent Society, passing by the PNA-linked Maqassed Hospital and Palestinian
Red Crescent Society of Hebron. Following the need to assess the impact of external aid, they
will be split into two groups, one who resources are mostly locally generated and the other
whose resources are coming from international donors.
a) Externally generated income
Al-Ihsan Charitable Society (established in 1983) is based in Hebron and is specialized in care
to disabled people. It is a member of the International Cerebral Palsy Society and trains health
professionals for the rest of the W est Bank on such disabilities. It also runs an emergency
primary health care center with four doctors and five nurses (about 60 other staff work in the
disability unit). When asked about how the organization views the role o f the organization
vis-à-vis the population and its needs, Ihsan’s PR officer responded that:
We can give the value of an institution; we give rules and help them for sodety. We should be a 
light-house for the sodety and the people”
We are the candle lighting the path for the people.”591
Behind this very colourful phrase lies a totally different philosophy: no more secular discourse
about people’s empowerment through pluralism or civil society, but very pious invitations to
follow religious models of activism. Far from being a militant religious Muslim association,
589 This NGO plays with a rather conservative symbolic, namely, the Dome of the Rock.
590 Interview with Carole JA*BARI, Director, Patients Friend Society in Jerusalem, Mount of Olive, 21.02.2004.
591 Interview with Iyaad SUROUR, PR Officer, Ihsan Charitable Sodety, Hebron, 11.02.2004.
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this NGO (like others in the Hebron region) insist on religious obligations in general. Thus, 
the annual reports o f al-Ihsan and o f al-Ahli Hospital (run by the Patients’ Friends Society o f  
Hebron) both start with three pages full of bad itb s, excerpts of the Q u r ’an^ pictures o f the 
Ibrahimi Holy Mosque and o f the inevitable fa tih a .592 Unsurprisingly, most of the international 
donors of these two organizations are Arab or Muslim organizations. However, they also 
collect funding from non-religious western organizations (such as ANERA, CARE, Red 
Cross, various Consulates, etc) because of the good quality o f their work.593 Obviously the 
likely target audience of such bilingual reports w ill be other pious organizations, explaining 
thus the totally different orientation o f the content o f such reports.594
I also visited another pious organization of Hebron, the Islamic Charitable Society, but 
despite the fact that an interview was formally set, I was shown the door without any answer 
to my questions about the role of the organization with regard to socio-political work. A  
cursory glance at the Society website595 indicates that schooling, orphan care, health, and 
housing projects are vital aspects of this association established in 1962 and running branches 
in four other large urban centre of the Hebron district, revealing a deep anchorage in the 
region. In this case, the religious message is even more important than for the two other 
Hebron organizations visited.596
But religion is not a must in this category: this third approach where civil society is not 
mentioned but where sources o f funding are externally located is also conveyed by secular 
organizations: the Palestinian Red Crescent Society o f Hebron, as well as the Union o f the 
Charitable Societies (UCS) of Hebron District, along with the Maqassed Hospital in  Jerusalem 
are examples o f this orientation. A ll three are very dose to the dominant political faction, that 
of Fatah, and o f  the PNA. Both the director o f Maqassed Hospital and the Vice-President o f 
the UCS-Hebron District were putting forward the importance of PNA’s work and prompt 
to attack certain secular NGOs for being too “business-oriented” and “undemocratic”.597
592 The opening verse o f the Qur’an.
593 Interview with Iyaad SUROUR (ibid), and with Baasem NATSHEH, Public Relations Officer, Patients’ 
Friends Society (running al-Ahli Hospital), Hebron, 11.02.2004.
594 We will come back later to the comparison o f Arabic-English presentation material.
595 See http://wwwjcshebron.org/projects_e.htm.
596 The orientation o f many o f the Islamic organizations in Hebron is, according to an insider of Khalili (Le. 
Hebron) politics, dose to that of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brethren), rather than militant Palestinian groups. The 
Islamic Charitable Organisation is probably doser to more openly militant groups. Hence, probably, the refusal 
to answer any of my questions.
597 Interview with Samih ABU ‘AYASH, Vice-President, Union of Charitable Societies in the Hebron District, 
Hebron, 12.0Z2004 and Interview with Dr. Khaled QUREIA, General Hospital Director, Maqassed Hospital, 
East-Jerusalem 26.02.2004.
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b) In ternally  generated  incom e
This second subgroup is made of organizations insisting on involving as much as possible 
local residents whose voluntary contribution represents the major part of the NGO work. 
The first case is that of the %akaat committees. Zakaat is an obligatory form o f almsgiving and 
is locally organized. In the case of the ^akaat committee I encountered, Hebron’s %akaat 
committee disbursed between 1988 and 2000, an average annual amount of $930,000, with a 
peak in 2000 w ith $ 1.3m,538 10,000 people benefited from its small clinic. Special financial 
contributions for people not covered by health insurance were also made regularly by the 
yakaat committee during this Intifada.
The Tarqumiya Benevolent Society is a small NGO in a town west of Hebron, and whose 
catchments area is o f 70,000 people, caught between Hebron and the Green Line. The 
organization also relies financially on local contributions, in-kind or cash. It extended its 
primary health care centre (originally donated by Hebroris Patients Friends Society) on a 
piece of land donated by a local resident, and receives only rare and small contributions of 
international organizations (like CARE, Canadian Development Fund and Oxfam GB).598 99 As 
for the final organization of this category, the Union of Charitable Societies o f Jerusalem, the 
stress is put on local resources and on the necessity for Palestinians to do themselves 
developmental work.600
In all three cases, very little discourses are made about civil society in general Rather, 
interviewees insist on the vital capacity that Palestinians have to organize themselves their 
priorities, but by working direcdy, and also thanks to local contributions. This is, for them, the 
best guarantee that social work will be done in the best interests o f all and with the minimum 
costs involved.601
6.2.7. What do these different takes on ‘civil society5 mean?
What is the purpose of this excursus on the different visions o f civil society held by health 
actors? Two reasons should by now become dear.
First, the use o f ‘civil society’ and reference to some o f its key contents are not the unique 
resource of few larger ‘modem’ and professional secular NGOs. On the contrary, many 
organizations that do not have extensive staff to write fine presentation materials, also resort
598 Interview with Maieed NASSER ed-DIN, Board Member, Zakaat Committee Hebron, Hebron, 12.02.2004. 
See also the presentation flyer of the organizations where exact figures are available. The figure, however 
surprising for its importance, matches the amount spent by Tulkarm Zakaat Committee: $1.3m in 1997. See 
Curmi 2002:107).
m  Interview with Izzo GHRAYB, Board Member, Tarqumiya Benevolent Society, Tarqumiya, 10.02.2004.
600 Interview with Maajed ‘ALOUSH, Board Member, Union of Charitable Societies of Jerusalem, 28.01.2003.
m  Various interviews.
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to notions o f civil society.602 The use o f ‘civil society* is not the unique domain o f people w ho 
were trained and educated abroad. Many physicians, whom I interviewed and who studied 
abroad, do not automatically use the concept of civil society as an overarching justification for 
the work done in  the health sector.603 In short there is no monopoly of ‘c iv il society* b y  a  
g iven  type o f  organ izations or by a certain profile of individuals running NGOs. To the 
contrary, the concept is a widespread one.
Second, in  addition to the s e r v i c e  provided by health NGOs, what also matters is the 
m e s s a g e  that is transmitted through or along the service.604 Some chose to link a strong 
message about socio-political change, some about the necessity to enhance the rule o f law ; 
some entertain a paternalist model o f NGO-communides; while still others prefer to instill 
conservative religious values into their health work. The question is which message is more 
successful and more popular amongst Palestinians? Is civil society as a panacea the message 
to provide to the population? Can it compete with more conservative ones?
As argued before, ‘civil society* has been intimately linked to the narrative o f left-wing 
political parties. It is no surprise if  the PNA and intellectuals close to (or members of) Fatah, 
the dominant faction of the PNA (and PLO), have on many occasions attacked the concept 
of civil society and the physical entity ‘hiding* behind it, namely NGOs. There have been 
many campaigns led by PNA officials against the idakakeen\ a word meaning in Arabic 
“boutiques* to denote the business-like approach o f  some o f the NGOs that are prone to 
represent themselves as watchdogs o f the corrupt PNA. Fathawi intellectuals (that is, those 
members o f o r close to Fatah) have as well produced various texts showing outright 
scepticism about the concept of ‘civil society*.605 In the case of health, the director o f 
Maqassed H ospital in East Jerusalem  was keen to stress that when the PNA decided to take 
over and to replace by force (security people broke into the office of the previous director) 
the previous board (composed o f a coalition o f health professionals whose political 
credentials were rather on the left o f  the spectrum), it was nothing but a normal historical 
return o f the PLO  (through the PNA) into East Jerusalem. The previous board, it  should be 
observed, had not performed elections in  the previous 15 years.606 But there is nothing new 
here, a group on the left hand using civil society to justify its campaign for a more democratic
602 Let us note that other organizations with a highly developed administrative apparatus (such as the Patients 
Friends Society or Ihsan Charitable Society in Hebron) do not automatically use concepts related to civil society 
at all.
603 Thus, Caroline Ja*bari, from Jerusalem's Patients Friends Society, was bom in the USA.
604 In this, I follow with the view o f Salah ABDEL SHAFI, Director, Gaza Community Mental Health 
Programme. Interview in Gaza City, 02.02.2003. See also his article (2004).
605 The latest example can be found in Abu S a if2005.
406 Interview with Dr. Khaled QUREIA, General Hospital Director, Maqassed Hospital, East-Jerusalem
26.02.2004. Dr. Qureia also happens to be the brother of PM Ahmed Qureia.
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PNA and on the right hand a defensive PNA mirroring black spots of the ‘civil society’ 
champions (e.g., corruption scandal in the LAW NGO).
The new point I would like to stress here is the dimension internal to the left-wing groups in 
the narrative about civil society. The latter is actually one o f the organising and structuring 
elements of the clashing narratives amongst left-wing NGOs. In other words, the use o f  ‘dvil 
society’ has become the discursive comer stone o f the internal feuds between left-wing 
NGOs.607
For example, Mustafa Barghouthi’s tendency to speak on behalf of the whole o f civil society 
organizations is reproached by one rival health organization, the UHWC, close to the PFLP. 
Its W est Bank vice-director attacked, without naming anyone, the tendency o f some 
“prominent figures within the NGO movement to say « WE are the civil society, a b it like la 
France c ’est m o il»” {sic). He also pointed to the fact that PINGO (the NGO Network) had 
become a place for “the hegemony o f one or two persons” only.608 On the same issue of 
PINGO, the smaller partner of what was a broad left-wing coalition in 1993, the UHCC 
(close to the DFLP) also lamented that the PINGO network served dominantly the interests 
of two political factions at the expenses of other smaller ones.609
These excerpts should make clear what is meant by an internal left-wing feature. Let us note 
that this is not only the case of health: the same factional struggle exists in the held of 
agriculture (Abu-Sada 2005c), women and advocacy: each political factions and ‘their* NGOs 
try to compete in  what is more a struggle over a constituency than an effort towards uniquely 
professional developmental goals.610
To come back to the question o f the message attached to service delivery, different overtones 
are used by NGOs. A segment of the health NGOs has tied its services to the message of 
civil society in  response to two levels o f engagement On the first tier, ‘civil society* was a 
natural response to the evolving Z eitgeist, where the concept became fashionable, and meant 
an easier form o f recognition from the donors, all pretty much formatted to the international 
developmental parlance.611 On the second tier, a domestic one, ‘civil society* became the 
ideological cover to attack an increasingly autocratic PNA. But the problem is that this
607 Our argument is different from Hammami’s view that dvil sodety “has become the central term through 
which a demoralised and de-mobilised grassroots movement has been coming to terms with its powerlessness in 
the face of the transformation of the once distant PLO into a local authoritarian reality*’(Hammami 1995: 52). 
Here, we argue, there is also an internal (leftist) dimension to the use of ‘dv il sodety’. See also next chapter the 
part on political exdusion.
608 Interview with Dr. Majeed NASSAU, Deputy Director, Union of Health Work Committees, Beit Sahour,
20.01.2004.
609 Interview with Dr. Ra’eb SABAH, Director o f the Gaza Branch, Union o f Health Care Committees, Gaza 
City, 30.01.2003.
610 Such internal tensions are probably exacerbated by popular disaffection for left-wing parties.
611 Some would call it the Washington-Consensus. On that, see Fine & al. 2001.
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message o f civil society has been gradually diverted from its primary target (PNA) towards 
internal chicanes and feuds amongst different left-wing groups, though remaining the 
normative or framing interface between certain NGOs and donors.
Because o f this loss of focus on the PNA and because o f  its overuse by international and 
local advocacy organizations (see foiloxring part), th e  m essag e  of c iv il so c ie ty  h as lost its  
im pact as a  gathering  force amongst a large share o f the population.612 The focus amongst 
secular health NGOs has been on which organization would hold the totem o f civil society, 
or on which person would be the m ost important civil society figure. Other messages put 
forward by other health NGOs, in the context o f a return to conservative religious values, 
have become more powerful in capturing people’s imagination in the xrider *battle’ o f  
fostering social support through local NGOs.613
Palestinian NGOs have been caught in  a two-tier negotiation process. The upper part 
involves interaction (and in some best-case scenarios, deliberation) with international donors 
to get funding and the lower part involves interaction between the NGOs and their local 
populations/constituendes. NGOs have been trapped in  a time warp with international 
donors; whereas, the local population, because of the increased economic difficulties of the 
Oslo and post-Oslo years, has moved towards different (in general much more conservative) 
ideologies. This hiatus or distance that grew  between local NGOs and their bases, would help 
to explain why there are attempts on the side of NGOs o f repolitidzing their actions, or at 
least, returning to local forms o f assistance and political justification (Abu-Sada 2005b).614 
If we assume that the various popular committees and mass movements were the ancestors 
and frontrunners of nowadays NGOs (which represent anyway only a part o f civil society), 
then w e could modelize the impact o f international aid, and in  particular that o f  civil society 
promotion upon the evolution o f civil society formation in  Palestine. As stressed in various 
sections o f Chapter 2, the concept o f  civil society can already apply to describe the type of 
collective actions o f the 1970s and 1980s, providing that we stay away from strictly fixed 
definitions of civil society based on a Euro-centric model and on a late twentieth century 
institutional definition. Instead, considering civil society in its diversity, en devenir,; and as venue 
reach autonomy thanks to its capacity o f auto-institution allows to take these forms of
612 Of course, the question of the general de-politidzation of the population at large might have also contributed 
to this disinterest in the topic of civil society. See (Picaudou 2003:187f).
6,3 This is the very reason why these more secular NGOs have actually tried to ‘repolmdze* their social work 
See on that matter, Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3. See also Abu-Sada 2005a.
614 Caroline Abu-Sada even speaks of NGOs suffering from a lack of legitimacy (Abu-Sada 2005a). By local’, 
one has to understand either local priorities, but also local means o f providing social assistance (through families, 
clans, or geographical proximities).
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collective organisations into consideration in our analysis of the impact o f external aid o f local 
civil society.
We could portray what happened over the years in the forms of three graphs. On the first 
one, local NGOs and populations are lined up in the same vertical space, expressing thereby 
the fact that they are having the same interests, or areas of priority, although somehow 
engaged in a relationship o f power.615 This would correspond to the period o f the 1980s, 
where NGOs were active as popular committees, with no international donors really 
influencing the rules of the game. W e put here two sets o f local constituency and NGOs to 
stress the diversity of needs, or population, and o f type of NGOs. They are linked by arrows 
symbolizing the fact that in a way NGOs represent and serve local interests, while the local 
population provides with voluntary and grassroots support to ‘their* NGOs.
Table 23: Model o f relations between NGOs and constituencies in the 1980s
On the second graph (Table 24),616 we can see that the international donors, local NGOs and 
populations are lin ed up in the same vertical space, expressing a relation o f power (donors- 
NGOs and NGOs-constituency), but also the fact that they are working, grosso modo, along the 
same lines (or with the same interests). The various arrows indicate that they have a different 
relationship o f financial dependency and accountability with one another. This type of 
relationship would be the one at the time of the first Intifada, until the early 1990s, before the 
implementation o f the Oslo agreements.
615 Hence the fact that they are on different vertical positions. The different arrows (dashed or not) imply that 
they have different obligations with one another.
616 For the sake of clarity, we put only one set of constituencies, NGOs and donors. We could have added 
another one to show the diversity of interventions. The same remark applies to Table 25.
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Table 24: Model of relations between donors, NGOs and constituencies bv 1990
Table 25: Model o f relations between donors. NGOs and constituencies bv 2005
In the third and final graph (Table 25), we can see that NGOs are still lined up with 
international donors, but not with their constituency anymore. Thus, they have lost most o f 
their contact points with the local populations, in order to remain in a funding relationship 
with donor organizations. They do not have the same in terests), or priority o f intervention. 
This situation would reflect distorted changes that took place during the Oslo years and in 
some cases, during the second Intifada. 617
Such situations, it will be argued, can be modelled as a  situation o f  autonomy and 
heteronomy, as w ill be further explored in the following final chapter (Tables 27-29). Let us
617 The division Oslo vs second Intifada years is rather fictional. The ‘sliding* process (whereby donors, NGOs 
and local constituencies are not lined up anymore) is a longer-term and multi-faceted one. Certainly the hardship 
which a majority o f  the population has to suffer during the second Intifada has increased the gap and accelerated 
the trend.
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My database o f 890 NGOs includes about 50 NGOs active in cause-oriented organizations or 
broad advocacy activities (a little less than 5% of the total NGOs in Palestine). Activities 
range from legal protection, human rights protection and awareness raising, civic education 
and democratization information, peace promotion activities, as well as few research centres 
(dealing with advocacy issues). They were mostly founded in 1992, reinforcing the divide 
between older service-oriented NGOs and more recent advocacy ones.
In terms of the geographical distribution, if  there is a very good proportion between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip with regard to the total population (62% of the advocacy NGOs are 
in the WB which has 63% o f the population, and 38% of NGOs are in Gaza where 37% of 
the population live61*), the distribution by dty and govemorate displays a huge imbalance. 
Gaza City has the lead with 36% o f the advocacy NGOs based within its boundaries (17 
NGOs), slightly more than Ramallah (14 NGOs for 30% o f the total number) and about 
twice as much as East Jerusalem (with ten NGOs, or 19% o f the total number). Nablus and 
Beit Lahem with three each, J e n in  with one, and North Gaza one, are far behind. Central 
regions (around Ramallah and Gaza City) are therefore over-represented in this sector of 
activities. This striking geographical imbalance will be discussed later (Table 26 and Section 
6.3.3).
24 advocacy NGOs were visited and interviewed for this research. 68% o f these were in the 
West Bank and 32% in the Gaza Strip. Though three organizations are older than the 
majority (al-Haq and MAT TIN Group were both established in  1979, the Gaza Centre for 
Law and Human Rights in 1985), m ost o f them were established from 1988 onwards, at a 
time when the Palestinian issue gathered international interest with the outbreak o f the first 
Intifada (1987-1993). Half o f the visited NGOs were actually established from 1993 onwards, 
indicating also the strong interest o f  donors in supporting this sector of activity, exactly at the 
time when the peace process was fostered.
A last general word on this sector advocacy NGOs employ ten staff on average. Six of the 47 
NGOs are part of PINGO and only two are affiliated with the Union of Charitable Societies. 
18% o f these NGOs are run by women (slightly more than in the health sector where 12% of 
NGO leaders are women). The political composition o f advocacy NGOs also reflects the 618
618 Population percentage based on PCBS’ data for mid-2004. See (PASSIA 2004: 274).
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predominant role played by left-wing political organizations: 44% o f them are (or were at least 
initially) close to left-wing political parties. Within these, PFLP seems to have the lead, 
followed by the PPP.619 39% are independent and 17% close to the government,620 not to say 
simply Fatah-outlets as in some o f the cases we will present later.
a ) Pre-1987 organ izations
The first advocacy organization created in  the Territories is the Arab Thought Forum. It was 
launched in 1977 around socio-economic issues in  Jerusalem. Though it claims to be 
politically independent on its website, it was established by Ibrahim Daqqaq and other people 
close to the communist orbit621 In a w ay it corresponds to the ‘partisan clubs* that emerged 
from the late 1970s onwards. Departing from usual political affiliations, al-Haq was founded 
in 1979 by a group o f lawyers who decided to challenge legally Israeli Occupation and to 
analyze its military orders and legal ruling o f the Territories through ‘civilian administration*. 
Al-Haq is the first human rights organization not only in the Territories but also in the 
Middle Hast and its model was emulated by the PLO, which decided, through its Arab Studies 
Society (founded in  1980 and based for many years in the controversial Orient House in East 
Jerusalem) to establish the ‘Palestinian Human Rights Information Centre* (PHRIC, now 
closed). Though al-Haq was accused by certain nationalist milieus of spying,622 the quality of 
its work and its readiness to work in collaboration with PHRIC reinforced its credentials. Al- 
Haq, by training m any human rights workers in the Territories, had a crucial role in  shaping 
other advocacy organizations. M any heads o f  other NGOs I interviewed actually started their 
training in the field o f advocacy thanks to al-Haq. Another human rights organization started 
working in the Gaza Strip in 1985 to monitor Israeli violations there (Gaza Centre for Rights 
and Law).
b ) F irst I n t ifa d a  wave
All other advocacy organizations were established after 1988: at least 20 were created between 
1988 and 1993, that is during the first Intifada, 20 others were established during the Oslo 
years (1994-2000). Many of the organizations launched during the first Intifada were a direct
i19 DFLP seems to be lagging way behind.
i2° Political affiliation was decided upon a variety o f factors: other public role(s) o f NGO leaders, statements of 
NGOs on certain issues, given preference on their website for links to sister organisation, etc. Legrain*s Web 
Guide also offered very useful comments on and insights into the issues o f political affiliation. See Legrain 
1999c, and http://www.mom.fr/guides/palestine/palestine-Palestin-7.htmL
Percentages presented before are calculated on the known cases. Otherwise, it would be 34% for the left, 30% 
for independent organizations, 13% for Fatah, and 20% unknown.
621 See Legrain’s web guide (http://www.mom.£f/guides/palestine/palestine-Palestin-4.html#Heading212), or 
Legrain 1999c.
622 Interview with S ha’wan JABAARIN, Head of Legal Unit, al-Haq, Ramallah, 07.02.2003.
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response to imprisonment o f thousands o f Palestinians (Mandela Institute for Prisonners 
1989, Ad-Dhameer Prisoners Support Association 1992), repeated human rights violations 
(LAW Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment 1990), 
and to the beginning of systematic closure of the Territories by Israel impacting on 
Palestinians working in Israel (Democracy and Workers* Rights Centre 1993). A new type of 
organization saw the light during the same years, only to become more important during the 
Oslo years, namely advocacy NGOs promoting peace activities, and common work with 
Israeli partners (Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between People 1988, Search for 
Common Ground 1991, Palestine Centre for Peace and Democracy 1992). Finally, let us note 
that research centres also stem from this period (PASSIA, 1987; Ramallah Centre for Human 
Rights Studies 1990; MUWATIN 1992, and the Nablus-based Centre for Palestinian Research 
and Studies 1993).
c) Oslo yea rs
With the signing o f  the DoP (Sept 1993) and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (May 1994), self- 
government became tangible for the Palestinians o f die Territories, and, as in the case o f 
other sectors, advocacy NGOs literally mushroomed in  the subsequent years. Nearly half of 
all advocacy NGOs (23) were established after 1993. They can be subdivided into four main 
fields o f activities:
• There are eight ‘democracy* NGOs. They run crvic education activities, promote 
democracy values and monitor the rule of law on a higher level than individual rights 
(such as the Citizens* Rights ombudsman, PICCR set up in 1994, or the Coalition For 
Transparency And Accountability (AMAN));
• There are seven human rights organizations dedicated mostly to individual rights 
violations;
• Four NGOs are specialized in peace promotion activities, and
• Four more are specialized in collective rights dealing with refugee questions and 
expropriations (in particular because of Jewish settlement expansion).
In sum, many o f  these new NGOs were surfing on two large consensus waves: (1) the 
consensus around Oslo that the peace process was the goal to support NGOs responded to 
the international donors* readiness to support democracy and peace promotion (such as the 
‘people-to-people* programmes, later described); (2) the Washington-consensus (with priority 
given to sound governance, a vibrant civil society, and informal economy) was also echoed 
with many NGOs devoted to questions o f the rule o f law and democracy.
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Except for the last four NGOs, all o f  the most recent NGOs reflected the Z eitgeist, which 
implies the necessity for new organizations to "build’ a civil society, to ‘construct’ democracy, 
‘promote’ human rights values and ‘reinforce’ the rule o f law. In other words, this 
mushrooming of advocacy NGOs hints at the belief of those who funded them that there 
was a lack, an absence of democracy, civil society and rule of law. In that, this line o f thinking 
reproduces the previously discussed (neo-)orientalist arguments that there were no civil society 
actors and that it was the mission of donors to build them ex  n ih ih . An alternative explanation 
is that the civil society active before Oslo was not the one desired by international donors. 
Therefore, a nen> type of advocacy organizations had to be favored, if  not created. In both 
hypotheses, such form of funding for these sectors o f interventions has been overlooking 
previous forms of local organizations informed with such themes.
But looking closer, one discovers that the advocacy sector was more a basin full o f sharks 
than peaceful doves.
d) The many tentacles o f the PNA
Many authors have unduly concentrated their attention on the particularly thorny relation 
between NGOs and the PNA, but hereby missing the point o f  the question of the relations 
between the NGOs and the local population. Surely, the PNA has not always had a smooth 
and easygoing relationship with the advocacy sector. It is worthwhile illustrating two kinds of 
reactions that the PNA had vis-à-vis the advocacy NGOs, since the PNA’s tendency to take 
over the sector was much more conspicuous than in  other sectors of NGO work.
The first type o f reaction has been to occupy the field of advocacy as Fatah did in  the 1980s 
by responding to the hegemonic mobilization around leftist parties’ popular committees. Pro- 
PNA organizations were set up in  the Territories, as is the case with the Palestinian 
Association for Human Rights (PAHR). The latter, actually established in  1985 in  Cyprus, 
came back with other PLO returnees in 1994 and established its office in Gaza City. Its 
director, Khalil az-Zibn, was also Director General in the President’ Office and a personal 
advisor for NGOs to President A rafat623 Khalil az-Zibn did not even try to hide that his 
money was from Arafat, though insisting it was from his “private funds and not from the 
PLO.”624 To prove the character of Arafat’s homme d epa ille, let us note that Khalil az-Zibn was 
also the head the Gazan Bar Association and the leader of one o f the fake NGO networks in
m  Khalil az-Zibn was shot dead in front of his house by Palestinian gunmen in Gaza in March 2004. See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/352441 S.stm.
624 Interview with Khalil az-ZIBN, Director, Palestinian Association for Human Rights, Gaza Gty, 02.02^003.
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Gaza to counterbalance PINGO and the Palestinian General Union of Charitable Societies in 
the World Bank NGO Project625
Another advocacy group, the Palestinian Association for Legal Science (PALS) was 
established in  1997 in Gaza at the instigation of Nahed ar-Rayyes.626 The latter is another 
PLO returnee elected in 1996 to the PLC on a Fatah list and a later Minister of Justice (7* 
Cabinet appointed in November 2003). Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) also established an 
NGO in Ramallah running people-to-people programs, the Palestinian Centre for Peace 
(PCP). A final example of physical occupation of the advocacy terrain by people close or in 
favor o f the PNA, happened when the director of the Gaza Centre for Law and Human 
Rights Centre, Raji Sourani, was arrested in 1995 for having been too vocal in his criticism of 
the PNA. Not only was he put in jail, but he was even replaced by a manager who was less 
critical o f the authorities! Raji Sourani moved on to establish his own center, the Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights, which he still heads today.
The second way o f the PNA to scratch its political opponents is through intimidation. On 
some occasions, the PNA did not hesitate to jail and beat up Palestinian human rights 
activists (e.g. in the cases of Dr. Eyad Sarraj and Raji Sourani), just as it intimidated other 
political opponents (e.g. in the case o f the Petition o f the Twenty).627 Another method, much 
more efficient in terms of impact upon the collective opinion, consisted in a massive 
campaign of mud-throwing by the Ministry of Justice against human rights organizations. In 
1999, misreading a report from the UN Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories 
(UNSCO 1999b) on the Rule O f L aw Development, the PNA attacked advocacy NGOs for 
receiving more aid than the Ministry of Justice for the promotion of the rule o f law  and 
human rights awareness (see Hammami & aL 2001).
6.3.2. Visions of civil society
What are the types of vision about civil society that are generated by organizations active in 
the field?628 For that matter, the 22 interviewed organizations will be separated in two 
subgroups, w ith regard to the interpretation of civil society, following an analytical study of 
the content o f the message intended by advocacy NGOs. To link this analysis to the question 
of the role of donors in the process o f  civil society in  the Territories, consideration w ill focus
625 On die establishment in August 1994 of the Office of National Organizations, see (Brown N. 2003:154).
626 See Legrain’s web site: http://www.mom.fr/guides/palestine/palestine-Palestin-7.htnil#Heacling508. See 
also Legrain 1999c.
627 A Petition signed by twenty prominent figures of the Territories, calling for the end to the privileged class 
and less corruption in Palestine. See N FW 1999, and (ChaQand 2002 :18ff).
628 Part of the advocacy NGOs was already analysed in Section 6.1.
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on the preferred priorities by some international donors, and the impact that such priorities 
can have on the long term for local advocacy NGOs.
Since most o f the advocacy organizations were bom  at the end of the first Intifada , exactly at 
the time where the phrase ‘civil society’ made its w ay into public rhetoric in Palestine, there 
will be no thorough analysis o f the shift o f meaning and reference over time of d ie substance 
of civil society. Instead, we w ill show how the international context of peace negotiation has 
been influential in  setting priorities w ith regard to advocacy issues.
a) The dilemna of individual o r collective rights? Donors’ hiding chiasmus
The divide between individual-collective rights stresses the type of solution envisaged by 
donors and by local NGOs with regard to the Palestinian issue, which is, since the Oslo years, 
twofold. On the one hand, it is about a continuous struggle for self-determination and full 
autonomy from the Israelis (which would be a collective right issue), while, on the other h an d , it 
is about the struggle of citizens for the establishment o f a democratic Palestinian polity (this 
rather reflects a quest for individual rights).629
By hiding chiasmus, I mean that in  the course o f a moribund peace process, some donors might 
have favoured one aspect of the struggle at one very moment and switch to another approach 
later (this is the idea of chiasmus, or inversion). In other words, funding might not have 
always aimed at the same target (collective or individual rights) and priorities were switched in 
order to insure the survival o f the peace process itself,630 as opposed to stren g th en in g  the 
democratic credentials of the Palestinian polity first. Donors, although many of their 
programmes openly aimed at reinforcing internal democratic principles, and at strengthening 
Palestinian civil society, were actually pursuing another goal, that of the success o f the peace 
process, which actually meant overall the attainment o f security for Israel at any costs.631 
This latter aspect of shifting the level o f  intervention is what is meant by ‘hiding’, since 
donors themselves were not consistent in  helping Palestinians in  building a  democratic and 
accountable political system. A n example is that o f  the State Security Courts which were 
created in  the mid-1990s with the full support of some key international actors — despite the 
fact that they constitute an exceptional jurisdiction and are therefore highly problematic in 
terms o f  accountability632 -  in order to fight against Hamas and other militant organizations
629 The division operated here between collective and individual rights serves symbolically to illustrate the 
tension between the two levels of Palestinian politics. There are issues related to the end o f Occupation that are 
also question o f individual rights, and problems internal to Palestinian which are matters o f collective rights.
630 On the general preference for the peace process, see Le More 2004.
631 On the asymmetrical containment pushed forward by Israel through the Oslo Accords, see Khan & al. 2004.
632 Many were right to denounce the legitimacy o f such State Security Courts during the second Intifada and their 
expedient procedures leading to the execution o f alleged ‘collaborators’, but few recalled that these Courts were 
pushed by the USA and Israel in order to deal efficiently with Hamas during the Oslo years.
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working through violence against the realization of the Oslo Accords (and the attainment o f 
Israeli security). In that case, the preference for donors was for collective rights at the expense 
of individual rights, whereas in other moments of the peace process, donors preferred to 
insist on domestic individual rights (say PNA violation of human rights against its citizens 
during the 1990s, and pushing for the reform agenda during the second Intifada), while hiding 
burning collective issues (such as the extension of settlements and land expropriation by 
Israel).
Tocci speaks also about “the widening gap between rhetoric and reality in EU policy” in the 
case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Toed 2005) and stresses the ambiguities in some of 
EU’s decisions. The phrase ‘hiding chiasmus’ is another way of referring to some o f the 
inconsistent shifts of donors during the last decade. It is important here to stress that the 
local population is very consdous o f  the erratic attitude and programmes pushed by certain 
donors. A  survey conducted in 1997 revealed that about 40% of the population believed that 
“foreign funding had a [...] negative or very negative” effect in the Territories (Kassis 2001: 
44).
Some went even further in their accusations against donors by arguing that funding by donors 
was exclusively conditional upon full support of the peace process (Hanafi & Tabar 2002). 
Since two three political factions openly opposed the Oslo accords, the question was not just 
rhetorical The PFLP and DFLP were most likely to be concerned since Hamas (the third 
mdn faction) probably did not receive a penny from international donors. NGOs close to 
PFLP were keen to stress that they felt the sudden lack o f support from donors after the 
signing o f the Oslo Agreements.633 Examples given also by the recent research on this 
question stresses that this was not just a problem for DFLP and PFLP but a much broader 
one (Nakhleh 2004). Independent NGOs have experienced difficulties in receiving funding 
for projects that were not clearly and directly oriented towards peace. Dr. Iyaad Barghouthi, 
professor of sociology at an-Najah university (Nablus) and head of a small research NGO 
specializing in questions of Islamism, expressed his profound difficulty in getting funding for 
his human rights training within Islamic milieus and felt many times that donors would prefer 
him to work on peace issues.634
In other words, what donors might have wanted at certain moments of the last decade might 
have been out o f touch with the priorities of local populations. Thus, the projects baptized
633 Interview with George RISHMAWI, Coordinator, Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement Beit Sahour 
21.01.2004 and with Dr. Rabah MUHANA, President, Union of Health Work Committee, Gaza Gty,
30.01.2003.
634 Interview with Iyaad BARGHOUTHI, Director, RamaUah Centre for Human Rights Studies, Ramallah,
22.01.2004.
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Teople-To-People’ refer to joint activities (such as workshops, conferences, youth camps, 
students exchanges, etc.) between groups of Israelis and Palestinians. Much in vogue during 
the first three or four years after the foundation of the PNA, these programmes started to 
experience real difficulties from 1998 onwards. PINGO invited its members to boycott all 
people-to-people projects in 1998 because such activities m isled many external donors into 
believing that there was a real normalization between the two sides.635 The m ain  reproaches 
expressed by Palestinians are twofold. First, it was seen as giving an image to the outside 
world that normalization was on the way between Israelis and P a le s tin ian s, although 
autonomy only existed on paper.636 Second, many Palestinians are convinced that the people- 
to-people programmes were not promoting full equality and that often Israelis had the larger 
shaie in terms o f say and funding.
The issue of preference given by certain donors was also stressed openly in terms o f 
collective or individual rights. The NGO of Khalil az-Zibn (Talestmian Association for 
Human Rights* and very close to the PNA) insisted that for the time being priority should be 
given to collective rights of Palestinians, and that donors were only interested in “showing 
PNA’s violations of individual human rights”, thus deflecting attention from the absence o f 
real autonomy on the Palestinian side.637 Az-Zibn hints probably at a different conception o f 
advocacy that favours collective rights first: in that sense the late Khalil az-Zibn was closer to 
Islamist factions whose inteipretation o f the question of hum an rights is that the solution 
must come from strictly observed Islamic rules for the ummah, rather than by teaching citizens 
about their individual rights.
Leaving this controversial and peripheral point aside, some NGOs interviewed stressed a
much more worrisome type of intrusion by international donors in the work o f  advocacy
organizations. Because of the growing economic hardship w ith the closures and military
operations of the last five years, some advocacy NGOs have felt the need to link service-
provision to the cause they want to defend. This idea o f l in k in g  the two elements also
stemmed in  the mind of one NGO director from the fact that:
“For the society, much of our work is not understandable, especially when it is related to 
monitoring for example. People want tangible things that contribute to improve, or to make 
changes in their life.
Sometimes we have some problems with donors. We don’t understand that, but we see that on 
the local level, there is a kind of danger, when all organizations, in specific sector, just follow the
635 Interview with R am  BISHARA, Coordinator, PINGO Network, Ramallah, 22.01.2004.
636 Palestinians could thus not travel freely between zones A; their lands were still expropriated for ‘security 
reasons' and their vital space shrunk because o f the doubling of settler populations from 1993 until 2000.
637 Interview with Khalil az-ZIBN, Director, Palestinian Association for Human Rights, Gaza City, 02.02.2003. 
Az-Zibn thus accuses left-wing advocacy NGOs to play in tune with Hamas for they both allegedly want to 
torpedo the PNA.
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trend; whether it is the trend of funders, or global trends but they tend to fo rget about real needs o f 
the population.”638
But when trying to get funding to respond to local needs and to provide service on top o f the 
cause advocated by its organizations, this NGO was met with blank face instead o f a  blank 
check by one o f its regular partners:
“One of the international NGOs stopped funding our organization because they told us we are 
providing only services. Although we clarified [immediately that we do] not only services! 
Service is one of our strategies to build awareness in our local level, to continue to have our 
roots and our connections with our people, otherwise we will be in a different areas, we will be 
misunderstood by our people and we will create a vacuum that will be filled by others. And no 
one wants to hear about i t  Unfortunately!”639
A similar uncomfortable experience happened to the same NGO for wanting to promote a 
campaign of information for Palestinians about issues related to settlement expansion, but 
again some donors refused to fund this project
The point here is not to stress that donors in some occasions have the capacity to vet local
projects (which is certainly a rather unfortunate exception), but that in the name o f certain
conceptions o f ‘civil society* promotion or in the interest o f the peace process, international
donors actually only pay lip service to local advocacy priorities. For one o f the most active
human rights organizations this is really disturbing:
“We are wondering and feeling sorry that the western style of democracy is claiming democracy 
but practicing a conspiracy of silence. Those who are practicing or those who are claiming to 
practice and asking for democracy (either Europeans, from governments, or their guardians of 
human rights) are all intentionally practicing the conspiracy of silence about what is going on 
here.
What are they waiting [to denounce Israel] for? massacres? genocide? ethnic cleansing? [We do] 
not [ask them to act] according to our descriptions, but according to the international concepts: 
the ICRC [...] is speaking about war crimes in the case of settlements. So, we are not asking to 
be in favour of the Palestinians, we ask them to be committed to the rules they work for, for the 
conventions that were ratified, to the principles which they invoke.**640
On that account, advocacy activities are very sensitive to international donors* interference. In
the case of service providing NGOs, the work is usually that demanded by the lack o f given
infrastructures, or by a lack of coverage in certain zones (all which can be often quantified).
Advocacy activities require much more scrutiny on local subjective perceptions. It is not sure
that all international donors consider full partnership with advocacy NGOs as a necessity.
That can have negative outcomes since local organizations are not given full credit for their
initiatives. Such top-down priority setting (from donors to local NGOs) reinforces the notion
638 Interview with Issam AROURI, General Manager, Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.02.2004. The emphasis is mine.
639 Ibid.
640 Interview with Jabr WISHAH, Deputy Director, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Gaza City,
30.01.2004.
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that advocacy priorities must come from abroad. Again, local organizations are the receiving 
end, or the empty recipient accepting a message to promote.
These contradictions, both in  the priorities of donors, and those raised by Palestinians -  be 
they NGO leaders and simple citizens — stressed the need to articulate and study the 
interviews o f advocacy NGOs in the light of their need to respond to internally-generated or to 
externally-oriented questions. It was done so for two reasons. First, it responds to the 
overarching question of the interaction of donors with local NGOs in the definitions and 
setting of priorities with regard to ‘civil society’ and, second, it enables us to survey such a 
large quantity of material (activity reports, course textbooks, conference proceedings, 
interviews, and the like) through an analytical prism.
b) Inward-oriented NGOs
The first type of approach is that o f  local advocacy NGOs which grant mostly priority to 
local issues and which tailor their w ork to the needs o f beneficiaries in a close-range and in 
rather direct contact with the NGO. The work is perceived and conceived641 by NGO actors 
as mostly linking with their local constituency. Some elements of the interviews hinted 
unobtrusively to such model o f orientations.
A first revealing ingredient was the capacity to link general advocacy items to specific issues 
of the Palestinian context For example, for one interviewee, the focus had not only to be on 
building a democratic society through lobbying and awareness raising, but also by actually 
placing the focus on “democratic struggle as much against the autocratic PNA as against the 
intolerance o f the Islamists”.642 For another, it was about bringing “internal discussions back 
to the grassroots [level]. Internal democracy is the key”,643 while for still another it was about 
creating a stronger tie with the population, “through service providing. Many of our 
volunteers are people whom we served [in cases of] land confiscated, or house demolished, 
etc. They are more ready to do voluntary work and assist others [later].”644 
Another way to frame this model is that lower strata o f the populations are preferred to elites 
and a particular effort is done towards that direction. For example, a project can aim at 
“empowering people by teaching [diem  how] to speaking in  public”, or assist “a variety of
641 We insist on this subjective aspect: obviously if  one asks local NGO leaders whether they want to related 
their work to the local population or to large-scale international debates, surely the vast majority of answers will 
be about the local population. Even more so in the very difficult case o f the Palestinian Territories. We will 
come back on this aspect through the analysis o f  the most expected public speeches (MEPS, in Section 7.5.2).
642 Interview with Nassif MU’ALLEM, Director, Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, Ramallah,
21.01.2004.
643 Interview with A ref JAFFAL, Executive Director, Gvic Forum Institute, Ar-Ram, 17.02,2004.
644 Interview with Issam AROURI, General Manager, Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.02.2004.
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smaller organizations, such as handicapped organizations, to better convey their messages”
into the public agenda.645 W hat matters is that the projects or programmes in question
respond to pressing local needs and not just to fashions relayed by donors.
Sim ilar to this idea o f working directly upon die lower levels of society, the issue o f language
is also very im portant Some actors were aware of the difficult work of advocacy NGOs. As
an interviewee put it, service-providing NGOs
“axe working on tangible issues, like UPMRC, and others. You feed directly with something. 
But in [advocacy] NGOs like us, we are teaching, lecturing, doing some training. You cannot 
feel directly the results. We are suffering more from the critical point that people think that we 
an  selling words and nothing concrete!” [... Instead, we should] look more at priority and burning 
questions [of the population].”646
A second response to the risk o f ‘selling only words’ is to promote concrete activities that 
give a grounding to the very abstract concepts of democracy, governance, and transparency: 
for example, one NGO invited the union of handicapped people to push for the real 
implementation o f  measures rehabilitating public infrastructures that would become more 
user-friendly, or by forcing the PNA to respect very concrete implementations of 
environmental laws (by translating pesticides labels and warnings into Arabic),647 etc., as a first 
step towards a more substantial involvement o f various layers of die population into 
democratic practices.
c) Outward-mediated NGOs
On the other end of the dichotomy, one finds NGOs that tend to give priority to 
international preferences or that conceive of their task as serving relays between international 
donors or ideas and the local. This preference (hence ‘outward-mediated3) can be expressed 
both in terms o f programmes and language. It is also denotes a rather elitist approach of 
doing and conceiving of NGO advocacy work.
One can never stress enough that all o f these models are just intended as a heuristic means to 
produce a generalizing sense out of particular cases, to offer a taxonomy, and to serve the 
broader discussion on some of the unintended consequences of civil society promotion by 
international donors.
For obvious reasons, few NGOs would actually reveal openly elitist preferences or admit that 
their work was deeply influenced by international fashions. Therefore quotes or hints at such 
practices always referred to other NGOs doing the same. Everybody seems to know that
645 Interview with Noah SALAMEH, Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, Beit I .ahem,
24.02.2004.
646 Interview with Iyaad BARGHOUTHI, Director, Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies, Ramallah,
22.01.2004. Emphasis is mine.
647 Interview with Issam AROURI, General Manager, Jerusalem Center for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.022004
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these outward-mediated practices exist amongst Palestinian NGOs, but no one acknowledges 
the fact for him/herself.648 (This reminds one o f the question o f USAID funding whereby 
everyone claims not to have received a single USAID dollar, but many NGOs actually do take 
such funding).
One could imagine spreading new models and norms into the domestic arena is just another 
way o f doing advocacy work. The fact is that many accused some o f the local NGOs o f being 
trapped in this model that engulfs them in a space warp far away from local realities. This is 
best translated by the idea that these outside-mediated NGOs “want to fight not on the 
ground, but in the American Colony”, referring to the 5-star Hotel in East Jerusalem  where 
high profile visitors usually visit while in the West Bank.
But why would there be such a preference for fighting in cosy atmosphere rather than on the 
ground? Some think it is a matter of simple comfort because it is simpler to discuss problems 
of advocacy than to confront them in  the remote zones. But for the majority, it  is due to the 
abundance o f monies dedicated to advocacy issues. The result is a form o f “opportunism” on 
the side of Palestinian NGOs “making hay while the sun shines” but at the expense o f “rural 
zones which are less covered” since most of the organizations doing this type o f activities are 
city-based.649 Another negative impact of surfing on the waves of foreign fashion is that local 
NGOs adapted to the idea that there is a “flavour o f the m onth”650 and therefore long-term 
efforts will be in vain because funding w ill not last for more than few years (at best).
The end result is that all this money has “made the NGOs lose contact w ith their own 
people.”651 Finally, for two smaller NGOs, the risk o f  losing contact with the bases was also 
due to the imposed language and formulation required in  order to succeed in  proposal 
writing. It is not an exaggeration to say that it takes professional proposal writers to  survive in 
the scrambling o f funding, and this means that many NGOs actually hire foreigners more 
fluent in English — the lingua fra n ca  o f development nowadays — to do the job o f the reporting 
and fund-raising.
d) NGOs as a locus for creating a habitus?
Taking a step back from the ‘inward-outward’ schemes, one could reformulate the questions 
of the introduction and Chapter 3, whereby one tries to assess whether civil society is alien or 
not to Palestine, or to the Arab Middle-East. In the precise case that occupies us now
648 Therefore some o f the quotes here will be d ied  anonymously. What matters are the practices, not who is 
doing what.
649 Interview with Nora QORT, Board Member, Palestinian General Union o f the Charitable Societies, East 
Jerusalem, 21.01.2004.
650 Interview with Carole JA*BAR1, Director, Patients Friend Society in Jerusalem, Mount of Olive, 21.02.2004.
651 Interview with A ref JAFFAL, Executive Director, Civic Forum Institute, Ar-Ram, 17.02.2004.
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(advocacy programmes), the question is not about individuals who internalize or instrumentali^e 
certain values. Rather it is about a systemic, indirect and unintended imposition o f language, 
or structures (isomorphism), ways o f working, or reporting on local NGOs that is at the 
origin o f the decoupling o f local organizations from the bases. Gradually, some o f  the 
Palestinian NGOs lost a finer sense o f the local problems and o f the population’s needs.
So eventually, this can lead for certain NGOs to a form of heteronomy, literally understood 
as the respect of or the conforming to someone else’s law. Put differently, the fact that civil 
society promotion must be funded means that the concept becomes a commodification. The 
latter implies a “change in production relations” that owes its driving more to the market 
(Marshall G. 1996: 69) than to constructivists views according to which principled beliefs 
acquire strength through their diffusion in the international system and by international 
actors.
To give further strength to this idea of an imprint left over by external actors (or by 
programmes preferred by them), one should underline that i f  advocacy means “public 
support for or recommendation of a particular cause of policy”,652 there is no reason that the 
flow of recommendations goes only one way. The previous presentations o f five generations 
of NGOs (Senisolla 1999) actually demonstrated that with third and forth generation NGOs 
there was supposed to be a true partnership between northern and southern NGOs since the 
late 1970s. The fact is that only one advocacy NGO interviewed actively promotes such 
advocacy from ‘southern* to ‘northern’ NGOs.653 This is not to downplay the very important 
role of other NGOs in reaching northern partners through information dissemination, but, in 
the latter cases, this tends to be done passively only.654
Unfortunately, this is the exception rather than the norm. The dominant apprehension 
amongst donors of local (advocacy) NGOs is that o f organizations which are less developed 
(in terms of structures), with less capacities, in need  o f other tools, and trapped with a 
‘backward’ or ‘traditional’ society. Is not that a mere process o f complexity reduction? Is that 
not a way to intellectually reinforce a prevalent dichotomy of ‘traditional* vs. ‘modem’?655 
One can wonder whether Talal Asad’s view ¿s not correct when stressing that categories such 
as ‘traditional’, ‘modem’, ‘secular’ and the like serve hegemonic trends:
“[...] In an interdependent modem world, ‘traditional cultures’ do not spontaneously grow or
develop into ‘modem cultures’. People are pushed, seduced, coerced, or persuaded into trying
652 The definition is from the New Oxford Dictionary ofEngUsk (2003).
653 Interview with Salwa DUAIBIS and Susan ROCKWELL, Partners, MAT TIN Group, Ramallah, 17.02.2003.
654 This is done through Internet or through sending publications. One could instead imagine or expect active 
programmes of Palestinian advocacy NGOs touting and lecturing northern organizations and doing ‘capacity 
building' in their turn, as many northern NGOs do when they go ‘south'.
655 See Section 3.1.2.
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to change themselves into  som eth ing else, som ething that allows them to  be redeem ed  It m ay 
n o t be possib le to stop this p rocess”
But such changes, though not directly forced,
“are not possib le without the exerc ise o f  political power that often presents itse lf as a force for 
redeem ing ‘hum anity’ from ‘trad itional cultures’. Or— and this comes down in  the end to the 
sam e thing— as the force for rec la im ing  rights that belong inalienably to man in  a state o f  
nature.” (Asad 2003a: 154)656
This relentless manner of promoting advocacy uniquely from ‘north to south’ and imagining 
southern NGOs uniquely as the receivin g end contributes to the resilience of the ‘traditional- 
modem’ dichotomy. Thus, local advocacy NGOs become a privileged vehicle to ‘redeem’ the 
less democratic polity, to ‘seduce’ or ‘coerce’ to think in terms of a vibrant civil society, all o f  
which defined according to the priorities of external donors. In that line, some NGOs (more 
exposed to interaction with donors) become the body in which the habitus of external inputs 
are transmitted and imprinted. Then these multiplicator NGOs redirect such habitus to 
another body (that of the Palestinian society) through workshops, conference, and awareness 
raising activities. Thus imposition o f  certain values can take the form of a disciplining 
process.
6.3.3. Problems with advocacy programmes
Faced with the argument that ‘civil society’ has been overstated (Shawa 2000 &  2001), one 
can adopt a two-pronged approach. On one hand, it would be interesting to investigate the 
degree o f legitimacy that the various types o f NGOs enjoy at the ground level. Unfortunately, 
this could not be done for this dissertation, but following the insights of Caroline Abu-Sada’s 
doctoral dissertation (Abu-Sada 2005a), the contention is that some o f the largest secular 
NGOs have recently suffered from a serious lack o f popular legitimacy.657 It is the contention 
of this thesis that the overuse o f civil society and its subtle imposition by external actors 
might become a  source of heteronomy for the Palestinians since the discourse o f civil society 
does not refer enough anymore to locally dominant rhetoric, the advocacy sector being a case 
in point.
But it would be too far fetched to put all the blame on international donors’ shoulders. 
Another way to apprehend this problem o f legitimacy is to acknowledge the harsh criticism 
addressed to NGOs at the beginning o f the Intifada (see Kuttab 2001; Abdel Shafi 2004) or 
shortly before (Haddad 1999) and to try to make sense out o f more visible problematic
656 Note the strik ing paralle l with the quote on  the ro le o f  key N G O s to help  Palestinian society to get out o f the 
‘state o f  n atu re ' (Section  6.1.2.a).
657 A ccord ing to th e  w o rk  o f  another PhD  d issertation  authored by Caroline A BU-SAD A, Sciences-Po, Paris. 
See A bu-Sada 2005a.
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aspects o f NGO work. In other words: to what extent are the blames addressed to NGOs 
due to their own responsibility?
Many o f these criticisms have actually been named over the last years, since the M inistry of 
Justice first started its anti-NGO campaign in 1999: over-centralization, conference mentality, 
one-man shows, book productions, but to what impact? Let us now go quickly through some 
of these critiques.
a) Over-representation in the central zones
The following table658 is a visualization of the stark imbalance between certain zones o f  the 
Territories. Ramallah, Jerusalem and Gaza display by far an over-concentration of advocacy 
organizations in comparison with the percentage of NGOs and in terms o f the population 
harboured in these govemorates. The already noticed imbalance (percentage o f population 
much higher than the percentage of advocacy NGOs) in Nablus, Hebron (KH), North Gaza, 
Khan Younis and Rafah is even more visible with regards the percentage o f advocacy NGOs. 
Table 26: Concentration of advocacy NGOs in the Palestinian Govemorates
■ □  %  of population ■  %  of C SQ s □  %  of Advocacy NGOs
Does that mean that there is no need for democracy, human rights and other advocacy 
NGOs in the peripheral zones? Many have argued during the interviews that it is due to the 
presence of universities in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Gaza City and the larger percentage of 
the population with third-level education. This provides only a partial explanation: w hat about 
the two universities of Hebron? why would Beit Lahem with its important university have a 
lower percentage than Ramallah for example? The second explanation put forward was that
858 The table is adapted from (Kassis 2001:39), from which I have taken only the percentage o f CSOs (Civil 
society organisation). Percentage of population calculated from PCBS data population by mid-2004 (PASSIA 
2004: 274). I have then adapted my own figures about advocacy NGOs. No data available in Kassis about 
Tubas. The Govemorates, for the sake of geographical visualization, are listed (roughly) from north to south: 
Jenin (JN), Tubas (TB), Tulkarm (TK), Qalqiliya (QQ), Nablus (NA), Salfit (SA), Jericho (JO), Ramallali (RA), 
Jerusalem (JM), Beit Lahem (BL), Hebron (KH for Khalil), North-Gaza (NG), Gaza Gty (GC), Deir al-Balah 
(DB), Khan Younis (KY) and Rafah (RF).
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Ramallah and Gaza officiate as governmental centres (until such time as East Jerusalem 
becomes the real capital)* This is already a more convincing argument because of the 
unavoidable centrality of Ramallah and Gaza for governmental matters.
However, one should also bear in m ind the over-concentration of donors themselves in 
central zones. Only two international donors interviewed have their main bases in  Gaza City, 
ten others in Ramallah and the vast majority (30) in East Jerusalem. This trend has been 
reinforced with the intense closure imposed on all Palestinian cities that provoked a true 
exodus from international organizations into East Jerusalem. Moreover, donors do not seem 
to make extra efforts to reach out for remote advocacy organizations. A concrete example of 
this apathy to reach out to rural zones through advocacy activities was given by a Palestinian 
organization very active in rural areas. It wanted to run a project on the “promotion of rural 
leadership” and went to donors who in  turn listed organizations who were allegedly already 
doing the same type of work. But in fact most of the activities were simply done in the cities 
rather than going to the communities themselves, since people cannot easily move to larger 
urban centres.659
Palestinian NGOs also suffered from intense closure, especially cities where Israeli troops 
operate for longer periods than in Ramallah for example. Beit Lahem (with Nablus) was 
placed under curfew much more than other cities in  the West Bank, though totally 
sporadically, as to render any normal life impossible. Nablus, the scene of very violent and 
frequent military incursions, also suffered tremendously and since late 2003 was not accessible 
to foreigners, unless they were working for USA organizations or for NGOs registered with 
Israel660 In the light o f the difficulty for certain Palestinians to reach Ramallah and East 
Jerusalem and for foreign donors to reach Nablus, the director of a Nablus-based advocacy 
NGO decided to move back to Ramallah during the years o f the Intifada because, “nobody 
could see [us] in  Nablus!”661 The second Intifada therefore reinforced the trend o f over­
centralization o f  the advocacy organizations.
b) ‘A l-iska li h a fí — Kingdoms w ith  little governance
If there is an irrefutable geographical concentration of advocacy NGOs, the same can 
probably be argued about the way few individuals concentrate much of the power of 
advocacy in  their own hands and in their own organization. Many observers, international and 
Palestinian alike, highlight and denounce the tendency o f few NGO leaders to run one-
659 Interview with Nota QORT, Board Member Palestinian General Union o f the Charitable Societies, 
Jerusalem, 21.01.2004.
64101 could thus not reach Nablus in my 2004 fieldwork period.
661 The NGO was originally based in Ramallah, but then moved to Nablus. Information from Iyaad Barghouthi, 
Director, Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies, Ramallah, 22.01.2004.
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(wo)man shows. The problem is so serious and well-known that a US NGO has tailored a 
programme to tackle this lack o f internal governance and democracy under the heading of 
‘technical assistance for intermediary organizations’: by promoting clear and shared rules 
about internal governance and financial management,662 the American organization tried to 
offer internal keys to stop the one-man show approach.
The ombudsman for citizens’ rights protection in the Gaza Strip also dwelled at length on the
matter. For him, there is too much of “cosmetical networking” amongst human rights
NGOs: all work in  their own comer, fearing for the “identity o f their organizations” and for
their “reputation”. He stressed that some o f the advocacy NGO work:
“is not community-based, but it is elite work. Here organisations are sometimes known by the 
head of the organisation, not the organisation itself. If this chairperson were to move, die or 
resign, the situation of the NGO will be shaky. Because it is a well known person, well 
connected, an elite person, internationally known. [...] So it is not pure grassroots.”663
According to a French saying, €Ce sont les coordonniers les p lu s m al chaussés\ or in Arabic, al-iskaafi
h aa fi* (literally T h e shoemaker is barefoot’). This is definitively the case for Palestinian
advocacy NGOs. Beyond the elitist tendencies and the pronounced lack of internal
governance, it looks like some of the conflict resolution NGOs also have a deficiency of
know how when it comes to themselves: i f  we believe observers and the harsh comments
gathered during the interviews about their sister organizations, peace and conflict
management organizations are also in need of some solutions towards non-violent and
peaceful healing inside the sector.
The advocacy sector harbours a true star-system that international donors actually sustain in 
two manners. First, there is a rush towards some high-profile figures such as Han an Ashrawi, 
Raji Sourani, Mustafa Barghouthi, Azmi Shu’aibi, Riad Maliri, etc., all of whom already benefit 
from a large visibility thanks to the mediatization of the conflict Thus AIDA, the platform of 
international organizations, always invites the same Palestinians to analyze the ‘situation’. In 
other words, some donors go into circles, betting only on known horses so to speak. UNDP, 
which generously funded the establishment of Hanan Ashrawi’s MIFTAH, promoted her 
NGO as “good country experience” and the “best organization” in 2003.664 
There is nothing intrinsically negative in that, except that it reinforces organizations that have 
already seven-digit budgets instead of sustaining the efforts o f smaller organizations and the
662 Interview with Hanna W. THEODORIE, Chief of Party, American Development Foundation, East 
Jerusalem, 18.02.2003.
663 Interview with Mazen SHAQURA, Director o f Gaza Branch, Palestinian Independent Commission for the 
Citizens* Rights, Gaza City, 01.02.2003.
664 Interview with Mounir KLEIBO, Governance Programme Analyst, UNDP, Jerusalem, 19.02.2004.
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diversity o f civil society and to contribute to the risk o f multiple-funding scandal such as th e  
one that destroyed the largest human rights NGO in the W est Bank (LAW) in 2003.
c) Does the language im plied speak to the m ajority?
Finally, and to link to the overall question of whether international donors contribute to th e  
lack of legitimacy of local NGOs, or whether international donors by their insistence on c iv il 
society promotion contribute to a form o f heteronomy for the Palestinian society, one needs 
to say a few words about the vocabulary and formulations used by advocacy NGOs in  the ir 
activities. Does the vocabulary used by advocacy NGOs speak to the population? If not, w hat 
are the alternatives to make it more successful? Does it really try to speak to the masses? O r 
does it fa i l  to speak to them?
In the first place, there is little doubt that most o f the 50 advocacy organizations listed in ou r 
database used the concept o f ‘civil society’. In all, o f  the 22 advocacy NGOs interviewed, the 
concept of ‘civil society’ was abundantly used in  their material and there were strong 
similarities in  the type of projects and programmes offered by these organizations. So w e 
cannot use the same three typologies about civil society as we did for the health sector.665 
Instead, particular attention w ill be dedicated to the question of translations o f certain 
problematic concepts around the notion of civil society. How are contentious issues such as 
‘secular’ (see Section 3.2.2) used and presented by local organizations?
Broadly speaking, there are two types o f  approaches. The first one is to fail to differentiate 
between concepts put forward in proposals (in English) to receive funding and the ones 
actively promoted (in Arabic) for local beneficiaries.666 The second is to consciously ban 
certain entries, like ‘secularism’ because they are badly perceived by the dominant local 
mentality. In the words of Mustafa Barghouthi, “ that does not mean you cannot promote 
things that lead to secularism”667.
In that line, some have openly admitted to playing with certain concepts and to adapting to 
their fashionable use amongst donors, but with the sole intent of securing funding, though 
remaining committed to the same bottom-line when defining their work with the local 
beneficiaries.668 A quick browse at presentation materials (such as annual reports, leaflets, etc.) 
produced by NGOs in Arabic and English reveals that there exist differences between Arabic
665 There were: 1) the substance and the phrase of a r il  society are used,
2) its substance but without the phrase, or
3) a totally different substance than ‘a r il society*.
See Sections 6.2.4 to 6.2.6.
m  Interview with Dr. Lily FEIDY, Vice-Secretary General, MI FT AH, East-Jerusalem, 16.02.2004.
667 Interview with Dr. Mustafa BARGHOUTHI, Director, HDIP (and President o f UPMRC), Ramallah, 
22.02.2003.
668 Remarks made on condition of anonymity.
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and English texts. Beyond the domestic context of the last four years where there has been a 
sustained return to nationalist discourse, it is easy to understand why the Arabic texts lay 
more stress on domestic issues than on international buzzwords. Nevertheless, it would be 
interesting to study this point and understand the exact origins and motivations for not 
translating certain words and concepts into Arabic. What would this lo st in translation* tell us 
about the way donors promote civil society in the Territories?
Maybe a third approach, favoured by some could be an honest account to remain faithful
both to its commitments and visions towards a democratic civil society working for a better,
more transparent and representative way of doing politics. The Ramallah Centre for Human
Rights Studies is doing a lot of work within Islamic milieus to promote an overture and
sensibilization to the question of human rights, tolerance and pluralism among Islamic
practitioners.669 Its leader prefer to use frankly and openly the concept of ‘secularism*:
Well, I use it! Even when I speak with them. I speak with them as I speak with you now!
We are trying to make them familiar with this concept that is not automatically negative, I 
believe.
[.. ,]The problem is: how, or what do they expect from you? Or who do they think that you are? 
When I say T am secular*, they consider that as a step forward, because they started thinking I 
am atheist and I came to say no! I am secular, which is “oh, it is fantastic!”.
The problem is that most of the academics and politicians pretend to be religious. But [they do 
that only] for m arketin g  themselves. After that, the religious people discover that they are not 
so religious as expected, so they are backwards \ie. disappointed, or a step back]. Better to begin 
from zero [and show what is meant by secularism]!670
Thus clichés over the West671 need also to be deconstructed and to be restated within the
given context o f  the Palestinian Territories. Therefore to lay stress on the need for
international donors to take more the h ea l setting and vocabulary into consideration does not
mean to abandon visions of democracy, civil society or governance. Rather it is about giving a
better chance for complex concepts to be (re-)eIaborated in a different cultural setting. Again,
this new cultural terrain should not be considered as close on itself, but rather already
containing seeds and substance favourable to the emergence of democratic polities. By
insisting also on local vocabularies and rhetoric, one probably gives more chance to a better
branchement or connection, and to the blossoming of married concepts reflecting local needs
framed in  international wording.
669 This work forms part of the curriculum itself of Islamic studies at an-Najah-University.
670 Interview with Iyaad BARGHOUTHI, Director, Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies, Ramallah, 
22.01.2004.
671 See the discussion in Chapter 3 o f the reversed forms of Orientalism and some of the dominant cliches 
within representation about the West in the AME. In this case, the resistance o f Muslim believers towards 
secularism stems from a false and simplistic interpretation of'secularism’ understood as the absence o f religion, 
although it means something totally different in reality.
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Ch apter  VII: The Exclusionary D imensions of 
Civil  So ciety
‘CSOs should combine service delivery with dear developmental objectives. 
Service delivery should not be seen as an end but rather as a means to an end. ’
(Abdel-Shafi 2004:15)
7.1. Introduction: Unanswered Questions
By putting the initial stress on the ambiguity and shortcomings of civil society promotion in 
the Middle-East, two main questions were to be solved in this thesis. First: was the focus on 
cultural variables justified to explain the shortcomings o f ‘civil society’ promotion in  the 
region? Second: was there an over-emphasis of civil society at the expense of the political 
factors in the region (along the argument of Langhor 2004), and if, so how could that be 
explained? Rather than studying local NGOs in their domestic setting, the research argued for 
the necessity to study local NGOs in their interaction with international donors whose power 
in shaping and deciding which programmes and projects will be effectively run, are much 
more important than usually acknowledged in much of the literature dealing with civil society, 
where the role of donors is assumed to be equally benevolent across time and types of 
donors.
We have seen that theories o f dvil society are very diverse in their approaches and that they 
often overlook certain issues, in particular the conditions through which civil society can 
become a space to reach autonomy thanks to its capacity o f auto-institution (a la 
Castoriadis).672 The thorough analysis o f  the emergence of ‘civil society’ within Arab-Middle 
Eastern intellectual fields demonstrated that civil society certainly does exist in  the region, but
672 See Section 2.5.
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that local specificities must be taken into consideration in order that it plays a constructive 
and variegated role. Adopting excessively dogmatic and fixed interpretations w ithout 
acknowledging the historical context in which ‘civil society’ was bom, Le. modem western 
liberal politics, and the particularities o f the Arab-Middle East where it becomes (re- 
)interpreted, would be a mistake. Instead, by giving importance to the loca l fram in g o f c iv il 
society, one can expect that civil society a la Middle East w ill have more chance to flourish in  
the region, since it is formulated according to local expectations and therefore sensitive to  
local difficulties (such as the question o f translation of concepts like ‘secular’, ‘individualism*, 
‘democracy’, etc.). On the epistemological level, the stress laid on sim ilitudes rather than 
differences (Section 1.1), and the careful observation of the moments in which local actors 
have connected  in a variety of ways to universal repertoires, (‘branchem ent a la Amselle), have 
opened new interpretations o f Palestinian civil society (eg. civil society as an internal identity 
marker o f the Palestinian political field, rejection of the phrase ‘civil society’ but simultaneous 
stress on another kind of message, etc.)
The chapter on international donors gave more substance to the ground argument that 
donors ought not to be considered as a single and homogenous actor.673 Rather, international 
donors are evolving over time, w ith an increased degree of professionalization and 
specialization in  the field of intervention. In the precise case o f Palestine, it was demonstrated 
that different geographical origins and longer historical involvement with local NGOs 
generate different approaches to and models of civil society. Larger actors that have been 
involved only for less than a decade tend to adopt a rather limited managerial and top-down 
view o f civil society, while smaller donors privilege approaches that are sensitive to internal 
NGO diversity, bottom up process, and local particularities. The latter points are even more 
important since the historical presentation of NGOs in Palestine (Chapter 4) sheds light on 
the m any groups o f NGOs, representing historically and socially differentiated populations. 
The visions o f civil society by international donors later find a larger echo in the domestic 
scene and rhetoric thanks to the study o f ‘civil society at work* (Chapter 6). The production 
of grey literature by local NGOs reflected two dominant views concerning civil society: on 
the one hand, a managerial view tends to impose its models through a variety o f actors, 
means, and programmes, and on the other hand, another mode to accommodate locally the 
concept o f civil society is that of the Palestinian secular left which adapted the concept in the 
in it ia l moments o f its opposition to the nascent PNA to create a different narrative of ‘civil
673 There are also important differences within the Vest’ in interpreting the Middle East and some of its 
conflicts. Beyond the different views on civil society stressed in Chapter 5, there is also a stronger tendency in 
North American social science literature to use and abuse of the culturalist arguments. For a discussion, see 
(Abrahamian 2003: 537f).
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society’ as a sort o f identity marker. The study o f the health service-provision sector 
demonstrated how the discourse of civil society was deeply entangled in the evolution o f  left- 
wing political parties whose influence over health popular committees (later institutionalized 
into professional NGOs) remains up to this date a moving force of their activities. It was 
argued that the substance of ‘civil society’ also existed outside the ramp of the secular left 
NGOs, as for example, in the parlance of smaller (charitable) NGOs, though without the 
phrase, and that in a third sub-group of health NGOs, neither the substance nor the phrase of 
‘civil society’ were to be found.
In the sector o f advocacy NGOs, civil society is directly relevant and there the role of 
international donors in ‘building a civil society’ is much more obvious and transparent, but at 
the same time more problematic and controversial Donors’ shifting of priorities have 
probably been detrimental to the development of a sound advocacy sector that would really 
respond to local needs (hiding chiasmus’), and as a result some o f the local NGOs have paid 
too much attention to fashions imposed by international donors at the expense o f their links 
with the local population (outward-mediated vs. inwards-oriented). Large amounts of money 
did not help to build a sound and sustainable NGO sector. Instead, the mushrooming o f this 
sector, and the rather large amounts o f money led to some personal empires and over- 
centralization tendencies. These elements grew at the expense o f building a legitimacy 
through strong ties to the local constituencies (preferably in the two Palestines).
Introduced in the first chapter, the image o f ‘two Palestines’ has served so far as a heuristic 
tool to stress the importance o f internal differentiations within Palestinian society. The same 
image w ill provide us now with the opportunity to identify implications and changes spotted 
on three levels:
International donors (professionalization, specialization, types o f views on civil 
society, trends),
Local NGOs (and pressure towards service-providing, professionalization, use (or 
not) of fashionable concepts, re-appropriation o f ‘civil society’),
Change o f  ‘mood’ o f the populations of the two Palestines paying a heavy price to the 
failure o f peace and state-building.
How have these three groups changed in the last ten years? Have they moved along in  the 
same direction or in opposite ones? Can one link the arrival o f  massive amounts o f funding 
to the popular discontent expressed against large sectors of the NGOs at the beginning o f  the 
second Intifada?
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The following graphs (Tables 27-29) offer two modelized attempts to describe a situation 
where civil society organizations can contribute to a situation o f autonomy and o f  
heteronomy (as defined in Section 2.5), However, unlike previous studies dealing exclusively 
with Palestinian NGOs acting within the national arena (Craissati 1996; Abu-Sada 2005a), the 
graphs try to take the influence and role o f international donors into consideration. Generally, 
studies on Palestinian NGOs focus on its relations with the PNA, or on its relation to the 
masses, but little work has been done on the three elements a t the same time.674 
It w ill be here argued that some NGOs have experienced a gradual dislocation of their 
previous alignment with their local constituencies, resulting in  certain sectors o f  civil society 
(and in particular NGOs) being cut off from their popular bases. Elements highlighted 
previously, such as the harsh criticism against NGOs in the beginning o f  the Intifada  (Kuttab 
2001; Hanafi & Tabar 2003; Brown N. 2003: 190; Samara 2003; Nabulsi 2004; Abu-Sada 
2005c) and the insistence o f many NGOs leaders who, during interviews, stressed the need to 
come back to more grass roots and voluntary work all indicate that some NGOs have been 
uprooted from their bases.
It still remains to spot the origins o f such a hiatus between NGOs and the population. Is it  
due to international donors* policies and views on civil society? Or is it, as put it by one 
leading health activist, a “purely internal defeat o f the NGO scene**675 which lost direct 
contact with the population? Is it a combination o f the two? W hat are the other elements that 
could explain this dislocation?
Part o f  the problem lies in the concept o f ‘civil society* itse lf  and in the way it  is envisioned 
and embodied in a variety o f programmes and narratives, both international and local. Plus, 
the fact that Oslo did not deliver the expected dividends for the majority of the population 
exacerbated the previous problems. Rather than ‘putting the blame* exclusively on 
international actors, who, in keeping with the dependency theory, would make o f NGOs a 
‘transmission-belt* between world centres and the Palestinian (semi-) periphery, or on 
blaming Palestinian NGOs only,676 w e argue that though som e of the force for heteronomy 
stems from the way international donors promote certain lim ited vision o f civil society, the 
concept of ‘civil society* itself has, within the Palestinian field, three dimensions of 
exclusionary power.
The first dimension is ideological, for its disputed definitions of civil society promoted by 
local actors reinforced abstract divides within Palestinian society for being ‘dvil* or not, and
674 Abdel Shafi 2004 does so, but in a very brief article.
675 Interview with Dr. Majeed NASSAR, Deputy Director, Union of Health W ort Committees, Beit Sahour, 
20.01.2004.
676 See the vitriolic pamphlet of Samara 2003.
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over all, maintains — if  not increases — the artificial divide between Arab-Middle Eastern 
societies and their western liberal counterparts. The second is a political exclusionary power, 
because ‘civil society’ is not only deeply embedded within the narratives of Palestinian 
factions, and because of this, there is a confusion between political work and developmental 
work that is not always playing into the hands of NGOs (since some can attack them on 
having a hidden agenda). Third and finally, ‘civil society* entails a sociological exclusionary 
dimension because it presides over the logic of specialization, networking, and internal 
dependency of large groups upon the specialization o f few NGOs. In other words, NGO 
activities contribute to a system of increased class differentiation, with NGOs adding weight 
to the middle class and serving beneficiaries of the lower classes (rather than being an 
emanation of these classes as it was the case until the early 1990s).
Before embarking on the three levels (political, sociological, and ideological), let us note again 
that ‘civil society* should not be read stricto sensu as only the activities labelled under this 
heading; civil society promotion takes many forms and addresses many related questions, 
such as democracy promotion, development, and other concepts that are implemented and 
realized by NGOs in  the last 15 years. In other words, one could say that many programmes 
and projects are realized broadly in th e nam e o f  civ il society.
So let us now look at the two modelized contradictory evolutions that took place under the 
umbrella of civil society promotion in  the Palestinian territories, one leading to a situation of 
heteronomy (Table 28) and the other to a situation of autonomy for local civil society (Table 
29).
The first table (Table 27 which mirrors Table 24 of Section 6,2.7) symbolizes the starting 
point o f donors-NGOs relations. The interaction between donors, NGOs and population is 
ideally lined in the same vertical space, hereby signifying their sharing common purposes, or 
same interest, despite the inherent relationship of power between the three levels.677 It 
assumes that this model represents the interaction between donors and Palestinian NGOs in 
the early 1990s.
677 The same observation as for Tables 23, 24 and 25 applies, with regard to power, meanings of arrows, and the 
simplified model with one set of NGOs under scrutiny.
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Table 27: Model o f relations between donors» NGOs and constituencies by 1990-1995
The next two tables (28 & 29) represent the evolution after ten years o f the relationship 
between local NGOs and international donors. To symbolize the changes that took place in 
the field of donors (more actors, specialization, more governmental funding, larger donors, 
etc., and described in  Chapter 5) and their shift of interests over the years, they have shifted 
position. Local constituency has also changed, and therefore moved from its original position. 
These changes are due to the subde shift in ideological values that permeated Palestinian 
society,578 and to the hardship context created by the second Intifada.
Table 28: Model o f  heteronomv for civil society
Table 28 represents a situation o f heteronomy for Palestinian dvil sodety. In such a case, 
NGOs came to respond not to the needs or the perceptions o f their local constituendes, but 
to the areas o f interests and priorities o f the donors. This can be termed heteronomy, since 
dvil sodety organizations do not contribute to establishing norms, values, institutions or even 
language that responds to the aspirations of the local population. On the contrary,
fi78 On the shift towards more conservative forms o f ideologies, see Legiain 2001a&b, and Hamzah & Larzilliere
2005.
302
international donors pushing for the success of the peace process, but sometimes at the 
expense of substantial democratic progresses inside the Palestinian territories (along what was 
termed ‘hiding chiasmus’), have dragged some NGOs behind them, and promoted views, 
norms and/or projects that do not really respond to the population’s aspirations. Over rime, 
such NGOs which were sitting between two seats, had to either choose between remaining 
aligned with the population’s demands and following trends and values set by international 
donors. In the latter case, their survival was guaranteed by donors’ funding, but they 
eventually became cut off from their bases. In the figure, NGOs and donors are in  the same 
vertical line. Some NGOs followed international donors by opportunism, in order to access 
funding or to gain international legitimacy in their internal struggle against the PNA.679 In any 
case, these NGOs have to re-build their own constituency, and as such, they can be described 
as being cut off o f their bases.
The final table (Table 29) represents a situation of autonomy for Palestinian society and civil 
society organizations. NGOs are now still in line with their original local constituency, and 
function as intermediary with international donors. They adapted partly to donors, but still 
defending the same interests as the population. The link with the constituency is preserved. 
This final model stresses the need for both NGOs and donors to analyse the circumstances 
under which civil society promotion takes place, in order to remain close to the populations’ 
priorities. This does not mean that NGOs should promote more conservative messages, as it 
is the case of the NGOs being part of the Islamist constellation. Instead, they should carefully 
adapt their programmes and language when working with smaller organizations that are closer 
to the bases, or that are on the same wavelength as the population.
m  As is convincingly argued by Abu-Sada 2005c, about another very large service-providing NGO active in the 
field of agriculture. This NGO reoriented some of its activities towards emergencies and encapsulated in its 
‘Food for Work* programmes visions o f ‘good governance’ and transparency, and became an essential local 
partner for the World Food Programme.
303
Therefore to remain in a situation o f autonomy and thus to avoid a hiatus or growing distance 
between the population and the NGOs, a double marriage is necessary. The first is linked to 
the wording or the packaging of civil society promotion that must be done with care and 
sensitivity according to the population served. The second dimension is about promoting 
programmes that respond to the true demands o f the population rather than responding only to 
the donors’ interests { eg  the success o f  the peace process at any cost). In brief, it is about 
keeping the balance between the right service-provision w ith a message adapted to the 
population’s needs.680 Formulated on a more theoretical level, this is about the capacity of 
societies towards auto-institution, namely being able to “call into question their own 
institution, their representation o f the world, their social imaginary significations” (Castoriadis 
1997: 17).681
The crucial point is that these models are not static. A situation of heteronomy between 
NGOs and the populations tend to further increase the hiatus and distance between the two 
groups. Therefore daily and practical aspects o f civil society ought to be taken into account 
with great attention since they can sometimes enlarge the rift existing between NGOs and the 
population. In other words this is an on-going process and, as recently highlighted by 
Nabulsi, the issue o f conditional support to the acceptation to an externally-sponsored peace 
solution is again a reality with the discussion o f the Road Map or the Geneva Initiative 
(Nabulsi 2004: 227). But both lack a genuine involvement o f wider Palestinian opinion, and 
the “accepted wisdom [about such plans] is so radically — and dangerously — divorced from 
the obvious realities [of the Palestinian street]” {ibid.: 228).
The argument about the potential situation o f heteronomy for the PNA could certainly be 
duplicated here as well (since the PNA is also caught between donors and the local 
populations). This would be in keeping with the view that the current Intifada is as much an 
uprising against the continuing Israeli occupation, as well as an internal popular revolt against 
the political class which made many painful concessions during a peace process steered from 
outside. Observers of the PNA also note that the latter had a dual discourse, one that aims at 
appeasing the international community and another one dedicated to its population (Abu- 
Sada 2005c). For obvious reasons, this could not be further researched here and we will now 
move back to the field NGOs to illustrate further the three dimensions o f the exclusionary 
power o f civil society.
680 A similar conclusion was reached recently by Abdel Shafi 2004. He also justly insists on the necessity for 
NGOs to respect internal democratic practices to enhance thdr image within the wider Palestinian population.
m  See Section 2.5.
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7.2. The Exclusionary Power of Civil Society: Political 
Dimensions
By political, I understand first the question o f factionalism that divides and leads political 
parties to have close (but sometimes conflictual) relationships with NGOs; second, the 
struggle that opposes the PNA with NGOs in the cat-and-mouse game of control for the 
PNA and checks-and-balances for NGOs and, third, the competitive relationship amongst 
NGOs themselves. In other words, it is about politics as having the pow er to influence others 
(and not a Weberian definition of struggle over the legitimate means of coercion). For 
obvious reasons, the focus will deal with aspects involving NGOs and the implication o f the 
discourse o f  dv il society and/or civil society promotion, rather than general aspects o f 
institutional political life, which, anyway, have been better studied elsewhere (Giacaman G. 
1998; Hilal 1998a&b). But it will be argued that because the nature of the political system in 
the Territories is increasingly that of a one-party system with neo-patrimonial features (Hilal 
1998b: 121), where opposition parries are "not merely outside the political process, but 
outside politics altogether” (Giacaman G. 1998: 8), it is even more important for dvil sodety 
to play a role in offering counter-models to autocratic tendenaes, in shaping and projecting 
pluralistic opinions into the public sphere.682
7.2.1. Pendulum movement
Historically political parties were the original matrixes of professional committees later turned 
into NGOs and which, during the 1990s, gained a life o f their own. The history o f NGOs is 
oscillates like a pendulum: the original swing and momentum was given by political parties 
and, at least for the left-wing factions, NGOs were to become very important for the 
identification and action of political parries in the late 1990s and years o f the second Intifada.
In the first place, political parties (secular and Islamist alike) created their own set of NGOs 
as “political shops” for their programmes (Muslih 1993: 262). This is well known and already 
documented. The collapse of the Soviet Empire (coindding with the emergence of a strong 
Islamist movement) provided another moment of critical juncture to renew the discourses o f 
the left factions, with the renunciation o f open references to Marxism and Leninism in both 
DFLP and PCP/PPP which actually coindded with the divorce o f Yasser Abed Rabbo’ Fida 
from DFLP mainstream (Taman 1992: 17 & 20). This had serious consequences for the 
survival o f the Union of Health Care Committees (the health NGO that was originally
6821 follow here George Giacaman to say that political parties were anyway losing their basis before the Oslo 
period (interview with George GIACAMAN, Director, MUWATIN, Ramallah, 08.02.2003), and that this 
weakening should not be read in terms of brain drain to the NGOs as suggested by Haimnami 1995.
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affiliated with the DFLP) which was “extremely weakened” by the 1990 split (Craissati 1996: 
129 & fh.35 123). Similarly, segmentation of trade unions was also due to attempts by political 
parties to gain hegemonic control of this sector of civil society (Muslih 1993: 264). The list o f 
evidence showing that political parties had the lead in the work and orientation o f NGOs 
could be longer.
The interesting point is that during the 1990s there was a gradual ‘depolitiazation’ to follow 
the argument o f  Hammami (1995) coupled with a professionalisation o f NGO work.683 
However this is only partially true. This is probably the case for the larger secular NGOs that 
managed to adapt to the new situation put forward with Oslo. Smaller NGOs did not all turn 
into professional bodies with a specialized administrative apparatus. Moreover, the vast 
majority of NGOs kept a link to political parties despite nomination of cross-factional boards 
of directors. Nevertheless, m ost active NGO actors watered down their political affiliation.6®4 
Many other newly created organisations might well have become less partisan, along with the 
general trend for Palestinians to become less and less affiliated to political parties. Thus a real 
partisan and “social demobilization” took place during the Oslo years when the percentage o f 
persons without political affiliation soared between 1994 and 2000 to reach an incredible 35% 
by mid-2000 (Picaudou 2003: 187f), compared to just H .7% 685 in December 1994 (Hilal 
1998b: 138).
So the political dimension in  this exclusionary power is best described as a paradox: despite 
being depoliticised (Hammami 1995: 55-57), the political entered again through the back 
windows of certain NGOs. It is argued here that the outbreak of the second Intifada 
reinforced this tendency of a repoliticization of NGOs.
How can this be possible? First of all, donors’ requirements about transparency, long-term 
planning and calls to abandon factionalist recruitment, might have led to the 
professionalization (to use the phrases o f H am m am i), but favoured the emergence of new- 
types o f factionalism. This new form is not based on strict affiliation to a given political party, 
but rather on loose affiliation to three neighbour political families (secular left, mainstream 
nationalists, and religious-conservative). The emergence of PINGO illustrates this dynamics 
o f loosely leftist organisations presenting themselves as a professional and independent 
network. A through study o f  the compositions o f  boards o f direction would probably 
reinforce the argument that there were mutual support within left NGOs and mainstream
f
683 Jamal M. 2005 sustains that this is what happened in the women’s sector.
m  In the case of a large service-providing NGO, employees were forced by the direction not to respond to 
questions by another social sciences researcher about the links o f the NGO with political parties.
685 The figures are from two different sources, but are nevertheless indicative o f a growing trend o f 
depoliticization. On the issue of depolitization, see the reflections o f Hilal 1998b and Bishara 1998.
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nationalist NGOs, but not across these two large groups. Second not all NGOs were really 
depolitidsed, or, because of the attempt by the PNA to foster support to the regimes by 
creating its own governmental NGOs, some NGOs took again an even more political 
outlook as a  reaction.
7.2.2. How real is real: a ‘political depoliticization9?
When knowing more about Palestinian political life, it is almost impossible to sustain that the 
largest NGOs have become de-politicized: Hanan Ashrawi (head of MIFTAH) is member of 
the PLC, Ghassan al-Khatib (ex-leader o f JMCC, a research centre in Jerusalem) is Minister o f 
Labour since 2003, Dr. Rabah Muhanna (President of the UHWC in Gaza) is member o f the 
Politburo o f  the PFLP, Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi (president of UPMRC and head of HDIP) 
was member of the Politburo o f the PPP, later founder of a new party (National Initiative), 
and declared candidate to the 2005 presidential elections, Khadr Shqirat (former head of 
LAW) announced, after the corruption scandal, that he would openly run for the PPP, 
Ibrahim Daqqaq (founder of Arab Though Forum) is a co-founder o f the National Initiative 
with Haydar Abdel-Shafi (President of the Gaza Red Crescent Society). This confusion is not 
only a left-wing feature, given that Fatah prominent figures also play on the NGO court: 
Hussam Khader (head of a NGO dealing with refugee tights) is a Fatah-elected member in 
the PLC, Mahmoud Abbas (founder o f the Palestinian Centre for Peace -  People-to-people) 
was Prime Minister and is now President o f the PNA, and some say that even Mohammad 
Dahlan, former head of the Preventive Security forces in Gaza and now Minister for Civil 
Affairs, has established an advocacy NGO in Gaza.686
A ll these examples, not to mention Khalil az-Zibn, prove that a full depoliticization o f NGOs 
is anything but an unsubstantiated claim ., both in terms of non-partisan engagement, and in 
terms of abstention of NGO activists to be part of political institutions (such as the 
Palestinian Legislative Council). Instead one should apply this label of ‘depolitidzation’ with 
caution: it might be true for some NGOs, but it also the result o f a lack of an institutionalized 
opposition party system (Giacaman G. 1998), and of the apparent disinterest of the masses 
for political factions (Picaudou 2003). One way to read it is that because of the conditionality 
imposed by some western donors, aid to NGOs was not meant to favour discrete political 
parties or factions.
But again, the attitude o f international donors is in that regard very paradoxical, since it 
pretends to contribute to the growth (or the emergence) of a Vivid’ or "vibrant civil society’ 
(to follow the well spread phrase) in order to build democratic polities, though through non­
6861 was not able to find out whether this was true, nor was I in a position to ascertain the name o f the NGO.
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political means. The further difficulty o f not having the same patterns o f political parties, or 
the same dividing lines amongst them as in Europe provides a partial source o f explanation 
for this ambiguity, or lack o f know-how o f international donors when dealing with Palestinian 
parties (where are the Christian Democrats? Where are the socialists and the liberals in 
contemporary Arab political systems?). Another reason for this paradox might stem from the 
fact that theories o f civil society are far from clear about the inclusion or exclusion o f political 
parties from its very definition.
In any case, two things result from this description. First, more thought ought to be dedicated 
to the necessity (or not) of having ‘depolitidzed’ aid to civil society (and what it exactly meant 
by that in the first place). Second, despite the implicit prohibition of engaging in politics by a 
majority of international aid donors/bodies (since solidarity funding would not have to care 
about such issues), and because most o f them are originally social movements, Palestinian 
NGOs found other ways to cope and continue to do politics but through other means.
7.2.3. New political arrangements in the shadow of ‘civil society*
Forced to pledge allegiance to non-factional/non-political work, older NGOs687 originally 
attached to political parties688 could resort to two types of strategy. These strategies are, it is 
important to stress, also the result o f more widespread use of the topic o f ‘civil society’. Put 
differently, new political arrangements were made in  the Oslo years in the name o f civil 
society. To discuss some of these, and some of the excluding effects s that programmes done 
in the name o f civil society had, a two-pronged approach w ill be adopted here. First, we will 
deal w ith internal features of political exclusion, and then more light will be shed on structural 
features, those concerning other organizations and other socio-political actors.
a) Internal motives or features o f exclusion: who are the beneficiaries?
By internal, we mean the motivations and activities bom inside NGOs and organized from 
within the NGOs that propel activities aiming at replacing normal political party work.689 In 
other words, when NGOs have as an objective not just the provision of services (or an 
advocacy project) but also to use their institution for political purposes and/or gam er political 
mobilization, then this would be an example o f the exclusionary power o f civil society. This 
is, in our view, the case since this is normally the work of political parties, maybe also trade 
unions, but not that of NGOs. It becomes ‘exclusionary’ because it might be done without
687 Let us note that what we will discuss now concerns mostly NGOs established before the Oslo years. More 
recent ones are anyway bom in a period in which factionalism was in a receding phase.
688 And that were not o f the Fatah galaxy since a large proportion of them were subsumed into the PNA.
685 Assuming that political parties are the normal and most important place to foster political activism.
Obviously trade unions are another locus of such mobilization. But NGOs, given the professional turn they 
took, should not be considered as the prime place for such activities.
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the formal consent of the party and, therefore, create tensions between the two bodies, and 
because it  is done ‘in  the name o f civil society* and hence leads to undeclared strategies. Such 
intentions that are not clearly stated might lead other actors (NGOs or local population) to 
question the bien fin d s  or of the true intentions of NGOs. Since such activities take place in 
this case from within the NGO, then it is an ‘internal’ motive.
What are these kinds of activities that are geared towards political work and socio-political 
mobilization? One leading example is done through youth programmes. Many NGOs have, 
in recent years, targeted the youth and younger generations. Many medical organizations run 
workshops dedicated to teenagers, and host youth clubs.690 W hy is that? There are surely 
important advances to make, for example, in relation to prevention in the case of health, but 
there is certainly some political interest in politicizing, or, (to put it less bluntly) in making 
young people aware of issues of democracy, and of the necessity o f their participation as 
future citizens. But there is probably a hidden two-fold objective. On the one hand, this is a 
sure way to create and build a political constituency, since 46% o f the population o f W est 
Bank and Gaza were aged between 0 and 14 in 2003.691 Second, there is the concurrence 
embodied by Islamist groups who are extremely strong in  the field o f orphanages, 
kindergartens, schools and (religious) education, through various organizations and 
community clubs.692 Political activism, or at least developing a consciousness o f the existence 
o f conflicting factions, starts very early for Palestinian children {eg. LaiziUiere 2004): it is 
urgently needed for all fictions to start political work as early as possible with Palestinian 
youths.
Religious affiliation does not only refer to militant groups, but also, in certain zones o f the 
Territories, to the issue of intra-faith relations. Christians represent an increasingly declining 
minority o f the Palestinian Territories* population, roughly 2 to 3% (Sabella 2004) and 
coexistence between Christians and Muslims groups is in general very smooth. International 
aid, such as ‘civil society promotion* is, in theory, blind to religious preferences. In other 
words, civil society promotion should be the same for Christian and Muslim target groups 
and aid should be given indiscriminately to both Muslims and Christians. Thus, the UK-based 
Islamic Relief provides help without religious prejudice to both Muslim and Christian 
beneficiaries.693 So do many Christian international NGOs.
490 This is in addition to the targeting of children through school education and prevention activities. But in 
these cases, it would be difficult to imagine political work done in such forums.
691 Situation as of mid-2003.
692 Interview with George GIACAMAN, Director, MUWATTN, Ramallah, 08.02.2003. He believes that leftist 
parties have abdicated their responsibilities and left the field free for “Hamas’ indoctrination o f the young” in 
the Territories.
693 Interview with Adel QADOUM, Country Director, Islamic Relief, Gaza City, 03.02.2003.
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Nevertheless, both youth activities and non-discriinination o f religious identities seem to 
provoke some backlash on the image o f  NGOs. In the first type o f activities, the line between 
awareness raising and building a political patronage seems to be very tenuous. The 
documented case of a service-providing NGO (in the field o f agriculture) forcing potential 
beneficiaries to join their own professional unions if  they wanted to receive some aid (Abu- 
Sada 2005c) is an example o f how NGOs can use their work for political conditionality. Such 
conditionality is not imposed by donors, but by NGOs in their own political perspectives and 
objectives. As for the religious target groups, one cannot but have the sense that despite 
declarations o f non-preferenrial support, a lot of the money o f  large Christian NGOs goes to 
where Palestinian Christian minorities are based. According to some off-records observations, 
these donors have also been giving some money under the table to local NGOs who 
historically or geographically, are staffed predominantly by Christians. The point here is not 
to dispute the rights of religious groups to help preserve a religious heritage and presence in 
certain zones. Rather, the fact that this aid can use hidden and indirect means is probably 
more problematic since it is eventually discriminating contrary to the declared objectives o f 
the programmes (such as civil society promotion).
b) External features o f political exclusion: in or out?
By opposition to the previous model o f political exclusion, ‘external* covers the political 
motivations that include one NGO in  relation to other actors, be they other NGOs or other 
institutions. The focus will be again in terms o f potential political consequences. Two 
elements will be discussed (networking and civil society as an identity marker).
The most apparent phenomenon o f political exclusion related to NGOs is that of the 
sometimes-bizarre politics o f netw ork ing . Very shortly after its foundation, Rema Hammami 
pointed out the fact that PINGO was more a “lobby*’ than a  “movement” and that the only 
constituency some NGOs could find at the beginning of the Oslo era were other NGOs 
(Hammami 1995: 59).
Again, there is nothing intrinsically negative about the fact that NGOs combine their efforts, 
especially that PINGO was extremely important in the lobby for a positive law concerning 
NGOs. The problem arises when this same network, which claims to base its membership 
criteria on professional aspects of internal governance and adherence to certain visions of 
principles,694 refuses membership to organizations because o f their different political 
orientations.695 Other NGOs prefer deliberately to stay out of PINGO because of the
694 Interview with Rana BISHARA, Coordinator, PINGO Network, Ramallah 22.01.2004.
695 Interview with Caroline JA'BARI, Director, Patients Friends Society o f Jerusalem, Jerusalem, 21.02.2004.
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obvious political orientation o f the network,696 reinforcing the interpretation that PINGO is
more than a. simple coordinating body for the professional development of NGOs.
Furthermore, declarations or some o f PINGO’s members who did not hesitate to denounce
the attempts by some two or three NGO leaders to monopolize the network for their own
personal (or political) prestige, hint at political use o f the network For example, one NGO
(which refused to join PINGO precisely because o f the political overtones of the network)
denounced the selective instrumental izarion of PINGO by quickly publishing a press
statement when one PINGO prominent member was beaten in Jericho by security forces,
without following normal procedures of double-checking the in fo rm ation (in order not to
discredit advocacy organizations in the case of propagating false information).697
Networking problems are not limited to PINGO. There are some thematically-oriented or
geographically informal networks. For example, one observer o f the advocacy scene noticed
how three large h um an rights NGOs split geographically (one covering the West Bank,
another Gaza and a Israeli-based Palestinian NGOs based in Nazareth) would refer
exclusively to one another at the expense of a better and more open and integrated
coordination w ith other NGOs active in different places and different fields as well.
Coordination is mentioned by everyone, but with little result For the Palestinian ombudsman
for citizens’ rights, there is too much o f “cosmerical networking” amongst Palestinian NGOs,
and the end result is useless duplication o f activities:
“It is a question of identity for each organisation. Take the press release about the appointment 
of Attorney General.698 There are three or four press releases, but it is only a copy. There is just 
a different logo and sometimes different vocabulary, but with the same substance. It is a matter 
of reputation.
[...] Here the NGOs are a little bit different than in other parts of the world. I would not say it 
is community-based organisation: it is elite work The organisations here are sometimes known 
by the head of the organisation, not because of the organisation itself. If this chairperson were 
to move, die or resign, the situation of the NGO would be shaky. Because it is a well known 
person, well connected, elite, person, international known. So it is not pure grassroots, or 
community-based organisation.
So that is why you have a certain competition amongst certain of them, amongst their heads.”699 
At then end o f the day, coordination is about power, and donors as local NGOs are keen to 
speak about the necessity o f coordinating, but little is done effectively towards that
700purpose.
696 This came out in many interviews. For some PINGO is uniquely com m unist, for others it is a coalition of 
PFLP and PPP.
697 Interview with Khaled BATRAWI, Board Member, Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners, Ramallah,
09.02.2003.
698 Which provoked at the end of 2002 a serious malaise because of the lack of independence of the judicial 
system.
699 Interview with Mazen SHAQURA, Director of Gaza Branch, Palestinian Independent Commission for the 
Citizens’ Rights, Gaza City, 01.02.2003.
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More interesting about the issue o f networking would be to study the composition of the 
board of directors o f the most successful NGOs: not enough evidence could be gathered on 
that point, but for the Ramallah-based NGOs it is pretty much the same personalities 
appointing one another in their own NGOs’ board. Formally, this means that boards will be 
cross-factional, but that also implies a risk of neutralizing criticism and creative feedbacks 
since everybody is running into the same problems in  her/his own organization. More 
reflections on the composition o f boards to include a variety of actors of different sodo- 
professional backgrounds would not hurt the image o f NGOs at large. This could also 
contribute to a form of checks and balances that NGOs often lack and are criticized for.
The narrative o f ‘civil society’ is deeply entangled with the history of the various leftist groups 
and serves as an  iden tity  m arker. It reflects their vision o f political work, and even more so 
after the emergence o f the PNA. The imposition o f the phrase ‘dvil sodety’ reflects a gradual 
shift over who would have the lead in the secular left-wing spectrum, and serves at the same 
time as the exdusionary boundary o f who belongs to this politicized (if not straightforwardly 
political) left-wing camp (see in particular Sections 6,2.3 and 6.2.7)
The ambiguity o f the dvil sodety argument and its hidden link to factionalism (in terms o f  
relations to political parties) is best portrayed by a passage o f  the interview with Dr. Mustafa 
Barghouthi about the acquisition o f a private TV-channel by one of his NGOs. Questioned 
on the very reason why UPMRC, a medical organization, was buying a TV channel in 
Ramallah, Dr. M. Barghouthi replied:
“It is not only UPMRC, it is a combination of dvil sodety organizations: PARC (Palestinian 
Agriculture Relief Committees70 01] as well, Palestinian Hydrology Group. We want to use this 
instrument for two reasons:
1. We use it as an instrument of health education and awareness building.
2. Because the only TV that could represent an independent view was about to collapse 
(due to financial constraints).”
I then asked him i f  one could still speak of an ‘independent’ TV channel i f  it was acquired by 
organizations that are all historically affiliated to the PPP: His response was a simple:
Fair enough, but it is not factional, I would say.”702
What is this then, i f  not factionalism? Claiming that it is for, or in the name of, ‘civil sodety’ 
goes hand in hand with one o f  the best-documented websites of the Territories and which 
Barghouthi also hosts in one o f his NGOs (HDIP). The point is not about the widely
700 Senior foreign representatives and heads o f development agencies with years of experience throughout the 
world all agreed that they have never seen such a quantity of coordination fora , but doubted the usefulness of 
these. On the donors’ multiple but doubtless efforts of coordination, see Brynen 2000 and LeMore 2004.
701 Sister organization o f UPMRC, historically affiliated with the PCP/PPP.
702 Interview with Dr. Mustafa BARGHOUTHI, Director, Health Development, Information and Policy 
Institute (HDIP) and president of the Union o f Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, Ramallah, 22,02.2003.
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acknowledged quality of the Palestine Monitor (www.palestinemonitor.org), but the fact that 
it is the self-proclaimed ‘Voice of the civil society*. The ‘About Us* section o f the website, 
states that the website’s origin is as follows:
“PNGO therefore delegated to HDIP the responsibility of disseminating messages and unified 
responses to the local and foreign press about local developments coming from Palestinian civil 
society. We did so by creating The Palestine Monitor.”703
Following this line o f reasoning, civil society has little to do with a buffer zone between
citizens and state, or as an intermediary layer. It is rather like a Russian matriusbka, w ith small
dolls placed, one after another, into larger ones: Palestine Monitor is hosted by HDIP on
behalf o f  PINGO, which, at least according to the web, does so on behalf o f the Palestinian
civil society.
The problem w ith this view is threefold. First, the omnipresence o f Mustafa Barghouthi (that 
increased even more with the January 2005 presidential elections where he ran as the 
candidate for the National Initiative) hides the organizations he embodies (UPMRC and 
HDIP) and his persona l political agenda becomes more important than his NGO work. 
Second, within the PINGO network, many accused Barghouthi and his organizations of 
monopolizing space and attention on the website.704 Finally, non-PINGO members also 
criticized the network for obstructing the efforts of smaller organizations working in  more 
remote zones. Here access to technology, and the capacity to ensure a high profile for the 
organizations are a vital precondition for any organization’s visibility. Some are much better at 
that game, but this struggle over the means of communication amongst Palestinian NGOs 
simply reflects internal political chess games, where few individuals have the lead, and where 
NGOs are pawns o f these games, hither with the PNA, thither with the Islamist bloc.
It is striking to see how the discourse o f ‘civil society* is widely spread amongst NGOs close 
to leftist factions and much less to other NGOs. Thus, the idea o f ‘civil society* serves as an 
identity marker for internal left ‘feuds* and rivalries, and it can also serve to draw the 
boundaries o f the leftist blocks vis-à-vis other political groups. Two observations are to be 
made.
First, in terms o f  domestic politics, the leftist platform is attacked on two sides. There is 
obviously the mainstream nationalist faction (Fatah), which has been vocal in its attacks 
against NGOs and clear in its efforts to control them (Rabe 2000). It comes as no surprise 
that there is little sympathy within PNA*s and Fatah*s intelligentsia for the phrase and concept 
of ‘civil society*. A recent book, published by a young Fatahwi intellectual, argues that civil
703 http://www.palestinemomtor.oig/ new_web/aboutus.htm.
704 Various interviews with PINGO members.
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society played against the emergence o f a consolidated Palestinian State, which is, in  his view, 
paramount to the national struggle (Abu Saif 2005). Further evidence that the discourse o f  
‘civil society’ can serve as a boundary marker within Palestinian factions stems from  the rather 
limited attention that leftist groups receive in the work o f Sayigh on A rm ed S truggle and th e 
Search fo r  th e S tate (1997). Despite the fact that his focus is broader than politics inside the 
Territories, he relays views that are not all sympathetic to the left blocks. For example, the 
exaggeration o f funds available to leftist NGOs705 is not very far from the type o f  argument 
used by the PNA against NGOs that they receive enough money anyway. He also makes o f  
left-wing NGO leaders a group o f well-off middle class individuals who are western-trained 
(Sayigh 1997: 613), which is also highly disputable, since many come from poorer 
backgrounds (Robinson 1997).
To stay on the right of the political spectrum.,706 Hamas and Islamist groups are not keen to 
promote either the substance or the phrase of civil society,707 since they rely on another type 
of ready-made discourse that is also greatly constrained by nationalist rhetoric. When 
speaking about NGO work they would click on the phrase o f al-*aml a l-ah li (civic work), a  
version that is more widespread in  daily Arabic parlance.708 A recent article by  a declared 
Islamist exponent was even proposing the new phrase of ‘al-jihdd al-madan? (literally the ‘civil 
struggle’) (Madhoun 2004). Such expression is highly interesting for our argument, because it  
marries the concept of Jihad  (understood as a ‘struggle’, an ‘effort’, either spiritual or physical), 
with that o f madam, or ‘civil’. J ih a d  is a very popular concept amongst religious and 
conservative strata, and the phrase is a way to refer to open political struggle within the 
sphere of social mobilization. In keeping with this line of argument, this rebuke o f ‘civil 
society’ (mujtama ’ madani in Arabic) is further evidence of how the concept is extremely loaded 
with internal political connotations to serve as a gathering banner for a variety o f political 
forces. The fact that the Islamist w riter preferred not to use ‘civil society’ but to collocate
705 For example, he speaks of a volume of international assistance for left NGOs up to $170m to $240m by the 
early 1990s. He actually uses figures by Sullivan (1995), but these figures concern at/KGOs and not only left- 
wing NGOs. See, for example (Sayigh 1997: 612).
706 Assuming that it makes sense for a short —but unrealistic— while while to use the left-right dichotomy 
traditionally applied to political parties.
707 Let us insist that within the charitable Islamic (and not Islamist) groupings, the content o f civil society is also 
present but not the phrase. Among these Islamic organizations, one cannot find the declared adversity for the 
topic o f civil society as it is the case in Fatah and Hamas’ views.
708 For an example o f such rhetoric, see the article o f Madhoun 2004, published in the daily al-quds al-arabi 
(27/07/2004).
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‘civil’ to ‘jihad’, hints at how badly the concept of civil society is now understood amongst 
strata o f the population.7®
Civil society serves to articulate attacks against larger secular NGOs not only from the right 
(Fatah and Hamas), but also from the far-left, such as the attacks from Adel Samara (2001; 
2003). In Samara’s view, the ‘NGO-ized Palestinian left* becomes an anthropomorphized tool 
and vehicle for the corruption of intellectuals and thereby o f the entire community, since it is 
spreading corruption and has practically abandoned the fight against the ‘Zionist enemy’ 
(Samara 2001: 170 & 179). In his recent pamphlet, Samara (2003) even questions the loyalty 
of NGOs by asking if  they have not simply become the *Bases For Others’ rather than 
serving the Palestinian struggle, meaning that NGOs were doing more harm to the national 
cause than good.
The end results of these various attacks against a certain left and ‘civil society*, was that the 
discourse of civil society has lost some o f its meaning over the years. It is as i f  civil society is 
not anymore a concept in  it s e lf {an sick , namely a form of activism that promotes popular 
participation or a place for the definition o f autonomy) but has also become f o r  its e lf ( f i r  sicby 
namely an rhetoric convention that insists uniquely on certain words and concepts without, 
though, any substantial grounding to these).709 10 By this, I mean that civil society has acquired a 
new dimension, or meaning, by and through its invocation. The discourse o f civil society has 
become of a vehicle for the conscientization of political action of certain groups o f  the 
Palestinian political spectrum . So the argument is more that the one produced by Hammami 
almost a decade ago, when she stated that:
“ [ . . . ]  the discussion o f c iv il society am ounts to a discourse o f  defeat. It has become the central 
term  through which a dem oralised and  de-mobilised grassroots movement has been com ing to 
terms w ith its powerlessness in the face o f  the transform ation o f  the once distant PLO  into a 
local authoritarian reahty” (H am m am i 1995: 52).
This is not the proper place to assess whether the left has been defeated, but the careful study 
of the discourse of civil society and o f  the actors who use this discourse leads the reader to 
conclude that civil society has become the gathering banner o f a group of precise NGOs and 
that within this group, there is a straggle over who have the prestige to hold this totem, or the 
banner of ‘civil society*. Palestine M onitor is just a concrete example of such an internal 
struggle of civil society f i r  sick, whereas Samara’s, Abu Sa ifs  or Sayigh’s critiques are 
embodiments o f different banners federating different political forces. These last critiques do 
not address the core of civil society, but rather the particular use made by some other figures.
709 On the differences between mujtama' madani and mujtama ahii, and a discussion of how the two are perceived, 
see Section 3.2.3.C. (on Ghalioun). On the tension between madani and ahii, see (Carapico 1998b: 4-8), and 
(Botiveau 2002:235).
710 See (Camau 2002:221) and Section 3,2.3-c.
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Finally, one can find hints at the function of civil society as a boundary marker in the 
production of studies about the concept o f ‘civil society* and NGOs in Palestine. literally , 
there have been dozens of analyses on the issues and most o f them are, as with civil society 
around the globe, rather apologetic and optimistic accounts o f dv il society.711 Not to forget 
that all NGOs represent only a small fraction of civil society at large, many (if not all) o f  these 
studies tend to focus on only the larger professional NGOs which are the most active, the 
most funded ones.712 In brief, such studies concentrate on the tip o f the iceberg. But this is so 
widespread that this form of reductionism has come to influence both donors who look 
exclusively for this type o f NGOs, but also local actors who ‘sell* their work through this 
positive line.
In other words, there is a reflexive dimension of this s h r i n k i n g  of civil society that is 
further reinforced by much of the literature assuming that — back to Russian dolls — few 
NGOs represent all NGOs, which in turn, represent the whole o f dvil sodety. Surely there is 
a serious problem with this view and both donors and students o f dvil sodety should look 
beyond the pale o f this self-proclaimed d v il sodety section.
c) B u t w hose w ork is it  a t  the en d  of the day?
There remains one very difficult (but legitimate) question about the exclusion o f politics: 
should it be the role o f NGOs to take over a political role? Using Kriesi* typology on the 
organizational structure o f new social movements (Kriesi 1996: 152-184), the next table 
(Table 30) allows one to visualize the evolution of the various NGOs. If the larger secular 
NGOs originally were both in A  and D  quadrants, they have tended to move towards C, 
where service is provided but w ith a certain loss of direct partidpation of the base (through 
voluntary work, or popular committees). Thus moving from the right half of the table these 
NGOs come to also ‘occupy* the ‘territory* o f political representation. Charitable 
organizations and some of the Islamic NGOs remained (or were established) in the quadrant 
D.
711 For good examples o f this views, see Sullivan (1995; 1998; 2001), Craissati 1996, Shawa 2001, Brynen 2000, 
etc.
712 In the wording of a local observer, “80% of the funding goes to 20% of the NGOs”. Interview with Dr. 
Rafiq HUSSEINI, Deputy Director General, Welfare Association PNGO Project, Beit Hanina, 06.02.2003.
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Table 30: Organizational structure o f  social movements
Constituency/client orientation
Service Self-help
No direct - C - -D -
partic ipation of - B - -A -
constituency Political representation Political mobilization
SMO
Direct
Participation o f  
constituency
Authority-oriented
During the interviews, various responses were given about whose role it was to play a political 
role. First, some argued that this was the role of the PNA to organize the work of civil society 
and that larger NGOs should adopt a lower profile and give more space to charitable 
organizations.713 Second, others thought that NGOs should simply not engage in political 
work, even more so that a lack o f a clearly institutionalised party system does not really help 
in defining the role o f who.714 A third view stressed the impossibility to dissociate NGO work 
from politics. The second Intifada gave the chance to many NGOs to do even more political 
work and to react against the rise o f Islamist groups, by tying "a  message o f pluralism, o f 
tolerance” to the service provided by NGOs.715 A fourth and final view was to say that 
NGOs can be formally detached from political parties, but NGO work serves in any case to 
give more credit to political parties.716 In conclusion, it can be said that the different 
approaches depends on the political faction to which the person interviewed belongs. But it is 
very interesting to notice how actors have re-affirmed in  the last years a more openly political 
and militant tone, acknowledging the need to do more political work. After de-politicization, 
a return to re-politicization? There is probably a good ground enough by now to make the 
argument
713 Interview with Sameeh Hashem ABU AYSHEH, Vice-President of the Union o f Charitable Societies 
(Southern Branch), Hebron, 12.022004. In his view, these Targe NGOs’ are not democratic at all and pursue 
only their financial interests.
714 Interview with Dr. Majeed NASSAR, Deputy Director, Union of Health Work Committees, Beit Sahour, 
20.01.2004.
715 Interview with Salah ABDEL-SHAFI, Director, Gaza Community Mental Health Project, Gaza Gty, 
02.02.2003.
716 Interview with Dr. Rabah MUHANA, Director of the Union o f Health Work Committees (Gaza Brach),
Gaza City, 30.01.2003. See also the interview with Dr. Mustafa BARGHOUTHI, Director, Health 
Development, Information and Policy Institute (HD IP) and president o f the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief 
Committees, Ramallah, 22.02.2003.
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7.2.4. The role of international donors
a) W hich level of po litics? M acro- (peace) or m icro -level (dem ocracy)?
Let us conclude on the political exclusionary power o f civil society, by looking at the potential 
role, or contribution of international donors in this regard. There is a broad consensus 
amongst left-wing NGOs that there has been an impact o f  the peace process in  terms o f 
political conditionality towards NGOs which had to comply, nolens volens, with some o f  the 
rules imposed by donors (most notably to support Oslo). A s for the de-politicization, there 
has been a minimal acceptance through the promotion of non-factional board composition 
and through the re-direction o f political works through other means.
At the time o f writing (early 2005), when substantial political negotiations were on the 
horizon, it was not a surprise that the carrot and stick argument of increased aid to the PNA 
was heard again. The New York Times reported, in December 2004, that aid to the PNA 
could reach $2bn a year (against an average o f $500m during the Oslo years) in the following 
four years, provided that there was a “Palestinians’ push for peace” and that there was “a 
crackdown on terror” (Ha’aretz 2004). So if  donors, thanks to the vast amount o f money 
poured into the Territories (which soared again to reach probably about $300 or $400m a year 
for NGOs during this Intifada), have a powerful leverage on NGOs in terms o f  the m acro­
politica l conditions (acceptance o f a negodated-treaty),717 their capacity to influence political 
work (providing that this is their will) is very limited on the m icro-level.
Distinguishing between these two types o f political pressures on the part o f donors can be 
one of the reasons for the divergence o f views amongst local actors. Some think that 
international donors have a responsibility in the loss o f contacts between NGOs and local 
population, while other see this failure o f NGOs as a purely internal defeat. But m ost o f  the 
NGOs also stressed the ‘depoliticized* attitude on the donors’ side (or the lack o f w ill o f 
donors to express political disagreement about the continuing occupation). Again, the figure 
of the chiasmus is useful. On both sides (donors and local NGOs), there are wishes for each 
other to be political, but not always the ways each other would expect The fact that NGOs 
and PNA are the privileged interlocutors o f donors is a mixed blessing both are taken in  a 
two-tier negotiation where the local population does not (and cannot) perceive all the 
motivations of these interactions with donors. Eventually, this can lead to a form o f distrust 
on the side of the population from donors. The Islamist opposition has the easy part, since it 
does not have to enter into relationships with western donors, and it can portray itself as 
resorting only on local resources.
717 See how donors ‘imposed* political conditionality during the Oslo years, Hanafi & Tabai 2002.
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b) Short-sightedness on the side of donors
The problem is the lack o f understanding by many donors about the political context of 
NGO work in the Territories. Thus, about a fifth of the international donors interviewed did 
not seem to know about the historical links of local NGOs with political parties. The vast 
majority would simply consider them on the basis of criteria o f ‘professionalism’, while others 
developed clear strategies to have a balance between the political factions. Solidarity 
organizations, in  turn, would actually choose openly their partners in function of political 
preferences. Another reason for the lack o f knowledge about NGOs is the high turnover of 
the personal on the international donors side. Nearly half of the figures interviewed were 
present in the Territories for less than two years,718 which would explain a lack of institutional 
memory contributing to this short-sightedness in terms of political involvement of NGOs. 
Another type o f attitude from donors is not that o f lack of knowledge, but of deliberate 
political support. On the one hand, it calls publicly for non-political work, but on the other, it 
provides political support but as if  NGOs were not political. The case of the Maqassed 
Hospital (registered as a charitable organization, hence NGO) illustrates this type of attitude. 
The hospital was a historical stronghold o f independent and left-wing health activists but was 
unofficially and rather violently taken over by the PNA in 1997 (Curmi 2002: 112 &  Curmi 
2003). Though everybody knows about this affiliation with the PNA (its director is the 
brother o f the PM  Abu Ala), the issue does not raise an eyebrow on international donors’ 
faces, despite the fact that this NGO has a high political profile (Curmi 2002: 112) and that 
there was a substantial drop in the quality offered after this take over.
c) Too much on advocacy
Finally, a third type of contribution by donors in the process o f political exclusion is the 
aspect o f preferred advocacy activities over service-providing. Some international donors 
have contributed to a slow shift during the Oslo years of the NGO work from service- 
delivery to cause-oriented or advocacy activities. If, until 1990, the majority of active NGOs 
that were leftist ones were providing mostly services, the 1990s saw the powerful growth of 
advocacy and cause-oriented NGOs. Hamas and Islamist NGOs occupied the ground of
718 Table with overview of years o f work in the Territories done by the head o f the international donors
Total years o f work in the OPT for Donors Total case T otal % Valid %
Less than 2 years 15 41% 48%
3 or 4 years 8 22% 26%
5 to 10 years 8 22% 26%
NA 6 16%
Total 37 100% 100%
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service providing — but with a clear religious message — whereas some secular NGOs 
gradually abandoned service-providing organizations, like in the case o f  women’s 
organizations (Jamal M. 2005), and some of the health and education NGOs.719 In the latter 
cases, even i f  their message (aiming at enhancing the level of democracy within the 
Territories) w as an important one, the abandonment of some service-delivery activities at the 
expenses of very abstract concepts fired back, even more so that the peace process failed to 
deliver. It was as if  the priority was about strengthening and solidifying abstract concepts, 
before having a firm ground. On the other end, the success o f Islamist organizations was due 
to the quality o f its services, but also to the popularity o f religious messages (Abdel Sbafi 
2004:12-15).
In other words, it is extremely important that donors reflect on the consequences that the 
imposition o f a given model can have. Though the idea to promote advocacy activities was 
important since PNA’s performances were undemocratic, the socio-political context (no 
economic growth, continuous ‘de-development’ (Roy S. 2001a), and benefits o f  the peace 
process going in the pockets of a happy few720) should have hinted at the necessity to 
continue service-provision in deprived areas, rather than totally reorient the work to advocacy 
and lobby activities.
Thus, much o f  the work done under the banner o f ‘civil society’ during the Oslo years 
contributed to the exclusion o f ‘the political’ in the work o f NGOs. Not sure this is the case 
everywhere, but, since in Palestine factions were very much divided in their support o f the 
Oslo agreements, becoming ‘depolitidzed’ was a pre-condition to access funding. Thus, 
because o f short-sightedness, or misreading Palestinian politics, many donors aimed at the 
wrong target
7.3. The Exclusionary Power of Civil Society: Sociological
Dimensions
7.3.1. Class Formation
Civil society at work can also produce social exclusion. By sociological, it should be 
understood that under the name o f civil society, activities and development within the NGO 
sector m ight lead to social class (trans-) formation, or changes that concern Palestinian society 
at large. By class, one should understand clusters o f individuals who share, along fictitious
719 On the retreat o f women’s organizations, see (Hilal 1998b: 140) and (Curmi 2002:106). The problem was 
also highlighted by Issam AROURI, General Manager, Jersualem Centre for Legal Aid and Human Rights, 
Ramallah, 14.02^004. He is vocal and makes a strong argument that it is international donors who diverted the 
many women associations from service-delivery towards advocacy, with the consequence that the field was 
quickly occupied by Hamas.
720 On these issues, see (Roy S. 2001a: 371 ff), Bishara 1998, Lagerquist 2003, and Khan & aL 2004.
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horizontal lines, common properties in terms of access to the means of production, or broad 
economic and market capacities and whose positions are antagonisitic to other groups.721 
HilaTs work is the main source about this gradual process of class formation in  the Palestinian 
territories. He promptly notes that beyond the formation of a new class of entrepreneurs and 
businessmen, a rather large and diversified middle calls developed during the PNA years. 
Right after the top PA civil servants, Hilal lists top NGO employees as part o f this class (Hilal 
2003:169). Hanafi & Tabar also point to the important contribution of some NGO leaders to 
the growth o f a ‘globalized elite’ (Hanafi & Tabar 2003: 209).722 But if  NGOs contributed to 
the growth o f the middle-class, they did not contribute to creating a class-consciousness. 
They rather contributed to a further fragmentation of Palestinian society (Hilal & Khan 2004: 
95ff).
Transnational l in k s  put certain NGOs in a position of advantage within the domestic context 
(and, hence, contribute to the impression of a ‘globalized* elite). What deserves attention are 
the m ech an ism s of consultancy (partly touched upon in the case of the ‘grey literature* on 
civil society) and o f individual consultants established in connection with large USAID- 
funded programmes that reinforce each other’s role. The interesting point is that these large 
international entities (but often staffed and run in their local offices by members of 
prominent business fam ilies) function as focal or contact points for only some NGOs. Let us 
now look at these firms and how they connect with one another.
Massar Associates is an affiliate o f Chemonics International, the Washington-based 
subcontract for USAID’s civil society project It also worked for the Welfare Association,723 
and another US consultancy development firm , called ARD.724 The latter worked on USAID 
projects on the Rule of Law in Palestine,725 and for Rafeed (a USAID-management NGO) 
which itself worked with another US consultant, DPK. 726 The latter is yet another 
Washington DC-based consultancy f irm . DPK actually subcontracted to a large computer
721 For a discussion, see Saunders 2001.
722 Though their approach raises some important questions about the importance of NGOs to have 
“connectivity to international NGOs, actors and agendas” (p. 209), their article tends to over-concentrate upon a 
very limited segment of the NGO sector and therefore reproducing many of the bias of conceiving o f NGOs as 
being the large secular NGOs only. See our critique at the end o f section 7.2.3.b.
723 See a list of beneficiaries under http://www.massar.com/clist.htm. See also 
http://www. chemonics. com/aboutus/affiliates.asp.
724 http://www.ardinc.com. "ARD is a privately owned firm that offers consulting services in the United States, 
developing and transition countries. Our main clients are the U.S. Agency for International Development 




firm in Ramallah part of the project, the "Jaffa Net Computer System*,727 owned by a rich 
Palestinian businessman.
Beyond the fact that these various organisations refer to one another, the point is that some 
local NGOs are beneficiaries or clients o f their services, which in a way surely enhances their 
market position with regard to other donors. Interestingly, some of the most prominent 
mulriplicator NGOs (namely, NGOs working and/or offering training courses for other 
NGOs) are often the ones that have gravitated not very far from these economic consultancy 
firms. In this precise case, it is correct to speak o f ‘globalized* elites as Tabar & Hanafi do 
(2003). Not only do these few NGOs contribute to the growth of a Palestinian well-off 
middle-class, but i f  they do so, it is certainly because of the amount of capital, both real and 
symbolic, that working with international organizations can grant. In these cases, there does 
not seem to be a political instruments li zation of networking, but rather the prevalent factor is 
that o f enhancing one’s social position within the field o f Palestinian NGOs.
73.2. Wider participation or elitist concentration?
Beyond the concentration by large NGOs of a variety of networks and preferential ties with 
international donors, it is noteworthy to underline how networking is generally put forward as 
a positive element o f civil society promotion. The rather straightforward idea is that NGOs 
should cooperate with one another to enhance the quality o f public discussions through 
horizontal links and eventually to improve the quality of civil society. The problem is that 
these forms o f networking can lead to reinforce the dominant position o f mulriplicator 
NGOs, that is, large NGOs whose role has precisely been to be specialized in the funnelling 
of funds and expertise into smaller organizations. The end result is the creation of large 
NGOs with specialized administrative apparatus to manage such sub-grantees.728 
In such setting elements of political patronage could certainly be found, in terms o f  which 
smaller organizations get the chance to benefit from a sub-grant from larger NGOs. This is 
the case o f the PNGO Project (run by the Welfare Consortium). There were complaints by 
large NGOs which did not succeed in  receiving funding to become such a mulriplicator 
NGO, that the conditions for lead partner were tailored in advance to allow predetermined 
organizations to become the mulriplicator NGOs.729 Slightly more than a third of the NGOs
727 http://wwwi-jaffa.net/events/692001 .html.
728 Going in the same direction, Shawa states that “There were also some international donors' views on civil 
society, which limited the possibilities for most NGOs to be considered as key components of civil society and 
gave preference to a handful of NGOs. These differences in support for NGOs created ‘class divisions’ among 
NGOs, which negatively affected the practical consequences of building civil society.” (Shawa 2000)
723 This is obviously not always the case, and even disputable in the PNGO case, although some catena were 
rather intriguing. The German Fund for example, (a joint German government and Stiftungcn endowment for
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interviewed (38%) were functioning, t o  various degrees, as multiplicator NGOs, be it through 
the re-distribution o f sub-grants to smaller organizations, or by providing training activities to 
other ones, or simply by proposing small projects in partnership with other organizations. 
Such practices pose the question o f who are the most active actors within civil society. 
NGOs, as the most visible ones, all too often are synonymous with large organizations at the 
expense o f smaller and less experienced organizations. This in turn, reinforces the 
predominant positions of a few elite organizations which can then re-distribute some money, 
or provide courses or training to smaller organizations.
On the internal level, this problem is also reflected in terms of the turnover within NGOs.
The latter have often been accused o f being the locus for a one-(wo)man-show and Palestine
is a crude example o f that. A  short survey of “who heads which organization” points to the
fact that at least 56%730 of the local organizations interviewed for this research have had the
*
same person as director since its foundation.
Many organizations have lost their voluntary and participatory spirit731 The trend is 
increasingly that o f  the private sector, where what matters are salaries and a good position. 
Successful NGOs became more elitist in their modus operandi. This tendency is reinforced by 
the Best Eastern or American Colony mentality732 of the part of donors who are keen to 
organize conferences in 5-star hotels rather than go into the field.733
7.3.3. Brain Drain
Although some o f the exclusionary dimensions of civil society are quite unique to the 
Palestinian scene (the historical politicisation of NGOs is undoubtedly unique), other social 
features o f exclusion are, unfortunately, more universal and have been studied elsewhere in 
the literature. One example is the issue of the local brain drain o f highly qualified persons 
who abandon domestic institutions to take a position with an international NGO or in the 
multilateral sector, or who prefer working for an important local NGO than serving in the 
public sector.
Because o f the above-noted features o f successful NGO life — and multiplied by the current 
hardship within the Territories — NGOs have become a major source o f social prestige
Palestinian NGOs) did its best to avoid the *big fish’ trap by setting a vety low ceiling to the grants given in 
collaboration with smaller NGOs. See http://www.gennan-fund.otg/.
730 56% out o f the total percentage. The valid percentage would even be higher - reaching 68% - of unchanged 
directors since the foundation of the NGO (information taken out of my interviews).
731 For a similar conclusion in the women sector, see Jamal M. 2005.
732 Interview with Nassif MU’AIXEM, Director, Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy, Ramallah, 
21.01.2004.
733 (Abdel Shafi 2004:14) also stresses this problem and lists three types o f elites. Another study on NGOs 
underlined the fact that much of the advocacy activities were aiming at educated Palestinians who are more likely 
to read newspapers where NGOs’ activities are announced and reported (Hanafi & Tabar, unpublished script).
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because of the good level o f salaries,734 and both academia and public services suffered from a 
brain drain. The winning end was that o f the various UN agencies and NGOs, both local and 
international ones.
This has a potential incidence on the impoverishment o f the political sphere since working 
with UN or other international organizations hinders Palestinian activists from voicing their 
political views because of the reserve imposed by their work or position. Nevertheless, the 
end result, beyond the formation o f a middle-class, is the exclusion from politics o f a vital 
sector o f the intelligentsia. But this is not just the result o f civil society promotion but o f the 
impact o f a large quantity o f development aid given to a country, as reported elsewhere in the 
literature (Harm & Dunn 1996; Strazzari 2002; Chiodi 2005).
7.3.4. Social Exclusion because of the Programmes/Projects
A final feature o f the exclusionary sociological power o f civil society stems from the fact that 
in some cases programmes or projects are accepted out of sheer opportunism. In that case, an 
NGO has the chance to get extra-funding, to get new material, or to hire new staff, but the 
programme funded does not always respond to a real need on the side o f the NGOs and/or 
of the population. Such opportunistic acceptance might lead to a form o f sociological 
exclusion, because the local beneficiaries, target groups or the population at large will very 
often notice the opportunistic motivation. As in  die case of non-declared politically- 
motivated programmes, such practices can discredit not only the institution doing it, but also 
individuals staffing the programme or even the wider sector o f NGOs doing same types of 
programmes.735
7.4. The Exclusionary Power of Civil Society: Ideological 
Dimensions
The final section o f the exclusionary power o f civil society involved the ideological 
dimension. Here, ideology should be understood as a set o f ideas informing and guiding 
social action.
7.4.1. North & South, Arab & non-Arab, civil & non-civil
The foremost ideological dimension o f the exclusionary power of civil society is that of the 
enacted and (by some) reinforced idea that the two spheres o f ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Arab-
734 1 remember, for example, at a gathering of Palestinian elite in Ramallah how people expressed their greatest 
delight and pleasure when introduced to guests from NGOs (Spring 2001).
735 1 came across such widespread criticism in the Gaza Strip in 2003 when people questioned some of the job- 
creation programs and were very dubious about the real intent and intentions o f certain NGOs promoting non­
violence at schools since die historico-political context was totally unmentioned in such programmes. See supra 
on the remarks about the ‘people-to-people’ and similar objects.
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Middle East W orld’ are mutually incompatible. It is striking to see how some of the (neo- 
) Orientalist arguments (in the meaning of Said of an abstract negative portraying o f the 
Orient in reflection to the West) have permeated the ideas of some local actors.
The stark statements by one o f the large and very successful NGOs in Ramallah that there is 
“no civil society in  Palestine” (or in  the Arab world for that matter), but only a phase o f 
“transition from the state of nature”736 is the best embodiment o f such views. It is one thing 
to claim that one cannot speak o f a full-fledged dvil society because o f some inherited links 
(irtkiyah) or because of the lack of individual autonomy737 in the region, it is a totally different 
matter to claim that there is no civil society and that the ‘state o f nature’ is still the norm in the 
Territories and in  the rest of the Arab world.
One can discuss the first statement, which might have some elements of truth, and which 
might evolve over time,738 but the second statement reinforces ideas that there is an intrinsic 
“lack of avility”739 in Palestine and the Arab world. In that case one does not speak fully 
about ‘dv il society’, but stops at the ‘civil’ and the argument becomes one of the twisted kind 
for the strong ethnocentric dimensions that any discussion o f  ‘civil’, ‘civility’, ‘civilisation’ 
entails (Amason 2001).
Instead o f uselessly debating the ‘civility’ o f the ‘Other’, I would argue that the bottom line, 
or the decisive factor about the research for the existence of d v il sodety is a matter of empiria. 
Even if  one is bom  to a Family Association in Palestine, it is a m atter of fact that this type o f 
organization has empiricalfy performed the role of a dvil sodety organization in  recent years. It 
has done so by functioning as a relay o f  complaints between individuals and the PNA, or by 
inculcating the basics of dtizen partidpation to large segments o f poorer and/or less 
educated elements of the Palestinian population of the second Palestine. Therefore, as the 
second statement implies (“being in the state of nature”), the enquiry about the civility o f  a 
given group takes precedent over the ju n ction  that this dvil sodety organization can have. 
Instead, one now faces sweeping assumptions about the dvility o f some actors, rather than 
assessing the various forms that d v il sodety can take in different contexts. Using the 
theoretical discussions of Chapter 1, the first approach underlines the differences, whereby the 
second puts the stress on sim ilitude (Section 1.1).
736 Interview with Izzat ABDEL-HADI, General Director, BISAN Center for Research and Development, 
Ramallah, 28.02.2004.
737 For a critique o f the simple view that individualism is an acquis in western modem societies, see Kalupner 
2003.
738 We tend to forget that the dvil society from which Tocqueville spoke is very much different in its quality 
than the one modem western democracies host nowadays. For a discussion with a historical perspective, see 
Bermeo & Nord 2000.
739 This phrase was expressively used four or five times in the interview.
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The kind of argument might well have another explanation, touched upon briefly in terms of 
champs involving advocacy NGOs whereby only certain actors became the privileged 
interlocutors o f international donors. As seen, being commissioned to produce a report on 
NGOs might open the door to many different funding sources or role of advisors. Therefore, 
holding such a view  put its author above the scrum of ‘normal* NGOs. But the (probably) 
unintended consequence (of the image o f Palestine being in  a ‘state of nature*) was that it 
depicted local organizations in negative terms and neglected some of the potential they have. 
Therefore, it does not make any sense to investigate which one of civil society organizations 
or community-based organizations have “more aspects o f  civility**, or which one are less 
“clannish** or “ tribal*’. Moreover by holding the view that Palestinians are “managing 
transition from relief to development, from natural society aspects (which means 
factionalism, clannish or familial [relationships]) into more democratic, accountable and 
transparent sector*’,740 it makes Palestinian NGOs fall nicely into the pigeon-holes o f 
‘development* or ‘transition*. It finally reinforces the (very spurious) idea that local NGOs are 
empty recipients in need of Promethean assistance, and in need o f the light of democracy that 
can be brought and ‘imported’ by foreign donors.
With regard to previous theoretical discussions of civil society in the Arab-Muslim world, 
such views that there is no civil society in the region seem to go hand in  hand with that of 
Azmi Bishara (that there is individual autonomy, see Section 3.2.3.a). But the argument 
actually developed by Izzat Abdel Hadi is broader and openly refers to western authors and 
western conceptions of civil society.741 Beyond the quotation o f Weber in Izzat Abdel Hadi’s 
reformulation o f  the problematic dichotomy of ‘traditional* vs. ‘modem* society, there is 
another element hinting at a neo-Orientalist argument, namely that of a strong society. This 
view — and by discussing so much about the ‘civility* o f various social groupings in Palestine, 
Izzat Abdel Hadi’s views are close to Gellner’s — contends that Muslim societies are actually 
too strong to become a truly civil society (see Section 3.1.4.c). Izzat Abdel-Hadi (and Gellner) 
see(s) the problem in the fact that local associations are resisting ‘modem* norms of 
behaviour, but he overlooked the vivid tradition o f association^ life in Palestine and the 
positive role it has had so far and the one it can have in the future. We again are going into 
circles. ‘Local* views on civil society are influenced by the previously discussed neo-
740 AH quotes are from the interview with Izzat ABDEL-HADI, General Director, BISAN Center for Research 
and Development, Ramallah, 28.02.2004.
741 He thus expliddy mentioned Hume, Gramsci and Marx. Most interesting for our argument, he referred to 
Weber’s view on ‘traditional* societies, such as the one in Palestine. Interview with Izzat ABDEL-HADI, 
General Director, BISAN Center for Research and Development, RamaHah, 28.02.2004.
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‘Orientalist’ debates, which, in  turn, are fed and fuelled by such views that there is no Arab- 
Muslim civil society.
7.4.2. Donors and the conferring of technical legitimacy
A final element o f  exclusion in terms o f ideology comes from the legitimacy granted by 
international donors to local organizations, and in particular to multiplicator NGOs. The 
multiplicator NGOs actually play the role of ideologues, o f the shepherds, providing the 
‘technical’ knowledge that is re-distributed either through publications commissioned by 
some donors, or through training courses offered to smaller local NGOs. But the problem is 
that this type o f  knowledge is carefully selected or co-opted by donors.
This ‘technical’ discursive legitimacy implies a relationship of proximity with donors, instead 
o f one o f representativeness o f and accountability to the local population. This type o f 
legitimacy bestowed by international donors reinforces the elitist work of NGOs, instead o f 
promoting a popular type o f  legitimacy.742 This argument is illustrated by the case o f a 
Palestinian NGO fighting against the PNA to obtain funding for agricultural programmes 
from the World Food Programme. The struggle between the NGO and the PNA is not only 
the distribution o f  food, but also the prestige and credibility that such joint programmes 
confer on local actors (Abu-Sada 2005c). But even if  some legitimacy can be gained from 
working with an international organization, the fundamental question will be that o f the local 
political legitimacy.743
This tension between the interest o f donors and that of locals is a topos o f developmental 
literature. For many this is simply Achilles* heeL Anheier &  Themudo (noticed that the 
increased division of labor for northern NGOs to concentrate on fund rising, capacity 
building and advocacy, might create a uniformization of the agenda. This in turn translates 
into pressure towards isomorphic tendencies about the issues dealt with, but also on 
increased bureaucratization. Eventually, the risk is that southern NGOs, in order to gain 
funding and this type o f legitimacy, w ill be forced to “mimetic isomorphism stemming from 
increased competition for scarce resource” (Anheier & Themudo 2002: 205-212).
But the issue o f  legitimacy is not only provided by the discourse, by the ‘technidty’ o f the 
jargon, or even by the bureaucratization implied by funding. It also depends on the way it is 
formulated and how it is practically implemented as a response to local needs or n o t For
742 But to be fair to this type of NGO, one has to acknowledge the fact that representation is always subject to 
the iron law. Moreover a glance at the history o f associationism in Palestine shows how this type of activity has 
remained a privileged place of actions of certain elites. The difference is now that middle-class and even lower- 
class individuals have managed to break through and make their way upwards in terms of social mobility 
(Robinson 1997).
743 1 follow the reasoning steps of Abu-Sada 2005c who refers to Pouligny 2001.
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example, one cannot but have the feeling that some o f the funding made available by  USAID 
is meant to alleviate the consequences of the harsh closure imposed in the last years by the 
Israeli military forces. As if  it was about making sure that minimum services can be delivered 
despite the closure and bantustanization o f the Territories. For example, in the case o f  delivery 
facilities developed recently in villages, one could wonder whether ‘sustainability1 is possible 
in the long run. Is there really a need to have delivery rooms in  each village when in  ‘normal 
times’ each villager can reach an urban centre in  less than 30 minutes? One cannot help but 
feel that there is a form of guilty consciousness on the side of some donors, but the 
consequence is that these donors subsidize and indirectly support the occupation and colonial 
regime put in place and increased by Israel over the years. The consequence for local NGOs 
benefiting from this financial manna can be perceived by the population as working for 
somebody else’s interests rather than the local common good.
Another similar danger concerns certain projects dealing w ith peace and non-violence. I f  the 
content promoted by such courses or activities are not context-sensitive or negate some o f 
the basic dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,744 or falsely favor the view that there is 
a normalization or a symmetric balance in the Palestinian-Israeli relations, then bitterness 
might grow and jeopardize - or even alienate — the future work of the local NGOs 
implementing on behalf of international donors. Two examples might be worthwhile to 
expose here.
I had the occasion to speak at the beginning of 2003, shortly before the Iraq invasion (and 
fear that Israel might launch a massive military campaign in  the Territories) w ith a Gazan 
schoolteacher who had to follow a multi-session course on non-violence and democracy 
organized by an Anglo-Saxon organization which was totally oblivious to the historical 
context and origins o f the occupation. He told me that most o f  his colleagues simply refused 
to keep following the course since its content was so obviously biased.
A second example, related to service-provision studied in this thesis, is about the rather 
fashionable programmes for tackling mental health issues. Based on the positive assumption 
that health is more than physical well-being, many international donors have developed 
during the Oslo years, and during the second Intifada on a m ore intensive scale, programmes 
meant to alleviate psychological suffering due to long-term exposure to violence or traumatic 
experiences. Without denigrating the positive aspect o f such programmes, they are often 
perceived by Palestinians as a way for donors to avoid facing their responsibility to put 
pressure on ending the occupation, the real origin of psychosocial trauma rather than
744 As is the case frequently uith the question of refugees’ inalienable tight o f return. See Nabulsi 2004 on that 
matter.
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repeatedly curing patients who will unfortunately all too often experience further violence and 
trauma.
Put in other words, some of the programmes and activities favoured by some donors might 
end up being mixed blessings for the local organizations running  them. On the one hand, 
they provide activities and salaries to local employees (which is not to be underestimated in 
the current situation of hardship experienced by a majority o f Palestinians), while, on the 
other, the image o f local NGOs can suffer from the fact the programmes are undertaken 
purely for opportunist reasons (then backfiring on the reputation of the organization and 
possibly on the whole sector). Future projects and messages from the same organization 
might be therefore ruined or at least altered and lessened to the detriment of the organization 
and the people running i t  Therefore it can be said that this type of activity entails an 
ideologically exclusionary power since it is done with the purpose o f enhancing the very id eas 
o f dvil society through an ideological support for the success o f  peace, but at the expense of 
the respect for day-to-day realities of the population.
7.5. Conclusions: Of the Necessity of Looking ‘Beyond the Pale*
7.5.1. Limited and limiting views
Throughout this dissertation, civil society has been presented as more than a theoretical 
construct. The concept has so many strong implications in the world of praxis, o f which 
some are potentially negative, and should therefore be studied with critical attention and, 
especially, promoted with great care.
Furthermore, theoretical discussions o f civil society should lean more on empirical evidence. 
Too many papers and studies exclude certain social or religious groups from civil society on 
the basis that they do not qualify on rather limited theoretical grounds. But such a conscious 
(or unconscious) refusal to recognize the variety of civil societies has two implications. First, 
it reinforces mainstream discussions that remain confined to its emergence in western 
countries and its re-emergence at the end o f the Cold War. Second, it increases the artificial 
distance that exists between theory and practice.
This distance, or better, this hiatus, is very similar to the limited conception o f civil society 
used by most international donors and appropriated by a few powerful local recipient NGOs. 
Both outside donors and inside recipient NGOs rely on a rather exclusive definition o f  civil 
society that is constantly infused into the parlance o f  large international donor institutions. 
The role o f Putnam is an apposite example of the recycling of social-political theories into the 
priorities of multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. In other words, selective theoretical
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discussions can definitively make a difference since they largely influence donors and NGOs* 
practice.
To be more precise and concrete, we have tried to demonstrate that:
1) civil society promotion tends to limit itself to a particular range o f  NGOs 
(shortcomings of the theories o f  civil society by proxy);
2) few NGOs tend to become the privileged partners o f international donors at the 
expense o f a much larger number and broader range of civil society organizations 
(shortcomings of the process o f implementation between donors and recipients 
NGOs);
3) the (neo-)OrientaIist claims that there cannot be a civil society in  the Arab-Muslim 
world have had an influence on donors (for being selective and discriminating against 
Islamic — as opposed to Islamist — organizations), and on key local intellectuals who 
reinforce the view that there is no civil society in the region (shortcomings in the 
conception o f  civil society in a  transcultural setting).
All o f these three shortcomings can be summed up as follows: programmes and projects 
concerning the promotion of civil society, as implemented through the interaction between 
western donors and local NGOs, tend to have a differentiated and hence exclusionary impact 
upon the civil societies of receiving countries, especially in  the Arab-Muslim worlds. This 
exclusion is about promoting a version o f civil society which is not about intrinsic political 
participation (civil society in itself, o r an rich), but about consdentized and reflexive 
appropriation o f the discourse about key civil society organization (civil society for itself, or 
fu r  rich). In a catchphrase, only these civil society organizations having the means to sell 
themselves under the accepted label o f  ‘NGOs* will be successful in their interaction with 
international donors and their quest to receive funding for their activities.
Ways to get away from these exclusionary tendencies would be for international donors to 
acknowledge the diversity of local forms o f civil society organizations and to be less fixed in 
their notion of what a proper ‘civil society’ should eventually look like. Civil society can be 
found under a variety of phrases and manifestations, without altering its substance, i.e., its 
possible contribution towards the definition o f a project of political autonomy. By allowing a 
greater variety of views to flourish, international donors could contribute to the fostering of a 
pluralism o f content (rather than a mere pluralism o f number). By providing more long-term 
funding, and/or by helping to put in place endowments for NGOs,745 they could contribute 
to a re-focusing o f  local NGOs towards more programmes (as opposed to projects that
745 The suggestion was elaborated in the interview with George GIACAMAN, Director, MUWATIN, Ramallah, 
08.02.2003. Endowments would generate income and give financial stability and autonomy to NGOs.
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correspond to the momentary fashion of donors) that respond to the needs o f the 
population.746 D ulcis in fin em , all of these would support the blossoming of accountability 
between local populations and their civil society organization (such as NGOs).
If not, ‘civil society at work’ will remain what it has become in  the last ten years or so: an 
empty ideology with a life o f its own. Because of the divorce that took place between theory 
and praxis, and the particular appropriation of the concept by some left-wing actors, this 
ideology has lost, at least in  the Palestinian case, much of its fo r ce  de frappe, namely its impact 
on the political and social imaginary. In many places in this dissertation, we have alluded to 
the importance o f  a message that ought to be tied to the work o f civil society organizations. 
We have also shown how certain organizations, not only the secular ones but also some of 
the more militantly religious ones, have managed to remain in close connection with their 
basis. Thus they have not become a source of heteronomy for the local populations because 
they had been following too much the trends set by donors. International donors, it has been 
argued, have sometimes had a detrimental role in imposing or pushing for a certain type o f 
message that was not beneficial for the civil society organizations* historical constituencies 
(See Tables 27 &  28).
7.5.2. ‘MEPS5 as revealing elements of heteronomy
A quick survey about the evolving relations between local NGOs and donors done through 
interviews aimed at seeing how local actors subjectively perceived the distance between their 
organization and two types o f  actors. On the one hand, its relation to local constituencies, 
and, on the other hand, the distance separating it from donors (see Appendix III). 
Unfortunately, not all NGOs responded to the question, so this is only indicative in terms o f 
what seems to be one o f the many results of the second Intifada  with regard to Palestinian 
NGOs. 12 NGOs responded to the questions. Concerning the evolution of the distance 
between their organization and the local population, 75% o f NGOs (8 out of 12) declared 
that the distance diminished and 25% (5 others) said that the distance remained the same. 
This very homogenous result hints at the declared intention o f NGOs to respond not only to 
the increased need bom of the harsh military politics o f Israel, but also to the intrinsic need 
o f NGOS to get closer to the masses. On the contrary, 50% only hinted at improved distance 
with donors during the second Intifada, whereas, 17% said the distance with donors was 
stable.
And to be fair to the international donors, the last interview conducted in March 2004 (more than a year 
after the first group of interviews) indicated that they had moved a long way during the Intifada and after the 
LAW scandal in particular. There will be more emphasis on long-term planning, more cross-checking amongst 
donors and better sector coordination, at least amongst a group of Tike-minded donors’.
Interview with Hind KHOURY, Program Advisor, Norwegian Representative Office, Jerusalem, 01.03.2004.
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This short statistic ought to be taken with care, since it was not addressed to the entire 
population of NGOs interviewed. Two other distances were subjectively measured, namely, 
the distance between the NGO and the PNA/PLO as well as the distance to political parties. 
Interestingly, the only distance (out of the four dimension suggested, ¿e. PNA/PLO, political 
parties, donors and local constituencies), where there is a homogenous response is about the 
diminished distance to their local bases. A  contrano, this result suggests that the distance 
between them had previously grown wider.
But such homogenous statements on the side of NGOs constitute a form o f ‘official* 
response, or what I will term ‘m ost expected public speech(es)’ (MEPS).747 By MEPS, I 
mean the type o f  answers that are commonly expected in a public setting by actors in the 
same field.748 A closer interpretation o f such expected (or publicly ‘official’) answers allows 
students to understand, tn cnux , some of the contentious issues, and constitute, I would 
argue, a deictic or a revealing element o f heteronomy. Such a statement would not take place 
in the case of autonomy, because there is an inherent (but undeclared) tension between what 
is expected from the speaker and the inner beliefs of this person.749
Another case o f such ‘MEPS* concerns receiving funding from the USA and, in particular, 
from USAID. Given the context of rather unequivocal American support for the Israeli side 
of the conflict, it is badly considered in the Palestinian community to be the recipient of 
USAID financial support Contrasting the results of the question put to NGOs whether they 
receive American aid with a list o f Palestinian NGOs who actually receive aid, one can see 
that there is also a hiatus: in at least four cases (out o f 28 NGOs which declared not to 
receive USAID money), those who declared  not to take USAID money, were actually doing so. 
But because o f the significant unpopularity of USAID money {e.g.y local NGOs and 
population refused the entry of USAID’s food and medicine into Jenin after the 2002 
invasion and destruction of one third o f its refugee camps), NGOs prefer to position
747 This should not be understood as a widespread phrase of 'conventional wisdom', since the latter implies 
general acceptance, private and public. On the contrary, the most-expected public speech (or ‘better socially 
accepted speech) entails a tension between what one expects to hear in a given context, and what the person 
author of such statement actually thinks deep inside.
748 The concept somehow overlaps with ‘cultural complicity’ put forward by (Harik 1997:181).
For him, “cultural complicity is a reticent social accord that takes the form o f general acquiescence in a certain 
idea of pattern of behaviours as if it were a given. It is problematic in that it often contravenes an explicit 
principle, also professed and accepted by the same community. Cultural complicity conceals an inconsistency in 
moral or intellectual positions — in effect — blind spots in a community, a cultural instinct that may be 
characterized as collective delusion”.
749 This goes somewhat in the direction o f Bakhtin criticizing Freud’s approach by stressing that there is an 
‘official’ but also an ‘unofficial’ consciousness and that one should not take certain public statements at face 
value. See (Bakhtin 1994: 9 e g ) .
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themselves as non-recipients o f  American aid.750 So, drawing on this example, the fact that 
there was a very homogenous answer by NGOs in favour of a closer link to their local masses 
suggested that the distance was probably greater. If not, respondents would have said the 
distance to the population remained constant.
Another element adding weight to the idea of MEPS is the sometimes-mentioned tensions 
between some concepts that translate differently from Arabic to English and vice versa. In 
addition to the rather problematic ‘secular’ (filamaniyy), the very phrase ‘civil society’ is used 
differendy in Arabic. Some usually refer to ‘mujtama’madan? (a literal translation), while others 
(according to political views, as argued before) prefer the expression m uftam d’ ahli (‘civic 
society5). Interestingly, the Palestinian NGO Network (PINGO) which is fiercely secular and 
at the vanguard o f left-wing NGOs, plays a lot on its usage o f ‘civil society’ in its English 
newsletters and various websites (Palestine Monitor being the best example o f it). In the 
monthly supplement published in one o f the main daily newspapers in the Territories {al- 
ayyaam), PINGO chose the more popular lal- 'ami a l-ah ft (‘the civic work5) to present its 
activities. Thus, PINGO chooses and adapts its vocabulary and rhetoric according to the 
context and milieus the network addresses. In other words, connections (‘brancbem entf) are 
different and actors click on different répertoires.
A final element hinting at the existence o f a regime of heteronomy that arose during the Oslo 
years comes from some of the political positions during the campaign for the presidential 
elections o f early January 2005. Marwan Barghouthi, the jailed W est Bank leader of Fatah, 
many times called upon the PNA and Fatah’s only candidate Mahmoud Abbas, not to betray 
the decisions o f the Palestinian majority. Using the image of the two Palestines, one could say 
that he begged the first Palestine (led and symbolized by Abu Mazen) to respect the w ill o f 
the second Palestine of which he is more representative. Another candidate and yet another 
Barghouthi (Mustafa, the leader o f the National Initiative, a coalition o f secular left 
politicians) also pointed to the existence of sources o f heteronomy among the Palestinian 
masses. In an article published in the International Herald Tribune (and serving as an 
announcement of his running for the presidential seat) in late November 2004, Mustafa 
Barghouthi developed the view that:
“A democratically elected leadership that respects the rule of law cannot avoid being 
accountable for its decisions, nor can it be manipulated into accepting arrangements that 
dissatisfy those it purports to represent to the extent of creating revolt or another Intifada” 
(Barghouthi M. 2004)
750 On similar remarks on the refusal o f USAID monies in the 1980s and those who actually take them later, see 
(Curmi 2002:113 and n.30).
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Reading between the lines, Mustafa Barghouthi held the view  (rather common in the 
Territories), that one of the reasons for the large support from the Palestinians for the 
In tifada  was that it was also an in ternal uprising against a leadership that accepted too many 
external diktats during the Oslo years.
7.5.3. A new beginning of the cycle of ‘post-conflict’ and state-building 
ahead?
As 2005 started, refreshed discussions o f peace negotiations, and a possible return to the 
creation of a Palestinian State made daily appearance in  news and articles. Many features of 
the discussion o f ‘civil society5 were evolving against a new background o f state-building and 
post-conflict peace building. The latter point of view  is actually not without problems, as 
highlighted in various parts of this thesis, since it implies ‘confidence-building’ measures, and 
gradual steps to end a violent conflict between the two sides. But, as correctly stressed by 
Nabulsi, applying this framework to d ie  Palestinian case m ight actually obstruct and hide 
many historical features of the Palestinian-Israeli puzzle. The two sides are not equal in  force 
and resources, and the type of ‘conflict* is not that o f a war between two armed combatants, 
but more like an anti-colonial national emancipation struggle. Therefore, some o f the 
measures usually taken in post-conflict situations should not be applied in the Palestinian 
case, even more so since the UN and its Security Council have passed quite a number of 
resolutions that should serve as the lega l basis for the resolution of any issue in the 
negotiations. Therefore, negotiations should start head on with these premises and not on the 
usual confidence-measures, unless they really address topics inherently part o f these 
resolutions (Nabulsi 2004).
This short detour by ‘post-conflict* is meant to stress that NGOs, and civil society, w ill again 
be the focus, or the privileged vehicle o f international aid, in particular of advocacy issues (as 
often the case in post-conflict situations). Therefore the shift back to service-delivery on the 
part of NGOs that one witnessed during the second Intifada  (as a means both to alleviate 
hardship and to compensate for an on-the-brink-of-the-collapse PNA) will probably decrease. 
We will probably come back to the 1994 situation, where donors will operate a distinction of 
the basis o f the roles o f the PNA towards state-building measures and of the NGOs whose 
role will be to serve advocacy purposes and complement service-provision with the PNA.
In other words, some o f the difficulties that NGOs faced around 1994 might well return in 
the coming years. The more political role undertaken by NGOs during the second Intifada and 
the efforts to come closer to their bases w ill probably disappear gradually with the return to a 
more ‘normal’ situation. Many NGO activists have spotted this potential difficulty. Their
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fears have also been fueled by the fact that they had re-acquired (or sought to re-acquire) a 
new legitimacy, thanks to re-directed programmes made possible by a larger amount of 
funding during the Intifada.
Whether this new  phase will reproduce and reinforce tensions between PNA and NGOs 
remains to be seen, but the outcome w ill be contingent on whether real progress is made on 
the PNA’s commitment to reforms (in accordance with the 100-day Plan, for example), and 
the results of the coming elections at the presidential, legislative and municipal levels. 
Determining factors w ill also be the participation or not of oppositional fictions in these 
elections (in particular the Islamic bloc, PFLP, and DFLP), and the overall success o f 
comprehensive negotiations pertaining to the well-being o f the two Palestines.751 
Some other signs suggest that Palestine is on the brink o f a new era in the development o f  its 
narrative about NGOs in particular and ‘civil society’ in general. The candidacy of Mustafa 
Barghouthi for the presidential elections materialized the drive o f certain NGOs to become 
openly and massively re-politicized. A n article published in late December 2004 by a scholar 
who has written on issues of NGOs and depolitiazation during the Oslo years, supported the 
view of a speculation about repoliticization. Islah Jad pointed out that the local municipal 
candidates under the banner of Mustafa Barghouthi’s National Initiative in the Hebron 
district were trying to do nothing more than provide services to the local communities by 
articulating a strong message. Interestingly, this message was not based on rather abstract 
notions about the emancipatory power o f civil society, but rather on the very concrete and 
day-to-day issues generated by the Apartheid Wall being erected in the West Bank.752 In other 
words, the lo ca l’ has powerfully re-entered political parlance and priority amongst secular 
left-wing politicians.
But as revealing as this return to the lo ca l’ may be, the return to a narrative about NGOs as
striving to reach down to the towns and local constituencies, is worthwhile mentioning:
“Mustapha Barghouti portrays himself as the representative of a 'third way\ neither political 
Islam nor Fateh's mainstream nationalism. [..^Understanding also the importance of the role of 
international public opinion, Barghouti has highlighted his ability to address that sector, on the 
formal and informal levels, as a way to boost his domestic standing and in an attempt at 
building a power base among the "silent independents" and the youth, as well as those 
dissatisfied with Fateh or Hamas’ policies, whether they be in the business sector or 
professionals.
Barghouti is also taking a leaf out o f Hamas' book. By utilising networks he developed from his 
work in the Medical Relief Committees, an influential NGO in the health provision sector, 
Barghouti hopes to transform his erstwhile sennet recipients into an organized constituency. It is
751 A nd on that po in t, G hassan al-K hatib is p ro b ab ly  right that w ithout a substantia l increase in  the quality o f  life 
o f  m ost Palestin ians, it  w ill the rad ical groups “w h o 'll call the shots” (K hadb 2004).
752 “Instead, [M ustafa] Barghouti, aw are o f  the im portance o f the discourse o f  resistance and sacrifice, seeks to 
build his source o f  legitim acy on non-vio lent p o p u lar resistance as m anifested in  the m obilization against the 
Israeli separation w all” (Jad 2004).
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important to note that the bureaucracy, networks, leadership and strategy needed to run an 
NGO are different than those needed to build a political movement or organization. The latter 
is based on shared goals, voluntarism, sustainable commitments and well-coordinated collective 
action. If he is successful in this project, Barghouti's example might set an important precedent 
for the many NGOs in the Arab world to transform themselves from  urban elite NGOs into 
popular movements, whether social or political ones. In doing so, they may be finally able to obtain 
some real political power and compete with both the Islamic movements and ruling parties” (Jad 
2004, emphasis mine).
This expresses many of topics discussed before, and shows at how the ‘political* was expelled 
artificially from the work of NGOs during the 1990s but later re-entered through the 
backdoor, ie . youth as a constituency, service-provision as w ay to reach out politically to the 
community, the fight against Hamas and not just PNA, etc. M any of these elements could be 
read as a confirmation of our hypothesis that ‘civil society* and more precisely NGOs under 
the influence of their external promoters tended to exclude the ‘political* in their work. But 
also noteworthy is the fact that NGOs are here being portrayed as ‘erstwhile service’ 
providers rather than popular self-organized committees, which, as demonstrated originally, 
were p o litica l organizations with a concrete mission in the field of health, or agriculture, etc. 
The new narrative is that these service-providing NGOs can become the means to politically 
mobilize a constituency. So we are back to square one: NGOs as socio-political movements 
(1970-1980s), becoming depolitidzed service-provision under the dominant Washington- 
consensus (1990s) to returning to socio-political movements at the end (?) o f the second 
Intifada. Whether this last step w ill work is a question o f time and o f future empirical research. 
Finally, a last question mark: Mustafa Barghouthi, according to Jad, portrays him self as the 
‘third way*. Are w e facing here an example o f the ‘repackaging’ o f NGOs, as happened in 
1993 or 1994 by (over-)using and abusing the concept o f  dv il society? Is this a new source of 
connection, or branchement, done by the secular left, clicking and downloading from a 
privileged topos o f the political socio-democrats o f western Europe?
‘Civil society* has not (yet) been abandoned however. In an international article announcing
his candidacy for the presidential elections, Mustafa Barghouthi still insisted that
‘The western democratic world should now support and encourage Palestinian civil society in 
its quest to realize the possibilities presented in growing democratic trends. Palestinians, like 
Israelis, are entitled to self-determination and democratic rights and to a homeland o f their own 
where they can live with freedom and dignity, without an occupation, walls or checkpoints.” 
(Barghouthi M. 2004).
No third way in this quote, but the Russian dolls are here again present: Palestinian civil 
society should be encouraged, read Mustafa Barghouthi.
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7.5.4. Of the necessaty good balance between m essa ge and action  (or 
services)
Does this “well-thought out ideological packaging** (“emballage ïd éologqu e conséquent*, Tamari 
1995: 294), explain the success o f NGOs and political actors in their quest to gain popular 
support from the two Palestines?
Why are some messages -  or ‘ideological wrappings/packagings* — more successful than 
others, and, if  they are better, is it because they are endogenous/local or exogenous/extem? 
This remains the question o f  endless debates753 and future research. Some see in the 
widespread Islamist rhetoric an ideology that owes its success to the fact that it draws on local 
or domestic experiences and knowledge, as opposed to the externally imposed ideologies that 
have been ruling in  the last decades in the Middle East, such as socialism and secular 
nationalisms (Burgat 2002 :106ff). But this view might be only partially correct because Islam 
is not *local* to Palestine. On the contrary, the international context in which Islam is 
projected as a solution makes it appear here as a local resource.
This also leads the reader to consider the important role o f language, be it in terms of 
translation, or of semantic subtleties. The long excursus in the chapter of the AME civil 
society highlighted the high emotional charge of certain concepts in Arabic (‘secular’ being 
one of the most conspicuous). In the line of Castoriadis, language Ís a social institution 
(Casotriadis 1999 :171ff, Ín p art 174) that is essential for the realization of the autonomy o f a 
given society. Ghalioun precisely underlines the importance o f language with the question o f 
secularism in Arab societies. Rapid modernization “remains therefore alien [to Arab societies] 
and has not succeeded, until now, to produce its own symbolic universe”754.
We are here again in the very core idea o f the connection, or brancbem ent (Amselle 2001).755 An 
application of Amselle’s model would provide a key to reading or, at least partially 
understanding the success of Islam in  the collective political imaginary of many AME 
societies. According to such a view, Islam is not simply reduced to a  form of relativist cultural 
strength, but rather functions as a universalizing force for many local societies to frame their 
differences (Ín our cases even disagreements). Thus, local societies connect to Islam as a 
repertoire to give credentials to their differences (Amselle 2001: in  part. 49). Language and 
symbols become therefore very important in this process.
753 On that m atter, see the interesting artic le o f  Z o lberg  1985.
734 The fu ll quotes reads: “la m odernisation rap id e  q u i s'est im posée depuis la  découverte e t l'explo itation du 
pétrole à la  fin de D euxièm e Guerre m ond ia le  revê t un  caractère purem ent techn ique. E lle reste donc extérieure 
et ne parvient pas, jusqu’à  maintenant, à  sécré te r u n  univers sm bolique correspondant” (G halioun 2000: 30).
755 See Section 1.1.
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Messages (or meanings) such as the ones put forward by Islamist groups are perceived as 
local* largely because they are projected against the background o f a modem liberalism and of 
western democracy that do not hesitate to resort to wax to promote and impose their 
institutions and message. Surely, in such a period of intense military confrontation throughout 
the Middle East, civil society, as one o f  the measures put forward by the US government as 
its solution for the alleged building o f democratic regimes, might pay the price of the broad 
unpopularity o f US plans and intentions. But because it was mostly deployed in Palestine 
during the Oslo years where very few dividends ‘trickled down* to most of the population, the 
message o f civil society runs the risk o f  being ‘polluted* and o f  being inherendy linked to 
external political conditionality and, therefore, badly perceived by some strands of the 
population. M utans mutandis, the same risks are probably true for any civil society promotion 
by the USA in particular in the rest o f the region in the coining years. So the main problem of 
civil society is not that it is a concept that is embedded in the historical context o f Western 
history, but rather the contemporary context and the manner in  which it is promoted and 
‘exported* abroad.
Similarly, it would be a huge mistake to consider that Islamist messages are successful simply 
because o f a given, fixed and immutable culture in which the Arab-Muslims live. Rather, as 
convincingly argued by Taman', the success o f Islamic rhetorics and politics is trie resu lt of the 
incapacity o f left-wing political discourses and measures that failed to transform Palestinian 
society (1995: in part. 299f). Muslih also notes that Hamas not only rejects Israel but also “the 
system of secular ideas and institutions prevalent among the Palestinians and Arabs in 
general’* (Muslih 1993: 268f).’*
Therefore to understand why the second Palestine is not ‘buying’ the arguments o f civil 
society (or, for that matter, those o f western modernity), it w ill not suffice to demonstrate 
that there is a ‘traditional culture*, or that Islam is a blueprint for socio-political order, or that 
‘civil society* is inherendy Eurocentric and, therefore, not applicable elsewhere. Rather, one 
has to re-analyse continuously the context, local and international, in which this ideological 
wrapping operates and which connection/branchement allows it to manifest itself as the local 
solution.756 Therefore, in the case of trie problematic marriage between secularism and 
modernity, Islamism “embodies the rejection by large segments of the Muslim and Arab 
population o f a model of modernity that d id not keep its promises. It [this rejection] reflects
756 As a  slogan co m m o n ly  spread by Islam ists says “Islam  al-hal\  that is , ‘I s lam  is  the solution” .
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the crisis o f this lumpen-modernity which does not produced meaning anymore [ . . . ] ” 
(Ghalioun 2000: 32, translation mine).757
One secular NGO activist openly acknowledged the failure of certain NGOs over the Oslo
years, and observed that if  the question o f message was the reason for this failure, it was also
the reason for the success of Islamist NGOs:
“The [second] Intifada was a shock for everyone of us. Everyone is complaining about the 
anarchy, that we lost direction. We cannot influence the society and the people. We cannot 
bring our message to the people.
Who has been able to deliver their message? Only the Islamic parties! The PNA collapsed, 
completely, or — if not — it lost its credibility. It has been seen as a corrupt, incapable Authority, 
at best helpless. Plus, tinder constant attack, destroyed.
Who has been able to influence people? The Islamist people! Not only because their political 
message is attractive to the people, but also because they have institutions themselves for this.
If you look, the vast majority of NGOs are more or less secular, but their impact, their political 
impact is very minimal. That’s why NGOs are thinking: “What the hell is going on? Why aren’t 
we influencing the people to bring the message of tolerance, of pluralism etc.” This is because, 
since 1994, we always say [that] we are professionals, [that] we provide services, [and that] this is 
our role.
But at the end of the day, what is the difference between you and private mental health clinics? 
Nothing!”758
It seems as though some of the larger and more secular NGOs have taken a more active 
stance in generating local political support through and thanks to their work. It is a kind of 
return to the principle of mobilization through the popular committees of the pre-Oslo era. 
The success of Mustafa Barghouthi’s new movement (National Initiative launched in Ju ly 
2002) might stem more from the campaign dealing with the Segregation W all in  some zones 
that are harshly suffering from its erection, than from the internal political messages o f the 
movement.759 But there is a bit o f irony to have a political party/movement owing its success 
not to its own political programmes but to capitalizing on a negative issue on which 
Palestinians unfortunately have litde to say.
But what might appear as a rather bleak picture about the risks o f civil society promotion and 
the difficulties that the historically strong secular NGO camp has been facing over the last 
decade, should not mean that the issue of civil society promotion by foreigners must be 
abandoned once and for all. Adopting the view that there are two main competing ‘tribes’ in
757 “Cet islam ism e n ’a  pas son origine dans le dogm e de l’Islam ou  m êm e de la  pensée islam ique m oderne, m ais 
dans les processus b loqués de la m odernisation, c ’est-à-dire dans les  conditions d ’une sous-m odem ité sans 
contenu m oral ni aven ir. I l incarne le  rejet par de larges couches d e  la  population m usulm ane et arabe d ’un 
modèle de m odernité qu i n ’a  pu réaliser ses prom esses. Il m anifeste la  d is e  d e  cette lum pen-m odem ité q u i ne 
produit p lus de sens e t dont la prem ière v id tm e e s t  l ’homme m êm e qu ’elle n ’a cessé d ’exalter” (G halioun 2000: 
31f).
758 Interview with Salah  ABDEL SHAFT, D irector, Gaza Com m unity M ental H ealth Project, G aza C ity, 
02.02,2003.
753 In spring 2004 a ll posters o f the N ational In itiative that one could  find in  'Ramallah (its stronghold) w ere  
reproducing maps o f  the wall, pictures o f  it and em phasizing its actions in  th is field, rather than  p ictures o f  
shahid (martyr) or po litical mottos, as the o ther po litical factions do.
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Palestine (Fatah/PNA vs Islamist groups),760 one can see that secular NGOs are placed 
between a rock and a hard place. Though the Fatah’s hard place is probably secured for years 
to come with the election of Mahmoud Abbas as President o f  the PNA, Hamas* rock might 
prove to be a sandstone at the end of the day, that depends very much on the general political 
context. Support for Hamas and its many NGOs might well drop with a significant 
breakthrough in  peace talks and the ensuing decline in  the significance of its social network. 
So far, this network has survived the ebbs and flows o f Palestinian internal politics, though it 
did suffer from the 1997 closure imposed by the PNA (Curmi 2002:117).
For secular NGOs, as well as for more traditional civil society organizations using the content 
but not the phrase o f  civil society, their success will depend on their capacity to (re-)mobilize 
strong constituencies. But this mobilization (or remobilization for the older organizations), if  
it wants to be successful, has to be accomplished more through locally acknowledged 
vocabulary and by mingling locally accepted forms o f collective action mobilization with 
universal concepts leading to more democratic practices within the Palestinian polity, rather 
than pushing for ready-made concepts which might not be w ell perceived locally, as it was 
too often the case in  the Oslo years. That is certainly the price they w ill have to pay to 
reacquire autonomy over the means o f defining their socio-political development for future 
Palestinian generations. Wiping the slate clean cannot be an impossible task for m any local 
NGOs, even for those which have been tremendously helped by foreign donors — provided 
the latter are able to look 'Beyond the Pale* of too narrow a conception of 'civil society’.
760 Such view  is  advanced  b y  M ahdi A bdel H adi, P residen t o f  PA SSIA .
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Appen dix  I: Full list  o f interviews
L is t of P alestin ian  NGOs in terv iew ed (b y  sector of intervention)
(* indicates informative interviews only)
ADVOCACY NGOs (24)
Name Person Met Function Location Date H our
1 Ad-Dhameer Association for Human Rights
Khalil Abu 
SHAMMALAH
Executive Director Gaza Gty 30.01.03 12.00
2 Palestinian Centre For Human Rights Jabr WISHAH Deputy D irector Gaza City 30.01.03 13.00
3 Palestinian Independent Commission for the Citizens’ Rights - Gaza Head Mazen SHAQURA
Director o f Gaza 
Branch Gaza City 01.02.03 10.00
4 Gaza Center for Law and Human Rights Amin DABOUR Director Gaza Gty 01.02.03 11.30
5 Democracy And Workers’ Rights Center -GAZA Nidhaal GHABAN
Head o f Training 
Unit Gaza Gty 01.02.03 15.00
6 Al-Mezan Center For Human Rights Issam YOUNIS Director Jabaaliya 02.02.03 11.30
7 Palestinian Association for Human Rights Khalil Az-ZEBN Director Gaza City 02.02.03 14.00
8 Al-Haq Sha'wan JABAARIN Head o f Legal Unit Ramallah 07.02.03 10.00
9 * MUWATTN George GIACAMAN D irector Ramallah 08.02.03 1200
10 Mandela Institute for Political 
Prisonners Khaled BATRAWI Board Member Ramallah 09.02.03 15.00
11 Palestinian Center for Peace -People-to- People Aysha ABU AWAD
Programme
Manager Ramallah 17.02.03 10.00
12 MA'i’l lN  Group Salwa DUAIBIS and Susan ROCKWELL Partners
R am allah 17.02.03 14.30
13 Democracy and Workers Rights Association Hassan BARGHOUTHI
General D irector Ramallah 22.02.03 10.00
14 AMAN — Coalition for Accountability 
and Integrity Dr. Azmi SHU’AIBI
Founder and 
Coordinator Ramallah 22.02.03 15.00
15 Ad-Dhameer Institute - West Bank Khaleeda JARRAAR Executive Director Ramallah 24.02.03 9.00
16 Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement George RISHMAWI Coordinator BeitSahour 20.01.04 9.30
17 Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre WI’AM Zoughbi ZOUGHBI Founding D irector
Bdt
Lahem 20.01.04 11.00
18 Palestinian Centre for Peace and Democracy Nassif MU'ALLEM D irector R a m a lla h 21.01.04 8.00
19 Ramallah Centre for Human Rights Studies [yaad BARGHOUTHI Director Sablus 22.02.04 9.00
20 [erusalem Centre for Legal Aid and Human Rights [ssam 'AROURI General M anager Ramallah 14.02.04 10.00
21 MIFTAH Dr. l i l y  FEIDY Vice-SecretaryGeneral [erusalem 16.02.04 1200
22 Civic Forum ArefJAFFAL executive Director [erusalem 17.02.04 10.00
23 MEND Lucy NUSSEEBEH Director [erusalem 18.02.04 10.00
24 Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Moah SALAMEH Director
Beit
Lahem 24.02.04 8.30
25 3ISAN Centre for Research and Development [zzat ABDUL-HADI General D irector Ramallah 28.02.04 1200
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HEALTH Sector (19)
N am e P erso n  M e t Function L o ca t io n D ate Hour
26 * Union O f Health Care Committees - 
Gaza Branch Dr. R a'eb  SABAH
Dir. o f G aza 
Branch G aza City 30.01.03 19.00
27 Union O f Health W ork  Committees Dr. Rabah M U H AN A & 
Dr. M ouna Al-FARRA
President & Health 
A ctivist G aza City 30.01.03 17.00
28 Medical R elie f and Development 
(UPMRC Gaza B ranch) A bdelhadi A bu K H O USA
1 lead  o f Gaza 
Branch G aza City 30.01.03 10.15
29 Union o f  Palestinian M edical R elief 
Committees HQ fack KH AN O
Head o f External 
ft elation
B eit
H anin ia 19.02.03
11.00
30 Gaza Com m unity M ental Health 
Programme Salah A B D E L SH A H D irector G aza City 02.02.03 13.00
31 Red Crescent Society fo r the Gaza Strip Dr. H aydar ABD EL 
SH A H
President G aza City 02.02.03 8.30
32 Health D evelopm ent In fo rm atio n  and 
Policy Institute
Dr. M ustafa 
BARG H O U TH I
D irector Ram allah 22.02.03 16.30
33 Union O f H ealth W ork Committees - 




34 Patient Friends Charitable Society Baasem  N ATSHEH Public Relations O fficer H ebton 10.02.04 1Z00
35 Ardh al-Itfal M oham ed M ahm oud JA B R Executive D irector H ebron 10 .0204 13.30
36 Farqumiah Charitable Society Izzo G H RA Y B Board M ember T aiqum ia 10 .0204 17.00
37 [hsan Charitable Society Iyaad SU RO U R Public Relations O fficer H ebron 11 .0204 11.15
38 Islamic Chariable Society - Hebron N izharSH E H A D E H General D irector H ebron 1 2 0 2 0 4 11.45
39 Palestinian Red C rescent Society - K halil Sam ih A B U ’A Y SH A  &  
H aroun JO ULAN I
President &  
Admin. D irector H ebron 1 2 0 2 0 4 9.45
40 Zakaat Com m ittee H ebron M ajeed N A SSR  Ed-D IIN Board M ember H ebron 1 2 0 2 0 4 13.00
41 JUZOUR Dina N A SSE R Executive D irector Jerusalem 16 .0 204 1030
42 Patients Friends Society Jerusalem C aroline JA ’BARI D irector Jerusalem 21 .0 204 10.00
43 * Bir Zeit U ni Public H ealth D epartm ent Rita G IACA M A N
Head o f 
Environmental 
H ealth U nit
Ram allah 25 .0 204 11.15
44 Maqassed Charitable H ospital Dr. K haled  QUREI'A G eneral H ospital D irector Jerusalem 2 6 .0 204 9.30
MIXED SECTOR (8)
N am e P erso n  Met Function L o ca t io n D ate H our
45 Family A ssociation o f  M ajdal Z akaria A l-B A L O U SH A Secretary General B e it Lahiya 01 .0203 18.00
46 Family A ssociation o f  Y afa K ham ees A l-BATTRAN Chairman o f North Gaza Branch Jabaaliya 01 .0203 20.00
47 Union o f  Charitable Societies M aajed 'A LO U SH Board M ember Jerusalem 28.01.03 11.00
48 Commission o f  N G O  Affairs K ham is R O K Deputy D irector G aza City 0 2 0 2 0 3 10.00
49 MOPIC - A id  Coordination Unit
Dr. E m ad  SH A’A TH  (& 
Y asser NA1TAR)
DG A id Coord (& 
DG. W . Europe) G aza City 03 .0203 8.30
50 PINGO N etw ork Rana B ISH A R A Coordinator Ramallah 22.01.04 10.00
51 *
Palestinian G eneral U nion  o f  Charitable 
Societies
N ora Q O R T Board M ember Jerusalem 23.01.04 9.00
52
Union o f  Charitable Societies - Hebron 
District
Sam ih A B U  'AYASH Vice-President H ebron 1 2 0 2 0 4 10.45
37 0
List o f International Organisations Interviewed (by type)
Non-Governmental Funding Bodies (20)
N am e P erso n  M e t Function L o ca tio n D ate H o u r
1 Norwegian People’s A id G udrun BERTINUSSEN ResidentRepresentative Gaza C ity 03.02.03 10.30
2 Islamic R elie f (U K ) Adel Q AD O UM Country D irector Gaza City 03.02.03 10.00




4 TAM KEEN (U SA id  
subcontractor)
M oham m ed Al-MBAID Chief o f  Party Ramallah 23.02.03 16.00
5 MAP U K Stuard SHEPHERD Field Co-ordinator Ramallah 21.02.03 14.15




7 W elfare A ssodation-PN G O  
project
Dr. R afiq HUSSETNT





8 World V ision Nasskn N O U R Operation D irector ferusalem 11.02.03 zoo








11 Save the Children U S ennifer MOREHEAD
M anager o f 
Information U nit
Ax-Ram 13.02.03 14.00




13 Oxfam GB Ton B E R G





14 Merlin — H ealth in  Crisis Natalie H O G G Project Coordinator Ramallah 10.02.03 12.00
15 Terre des H om m es Khalil M ARO U F CountryRepresentative Ar-Ram 10.0Z03 16.00
16 Diakoma
Christian LAGERLÔF 




17 Am erican D evelopm ent 
Foundation
Hanna W . T H E O D O R E Chief o f  Party erusalem 18.02.03 10.30












2 0 M ARAM  - H ealth USAID Dr. U m aiyeh 
vH A M M A SH
Chief o f  Party Ramallah 25.0Z 04 10.00
(Semi-)Governmental or Multilateral Funding Bodies (22)
N am e P e rso n  M e t Function L o ca tio n D a te Hour
21
USAid -  W est Bank and Gaza 
Mission
M artha M YERS
Civil Society Pro ject 
Manager
Jerusalem 11.02.03 9.00




23 Australian A id Iaw fiq  RA'AD
Program me M anager, 
AusAID
Ram allah 17.02.03 11.15
24 Austrian A id Leonhard M O L L
Country
Representative
Ram allah 20 .02.03 17.00
25 SIDA [Anne B R U 7.F .IJU S Consul Jerusalem 24.02.03 17.00
26 CIDA R a'idM A LK I D eputy H ead Ram allah 24.02.03 12.00
27 Swiss D evelopm ent and 
Cooperation
Fritz FRO E H LICH Deputy H ead Jerusalem 18.02.03 16.15
28
Dutch D evelopm ent 
Representative [cannette SE PPE N
D eputy H ead Jerusalem 11.02.03 17.45
29 Ireland Representative O ffice Ann M U RPH Y D eputy R epresentative Ramallah 17.02.03 12.40
30 Italian Cooperation M arco G RA Z IA  &  Maesa 
CRFAEYA
N G Os C onsultan t &  
Local H ealth  
Consultant
Jerusalem 21.02.03 930
31 Konrad A denauer Stiftung Dr. Canan ATTLGAN ResidentR epresentative
R am allah 21.02.03 11.15
32 Fredrich E bert Stiftung Felix E IK E N B E RG Project C oord inator Jerusalem 12.02.03 10.00
33 German Fund Andreas D E SC H I .F.R Consultant Jerusalem 13.02.03 12.30
34 Heinrich B oell Stiftung Hadil Q A Z Z A Z Program m e
Coordinator
R am allah 23.02.03 10.00
35 * OCHA Andrea R E CCH IA




I CRC Food E m ergency 
Programme
Gwyn LE W IS U VP M anager Jerusalem 16.02.04 1630
37 * EU Health D epartm ent Juan TE LLO H ealth E xpert * T ask M anager Jerusalem
17.02.04 15.00
38 EU ECHO • Alberto O G G ERO ECH O  E xpert Jerusalem 17.02.04 15.30
39 World BAN K Sima K A N A 'A N
D eputy H ead o f  
O ffice Jerusalem
18.02.04 15.00
40 UNDP M ounir K LEIBO
G overnance 
Program m e A nalyst
Jerusalem 19.02.04 830
41 FAFO H akram H A TTA LA H
People-to-People 
Program  C oord inator
Shu'fat 19.02.04 12.15
42 Norwegian Representative Office Hind K H O U R Y Program  A dviso r ¡Jerusalem 01.03.04 1200
372
............. .. -I i . i r i U . ^ . 1 1  f i -
J
Appen dix  II: Buildin g  Graphs
Methodology used for the graphs in Section 5.5.
Donors were asked questions related to civil society in general and then to the problem of 
civil society promotion in the case of Palestine.
The first set of questions served to define the Horizontal axis o f  the graphs. The following six 
variables (formulated as a continuum) were used to distinguish donors* views about civil
society in general.
Item # Description Coding Possibilities
1 Civil society is rather homogenous or is it instead multilayered? F+2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 .-2 1
2 Civil society is characterized by a plurality in numbers o f  
organisations or instead in types (or quality) o f organisations?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 , -1,-2]
3 Civil society is rather characterized by top-down decisions or 
instead by bottom-up forms o f participation?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
4 Civil society is rather static in its form and composition or is it 
instead evolving and changing with time?
Yes /No [+1,-1]
5 Civil society is expressed through a vocabulary denoting a 
managerial approach or instead by themes denoting a subtle 
quality work?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
6 Civil society is automatically benevolent or can it also be 
problematic?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
Various elements of interviews were used to code the donors’ answers. When one o f  the 
given issues was not sufficiently dealt w ith during the interviews, elements o f coding were 
taken out o f the donor’s presentation material and/or web presentation on their activities.
For each o f the six previous variables (representing the horizontal dimension of the graph), 
points were given ranging according to the possibilities described above. For example, if  a 
donor considered civil society to be homogenous a +2 was given. If it believed it was rather 
homogenous, then a +1 was attributed, a 0 in case of mixed answers, a —1 for the case where 
the donor believed civil society to be rather multilayered, and a  —2 if  s/he thought it is really 
multilayered. In the case of Yes/No possibility, only two coding possibilities were given (+1 
or —1).
The result for the six horizontal items were added to give an X  value, used to situate the 
donor on the graphs.
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As regards working with Palestinian NGOs and with civil society promotion in  the
Palestinian setting (Vertical axis), the variables used were found in  the following questions.
Item # Description Coding Possibilities
I Do donors consider the socio-economic conditions to be equal 
across the Territories or do their programmes have to be adapted 
to various zones?
Y es/N o [+1,-1]
II Do donors tend to impose the themes of the programmes or do 
they leave space for local partners to shape their own 
programmes?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 .-2 ]
III Do donors realize rather standard programmes (done in  other 
countries) or do they accept local modalities and/or adaptation 
to given programmes?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
IV Do donors tend to impose their ways o f working or do they 
work in a spirit o f true partnership with local NGO?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
V Do donors provide mostly short-term funding or do they allow 
for long-term funding?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
VI Do donors provide only large funding schemes or do they 
provide m ostly small grants?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
VII Do donors have tied funding or is it untied funding? Yes /No r+1, -H
VIII Do donors tend to impose normalization761 programmes 
independently of the circumstances or not?
[+ 2 ,1 ,0 ,-1 ,-2 ]
DC Do donors apply strict funding procedures or do they allow 
flexibility for local partners to re-direct some funding according 
to new emerging needs?
Yes /No [+1, -1]
X Do donors come up with ready-made emergency programmes or 
do they define them with local partners or according to local 
needs?
Yes-NA-No 
[+ 1,0 ;- l ] 762
The same remarks about coding and aggregation (as in the first set o f variables) apply for this 
vertical dimension o f  the graph.
761 Such as Peop le-to-People program m es o r in itiatives a im ing  at so lving the refugee questions w ithout tak ing  
the historical roots into consideration .
762 Since not all donors rea lize  em ergency p rogram m es, a  ‘0 ' was added in  the possib le  coding.
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Appen d ix  III: Subjective  Perception
Questionnaire used for the Section 7.5.3 (MEPS)
During the interviews, Palestinian NGO activists were asked to subjectively describe the 
evolution of the distance that exists between their organization and four sets o f actors:
- the PLO or PNA (after 1994); 
political party (or parties) 
local population or constituencies 
and international donors
Parti
From the first INTIFADA to the OSLO years
I f  the DISTANCE to these fo u r  partners where a t the current position a t the end o fth e fir s t  Intifada, w hat 
was the distance, in  y o u r  view, to each o f  these partners by, say 1998?
(^ ^ D O N O R ^ ^ )
PLO/PNA The
NGO
■ ^ ^ P A R T Y ^ ^ y
( ^ ^ S S E S ^ )
N ote: For example, if  the NGO felt that, over the period of time chosen (in this case the 
evolution between the first Intifada and 1998), it became closer to the local population 
(MASSES), then the person interviewed would put a cross (X) between ‘the NGO* and 
‘MASSES’, to symbolize the closer relationship. If the distance remained equal, no change 
was marked, but i f  the distance grew, the X was put further down the line to express the 




Ftom the OSLO yeats to the second In tifa d a
I f  the DISTANCE to these fou rpartn ers where a t the current position  towards the end o f the O sh y ea r s  
(1994-2000% what was the distance, in y o u r  view, to each o f  these partn ers by 2004?
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Appen dix  IV: Tech n ical Defin itio n s
Definitions of Levels of Country Income (See Section 5.1.4)
LICs: Low-Income Countries.
These are the countries whose per capita GNP amounts to less than $760 per year. 
MICs: Middle-Income Countries.
These are the countries whose per capita GNP ranges from $761 to $9,360.
They are subdivided into Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs - $761 to $3,030) 
and Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs - $3,031 to $9,360).
The Palestinian territories could be described as a lower-middle income country.
HICs: High-Income Countries
Such countries have a per capita GNP o f $9,361 and above.
Source: (OECD DAC 2003: 323)
It must be noted that the thresholds are adjusted on a regular basis. Thus in 1993, LICs were 
countries with a GNP per capita of $635 or less (World Bank 1995; viii).
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